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Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P.

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OR

A BRIEF COURSE OF THEOLOGY

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By the Right Reverend Father

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Introduction

This volume continues the translation of Jean-Baptiste Gonet's Manuale Thomistarum, taking up two treatises that sit at the heart of Gonet's own lifelong theological concerns: law, and grace. Readers of the earlier volumes will already know their author — the Béziers-born Dominican who held the chair of scholastic theology at Bordeaux for most of his working life, who was suspended from teaching for three years in 1660 after judging Pascal's Lettres provinciales free of Jansenist heresy, and who spent the last fourteen years of his life in Paris writing, above all, on moral theology and the theology of grace.

Treatise VI, on laws, follows the order Saint Thomas himself established in the Prima Secundae: law in common, first, then the eternal law, the natural law, and human law in its various species, before turning to the practical questions that most concern the working theologian — the interpretation of human laws through epikeia, dispensation from them, their abrogation, and finally the old and the new, or Evangelical, divine law. This is not merely abstract jurisprudence; it is the necessary preamble to the whole of moral theology, since law, for a Thomist, is the rule and measure by which human acts are judged good or evil in the first place.

Treatise VII, on grace, is considerably the larger of the two, and touches directly on the controversies that defined Gonet's career. He begins, characteristically, not with grace in the abstract but with its necessity — for the knowledge of truth, for willing and doing good, for the love of God, for keeping the natural law, for resisting temptation, for avoiding sin both mortal and venial, for final perseverance — before turning to grace's division, its essence, its causes, and its threefold effect: the adoption of man as a son of God, the justification of the sinner, and the merit of the just. This is the same ground on which the disputes over Baianism and Jansenism were fought throughout Gonet's lifetime, and his treatment here reflects the same Thomist balance he defended elsewhere: a nature genuinely capable of certain acts by its own power, and a grace that is nonetheless simply necessary for anything ordered to the supernatural end.

The volume closes with an Appendix to the treatise on grace, surveying the various errors of heretics on the subject: the Pelagian heresy first, in its origin and its chief tenets; then the Semipelagian heresy and those who held it; and finally the errors Gonet attributes to the Manicheans, the Lutherans, and the Calvinists concerning grace and free will. This closing survey is of a piece with the rest of Gonet's work translated so far — the same instinct that led him, in the Clypeus and in his moral theology alike, to locate

a controverted question historically before settling it doctrinally.

As throughout the Manuale, each thesis is stated plainly, defended by its chief reasons, and tested against the standard objections of adversaries, all distilled from the fuller apparatus of Gonet's Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae. It is in the hope of extending to English-language readers the same access to this stage of Gonet's synthesis — on law and on grace — that the present translation has been undertaken.

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Treatise VI

On Laws.

Since, according to the Apostle to the Romans 6, the knowledge of sin is had through the law, and sin itself is the transgression of the law, for a more perfect understanding of the treatise on sins we append a treatise on laws, in which we shall first treat of laws in common, then we shall expound its various species, namely the eternal law, the natural, the human and the divine, both the old and the new.

Chapter I

On law in common

§ I

On the existence and essence of law

We suppose the existence of law to be certain, and indeed the very nature of the intellectual creature insinuates its necessity, since it cannot be a rule of moral operations for itself, it necessarily needs some superior, by which it may be directed by a certain law and norm in its operations, lest it stray from the end for which it was created. For since its nature is defectible, and can turn away from the end of honesty to which it inclines, some law is necessary for it, which directs it by a certain norm to its end. Experience itself also demonstrates the necessity and usefulness of laws, for it is established that no commonwealth can stand without laws; whence laws are said to be as it were the foundations of the commonwealth, on which, resting, it stands, and as it were the bonds and cords by which, constrained, it perseveres firm and fixed in its good undertaking. Hence Cicero, in the oration for Cluentius, calls the laws the sinews and blood of the commonwealth, and says that just as our bodies cannot subsist without blood and sinews, so neither can the commonwealth without laws. And Aristotle, Rhetoric 3, asserts that the safety of the commonwealth is constituted in the laws.

Law consists essentially in an act of the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 90, art. 1, and he proves it: both because it belongs to law to prescribe and command, which pertains essentially to the intellect, as we showed in the treatise on human acts, treating of the act of command; and also because law is a certain rule in the measure of human acts: but to regulate and measure human acts pertains to reason, since it is the first principle of human acts, and in each genus that which is the principle is the measure and rule of that genus; just as unity, which is the principle of number, is the measure of all numbers, and the motion of the first heaven, which is first in the genus of motions, is the

measure of all motions of lower bodies.

Law, however, presuppositively and by connotation implies an act of the will, both because it is proper to law to move subjects to do something — but the intellect alone, without the will, cannot move; and also because law does not pertain to the speculative intellect, but to the practical: and the practical intellect presupposes an act of the will by which it is moved, and from which it participates in efficacy and power of moving. Law, therefore, consists essentially in an act of command, by which the Prince orders the subject to do something, by intimating or announcing it. Or rather, in something constituted by this act: for law is related to the intellect and its act as an idea is related to the intellect of the artificer and to art, for each is a measure, rule, and exemplar — the former of morals, the latter of things to be made through art. But the idea is the term produced in the intellect by means of art: therefore also law will be the term produced by means of command, and the practical word of it.

This is confirmed: law exists in the intellect of the Prince, not only subjectively, but also objectively, as a thing known in the one knowing; for while the Prince pronounces the law, he attends to it, he knows it: therefore it is not an act of the practical intellect, but rather the practical word itself, and the term of a practical conception, and of the command by which the Prince orders his subjects to do something.

Laws ought to be firm, stable, and permanent, and consequently in some way perpetual: for they are, as we said above, as it were the foundations on which the commonwealth rests, and as it were the sinews by which it subsists. Whence jurists establish this distinction between law and a precept made by a man, that a pure precept expires by the death of the one who prescribed it, but not law, which does not die with him, as the Abbot observed in the chapter Irrefragabili, on the office of the ordinary.

Laws ought to be made for the whole community, for in this too law differs from a precept, that a precept is imposed on one person, law on many: inasmuch as the former is ordered to the private direction of a part, the latter to the public governance of the commonwealth; whence law is an act of political or royal prudence, which per se, first, regards the good of the community. I add that law ought to be perpetual, as we just said: therefore it is not imposed on one private person, who is mortal, but on the community, which is perpetual, inasmuch as it endures through continuous succession.

From this it is inferred that it is of the nature of law that it be for the sake of the common good, and be useful for it, for the power of establishing laws is not given to men, whether by God or by the commonwealth, except for the sake of the common good. Whence Isidore, Etymologies book 5, says that law is written not for any private advantage, but

for the common utility of the citizens; according to that of the Twelve Tables: "Let the welfare of the people be the supreme law." I add that since law is subjected in the practical intellect, and is the rule of human acts, it ought to be regulated by the first principle of practice and of human acts: but the first principle in practical matters is the ultimate end and beatitude: therefore every law must be regulated by, and reduced to, the ultimate end or beatitude, which is the common good. Whence natural law is ordered to natural beatitude, which is a common good proportioned to it; but supernatural law to supernatural beatitude; civil law, however, orders men to the political beatitude of the city and kingdom, which is a good proportioned to it, and consists especially in the tranquility and peace of the commonwealth. Whence Plato, in Book 2 On Laws, says that laws are to be established for the sake of public peace.

Nor is it an objection that there are some laws which seem to regard a private good, such as the natural law of defending one's own life, and privilege, which regards the particular good of that person in whose favor it is granted. For it is one thing to speak of the proximate matter about which the law is concerned, another of the formal motive for which it is concerned with such matter; for since law is a rule of human acts, just as in human acts we distinguish those two things, so in law we ought to distinguish them. Natural law, therefore, of defending one's own life, regards the private good of the particular person as its proximate matter about which it is concerned; it has, however, the common good as its motive, which it regards per se and first, for since each man is a part of human nature, and a part is per se ordered to the whole, as the imperfect to the perfect, hence it happens that the good of each man in particular is per se ordered to the good of the whole of human nature: whence the author and preserver of the whole of nature, whose concern it is to regard such a good, therefore prescribes that each one preserve his own life, so that the good of the whole nature may be preserved, which cannot subsist except in individuals.

From this the answer is clear to what is added concerning privilege: for although it regards the private good of some person as proximate matter, this nevertheless redounds to the common good, that some are privileged, on account of things vigorously done in service of the commonwealth, so that others may be kindled to promote the common good through zealous and arduous works. I add that privilege, as we shall say below, does not properly have the nature of law.

From what has been said it is gathered, first, that the power of establishing laws pertains to the community or commonwealth, or to him who has care of it: because law (as has already been shown) is ordered first and principally to the common good: but to order something to the common good pertains to the community, or to him who has care of it;

because just as a part regards a particular good as its own proportioned end, so the whole community regards the common good: therefore, to grant civil laws pertains only to the community, or to him who is at its head, and has care of it.

It must be observed, however, that legislative power resides immediately and by the law of nature in the community, but in the King, or in whoever else has the power of making laws, only mediately, and by human law. For since the power of making civil laws cannot conveniently be exercised by the whole community through itself, it is wont to be transferred to one, who is the moral head of the community, and supreme Prince over all the rest, and monarchical government is instituted; or to a few and the best, if it is aristocratic; or among many and the common people, if it is democratic. The power, however, of making canons and ecclesiastical laws, residing in the Supreme Pontiffs and Councils lawfully assembled, was communicated to them not by the Church, but immediately by Christ, just as also the power of ruling the Church. Whence in the chapter Novit, on judgments, the Pontiff speaks thus of the Pontifical authority: "Since it rests not on a human constitution, but on a divine one; for our power is not from men, but from God."

It is gathered, second, that these three — precept, sentence, and privilege — do not have the true nature of law. For there is a threefold difference found between a simple precept and law. The first is that although a precept can be imposed on the whole community, this is not necessarily required, but it can be imposed on a particular person: law, however, always necessarily regards a community of persons. The second, a precept expires by the death or removal of the one imposing it, but law does not expire by the death of the legislator, since by its own nature it is perpetual. The third, a precept can be imposed by any superior whatsoever, but law can be enacted only by him who has legislative power from God or from the commonwealth.

Similarly a sentence differs from law: for law is the very ordinance of the superior, but a sentence is rather the application and execution of the law concerning a private person and event, than an imposition of law. Whence for pronouncing a sentence the supreme legislative power of the Prince is not required, but an inferior judge, through authority derived from him, can pronounce it, as is established from usage. And the reason is that just as in artificial matters, to dispose the form of a house pertains to the architect, but to apply it, by introducing it into some singular matter, hewing the wood and fitting the stones, pertains to the inferior craftsmen: so in moral matters it pertains to the Prince, who is the architectonic power of governance, to dispose the forms of laws for procuring the common good; but to apply them to singular cases and persons can pertain to particular judges.

Finally, law differs from privilege because law always regards a plurality of persons, and the common good of the commonwealth; privilege, however, can regard a particular person, and his particular good. Whence privilege, according to Isidore, Etymologies book 1, chapter 8, is called as it were a private law, or a law of private persons. Of which more below, when we treat of privileges.

You will ask first, whether promulgation is necessary and essential to law?

I respond that for law to oblige in second act, its promulgation is necessarily required; this is nevertheless not of the essence of law, or its formal reason, but only a condition necessarily required, that it actually oblige subjects.

The first part of this resolution is clear: for law is related by way of rule and measure of human acts, which men ought to follow, and to which they ought to conform their actions. But they cannot do this unless the law becomes known to them, since the will cannot be borne toward the unknown; nor can the law become known to them except through promulgation: therefore, for law to oblige, its promulgation is necessarily required. Not, however, equally in all laws, but diversely according to the nature of each; for positive divine law does not need such solemn promulgation as human law, for sometimes divine law is promulgated by internal revelation alone, as happened to many Prophets; but human law must always be promulgated through external signs, with some solemnity, and thus usage has obtained both in the secular commonwealth and in the ecclesiastical. The reason for this difference is that since God, the founder of the divine law, is the supreme lord simply and in every way, He can intimate His law in whatever way He wills, and oblige to its observance: but man, who does not have such supreme lordship, cannot do this, but since he acts as it were a twofold person, namely public and private, the Prince ought to propose the law in such a way that from the manner of proposing it he signifies that he proposes it as a Prince establishing a law, and not as a private person, which does not happen except by employing some public solemnity signifying this.

You will say, promulgation is not required for the revocation of a law: therefore neither for its institution. I respond by denying the antecedent, for as long as a law is not revoked by solemn promulgation, it is judged morally to persevere with its first and legitimate promulgation, and consequently to oblige in second act: just as while the value of a coin is not revoked by a solemn revocation, intimated to the subjects, it is judged, morally speaking, to remain, as is established from usage.

The second part, which asserts that promulgation is not of the essence of law, is St. Thomas's, here q. 90, art. 4, where he says that promulgation is the application of the law

to those who are obliged by it: but the application of some thing presupposes the thing already constituted in its formal nature: therefore promulgation presupposes the essence and formal nature of law already constituted, and consequently does not constitute it. Reason also persuades this, for for the essence and nature of law it suffices that it have aptitude for obliging; because things are defined, as the Philosophers teach, by aptitude and first act, and not by exercise and second act, which sometimes is and sometimes is not: but law not yet promulgated is apt to induce an obligation, although it does not actually induce it, until it is promulgated: therefore it has the true promulgation of law, although promulgation is a condition required for it to actually oblige. It is not, however, a purely accidental condition, and merely extrinsic, like the approach of an agent to a patient, but intrinsic and essential, since it is required by way of a proposal of the object to the will, which, since it is a rational appetite, that is, one following the guidance of reason, and the cognition of the intellect, cannot be borne toward the unknown. It does not suffice, however, for human law to oblige in second act, that it become known and applied to men through any notice whatsoever (to meet a tacit objection), but it must be applied to them through a notice proportioned to human law, which is only had when the Prince has it intimated and promulgated with some solemnity, as is established from what has been said above.

You will ask second, whether it is of the nature of law that it be committed to writing?

I respond that it is not, as is established, first, from Aristotle, Ethics 10, last chapter, where he says thus: "Whether laws are written or unwritten seems to make no difference." Second, from civil law, Institutes, on natural, of nations, and civil law, § "But also that which is constituted," where it is said thus: "Whatever the emperor constitutes by letter, or having taken cognizance decreed, it is established to be law." Here he distinguishes a decree from writing, and affirms both to be law. Nevertheless, for the better being [of law], and so that the fitting order of establishing law be observed, it is fitting that it be committed to writing; because since by its own nature it is stable, immovable, and perpetual, it connaturally requires that mode for its consistency, by which its immobility and perpetuity may be better preserved, and more tenaciously and firmly fixed in the memory of men; and this mode is writing, as will be said below. Whence St. Thomas here, art. 4, says that promulgation extends to the future through the firmness of writing, by which it in a certain way always promulgates the law.

From these things you will understand that law is rightly defined or described by St. Thomas there thus: "Law is a certain ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community." For as we showed above, law essentially consists in an act of the intellect, regards the common good, and must be

enacted by him who has care of the community. He adds, however, that it is promulgated by him, because although promulgation is not of the essence of law, as we said above, it is nevertheless an intrinsic mode of it, as obliging in second act. For into the definition of something can enter not only that which is related to it as its formal reason, but also that which is related to it as a mode or intrinsic condition; thus in the definition of faith, obscurity enters, and in the definition of the object of the will, apprehension of the intellect.

§ II

What is the division of law?

Law is generally divided into divine and human. Divine law is that which has force immediately from God's authority, although its promulgation may not have been made by God immediately, but through the intervention of an Angel or a man. Of this kind was the old law, delivered by God to Moses through Angels, and promulgated by him, and the Evangelical law, given by Christ, and published partly by Himself, partly by the Apostles. Human law is that which is enacted immediately by human authority, although received from God. The first legislator among men was Moses among the Hebrews, Phoroneus among the Greeks, Trismegistus among the Egyptians, Solon among the Athenians, Lycurgus among the Lacedaemonians, and Numa Pompilius among the Romans.

Divine law is subdivided into eternal, natural, and positive, according as the law of God is regarded either as conceived from eternity, or as impressed on the intellect of each man, or as manifested through public promulgation. Positive divine law is divided into the old and the new. The first is that which God gave to Moses, through the ministry of Angels, on Mount Sinai, and through Moses to the people of Israel. The second is that which Christ brought, the author of the new testament, and promulgated partly through Himself, partly through the Apostles. But just as the old contained precepts of a threefold kind, namely moral, ceremonial, and judicial, so the new also embraces threefold precepts, namely of faith, of the sacraments, and of morals, as we shall more fully expound below when we discuss the new law.

Human law is subdivided into ecclesiastical and civil. The former is enacted by ecclesiastical power, as of the Pope and Councils; the latter by secular power, as of Kings and Emperors. The first is called Canon law, the other Civil law.

The body of Canon law is divided into the Decree and the Decretals. The collector and arranger of the Decree is Gratian, a monk of the Order of St. Benedict, who, after the old

collectors of Canons and decrees, wove and composed that immense work, partly from the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, partly from the Canons of Councils, partly from the sayings and opinions of the holy Fathers of the Church. This body was corrected and published under the authority of Gregory XIII, Supreme Pontiff.

The Decree is divided into three parts. The first part contains a hundred and one distinctions, in which is treated of divine and human law, and of those things which pertain to the ordering of morals, and to ecclesiastical discipline. The second contains thirty-six causes, and each cause is distributed into various questions. In the thirty-sixth cause is inserted the Treatise on penance, which is completed in five distinctions. The third part, finally, of the Decree, which treats of consecration, comprises five distinctions.

As for the Decretals, by which name are properly signified the rescripts or letters of the Supreme Pontiffs, sent in response to the petitions or reports of those requesting them, these were collected under the authority of Gregory IX, Supreme Pontiff, by St. Raymond, of the Order of Preachers, his chaplain and Penitentiary, and divided into five books. Whenever the Decretals are cited simply, the Gregorian ones are understood by excellence.

To these five books of the Decretals of Gregory was added another book of Decretals by Boniface VIII, Supreme Pontiff, which book he therefore wished to be called the sixth. This volume of Boniface comprises five books.

There are also other constitutions or decretals, which have Clement V as their author. They were, however, edited and published by his successor John XXII, and are wont to be called the Clementines, and are divided into five books.

To the Clementines were added by the same Pope John twenty constitutions, which are called the Extravagantes, as if wandering and straying outside the aforesaid books of decretals.

Finally, there are other constitutions issued by various Roman Pontiffs, which are entitled the Extravagantes communes, and comprise five books.

Gratian, from distinction 14 up to 25, assigns six principles or sources, from which the whole of Canon law is drawn or derived, namely Sacred Scripture, the Traditions, which were promulgated by the Apostles as heralds of the Gospel; the Canons of the Apostles, which do not have as great authority as the Traditions; the Decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, and of general Councils; particular Councils, confirmed by the approval of the Supreme Pontiff, and the decretal Letters of the Supreme Pontiffs.

The order and division of the books of civil law, collected by the Emperor Justinian, is of this kind: Justinian, when he observed that Roman law, which is called civil by excellence, had grown into an immense and confused mass, determined to enclose it within certain and shorter bounds. Before his time there were three Codices, which contained the laws and Constitutions of earlier Emperors — the Gregorian, the Hermogenian, and the Theodosian — from which he composed one, which he named after himself. Having completed the Code, Justinian turned his mind to the volumes of the ancient Jurisconsults, whose almost infinite multitude, scattered through two thousand books, he compressed and arranged into fifty books, which are therefore called the books of the Digest, or by another name, the Pandects, from the Greek words meaning "I receive everything," that is, "I contain the whole," because it contains the whole science of ancient jurisprudence. Then, so that young men eager for the laws might have an easy and simple way by which they could progress to the fullest knowledge of the law, Justinian had four books of the Institutes composed, that they might be the elements and principles of the whole law. But since the earlier Code seemed to lack many things, Justinian published another, more accurate and corrected, which he called the Code of the second reading; and this is the Code which we have, and which we use. Finally, the same Emperor gathered into one book various constitutions, which he afterward promulgated during his reign, and these constitutions we call sometimes the Novellae, sometimes the Authentics. Therefore the whole of civil law consists of, and is composed of, the Code, which is completed in twelve books, and the fifty books of the Digest, or Pandects, four books of the Institutes, and one book of the Novellae.

§ III

The offices, effect, and acts of law

There are two principal offices of law, namely to direct, and to oblige, for since it has the nature of a rule and measure of human acts, it is directive of men, and shows them what they ought to do or omit, wherefore it is called light. Proverbs 6: "The commandment is a lamp, and the law is light." But since it has emanated from a superior, and contains his will, it has the force of obliging. Whence law is named from binding, because, as St. Thomas says here, art. 4, subjects are obliged by it to observe it, or (as Cassiodorus says) because it binds our minds, and holds them subject to what is established.

The principal effect of law is to render men good, either simply, or in a qualified sense. For divine law, especially the Evangelical, intends that man become simply good, not only in exterior work, but also in interior mind. Natural law, that he become good by the moral virtues, which are commensurate with nature. Civil law, that he become a good

citizen, and do those things which are necessary for the peace of the commonwealth. Ecclesiastical law, that he become a good cleric, who fulfills his office.

There are four acts of law, namely to command, and to forbid, to permit, and to punish. For human acts are either of the genus of good, or of the genus of evil, or indifferent by genus or object: the first are commanded, the second are forbidden, the third are permitted. And because law could not efficaciously forbid other acts, unless it could withdraw men from evil by fear of punishments, a fourth act is posited, which is punishment.

Chapter II

On the eternal law

The eternal law is the plan of divine wisdom existing in God from eternity, insofar as it is directive of all acts and motions of individual creatures in order to the common good of the whole universe. Thus St. Thomas here q. 93, art. 1, where he discourses thus: "Just as the plan of things to be made through art is called art or the exemplar of artificial things, so too the plan of the governor's act regarding his subjects obtains the nature of law, the other things being preserved which we said above are of the essence of law: but God, through His wisdom, is the founder of all things, to which He is compared as an artificer to artifacts: and He is the governor of all acts and motions found in individual creatures. Whence just as the plan of divine wisdom, insofar as through it all things are created, has the nature of art and exemplar, or idea, so the plan of divine wisdom, moving all things to their due end, obtains the nature of law. And thus the eternal law is nothing other than the plan of divine wisdom, insofar as it is directive of all acts and motions of individual creatures." Or as St. Augustine says, Book 1, On Free Will: "The eternal law is the plan existing in the mind of God, by which all things, through fitting means, are ordered and directed to their ends."

From this it is gathered, first, that the eternal law differs in many ways from an idea. For an idea regards a thing as creatable, the eternal law as governable. An idea is related by way of that which determines God to the specification of the work on the part of the object; law, however, by way of that which obliges to the execution of the work. Ideas in God are multiplied, because they express a relation to diverse creatures, according to their proper and distinct natures and quiddities; but the eternal law is unique, because it regards the actions and motions of all creatures under one common notion, namely inasmuch as they are ordered to the common good of the universe.

It is gathered, second, that the eternal law differs from providence; for the former per se, first, regards the common good of the universe, but the latter the particular good of each single creature. The former expresses in its notion a binding force, but not the latter. Likewise the eternal law in God hands down general rules of governance, e.g. that a stone be inclined downward, fire upward; but providence disposes according to those rules the motions of creatures in particular, and therefore providence has the eternal law as its principle.

It is gathered, third, that all laws are derived from the eternal, and flow from it as from a source: both because the first in any genus is the cause and measure of the rest; and also because in all ordered movers, the power of the second mover is derived from the first, whence since the eternal law is the plan of governance in the supreme governor, it is necessary that all the plans of governance which are in inferior governors be derived from the eternal law. Yet not all laws flow from the eternal in the same way, for the divine flow from it immediately, the natural through the medium of the light of reason, the human through the medium of power, communicated to Princes either by God immediately, or through the consent of the commonwealth.

It is gathered, fourth, that since the eternal law is directive of all the acts and motions of individual creatures, all the operations of creatures, whether rational or irrational, are subject to it — with this difference, however, that the actions of rational creatures are subjected to the eternal law as commanding and obliging, but the actions by which insensible creatures, devoid of reason, are directed to their ends, are not subjected to the eternal law as formally commanding and obliging, because they are not capable of obedience and obligation, but as ordaining and moving them to their ends.

It is gathered, fifth, that the eternal law is truly and properly law, since it is an ordinance of reason for the common good by him who has care of the community, in which the notion of law essentially consists, as is established from its definition handed down in the preceding chapter. Nor is it an obstacle that it was not promulgated from eternity, since from eternity there were no creatures to whom it could be promulgated. For promulgation is only an intrinsic condition, that law oblige in second act, but not that it have the nature of law, and be obligatory in first act, as was shown in the preceding chapter.

It seems more probable, however, that although the eternal law, with respect to rational creatures, to whom it is notified in an intelligible manner, exercises the nature and function of a true law; nevertheless with respect to irrational creatures, to whom it is notified and promulgated not in an intelligible manner, but through the impression of

an inclination and active principle, by which they are moved to their ends, it cannot exercise the nature and function of a true and proper law, but only of a certain providence, or principle of governance. Whence St. Thomas here q. 90, art. 1, says that law properly so called is the measure of human acts, and consequently does not seem to admit the nature of a true and strict law with respect to irrational creatures.

Chapter III

On the natural law

§ I

What is natural law?

Natural law is a certain dictate of natural reason, instilled in us by nature or by the author of nature, not only showing good and evil, but also commanding.

The first part is clear: for law consists essentially in an act of the intellect, or dictate of reason, as we showed in chapter 1: whence natural law must consist in a judgment or dictate of natural reason, and instilled in us by nature or the author of nature, according to that of the Apostle: "We have the law written in our hearts." Whence Augustine, Book 2 On the Sermon on the Mount, chapter 9: "There is no soul capable of reasoning in whose conscience God does not speak. For who writes the natural law in the hearts of men, but God?" And Ambrose, Book 9, Letter 71: "That law is not written, but is innate; nor is it perceived by any reading, but is expressed in each by a certain flowing natural source."

The second part, namely that such a dictate is not only indicative of good and evil, but also preceptive, is established from what was said in chapter 1, where we showed that law consists essentially in an act of command, since it belongs to law to prescribe or command, and this is an act of prudence, which is preceptive.

This is confirmed: the natural law is nothing other than the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature, as St. Thomas teaches here q. 91, art. 2, and as will be established from what is to be said below: therefore it does not consist in a dictate and judgment only indicative of good and evil, but also preceptive. The consequence is clear, because the eternal law, as such, is preceptive: therefore that which participates in it by way of law, participates essentially in the power of commanding.

From this it is gathered, first, that these three, which could otherwise be thought the same, must be distinguished: the law of nature, conscience, and synderesis. For the law of nature is the very ordinance of the divine will, impressed on us. Synderesis is the natural

light itself of the intellect, by which we naturally know that very ordinance of God. Conscience, however, is the very act of the mind, by which we formally know it, or the practical judgment, by which we apprehend, or judge, something to be done. I add that conscience concerns some particular actionable thing, but the law of nature is a universal rule of things to be done and avoided in common. Conscience concerns future, present, and already-done things; the law of nature disposes only of future things, nor does it regard things already done. Finally, conscience can be erroneous, but it is repugnant to reason that true law be erroneous.

It is gathered, second, that the natural law is as it were a certain part of the eternal law; for the eternal law extends itself to all creatures, both rational and irrational, just as does divine providence, but the natural law extends only to the rational creature, that is, to all men and Angels. Hence natural law does not properly reside in brute animals, because although they have from the Author of nature an inclination to those things which naturally suit them, this inclination is not related by way of a certain direction and precept, as in man, but by way of a certain impression, inasmuch, namely, as God impresses in them intrinsic principles of acting in conformity with their nature, which impression ought to be called rather natural instinct, than law of nature.

It is gathered, third, that the natural law is in itself simply one, because although the precepts of the law of nature are many, they are all nevertheless connected in the ultimate end of human nature, to which they are ordered; and are radically contained in that first and most universal principle, "Good is to be done and evil is to be avoided," which is one: whence from the unity of the end, and of the radical and first principle, the natural law itself is said to be simply one.

§ II

What things pertain to the law of nature?

To the law of nature belong, in the first place, those most well-known and most universal practical principles, naturally known to everyone: "Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided." "What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another." These are not so much to be called precepts, as the principles of all precepts.

Second, to the same law belong all the precepts of the Decalogue, for these are inferred from those two principles by the natural light, as is established regarding the worship of God, the honoring of parents, the not committing homicide, theft, and adultery, and other things, which are not good because they are commanded, and evil because forbidden; but on the contrary they are commanded because good, and forbidden

because evil, and naturally befitting. There must be excepted, however, the precept of observing the sabbath, which has something of positive divine law, and something of natural law. For insofar as it commands the worship of God, it is of the law of nature, since indeed nature teaches and dictates that God, on account of His supreme excellence, and on account of the benefits conferred, ought to be worshipped. But insofar as it prescribes a certain day rather than another, it is of positive divine law; for nature does not prescribe this day, but God alone expressly prescribed it to be observed by Adam and Eve, because, as Scripture says, from creation, or from all the work which He had accomplished, He rested on the seventh day; and thus it was only by the abrogation of the old law, of the ancient by the Evangelical, in which the Lord's day, consecrated by the resurrection of Christ, succeeded to be observed by us instead of the Sabbath.

Third, all the acts of the moral virtues are of the law of nature, if regarded according to their generic nature, or insofar as they are virtuous; but not if considered according to themselves and in their proper species. Thus St. Thomas teaches here q. 94, art. 3, where he demonstrates the first part by this reason: "To the law of nature belongs everything to which man is inclined according to his nature; but each thing is naturally inclined to the operation befitting it according to its form, as fire to heating; whence since the rational soul is the proper form of man, a natural inclination is present in every man to this, that he act according to reason, and this is to act according to virtue; whence according to this all the acts of the virtues are of the law of nature, for this is naturally dictated to each by his own reason, that he act virtuously."

The second part he proves from this, that many things according to virtue are things to which nature does not primarily incline, but which men have discovered through the inquiry of reason as useful for living well, as is clear in the acts of commutative justice, which are exercised in buying, selling, and other human contracts.

Both parts can be declared by this example: the act of temperance, e.g., according to its generic nature, or by its genus, that is, insofar as it is a virtuous act, is such that nature inclines toward it, and thus is said to pertain to the law of nature: but that it ought to be exercised through abstinence from meats, and through the Lenten fast, this is not from the natural law, but from the positive, and depends on the will and precept of the Church.

You will say: not all sins are against nature: therefore not all acts of the moral virtues pertain to the law of nature.

I respond that although not all sins are against animal nature, or that common to all animals, in the way in which the intercourse of males is said to be against nature, all sins

are nevertheless against rational nature, that is, against reason, which is the nature of man. That this may be better perceived: it must be observed that in the nature of man three grades are distinguished, of the living, of the animal, and of the rational: if it is regarded according to the grade of the living, killing oneself is said to be a sin against nature, because each one, insofar as he is living, is bound to preserve his life, according to that of Cicero, Book 1 of the Offices: "In the beginning, it has been granted by nature to every kind of living creature, that it should watch over itself, its life, and its body." If it is considered according to the grade of the animal, unspeakable sins of the flesh, such as sodomy, bestiality, and self-abuse, are said to be against nature, because they conflict with the natural inclination present in all animals. Finally, if the nature of man is regarded according to the rational grade, and the proper difference by which it is distinguished from brute animals, all sins are said to conflict with the nature of man, because all are contrary to reason, which is the nature of man, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 71, art. 2. Nevertheless, by antonomasia, the two former genera of sins are said to conflict with nature, because it is a most abominable thing to commit that from which brute animals themselves, and indeed all living things, shrink.

§ III

Whether the natural law can undergo change, dispensation, or interpretation?

I say, first, that the natural law cannot undergo change properly so called, but only improper change, or change on the part of the matter.

The first part is proved: change of law properly so called occurs then, when the law itself is changed in itself, either because it ceases in itself, as when it was enacted for a time, or when from just it becomes unjust, or because it is abrogated by a superior, or is restricted by him through dispensation: but in none of these ways can the law of nature undergo change; for it cannot cease through itself, because it was not enacted for a time, but without a term. Nor can it become unjust from just, since it commands nothing which is not intrinsically and by the nature of the thing good, forbids nothing which is not intrinsically evil, for it does not make good or evil, but shows it. It cannot even be abrogated by God, because God cannot fail to command, or fail to forbid, those things which are necessary or unlawful by natural law. Whence Cicero, in Lactantius, Divine Institutes, book 1, chapter 8: "There is one true law, right reason, agreeable to nature, diffused among all, constant, everlasting, which calls to duty by commanding, deters from fraud by forbidding. To this law it is neither permitted to propose any amendment, nor is anything allowed to be derogated from it, nor can it be wholly abrogated. Nor indeed can we be released from this law by the senate or by the people;

nor is any other expounder or interpreter of it to be sought. There will not be one law at Rome, another at Athens, one now, another hereafter; but one law and everlasting and unchangeable will bind all nations and at all times." Finally, dispensation cannot fall upon it, as we shall say in the following conclusion: therefore it cannot undergo change properly so called. Whence Gratian, distinction 5, chapter 1: "The natural," he says, "is that which holds the primacy among all things, both in time and in dignity, for it began from the origin of the rational creature, nor is it varied by time, but always remains immutable."

That improper change, however, on the part of the matter, can fall upon the natural law, is manifest; for the matter about which the law of nature is concerned is not always disposed in the same way, but is sometimes varied on account of certain occurring circumstances; from which it happens that what was of the law of nature, afterward is not of the law of nature: e.g. it is of the law of nature that a deposit should be returned, when the thing constituted in deposit is not sought to the harm of someone; but because it can happen that it is sought for someone's destruction, then the matter of the law of deposit is changed, and consequently the law concerning the returning of a debt is changed improperly; for before it dictated that the deposit should be returned, namely when this circumstance was not considered, but afterward it dictates the contrary by reason of such a circumstance. Nevertheless the reason of the natural law always remains unchanged; for it only dictates that the deposit is to be returned, the due circumstances being preserved, and consequently provided that what is sought does not turn to the detriment of someone, and not otherwise: but this is never varied, nor can it be varied, since it is intrinsically good, just as to worship God, and to honor parents.

I say, second, that no power, either human or divine, can properly dispense in the natural law, by relaxing the obligation, the matter of the precept remaining unchanged; but it can, improperly, by changing the matter from which the obligation of the law proximately arose.

The first part is proved: dispensation in the law of nature can be understood only in two ways: first, with that remaining unlawful and dishonest, and dissonant with rational nature, in which one is dispensed, e.g. a lie, or adultery: second, in such a way that through the dispensation the act ceases to be unlawful and dishonest, and dissonant with rational nature: but dispensation in the law of nature can occur in neither way: therefore it is repugnant that any human or divine power, properly and directly, dispense in the law of nature. The major is clear; the minor also seems manifest as to the first part, for if God were to dispense in this way in the natural law, so that man might elicit some act which, notwithstanding the dispensation, remained unlawful, dishonest, and dissonant

with rational nature, He would be dispensing him to sin, and to elicit an intrinsically evil act, which is repugnant to His infinite sanctity. It is proved, however, as to the second part: the negative precepts of the natural law forbid only actions in themselves intrinsically and by their own nature evil, and dissonant with rational nature, such as lying, stealing, committing adultery, giving false testimony, etc. But a thing per se and intrinsically evil cannot but be evil, because the essences of things are invariable: therefore dispensation cannot bring it about that it not be evil, so as to take away from it its natural malice.

What we have said of the negative precepts of the law of nature must be said, with due proportion, of the affirmative; for the affirmative precepts of the law of nature oblige only on those occasions on which the omission of the commanded act would be intrinsically and thoroughly evil: therefore this omission cannot but be evil, and it cannot happen that through dispensation malice be taken away from it, so that the act opposed to that omission be no longer morally necessary.

The second part of the conclusion, which asserts that one can be dispensed improperly in those things which are of the law of nature, by changing, namely, the matter from which the obligation of law arose, is clear in the dispensation of vows, which are of the law of nature, and yet through Ecclesiastical power one is dispensed in them improperly, inasmuch as, by the authority of the superior dispensing, it comes about that what was contained under the vow, is no longer contained, insofar as it is determined in this case that this is not a fitting matter of the vow, as St. Thomas says, II-II, q. 88, art. 10, ad 2. The same will more fully appear from what is to be said below.

I say, third, that the natural law not infrequently needs declaration and interpretation. For since not all precepts of the law of nature are equally known, and equally easy of understanding, some of them need some declaration and interpretation, in order that their true sense may be had. For example, the natural law which commands that a secret be kept needs some interpretation, since it does not oblige in every case, namely in that case in which the keeping of the secret would harm the commonwealth. Similarly in the natural law forbidding homicide, it must be explained that this is not to be understood of one killing with moderation of blameless self-defense, or for another just cause; and in the natural law commanding that another's property be restored, it must be understood, if it can be done without danger of life, or of starvation, which is a greater good; or without harm to the owner or another; for instance, if a madman should demand back his sword to kill someone, or a spendthrift his money to squander it.

You will ask whether Epikeia has a place in the natural law? I respond negatively: for Epikeia is the interpretation of the mind of the legislator, when it cannot be had expressly from him; whence if he himself, being present, should explain his own mind, such an expression of mind made by the legislator would not be Epikeia. But in the natural law there is no need of this interpretation, since reason itself, the legislatrix, which enacted and dictated the law, e.g. that a deposit be restored, dictates that it is not to be restored, when it is sought for the harm of someone: therefore in the natural law Epikeia has no place.

You will object first against the first conclusion: law is truly and properly changed through derogation: but the natural law can be derogated: therefore it can be truly and properly changed. The major is established; the minor is proved. By civil laws the natural law is derogated, as is established in the laws of usucapion and prescription, which take from the true owner what is his, and transfer it to the owner by usucapion; and yet it is of the law and of natural law that no one be despoiled of his own goods by another: therefore the natural law can be derogated by the positive.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor, for by the laws of usucapion and prescription there is not properly derogated the natural law commanding that no one be despoiled of his own goods by another, but only a change is made in the matter previously subject to the law. For the natural law only forbids that another's property be retained, the owner being reasonably unwilling: but when through the laws of usucapion and prescription the ownership of prescribed goods is transferred, the owner is not reasonably unwilling; because indeed those laws are instituted for guarding and preserving the common good, namely lest the ownership of things remain long uncertain, and lest lawsuits become interminable, and be multiplied beyond number.

You will object second, against the second conclusion: homicide, theft, fornication, polygamy, and the dissolution of marriage are repugnant to the law and right of nature: but God can dispense in all these, indeed and has in fact dispensed: therefore He can dispense in the law and right of nature. The major is established; the minor is declared by various examples taken from Scripture. For God dispensed with Abraham that he might slay and immolate his son, Genesis 22. Likewise with the Israelites, that they might despoil Egypt, and take with them the golden and silver vessels which they had received on loan from the Egyptians, Exodus 12. He also commanded the Prophet Hosea to take to himself a fornicating wife, and to raise from her children of fornication, Hosea 1. Finally He dispensed with the Jews, that they might have several wives, and permitted them to divorce their wives by a bill of divorce, and to marry others, as appears from Genesis, Exodus, and Deuteronomy.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor, and to its proof I say that God, in the aforesaid cases, did not properly dispense in the law and right of nature, but only improperly, by changing the matter, and thereby withdrawing it, through the change, from the natural law. For in the first example, as the supreme lord of the life and death of all, He gave Abraham a right over the life of an innocent, or willed to use him as it were as minister and executor: but the natural law does not forbid the killing of the innocent in such a case.

In the second, as supreme lord of all goods, having in His hand the dominion of creatures, He transferred the dominion of the Egyptians to the Israelites, or, as supreme judge, punished the Egyptians with this penalty, on account of the cruelty committed against the Israelites, and the sacrilegious use of those vessels, which they had applied to the worship of idols, as Augustine noted, Book 12 against Faustus, chapter 7. Or finally He rendered to the Israelites the wages of their labors, of which they had been defrauded by the Egyptians, as Scripture says, Wisdom 10.

In the third case, God, as supreme lord of bodies, able to effect through Himself what male and female effect through mutual legitimate consent, as regards the surrender of bodies, gave that adulteress Hosea as wife, before he approached her, on account of the mystery which was then represented in that deed, inasmuch, namely, as God Himself was to assume human nature in a bride, which through the sin of our first parents, and countless other sins, had shamefully prostituted herself, and had rendered herself like an infamous harlot. Others, however, think that a true and legitimate marital consent intervened between Hosea and that woman, before the carnal union, because (they say) consent is the cause of the formal essence of marriage, which cannot be supplied by God. Nor is it an obstacle that such a woman is called a fornicatress in Scripture; for she is so called not because she was then a harlot, but because she had previously been such; for it is not unusual in Scripture for things sometimes to retain the denomination of what they previously were. For Eve, after her formation from Adam, is called by Adam, Genesis 2: "This now is bone of my bones," because before her formation she was such. And the serpent produced by Moses from his rod does not cease still to be called a rod, Exodus 7: "The rod of Aaron devoured their rods." In the same way the woman given to Hosea is called a fornicatress, because before her marriage with Hosea she was such: but the sons begotten from that marriage, on account of the reproach of their mother, are called children of fornications.

In the fourth case, which contains two parts, one concerning polygamy, the other concerning the dismissal of a wife by a bill of divorce, it must be said that God, as author of nature, to whom the rights of marriage, in order to the propagation of nature, and the

common good of the whole species, are subject, and as supreme lord of bodies, divided the dominion of bodies from one wife into several, when He permitted the Jews to have several wives, and made void the bond of the prior marriage, when He granted them to dismiss their wives by a bill of divorce. Whence in both cases there was only a change of matter, not, however, a strict dispensation in the natural law; because the natural law never obliged that marriage of one with several not take place, God so disposing concerning the right and contract of marriage. Similarly the law of nature only forbids the repudiation of wives, so long as the marriage remains undissolved; but once the bond of marriage is dissolved, it does not forbid that the spouses be able to pass to other marriages.

§ IV

Whether invincible ignorance of the natural law, or of the precepts of the law of nature, can be given?

For the resolution of this celebrated difficulty, it must be observed that the precepts of the natural law can be reduced to three classes or three genera. The first are the most universal, which (as we said above) are not so much to be called precepts, as the principles of all precepts. Of this kind are these: "Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided." "What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another." "God is to be worshipped." "Parents are to be honored." Others are those which are deduced from these by an easy discourse, such as the precepts of not stealing, not fornicating, not lying, and the like. Finally, others are those which are deduced from the first only by a long and difficult discourse, such as are the precepts which forbid certain contracts, which are in reality usurious or simoniacal, but do not evidently appear as such, but concerning this there is difficulty and controversy among the Doctors, some affirming, others denying. This premised, for the resolution of the proposed difficulty.

I say, invincible and inculpable ignorance cannot be given concerning the natural precepts of the first and second genus, but can indeed concerning those which are of the third class.

The first and second parts of this conclusion are expressly taught by St. Thomas here q. 94, art. 6, where he discourses thus: "To the natural law belong, first, certain most common principles which are known to all, but certain secondary precepts more proper, which are as it were conclusions close to the principles. As to those common principles, therefore, the natural law cannot be blotted out from the hearts of men in the universal; it is, however, blotted out in a particular case of action, according as reason is impeded from applying the common principle to the particular action, on account of

concupiscence, or some other passion. As to the other secondary precepts, however, the natural law can be blotted out from the hearts of men, either through bad persuasions (in the same way that also errors occur in speculative matters concerning necessary conclusions), or also on account of depraved customs and corrupt habits; just as among some, thefts were not reputed sins, or even vices against nature, as the Apostle says to the Romans, chapter 1."

From these the first two parts of our conclusion remain proved. For the first and most universal precepts of the law of nature are most well known to everyone, since they are the first principles of synderesis: whence Augustine, in his address 25 on Psalm 118, says that no one is permitted to be ignorant of them. And on Psalm 57, speaking of that first principle of the natural law, "What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another," he says that truth wrote that in the very hearts of us who were formed by His hand. This, even before the law was given, no one was permitted to be ignorant of, so that there might be a basis on which even those to whom it was not given might be judged. But lest men should seem to themselves to lack something, it was written on tablets what they did not read in their hearts; for they did not lack the writing, but they were unwilling to read it. Therefore, concerning the first and most universal precepts of the law of nature, invincible ignorance cannot be given.

That it also cannot be given concerning the secondary precepts, which are deduced from those by an easy discourse, is also clear from the reason of St. Thomas, because even if some nations are ignorant of such precepts, thinking it lawful to steal and fornicate, nevertheless this ignorance is vincible and culpable (not from the fact that it was engrafted into the minds of men through the sin of the first parent, as Jansenius teaches, whom we refuted in the treatise on sins, chapter 5) but because it arises from the man's own fault, namely from depraved custom, and corrupt habits, on account of which one is led into this opinion, so as to believe that to be lawful which he would perceive to be unlawful, and judge rightly, unless he were beclouded and blinded by the darkness of depraved affections, and unless, by the sins which he commits against the natural law, he placed a culpable obstacle to divine illumination, and to the rays of the natural law. For as St. Augustine says, Book 2 On the Sermon on the Mount, chapter 3: "God is always ready to give us His light, not visible, but intelligible and spiritual, but we are not always ready to receive it, when we are inclined to other things, and are darkened by the desire for corporeal things." To which his most faithful Disciple St. Thomas agrees, q. 3 De Malo, art. 7, in these words: "God, as far as is in Him, communicates Himself to all, according to their capacity, whence that some thing falls short of a participation of His goodness is from this, that in it is found some impediment to the participation of the

divine. Thus, therefore, that grace is not bestowed on someone is not a cause from God, but from the fact that he to whom grace is not given presents an impediment to grace, inasmuch as he turns himself away from Him who does not turn away, without light, as Dionysius says." He has similar things, 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 159.

From these the third part of the conclusion remains proved: for the reason why invincible ignorance of the precepts of the first and second genus cannot be given is that they are immediately and per se known to everyone, being, as it were, the first principles of synderesis; but the latter are deduced from those without great labor, by an easy discourse: but the precepts of the natural law, most remote from the first, are neither immediately and per se known, as is clear, nor can they be deduced from those except by great labor and difficult discourse: therefore they can be invincibly unknown by rustics and the unlearned, who are incapable of such discourse, and who cannot always be instructed and know by Prelates, Confessors, or Doctors, whether such precepts are of the law of nature, and oblige indispensably: both because they cannot always have access to them; and also because sometimes this is unknown even by others, since concerning this there is often dispute and controversy among Masters and Doctors, some affirming, others denying. Whence Medina, on I-II, q. 76, art. [?], says thus: "Concerning natural precepts which are elicited from the precepts of the Decalogue by a consequence not very evident, there can be invincible ignorance for a long time." Mercurius also, Inquisitor of Mantua, in his book On the practice of opinions, teaches that some invincible ignorance of the natural law can be given. To this Vincent Baron subscribes in the latter part of the Manuduction to moral theology, disp. 4, sect. 1, § ult.

Reason also persuades this: for law does not have the force of obliging, unless it is applied to men through promulgation or intimation, as we declared above, chapter 1: but the natural law is not intimated nor promulgated to all men, as to all the precepts which it contains, namely as to those which are most remote from the first and most universal precepts, which are the first principles of synderesis: therefore it does not oblige all men, as to those precepts, and consequently invincible and excusing ignorance can be given concerning them. The major is established; the minor is shown thus: the promulgation or intimation of the natural law occurs through the dictate of reason intimating to man what is to be done, or to be omitted: but such a dictate, as to the precepts which are most remote from the first and most universal precepts, is not had by all; since it is had only through a difficult discourse, and with great labor and study, of which very many simple, rustic, and ignorant persons are altogether incapable: therefore the natural law is not intimated nor promulgated to all, as to the precepts most remote from the first and most universal precepts, known to all.

I add that unless some invincible and excusing ignorance of the law of nature is admitted, an incredible perplexity of conscience follows, indeed also an unavoidable and harsh necessity of sinning here and now; as often as someone probably and in good faith judges that something must be done by him, nor can be omitted without sin, and yet it is unlawful by natural right. For he will sin in doing it, if no ignorance of the natural law excuses from sin. He will sin also by not doing it, because he will act against conscience, which dictates to him that this is to be done. He will therefore sin whichever way he turns, and whether he does this or not, and consequently he will necessarily sin, which is not only against the dogmas of faith, but also against the principles of the first natural light, namely against this principle: "No one sins in what he cannot avoid," which St. Augustine, in the book On the two souls, chapter 11, asserts to be so well known, and manifest of itself, that it is not only unknown to no one, but is furthermore sung and proclaimed by the whole human race. "Do not," he says, "the peasants sing this even on the mountains, and the unlearned in their circles, and the learned in the libraries, and the Masters in the schools, and the Bishops in the sacred places, and the human race throughout the whole world?"

From this follows another absurdity and inconvenience, namely that it would be for the most part a matter of fortune, and not of the will, that men sin, or do not sin, according as what they do is conformed or discordant with the natural law unknown to them, which is also most absurd, since the true and only cause of sin is the created will, as operating in a manner discordant with the rules of morals.

Nor is it valid to say that the aforesaid perplexity of conscience, and the harsh necessity of sinning, is voluntary indirectly and per accidens for those who sin against the natural right, because it arises from their own fault, and from depraved habits and concupiscences, by which they place an obstacle to divine illumination. For although this is true in those who sin from ignorance of the natural law, insofar as it contains secondary precepts, which are deduced from the first by an easy discourse, such as are the precepts of not stealing, not lying, not fornicating, and the like, as will be declared in the solution of the arguments; it is not, however, so in those who are ignorant of the natural precepts most remote from the first, because these are not deduced from those except by great study and labor, and by a difficult and long discourse, of which since very many rustic and unlearned persons are incapable, nor can they sometimes be instructed by others, their ignorance cannot be judged voluntary per accidens and indirectly, from the fact, namely, that they placed an obstacle to knowledge of them — as in the case of ignorance of the precepts of not fornicating, not stealing, and the like.

Against.

The objections are resolved.

Against the first part of the conclusion no difficult argument militates, but against the second it is objected first: for something to be a sin it must be voluntary, which Augustine, Book On True Religion, chapter 14, testifies to be so true that no small number of Doctors, no crowd of the unlearned, dissents from it. But ignorance of the natural law makes an act altogether involuntary: therefore it excuses from sin, and consequently is invincible and inculpable. The major is clear; the minor is proved. Advertence, or knowledge of malice, is required for a sin to be voluntary, since it is of the nature of the voluntary to be from an intrinsic principle, with knowledge, as is established from its definition: but ignorance of the natural law removes the advertence or knowledge of the malice of the evil act which is elicited: therefore it makes such a sin not voluntary. Whence St. Thomas, q. 3 De Malo, art. 8, says: "When someone does not know that fornication is a sin, he voluntarily indeed commits fornication, but does not voluntarily commit sin."

To this difficult argument the Authors respond variously. First of all, Jansenius says that ignorance of the natural law was introduced into the minds of men through the fault of the first man, whence since the fault of Adam is voluntary for men, because the wills of all men were in some way contained in the will of Adam as head of the whole human race, the ignorance of the natural law, flowing and arising from that, is reputed voluntary for them, and consequently evil and culpable.

But this response and doctrine of Jansenius was impugned by us in the preceding treatise, chapter 5, for we showed that although for original sin it suffices that it be voluntary with the will of the head, this does not, however, suffice for the nature of actual or personal sin, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, In II Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 1, in these words: "It is necessary that according as something has the nature of guilt, according to this the nature of the voluntary be found in it. But just as there is a certain good which regards nature, and a certain which regards the person, so also there is a certain guilt of nature, and a certain of the person. Whence for the guilt of the person, the will of the person is required; but for the guilt of nature (that is, original sin), only the will in that nature is required." The same is established from Augustine, Book on the two souls, chapter 11, where he says that neither sin nor a rightly done deed can be justly imputed to anyone who has done nothing by his own will. By these last words he plainly declares that for actual or personal sin, it does not suffice that it be voluntary with the will of the head, as it suffices for original sin, but it is necessarily required that it be voluntary with the proper will of him who sins.

Estius responds second, In II Sent., dist. 22, § 14, that ignorance of the natural law never makes an act altogether involuntary, even in that respect in which it is sin, because it does not make the evil altogether unknown, but always permits it to be known in some way. For although he who labors under this ignorance is ignorant of this evil which he does, under the aspect of genus, that is, does not know it to be a sin, he nevertheless knows it under the aspect of species, to which such a genus naturally and essentially belongs. For example, one who tells an officious lie, thinking such a lie to be lawful, indeed does not know that such a lie pertains to the genus of sin, and therefore thinks it not to be a sin, but he knows that he is lying, and consequently voluntarily commits an act which is essentially evil. The same reasoning applies in fornication, usury, simony, and other things evil in themselves, that is, which are not evil because they are forbidden, but are therefore forbidden and so named, because they are evil. This solution and doctrine seems consonant with the mind of Augustine, Book 1 Retractions, chapter 15, saying thus: "He who sinned without knowing, did not know that what he did was sin: thus neither could such a sin be without the will, but with the will of the deed, not with the will of the sin, which ought not to have been done." By these words the holy Doctor denies that works done from ignorance of the natural law are involuntary, because one so acting well knows the act to be intrinsically evil, and dissonant with the natural law, although through his own fault he does not reflect upon its malice, and upon the disformity or contrariety which it has to the natural law. That this may be more declared and elucidated.

I respond, third, to the objection, granting the major, denying the minor, and to its proof I say that ignorance of the natural law does indeed remove the knowledge or advertence of the malice of the sin, and of the disformity of the act to the natural law, but does not excuse from sin; because although such a lack of knowledge or advertence of the malice of the sin, and of disformity to the natural law, is not voluntary directly and in itself, it is nevertheless indirectly and in its cause, namely in depraved affections, concupiscences, and passions, which some do not voluntarily repress, and by which they place a culpable obstacle to divine illumination, and to the rays of the natural law. Whence Ambrose, Book On the good of death, chapter 9: "The eye errs, where the affection errs. Affection, therefore, is the deception; deception of sight is the deception of the affection." Because, as he observes there, being thus corrupted, it seeks to lust, not to know the truth. He elegantly pursues this reasoning in his commentary on Psalm 118, sermon 4, in these words: "This is the third path we tread. It captures us by certain enticements of a harlot, and, as it were, smears certain semblances of bodily pleasures and delight with dyes, that the truth may be hidden in them, and that by a certain outward appearance they may deceive those who approach."

Cajetan rightly explains this solution and doctrine, above q. 76, where he writes thus: "The contrariety intrinsic to sin itself is, in the one knowingly sinning, knowingly and per se willed; in the one ignorant or erring, it is willed per accidens in a threefold way: first on the part of the act, because it is willed as the object of the volition of the act. Second on the part of the voluntary ignorance, because in it, being willed, are willed all its effects, one of which is to fall into this contrary. Just as a man voluntarily falling with his eyes veiled wills in his cause whatever evil is naturally apt to follow from it; whence if he strikes against something harmful, he voluntarily strikes, by a caused will, namely the will of the veiling, or of the veiled walking. Third," etc.

From these, the testimony of St. Thomas taken from q. 3 De Malo, art. 8 is easily understood and explained, where he says: "When someone does not know that fornication is a sin, he voluntarily indeed commits fornication, but does not voluntarily commit sin." For by these words he only intends that when someone does not know that fornication is a sin, he voluntarily indeed, formally, commits fornication, but does not voluntarily, formally, commit sin; because he commits the sin not with advertence of the malice, but from ignorance or inadvertence of the malice, voluntary per accidens. That this interpretation is legitimate is established from these words which the same holy Doctor writes in this part above, q. 19, art. 6: "If erring reason says that a man is bound to approach another's wife, the will agreeing with this erring reason is evil, because this error proceeds from ignorance of the law of God, which he is bound to know." By these words he plainly declares that ignorance of the natural law (insofar as it contains the secondary precepts of the law of nature, such as is the precept of not fornicating) does not excuse from sin, because indeed it is always willed, at least indirectly, per accidens, and in its cause, in the manner explained above. This is so true, that Augustine, in the exposition begun on the Epistle to the Romans, concerning carnal sins, teaches that not even in children and adolescents are they purged from mortal malice by ignorance.

You will object second: invincible and excusing ignorance of positive law can be given: therefore also of natural law, insofar as it embraces the secondary precepts of the natural law.

But I deny the consequence and the parity, for since natural law, insofar as it includes the secondary precepts of the law of nature, has an intimate connection with the principles known by the natural light, and depends by a certain connection derived from the most common notions of morals, indelibly impressed in the very marrow and inmost parts of the human mind, everyone has knowledge of it in his own hand and power, unless he be impeded by a corrupt depravity of will; from which it happens that such right, as to those precepts, cannot be invincibly unknown. On the contrary, however, since those

things which are of positive law, and depend on the free will of the human or divine legislator, have no connection with the principles known by natural light, we do not have knowledge of them in our own power, and consequently we can have invincible and inculpable ignorance concerning them.

I add that one ignorant of positive law, and of the precepts which pertain to it, does not think that he ought to procure knowledge of them, nor does he have any light in himself, in which he could behold such an obligation; but it is otherwise with one ignorant of the secondary precepts of the law of nature, since from conscience urging him to them, good thoughts generally emerge, of which no man throughout his whole life is destitute; wherefore if such persons are ignorant of some such precepts, it is to be imputed to them, who were unwilling to heed their conscience admonishing them, or who placed a voluntary obstacle to its admonishing.

You will object third: although it is established by the natural light that acts intrinsically evil, and repugnant to the natural law, considered in themselves and absolutely, are never lawful, nor can be excused from sin; some nevertheless think them good and lawful, if considered as clothed with the circumstance of a good end: e.g. that it is lawful to steal in order to give alms, to lie in order to protect one's own or another's life, to defile oneself in order to preserve or recover health: therefore some ignorance of the natural law can be given, insofar as it embraces the secondary precepts of the law of nature.

I respond that in the aforesaid cases or examples, the ignorance is vincible, for it can be overcome and dispelled by that principle known by the natural light, and instilled in each by nature: "Evils are not to be done, that goods may come." From which anyone using reason can easily gather that it is not lawful to steal in order to give alms, to lie in order to protect one's own or another's life, and much less to defile oneself in order to preserve or recover health, indeed not even to avoid death. Whence St. Casimir, oppressed with a grave illness, steadfastly willed to die rather than undergo, on the advice of physicians, the loss of chastity; and of Verinus, a French poet, these verses are extant, consecrated to posterity:

"Venus alone could have relieved his slow disease. He preferred to die rather than defile himself."

Wherefore not only improbable, but even abominable, is the doctrine of Caramuel, asserting in his Moral Theology, no. 1601, that self-abuse is not forbidden by natural law, whence if God had not forbidden it, it would never be evil, would often be good, and sometimes even obligatory under pain of mortal sin. We refuted this monstrosity of probability in the dissertation on the probability of opinions, where we also cited these

verses of Martial against Ponticus defiling himself:

"Do you think this nothing? Believe me, it is a crime, and a great one, greater than you can scarcely conceive in your mind. Believe that nature herself tells you this: what you waste with your fingers, Ponticus, is a man."

You will object fourth against the third part of the conclusion: no probable falsehood, dissonant with the law of nature, excuses from sins which are against the natural law, although it appears and is thought to be true, and consonant with the law of nature: therefore no invincible and inculpable ignorance of the natural law is given at all. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved, first, by a threefold testimony of St. Thomas. The first is had in Quodlibet 8, art. 13, where the holy Doctor says: "That which is done against the law (eternal and natural) is always evil, nor is it excused by the fact that it is according to conscience." The second is taken from Quodlibet 9, art. 15, where he has this: "Error by which one does not believe to be mortal sin what is mortal sin does not excuse conscience wholly, although perhaps in part." The third is had in Quodlibet 3, art. 10, where he writes thus: "No one is excused, if he follows the erroneous opinion of some Master, for in such matters ignorance does not excuse."

It is proved second from the holy Fathers, who also seem plainly to teach this: for Augustine, Letter 154, says thus: "If someone should think that to be good which is evil, by this very thinking he sins: for all sins are of ignorance, when each one thinks that to be done well which is done ill." Bernard also, Book on precept and dispensation, chapter 14, has this: "Whether, therefore, you think that evil good which you perhaps do, or that good evil which you do, either is sin." Likewise Tertullian, On the spectacles, chapter 20: "It is nowhere and never excused that we have erred, because what God has never and nowhere permitted, is nowhere and never lawful."

The same antecedent is proved, third, from this definition of sin handed down by St. Augustine: "Sin is a deed, word, or desire against the eternal law of God": therefore every work dissenting from the eternal and natural law, which is its participation, is evil and unlawful, although it be thought good and lawful. Whence St. Thomas above, q. 19, art. 5, teaches that the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.

These are the principal foundations of those who teach that no invincible ignorance of the natural law can be given at all, which is not culpable, to which it can easily be responded, according to the principles established by us. Whence to the first passage of St. Thomas I respond that that which is against the law is always evil, nor is it excused by the fact that it is according to a conscience erroneous with a gross and affected error, which does not excuse from sin; but it is otherwise with that which is according to a

conscience erroneous with invincible and inculpable error, which the holy Doctor teaches excuses from sin, not only in the passages related in the treatise on sins, chapter 5, but also in that article 13 of Quodlibet 8, in the argument sed contra, where he says thus: "If someone applies diligence, inquiring whether it is lawful to have several benefices, and finds nothing which moves him to think this unlawful, it seems that he can have several benefices without sin: but it can happen that it is against the divine law to have several benefices: therefore," according to St. Thomas, he who from invincible ignorance does something repugnant to the divine law does not sin. Whence the same holy Doctor, in the same Quodlibet, art. 15, says thus: "Error of conscience sometimes has the force of absolving or excusing, namely when it proceeds from ignorance of what someone cannot know, or is not bound to know." From which it is clear that our interpretation is legitimate: whence it is handed down by St. Antoninus, part 1, treatise 3, chapter 10, § 10, where he says thus: "These words of St. Thomas (by which he asserts, in the said Quodlibet, that that which is against the law is always evil) cannot be understood except of those cases where it is manifestly clear from Scripture or the determination of the Church, that they are against the law of God, and he does not intend it of those cases where it does not appear, otherwise he would contradict himself."

From these the response is clear to the other passage taken from Quodlibet 9, for when the holy Doctor says: "Error by which one does not believe to be mortal sin what is mortal sin does not excuse conscience wholly, although perhaps in part," he speaks of a gross and affected error, or of a vincible error which arises from negligence in learning, but not of an invincible and inculpable error. The very same must be said as to the third text, Quodlibet 3, art. 10, where he says that no one is excused, if he follows the opinion of some Master: for this must be understood of him who follows that opinion from vincible and culpable ignorance, but it is otherwise with him who invincibly and inculpably is ignorant of such an error.

To the testimonies of the holy Fathers it must likewise be said, that they only intended to signify, in the passages adduced, that those who from a gross and affected error, or a vincible error, which arises from negligence in learning, think that good which is evil, or that evil which is good, sin from an erroneous conscience, which does not excuse from sin, as was shown in the treatise on human acts, last chapter. Whence when Tertullian says that it is never excused what God condemns, this must be understood when it is done knowingly and voluntarily, or when it happens from vincible error, but not if it happens ignorantly and involuntarily, or from invincible error.

To the third proof, taken from the definition of sin, I respond that when St. Augustine defines sin as a deed, word, or desire against the eternal law, this must be understood of

the eternal law, as intimated and participated through the dictate of reason, which is the proximate rule of human acts, and a certain impression, participation, and announcement of the eternal law, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 19, art. 4. Whence when the eternal law is not intimated to man through the knowledge of the intellect, or dictate of reason, but is invincibly and inculpably unknown, or when there is no dictate of reason forbidding the act, although it be contrary to the eternal law, it is not sin formally, but only materially. From which you will understand that when St. Thomas says that the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law, he speaks of the eternal law, as intimated to us through divine revelation or the natural dictate of reason, as is clear from his solution to the third objection, where he says thus: "Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the divine mind, it nevertheless becomes known to us either through natural reason, by which it is derived from it as its proper image, or through some additional revelation."

You will say: the same holy Doctor, Quodlibet 8, art. 13, teaches that one sins in two ways, namely by acting against the law of God, and by acting against conscience, so that for sinning it suffices to have either of those two: therefore he judges that for sinning there is not necessarily required the intimation of the eternal or natural law, which occurs through the dictate of conscience.

But I deny the consequence, for as we showed above, St. Thomas there is not speaking of conscience considered in itself and absolutely, as importing a dictate of reason intimating the eternal or natural law; but of an erroneous conscience, with a gross and vincible error. Whence he only intends that for some act to be good, it is required that it be according to the divine law and according to a conscience so intimating that law to us; but that it be evil, either of these two suffices, namely either that it be against the divine law, even if it is not against conscience; or that it be against an erroneous conscience, although it be not against the divine law, because an erroneous conscience does not excuse from sin, but causes it, as the same Angelic Doctor teaches above, q. 19, art. 5 and 6.

You will object lastly: many ancient theologians, distinguished in erudition, such as Alexander [of Hales], St. Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Durandus, Hugh of St. Victor, William of Paris, William of Auxerre, and others, teach that no invincible ignorance of the natural law can be given. Whence Gerson, Book on the spiritual life, letter 14, Charles 3, testifies that this opinion was concordant among theologians in his time: "Whatever may be the case," he says, "concerning ignorance of fact, or of human positive law, the concordant opinion is, that no invincible ignorance can fall upon those things which are of divine law." St. Thomas also seems to teach this, III, q. 80, art. 4, ad 5, in these words:

"That someone does not have conscience of his sin can happen in two ways: in one way through his own fault, either through ignorance of the law, which does not excuse, he thinks that not to be sin which is sin — for instance if a fornicator should think simple fornication not to be a mortal sin, etc." By these words he plainly declares that ignorance of the natural law does not excuse from sin, and consequently is not invincible and inculpable, but culpable and vincible. Whence Gratian, part 1, question 5: "Ignorance," he says, "of the natural law is damnable for all adults."

I respond that when those celebrated and ancient theologians teach that no invincible ignorance of the natural law can be given, they speak of the natural law, as it means those most well-known and most general principles of morals which need no discourse, but as soon as one has knowledge of the terms, become known by the very light of natural reason; or of other things which are deduced from these by an easy discourse, but not of those which can only be deduced from the first principles by a long and difficult discourse, concerning which alone we assert that invincible ignorance can be given. In the same way St. Thomas must be understood, when he says that ignorance of the law does not excuse from sin, for he speaks of ignorance of the natural law, as to the secondary precepts of the law of nature, which are deduced from the first without labor, and by an easy discourse, as is established in the example which he alleges concerning fornication; for the precept of not fornicating pertains to the secondary precepts of the natural law. In the same sense Gratian must be understood and explained, when he says that ignorance of the natural law is damnable for all adults.

Chapter IV

On human law

§ I

On the existence and quiddity of human law

Besides the natural and divine law, human laws are still necessary, as St. Thomas proves here q. 91, art. 3, from this, that the natural or divine law is general, and only embraces certain general principles of morals known per se, and at most extends to those things which are deduced by necessary inference from those principles: but besides these, some other things are necessary in the human commonwealth, for its right governance and preservation; therefore it was necessary that those general principles of morals be more particularly determined through human reason, which is done through human laws. The same he shows, q. 95, art. 1, where he teaches that it was necessary, for the peace of men, that some laws be imposed by men on virtue, by which the wicked and shameless might be restrained from vices by fear of punishments, and impelled toward virtue; because as the Philosopher says, Politics 1, chapter 2: "Just as man, if he be perfected in virtue, is the best of animals; so if he be separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all." Isidore touches this reason, Etymologies book 5, chapter 20, in these words: "Laws have been made, that human boldness might be restrained by human fear, that innocence might be safe amid the wicked, and that among the wicked themselves the power of doing harm might be restrained by the fear of punishment." Whence also there would be no human laws, restraining license to act, adulteries, thefts, homicides, and all other crimes, which would immediately overturn the commonwealth from its foundations, ravaging with impunity, according to that famous saying of Augustine: "With justice removed (which is chiefly established through human laws), what are kingdoms but great robberies?"

Human law is an ordinance of human reason for the common good, sufficiently promulgated by him who has care of the community. The goodness of this definition is clear from what was said above, chapter 1, when we expounded the definition of law in common. But concerning the last particle there is difficulty, and controversy among theologians, as to what sort of promulgation human law requires, in order that it oblige? For resolution.

I say, first, standing on natural law alone, that in order for a law, whether civil or pontifical, to be judged sufficiently promulgated, it suffices that it be published at the court. The reason is that for a promulgation sufficient by the nature of the thing, it suffices that the law be published in such a way that it can easily come to the knowledge

of subjects: but by a promulgation made at the court, the law can easily come to the knowledge of subjects; for since there is frequent recourse and concourse to the Prince's seat from all the cities which are subject to his rule, it is easy for what is done at the court to come to the knowledge of all: therefore for a promulgation of law sufficient by the nature of the thing, it suffices that it be promulgated at the court.

I say, second, having regard to civil positive law, that imperial laws do not oblige the provinces, unless they are promulgated in their metropolis; indeed they are not valid nor do they oblige in the province, except after two months from the promulgation made there.

The first part is proved from the Authentic, "Let new constitutions," which is constitution 66 among Justinian's Novellae, where it is decreed that new constitutions do not have force, until they have been made public throughout the metropolis, that is, until they are published in the metropolitan cities. Although the emperor there speaks of the laws of testaments, the Gloss nevertheless extends it to all laws, and brings this rule of the Jurists: "Whenever the words of the rubric make sense in themselves, and do not conflict with the body of the law, written in black letters, and contained under the rubric, the rubric is to be held as the text"; since therefore that authentic rubric speaks universally of all laws, that constitution of Justinian, although it speaks only of the laws of testaments, must nevertheless be extended to all laws, and consequently no imperial laws oblige the provinces, unless they are promulgated in their metropolis.

From this the second part remains proved, for that Authentic decreed that laws do not oblige in a province, except after two months from their promulgation, as is clear from the rubric, which is: "That new constitutions, after their continuation, be valid after two months." The same is established from a certain Bull of Pius IV, concerning the declaration of the time of observance of the Council of Trent, where he says thus: "By common law it is established, that new Constitutions obtain the force of obliging only after a certain time": in these words he alludes, no doubt, to the aforesaid Authentic, since nowhere else is anything found sanctioned concerning the time at which new constitutions have the force of obliging.

What we have said of imperial laws must be said also of laws enacted by Princes or Kings subject to the Emperor; because the right of making laws which they have from the Emperor was granted to them, according to the common law of the empire, and according to the manner and limitation which the Emperors themselves observe.

I say, third, standing on the common positive law, and unless there is a contrary constitution, or custom, that the laws of Princes who are not subject to the empire, such

as the laws of the King of France and the King of Spain, do not require promulgation in each province, nor two months after the promulgation, but the promulgation which occurs at the Prince's court, that is, in the city in which he resides, suffices, from which it may be spread to other places. This conclusion is clear, for by common law nothing else is sanctioned which could oblige more strictly than the aforesaid Authentic of Justinian: but that, since it is imperial, does not have force of obliging in lands not subject to the empire: therefore, etc.

I said, if there is not a contrary constitution or custom, because almost everywhere there is a custom, or law of the kingdom, that Kings who have several provinces have their laws promulgated in each province; nor do they otherwise oblige. And in France royal laws do not oblige, unless they are received by the Parlements. Whence some laws are observed at Paris, which do not oblige at Toulouse, or at Bordeaux.

I say, fourth, standing also on positive law, that for the sufficient promulgation of Pontifical laws, no other promulgation is required than that which occurs at Rome; nor is a space of two months required, for those laws to have the force of obliging.

This is proved from the practice and custom of the Roman Curia, for Pontifical laws are wont to be promulgated only at Rome, and according to them the Auditors of the Rota, the Cardinals, and other Pontifical Judges, judge the causes of other Provinces; although in those no promulgation has been made, but only a simple publication; unless by concession or custom they enjoy that privilege, that Pontifical laws do not oblige there, unless they be promulgated there also, or even received, as is the case in the kingdom of France. Likewise those who do not observe Pontifical laws at Rome, immediately after the promulgation, two months not yet having elapsed, are punished, as Navarrus testifies, Counsel 1 On constitutions, question 4, n. 18. Therefore, etc.

This is confirmed by that most received axiom, "The Pope has feet of lead, not of feathers," which John the Monk, in the chapter "In general," on the rules of law in the Sixth, and Navarrus in the said question 4, n. 20, assert to be true for this reason, that the Pope neither is wont, nor is bound, to travel through each province, carrying to them the promulgation of his laws; because he is the sole Shepherd and Vicar of Christ for the whole world, in spiritual matters conducing to the salvation of souls, of whose decrees, accordingly, the faithful ought to have a greater care of acknowledging, than of temporal laws, issued by secular princes.

You will ask, whether for human law to oblige, the consent or acceptance of the people is required?

I respond negatively, because the obligation of law arises from the subjection by which subjects are subject to Prelates, and the obedience which they are bound to render to them: but the force of obedience does not arise from the acceptance of the subject, but from the excellence of the authority which superiors have over subjects; for just as in natural things it is fitting that things inscribed by their superiors be moved by a certain necessity to their natural actions, as sublunary bodies are moved by celestial ones, through the excellence of natural power divinely communicated to them; so in human matters it is fitting that inferiors be moved by their superiors through the will, according to a certain moral necessity, in which the obligation of law consists, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 104, art. 5, in these words: "The obedient is moved to the command of the one commanding by a certain necessity of justice, just as a natural thing is moved by the power of its mover, by a necessity of nature": therefore the obligation of law does not depend on the consent or acceptance of the people. And indeed the power of the legislator could be almost useless, if he could not compel his subjects to accept and observe a just and useful law. Indeed unless the law compelled the subjects, and induced obligation, without dependence on their approval and acceptance, and the subjects could dissent, and reject such a law, there would be a just war on both sides; for the Prelate would justly demand obedience and observance of the law, and the subject would justly resist, since the acceptance of the law would be committed to his own judgment; but this seems absurd: therefore also that [premise is absurd].

This especially holds in Pontifical and Ecclesiastical laws, for since the Supreme Pontiff receives his power immediately from Christ, he cannot depend, in the use of it, on the consent of the Church: whence it seems altogether certain, that the Supreme Pontiff can oblige the Church by his laws, independently of its consent and acceptance. Indeed Suárez, Book 4 On laws, chapter 16, says that this cannot be denied without harm to the faith.

You will say, at least the civil legislator receives legislative power from the Republic: therefore in enacting the law he depends on its consent, and consequently, at least civil laws, are enacted under this tacit condition, that they have force, if they have been accepted, and received into use. Whence among the Romans laws did not oblige, before they had been accepted by the people, as Alexander ab Alexandro relates, Book 6 of the Genial Days, chapter 16.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence, for once legislative power has been transferred from the people to the Prince, it belongs to him alone to establish laws, and to oblige the people by them, independently of its consent, and acceptance. Nor is there any foundation for asserting that the people transferred legislative power to

the Prince, under this condition, that laws have force, if they have been accepted, and received into use, especially since such a condition would greatly weaken the obedience and subordination of subjects toward superiors, which is most necessary for right governance, as Aristotle teaches throughout the books of the Politics. Whence although the Roman people at the beginning transferred its power to legislators under this condition, and therefore at that time their laws did not oblige before they had been accepted by the people; afterward, however, the same people transferred the whole of its power to the legislators and heads of the commonwealth, and these certainly used it without any limitation.

§ II

On the power of human law

You will ask, first, whether human law can command or forbid things purely internal?

I respond that it cannot command or forbid purely internal acts, which have no connection with external things, nor those which are joined to them only per accidens; but it can indeed command those which are per se required for the integrity of external things in the genus of morals.

The first part of this resolution is clear, because legislative power per se, first, tends to the external and common governance of the commonwealth: but purely internal acts are not fit matter for human governance, whence it is commonly said that the Church does not judge of internal matters: therefore legislative power cannot extend to purely internal acts, which have no connection with external things.

From this the second part remains proved, for internal acts which are joined only per accidens with external ones, since they are not per se sensible, are not fit matter for human governance: therefore they cannot be commanded or forbidden by human law. Thus when human law commands the fast to be observed during Lent, it does not command the internal motive of either penance or temperance, because that is joined per accidens with the external fast, since it does not matter from what motive the precept of fasting is fulfilled, provided that it be fulfilled from an honest motive.

The third part, however, which many of the Recent authors deny, is persuaded by this reason: he who has power to command something, has also the power of commanding that which has a necessary connection with it, that it may subsist: therefore human law can command those acts which are per se required for the integrity of external things in the genus of morals. In this way attention is connected with vocal prayer, for there is no true exterior prayer, considered in the genus of morals, unless it proceeds from some

interior attention. Whence the Ecclesiastical precept concerning the reciting of the Canonical hours obliges not only to external attention and devotion, but also to internal, as we showed at length in the dissertation On the probability of opinions, against Caramuel.

You will ask, second, whether human laws, both civil and Ecclesiastical, if they are just, have the force of obliging to guilt, and in the forum of conscience?

I respond affirmatively with St. Thomas here q. 96, art. 4, which he proves by this reason. Human law, whether civil or Ecclesiastical, is derived from the eternal law: therefore it has the force of obliging in the forum of conscience. The antecedent is established from what was said above, chapter 2, corollary 3, in which we showed that all laws are derived from the eternal. The consequence, however, is proved: that which is derived from something participates in its nature in its own way, namely according to its own nature; since therefore it is of the nature of the eternal law to be able to oblige the rational creature in the forum of conscience, whence sin is defined by Augustine as a deed, word, or desire against the eternal law, the same will also be of the nature of human law, whether civil or Ecclesiastical, in its own way, and according to its own nature.

You will say, the power of Secular Princes is merely temporal and political: therefore it cannot extend itself to anything spiritual, nor consequently oblige to guilt, and in the forum of conscience.

I respond that the power of Secular Princes is called temporal by reason of its object, because according to itself it is entirely concerned with temporal persons, things, and actions; by reason, however, of the obligation which it induces, it can be called spiritual, and obliges in conscience: for although it per se, first, regards the temporal good of the commonwealth, and per se, first, does not intend to bind consciences, under pain of eternal damnation, but only to command something for promoting such good, under temporal penalty, proportioned to attaining its end; nevertheless as a consequence, because it commands this, as it stands under the order of the divine power, and by virtue of that power, which can oblige in the forum of conscience, as to guilt and eternal punishment, it obliges to guilt and in the forum of conscience, if it is just. Whence the Apostle, to the Romans 13: "He who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God; but they who resist, purchase to themselves damnation," which even damnation before God, Chrysostom and other interpreters there understand.

I said, if it is just, because as St. Thomas teaches here q. 96, art. 4, unjust human laws do not oblige in the forum of conscience, unless perhaps for avoiding scandal or disturbance. In three ways, however (he says), human laws can be unjust, namely either

as to end, as when some presiding one imposes burdensome laws on subjects, not pertaining to the common utility, but rather to his own cupidity, or glory. Or as to author, as when someone enacts a law beyond the power committed to him. Or also as to form, for instance when burdens are distributed unequally among the multitude, even if they are ordered to the common good. And laws of this kind are more acts of violence, than laws, because as Augustine says, that does not seem to be law which is not just. If someone knows how to apply this to particular laws, from it (Cajetan adds) he will clarify many cases of conscience concerning taxes and burdens, and public dues of this kind.

You will ask, third, whether human laws can oblige to their observance, with peril and expense of life?

I respond affirmatively, for when the public safety is in danger, unless it be relieved with manifest expense of the life of some of its citizens, the Prince and the Republic have the power of obliging subjects to expose their life for the safety of the commonwealth, and to do something, notwithstanding evident peril of life. Thus in a just war soldiers are ordered by their commanders to hold a dangerous position, or to make an assault, with peril and expense of life. Thus also, in time of plague, Prelates and Magistrates can command that some Priests and Physicians remain in the City, that they may succor it in so great a necessity. The reason is that every perfect community ought to have a means of preserving the safety of the whole, even at the expense of some of its parts; since it is no less of the law of nature, that the whole preserve itself, even with the destruction of a part, than that a part expose itself to danger for the preservation of the whole. Whence those laws which oblige citizens to expose their life for the safety of the commonwealth are not purely human, but include something of the law of nature.

But if you ask, from what can it be known, whether human law obliges even with expense of life? I shall respond briefly that this can chiefly be gathered from this rule. Whenever what is commanded by human law so conduces to the common good, that it is a greater common good to observe the law than to preserve one's own life, then the law obliges even with expense of life. If, however, it is a greater common good to preserve one's own life, than to observe the law, then human law does not oblige with expense of life. And the reason is that the preservation of the life of citizens pertains to the common good, just as does the observance of law: therefore, unless the obligation of law is of greater moment in order to the common good, than the preservation of the life of citizens, the legislator cannot oblige to the observance of the law with so great an expense; for he would oblige unreasonably, since he would not be ordering the lesser good to the greater, but on the contrary the greater to the lesser.

From this rule it is gathered that a Carthusian, placed in the extreme necessity of illness, can not only lawfully abstain from meats, but is even bound to do so; because the preservation of the stricter observance and discipline in the whole Carthusian order is of greater moment, than the life of one Carthusian. Similarly, religious of other Orders can and ought, out of love and reverence for their rule, so observe it, that they would not wish to be freed from disease, if it were necessary to violate the constitutions of their Religion, and if from their violation the observance of the Rule would not a little grow lukewarm, and the vigor of religious discipline would be much diminished.

§ III

Who are subject to human laws?

I say, first, that not only subjects, but also Princes and Legislators, are subject to their own laws, as to directive force, but not as to coactive, or coercive force. Thus St. Thomas here q. 96, art. 5, ad 3.

The first part is clear, for the head, as far as can be, ought to be conformed to the body and the members united to it, otherwise there would be very great deformity in it, according to that of Augustine, Confessions 3, chapter 8: "Every part not congruent with its whole is base": therefore it is fitting that the Prince or Legislator, who is the head of the commonwealth, observe his own laws no less than his subjects, and consequently he is subject to them, as to directive force, from the very natural law, which dictates that it is no less against reason for the head to be discordant with the members, than for the members to be discordant with the head. Whence in the Code, on laws, it is said: "It is a fitting utterance for the majesty of the reigning one, that the Prince profess himself bound by the laws." And "Princeps," on laws: "Let him obey the law, whoever has sanctioned the law." Similar things are had in Canon law, chapter Iustum, distinction 9, in these words: "It is just that the Prince obey his own laws. For then he judges his own laws to be observed by all, when he himself also shows reverence to them." And lest this seem to be said only for the sake of counsel, it is added: "Let Princes not think themselves beneath the laws, nor allowed to condemn in themselves the very rights which they establish for their subjects; for their authority is just, if they do not permit for themselves what they forbid to the people." Finally, Ambrose, writing to the Emperor Valentinian, Letter 32, speaks thus: "What you have prescribed for others, you have prescribed also for yourself. For the Emperor makes laws, which he himself first established."

The second part is proved from the difference which is found between the directive force, and the coactive, or coercive force, of law. For directive force regards lawful, or unlawful, or indifferent acts; coactive, however, or coercive force, regards the penalty

inductive to the observance of the law: but the Prince cannot be compelled or punished with a penalty inductive to the observance of the law, since he has no superior by whom he might be compelled, and no one can properly be compelled by himself: therefore the Prince is not subject to his own laws, as to coactive, or coercive force, but as to the obligation of undergoing punishment, he is released from them.

I say, second, that Clerics are not obliged by the civil laws of Secular Princes, as to coactive force, but indeed as to directive force, and from natural equity, by which they are bound to conform themselves to the other members of the commonwealth.

The first part is certain, since Clerics are exempt from the jurisdiction of secular princes, chapter "Decernimus," on judgments, chapter "Sancta Maria," on constitutions, chapter "Seculares," on the competent forum, in the Sixth. This exemption some think to be of divine law, and gather it from Sacred Scripture; from the New Testament indeed, from that saying of Christ, Matthew 17: "Then the children are free" — namely from the laws of tribute; from the Old Testament, however, from Genesis 47, where Joseph subjected all the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, except the land of the Priests. Others, however, think this exemption of Clerics to be only of human law, namely from the aforesaid constitutions of the Supreme Pontiffs, and by the favor of Secular Princes, which human law is nevertheless most consonant with natural and divine law. To this opinion St. Thomas seems to favor, on that passage to the Romans 13, "Therefore tribute," where speaking of the obligation of paying tribute, he says thus: "From this debt Clerics are free by the privilege of Princes, which indeed has natural equity."

The second part is established from this, that Clerics, notwithstanding their clerical status, are citizens of the commonwealth, and its members: therefore from natural equity, and by reason of the conformity which they ought to have with the other members of the commonwealth, they are bound to observe the civil laws of Secular Princes, which do not derogate from the privileges of Clerics, and which pertain to the peace and tranquility of the commonwealth.

I say, third, that those who are in a foreign territory, whether passing through, or dwelling there, are not bound to observe the laws of their own territory. The reason is that the authority of jurisdiction is limited within the Prince's own territory, just as the active power of natural agents is limited and restricted within the sphere of its activity: therefore just as these cannot act beyond their own sphere, so neither can the laws of Princes oblige outside their own territory. Whence chapter 2, on constitutions, in the Sixth, it is said that the penalty inflicted by a Bishop's statute is not incurred by one who, outside his territory, does not observe such a statute: because (he says) "outside the

territory, one speaking of the law is not impunely obeyed," as is had in the law "Ulumâ," on the jurisdiction of all judges.

I say, fourth, that foreigners and newcomers are obliged to observe the laws of the territory through which they pass. This conclusion follows from what was said in the preceding: for if a brief absence suffices to exempt travelers from subjection to the law of their own territory from which they depart, a brief presence ought also to suffice to subject them to the laws of the foreign territory, through which they pass. For it is fitting that he feel the burden who feels the benefit, as is said in rule 55, on the rules of law, in the Sixth. Whence newcomers and foreigners passing through places in which some feast is celebrated, if they are there for the whole morning of the feast day, are bound to hear Mass, though not bound to stay there in order to hear it. Likewise they are bound, as long as they are there, to abstain from servile work on the feast day, and from forbidden foods on a day of fasting. But those who depart in the morning from their own territory, in which the fast obliges, and arrive at night at a place where the fast does not oblige, can dine at night, and eat meat; since one departing is not bound to observe the laws of his own territory, but can follow the favorable laws of the place through which he passes. From which you will infer that a clandestine marriage, celebrated in a place where the Tridentine [decree] is not observed, is ratified and valid for an inhabitant of a place where it is observed. But of this more fully in the Treatise on Marriage, chapter 3.

Chapter V

On some species of human laws

Having spoken of human law in common, we must now briefly discourse on certain of its species. And first, on penal law; second, on unwritten law, which is called custom; third, on favorable law, or on privileges.

§ I

On penal law

Penal law is called every law which expressly appends a punishment to a precept or prohibition: of this kind are very many Ecclesiastical and civil laws, of which some frequently append temporal punishments of death, exile, flogging, etc. Others append purely spiritual punishments, such as censures and irregularities, or mixed ones, such as deprivations of office or benefice, or of active or passive voice; or finally sometimes purely temporal ones, such as fasts, bodily mortifications, and the like.

Concerning this law there is a threefold difficulty and controversy among theologians. The first is, whether when the legislator, in establishing a penal law, expresses nothing about an obligation to guilt, the penal law obliges to that, or only to the penalty? I respond that it obliges not only to the penalty, but also to guilt, unless the legislator has expressed the contrary: for the obligation to guilt follows the law by way of a property, impedible, however, by the legislator: therefore, a true law being posited, such as a penal one, the obligation to guilt immediately follows; unless the legislator, in enacting such a law, declares that he does not intend to oblige to guilt.

This is confirmed: human laws which are established without threat of penalty oblige to guilt, as is established from what was said in the preceding chapter: therefore also those which are established with threat of penalty. The consequence is proved, because a threat does not remove the obligation to guilt, but indicates it. For as Augustine says, Book 1 Retractions, chapter 9: "Every penalty, if it is just, is a penalty of sin, and is called punishment."

You will say, every law, especially penal, is to be interpreted benignly, when nothing else is established from the mind of the legislator: therefore when in a penal law the legislator does not express his will of obliging to guilt, it is to be judged that he obliges only to the penalty. The consequence seems manifest, for otherwise we would not interpret the mind of the legislator benignly, but very harshly.

I respond that although every law, especially penal, is to be interpreted benignly, this must nevertheless be done according to the nature of the law itself, and not by drawing it away from its connatural state; whence since it pertains to the connatural state of law that it oblige to guilt, unless the legislator expresses the contrary, it must be judged to oblige to guilt, unless the legislator has expressed the opposite.

The second difficulty is, whether penal laws oblige to the penalty before the judge's sentence, or only after his sentence?

I respond that they oblige to privative penalties before the judge's sentence, such as excommunication, irregularity, suspension, deprivation of active and passive voice, but not to active penalties, which require some executive action, e.g. the penalty of death, exile, or spoliation of goods.

The first part is clear, for laws which, by that very fact, impose the penalties of excommunication, suspension, interdict, irregularity, deprivation of active and passive voice, and of the fruits of a benefice from those not reciting the office, take effect immediately, before the judge's sentence. The same must be said of the Ecclesiastical law,

which, as a penalty of a crime, renders certain persons ipso facto incapable of marriage, namely those adulterers who committed adultery with a view to future marriage, or who are guilty of the death of a spouse; for the marriage of such persons is void before any sentence.

The second part, however, which concerns active penalties, requiring some action of the thing for their execution, seems manifest, both because a law obliging a man to execute the penalty of the law upon himself by his own action, before the judge's sentence, seems too rigid and harsh, and repugnant to nature itself; especially if the penalty to be undergone ipso facto is grave and severe, and is otherwise not necessary for the common good of the commonwealth, for it suffices for the common good, if the guilty one suffers such a penalty after the judge's sentence. Also, because to execute a penalty requiring some action, speaking per se, pertains not to the guilty party, but to the judge, and his minister. Whence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, art. 3, says thus: "As to guilt, a remedy is applied through punishment, whose infliction pertains to the judge. And therefore before he is condemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he received; but after he has been condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty."

The third difficulty is, whether the transgressor of a penal law is bound in conscience to undergo the penalty of the law after the judge's sentence.

I respond that he is bound in conscience to undergo the penalty which for its execution requires an action which is more suitably exercised by the guilty party; but not that which for its execution requires an action which is more suitably exercised by the judge, or his minister.

The first part seems manifest, for when someone is fined with exile or a pecuniary penalty, he is bound to leave the kingdom, or city, or to pay the money, for this contains no cruelty or injustice.

The second part, however, is proved from this, that a penal sentence, just as a law, is to be interpreted benignly, since a sentence is the application of that law, which is to be interpreted benignly, as is the common conception of the mind, and disposition of law: therefore the guilty party is not bound to execute upon himself that penalty, whose execution is more suitably done by the judge, or his ministers, but it suffices that he be prepared to undergo it, when it shall be inflicted by them. The consequence is clear, for otherwise we would not interpret that sentence benignly, but most harshly. Whence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 69, art. 4, ad 2: "No one is so condemned that he himself inflict death upon himself, but that he himself suffer death; and therefore he is not bound to do that from which death would follow, but he is bound not to resist the one acting, so as not to

suffer what it is just for him to suffer. Just as also, if someone is condemned to die of hunger, he does not sin, if he takes food secretly furnished to him, because not to take it would be to kill himself."

§ II

On Custom

Custom is a certain right instituted by usages; which is taken up in place of law, when law is lacking. Since therefore law can be lacking in three ways — first when it does not exist, second when it is useless, third when it is doubtful, or obscure — for that threefold defect of law, custom is taken up. For first, where there is no law, a custom is taken up which is introductive of law, or has the force of law. Second, custom comes into the defect of a useless law, abrogating it. Third, when a law is obscure or doubtful, custom comes into its defect, which has the force of interpreting the doubtful or obscure law. Wherefore theologians teach that custom, legitimately introduced, has a threefold force, namely of instituting, abrogating, and interpreting law, and that it can institute a new law, abrogate an old one, and interpret a doubtful one. Whence in the chapter "Cum dilecti," on custom, custom is called the best interpreter of laws.

Two things, however, must be briefly observed. The first is that just as it is of the nature of law to command good acts, so, in order for custom to have the force of law, it is required that that which it concerns be a good act; whence a custom of an unlawful or indifferent thing does not have the force of law. From which it follows that no custom can be introduced, which would have the force of obliging against the natural law, since the law of nature commands only that which is intrinsically good, and forbids only that which is intrinsically evil.

The other is that since every law ought to proceed from the will and reason of the Prince, in order for custom to have the force of law, it is required that the Prince, or another superior power, to whom it pertains to establish laws, consent to it, personally, or legally, that is, juridically. It is said to consent personally, when he consents immediately through himself, tacitly or expressly. It is judged to consent legally, or juridically, when either he himself or his predecessors at some time made a law, by virtue of which such a custom is approved.

As for what pertains to the time necessary for a just and legitimate custom, various opinions of the Doctors are given: but omitting these for the sake of brevity, it must be said that when a custom is introduced by the people, with the express consent of the Prince, there is no need to require any determined time; because since custom does not

have less force than written law, if there be added the consent of the Prince, expressed by a living voice, there is no doubt that it immediately establishes the custom, and consequently no determined time need be awaited for its validity. If, however, the custom is introduced by the people, and with the tacit or presumed consent of the Prince, then the time determined by law must be observed; because then the Prince is not presumed to consent, unless the time determined by law has elapsed; for he is presumed to wish to observe those things which are established by common law. Moreover, since neither in civil law nor in canon law is any certain time read as determined for introducing a custom, hence it happens that the time required by law for prescription is judged to be required for custom. Whence according to this rule, custom against civil law requires ten years, against Ecclesiastical, forty.

§ III

On Privileges

A privilege is that which exempts from common law, and grants some private or special and favorable right. Or as it is said in the chapter "Abbate," on the meaning of words, it is a private law granting something special. Whence just as it is not of the essence of law that it be written, so neither is writing necessary for the essence or validity of a privilege, but it can be established by word, just as also law. Likewise, just as law is permanent, nor does it expire by the death of the legislator, so neither does privilege. It differs, however, from law in two things: first, because law regards common right, but privilege regards a special right. Second, because law, as long as it is in force, always obliges the subject; but privilege exempts the privileged one from the observance of the law.

It is divided, first, into real and personal. Real is that which is given immediately to some thing, office, and condition distinct from a person, such as a pious cause, a temple, an estate, the clerical or regular state, the Episcopal office, the condition of wards or scholars, etc. Personal is that which is given immediately to a person, by reason of himself, and from the intention that provision be made for him, as if it be granted to someone, that he not pay tithes, that he be immune from taxes, that he can absolve from reserved sins, or dispense from irregularities. A real one is perpetual, as it lasts with the thing, office, state, dignity, or condition to which it is annexed. A personal one is for a time, and is extinguished with the person to whom it is granted, according to the seventh rule of law in the Sixth: "A personal privilege follows the person, and is extinguished with the person."

It is divided, second, into gratuitous, remunerative, and conventional privilege. Gratuitous is that which is given freely, without any merits of the privileged one.

Remunerative, that which is given as a reward for his own merits. Conventional, that which is given by a pact or condition intervening.

It is divided, third, into local, and general. The latter one may use anywhere; the former only in the place for which it was granted.

It is divided, fourth, into favorable and odious. Favorable is that which brings no inconvenience to anyone, such as to eat milk and butter in Lent. Odious is that which, although it favors the privileged one, is nevertheless simultaneously harmful or inconvenient to another, such as to be exempt from taxes or tribute, with the burden of others.

It is divided, fifth, into affirmative, by which the faculty of doing something is granted, and negative, which gives the faculty of omitting something. There are many other divisions of privilege, for knowledge of which recourse must be had to those who have treated of privileges expressly and at length.

You will ask, first, whether, for privileges to be of benefit, they must be known to the privileged one, or does it suffice that they have been given and subscribed by the Prince, and authentically dispatched at the court?

I respond that if those privileges cannot have effect or use without danger of sin, before they become known, they are not valid without the required knowledge; because it is more probable that the Prince does not wish to give occasion for that depraved use, nor wish to dispense except for an honest use. Whence a dispensation to contract marriage with a relative ought to become known to the parties, in order that they contract validly, nor does it suffice that the dispensation be authentically dispatched, and subscribed or sealed at the Roman Curia, if the parties are still ignorant of it. But privileges which, before they become known, can have effect, without danger of sin, have effect even before any knowledge on the part of the privileged one, from the very day of their dispatch, and acceptance by a proctor, because since the proctor, together with the privileged one himself, makes as it were one moral instrument with the principal agent, whatever the proctor does in the name of the privileged one, the privileged one is understood to do it.

You will ask, second, whether, the cause of the privilege ceasing, the privilege itself ceases?

I respond affirmatively: thus the privilege of not paying tithes to some Church, because it has elsewhere whence its ministers may be sustained, ceases when the Church ceases to have whence they may be sustained. Thus also the privilege granted to Canons, that

absent ones receive the fruits of their prebends, for the favor of studies, ceases, when they cease to be engaged in studies.

Chapter VI

On the interpretation of human laws through Epikeia

It is permitted sometimes to act against the words of the law through Epikeia, or a benign and prudent interpretation of it, namely when the literal observance would be harmful to the common good and safety, and there is no time to have recourse to the superior; for then necessity itself has a dispensation annexed, because necessity is not subject to law. For example: the general law is that the gates of a city not be opened at night; but this does not oblige in that case in which auxiliary troops, necessary for the defense of the city, should arrive at night, and there would be danger that unless they were soon admitted into the city, they would be killed by the enemies besieging the city. It is also permitted to interpret the law, when its literal observance turns to the notable harm of someone: e.g. the general law is that a deposit be returned; but it is a just and reasonable interpretation, that it need not be returned in that case in which it would harm the one demanding it, or another innocent person, as if a madman should demand back his sword in order to kill himself, or another, without just cause. Likewise it is lawful to interpret the words of the law in that case in which its observance would be too harsh and burdensome: for David, 1 Kings 21, judged that the law forbidding others than Priests to eat the loaves of proposition did not oblige in a necessity (although not extreme) in which he himself with his men was placed. Similarly the Apostles, Matthew 12, interpreted the law of the sabbath not to oblige as to not plucking the ears of grain, in a similar necessity of eating. That this was wisely done cannot be doubted, since Christ, in the place cited, praised both deeds.

But if you ask, whether in doubtful cases it is lawful to use Epikeia, and to interpret the mind of the legislator?

I respond that this is not lawful, the doubt remaining. For as St. Thomas says here q. 96, art. 6, ad 2: "If it is doubtful, one ought either to act according to the words of the law, or to consult the superior." And Quodlibet 8, art. 13: "If someone falls into some doubt through a contrariety of opinions, and, the doubt remaining, has several benefices, he commits himself to danger, and thus without doubt sins." Nor is it an obstacle that the same holy Doctor, II-II, q. 125, art. 10, ad 3, seems to teach the opposite, in these words: "It must be said that interpretation has a place in doubtful matters, etc." For this must not be understood of matters remaining in doubtful judgment, but of when the doubt is

set aside and removed by some reasoning which is judged truer and more probable; for such a judgment suffices for acting prudently, when the necessity of acting presses, and a more certain rule cannot be had. For otherwise, since in moral matters, and in particular cases, doubts most frequently occur, nor is recourse open to a superior, who would interpret the law, it would be an intolerable burden, and exceeding the human condition, if in such cases we could not follow the opinion which appears to us truer and more probable, although it might perhaps deviate from the truth. Of which more at length in the treatise on human acts.

Chapter VII

On dispensation from human laws

Dispensation differs from the interpretation of law, in this, that interpretation only declares the law not to have the force of obliging in some case or particular person; dispensation, the obligation of the law still being in force, exempts the subject from it. From which it happens that to interpret a law belongs not only to the superior, but also to the subject, who through Epikeia can declare in a particular case that the law does not oblige: but on the contrary, no one but a superior can dispense in a law, since it is an act of jurisdiction, which requires superiority in the one dispensing, and subjection in him with whom one dispenses.

Although dispensation, properly and strictly taken, cannot fall upon the divine law, because God foresees all singular contingents, nor upon the natural law, since this is nothing other than an impression of the divine and eternal law made in our minds; it can, however, fall upon human law, because indeed the human legislator, however prudent, could not foresee all the emerging and contingent cases, according to that of Wisdom 9: "The thoughts of mortals are timid, and our providence uncertain." I add that just as it conduces to the common good to exempt some persons from the common law, through a special privilege, so likewise, for promoting that same common good, it is fitting to dispense with some persons in the same law: since no less through privilege, than through dispensation, is a relaxation made from the common law.

You will ask, first, whether it is lawful for a superior to dispense a subject from human law without a just cause? I respond negatively, with St. Thomas here q. 97, art. 4, where he teaches that a superior dispensing with an inferior without cause, and for the sole will, sins against fidelity toward the Republic, which committed to him legislative power, in which dispensative power is included, that he might use it for its good and advantage, not, however, for its destruction and harm. He also acts against prudence, by exempting

from the common law one who is not to be exempted. Likewise he sins against justice, because to exempt from a common burden one who is not to be exempted, is the vice of respect of persons, opposed to distributive justice. Whence Bernard, Book 3 On Consideration, chapter 4: "Where necessity prevails, dispensation is excusable. Where utility calls for it, dispensation is praiseworthy. When neither of these is present, it is plainly not a faithful dispensation, but a cruel dissipation." The inferior, however, does not sin by using a dispensation granted by the superior without a legitimate cause; because no one sins by using his own right: but the one dispensed with uses his own right, by using the indulgence of the dispensation granted him: therefore he does not sin.

Nor is it valid to say, with Father Martinono, that although one using such a dispensation does not sin against human law, which has ceased to oblige him, he nevertheless sins against natural law, because base is the part which does not consent with the whole. It is not valid, I say, because although a part which discords from the whole without cause is base, it is not base if it discords from the whole with cause: but he who uses such a dispensation does not discord from the whole without cause; for, as to not observing that law in which he is dispensed, he has a cause and legitimate title, namely the benefit of the dispensation: therefore he sins neither against human law, nor against natural law.

It must be observed, however, that a dispensation made by the Supreme Pontiff in vows, or in other things which are of divine or natural law, without legitimate cause, is invalid, and consequently one so dispensed cannot use such a dispensation, with a safe conscience; because the Supreme Pontiff did not receive from Christ the power of dispensing in divine or natural law, without reasonable cause; as Cajetan rightly observes in his Summa, under the word "Dispensation," Sylvester under the word "Vow," 4, q. 3, and Soto, On justice and right, q. 7, art. 3, 23. But as to those things which pertain to human and Ecclesiastical law, the Supreme Pontiff can, from the fullness of his power, validly dispense in them, though not lawfully, if no just cause of such a dispensation exists. Whence Bernard, Book 3 On Consideration to Pope Eugenius, writes thus: "By so doing you prove that you have the fullness of power, but perhaps not of justice. This you do, because you can, but whether you also ought, is the question."

Chapter VIII

On the abrogation of human laws

Abrogation differs from irritation, derogation, correction, and cessation of law. To render a law void [irritare] is to prevent it from having binding force. To abrogate is, after the law has obtained the force of obliging, to remove it entirely. To derogate is to remove it not entirely but in part. To correct a law is to moderate it, by adding, or taking away, something. Finally, a law is said to cease, when either the time is finished, for which it was established to oblige, or the cause on account of which it was made ceases.

A legislator can abrogate a law enacted by himself, with the same power by which he established it. The same can his successors do, having equal power, and a fortiori superiors. But inferiors cannot abrogate the laws of superiors, since an inferior has no right or power over a superior, and his constitutions and laws.

Although a legislator sins by abrogating laws without any cause and utility, the abrogation so made is nevertheless valid, nor are subjects any longer bound to observe a law so abrogated, because law is essentially constituted by the will and command of the Prince, whence that being removed, for whatever reason it be removed, the law ceases, and consequently its obligation, for where there is no law, neither can there be an obligation of law.

In three ways a law previously accepted can be abrogated: first, through express revocation by the Prince; second, through the establishment of a new law, repugnant to the prior; third, through a contrary custom; for just as custom has the force of instituting law, so also of abrogating it, as we said above, chapter 5, § 2.

The just causes, however, of abrogating human law are: first, if its observance is rendered harmful. Second, if its observance is rendered incompatible with natural or divine law. Third, if by reason of the subject or some circumstance, the law becomes morally impossible to observe. Fourth, if the multitude of laws is great, and it is expedient that many be abrogated, and that the liberty of subjects be not so restricted concerning indifferent matters.

You will ask, whether when the whole and entire reason on account of which a law was enacted ceases, by that very fact the obligation of the law ceases?

I respond affirmatively, against Suárez, Book 6 On laws, chapter 9, where, although he grants that when laws command acts of themselves indifferent, such as to bear or not bear arms, to export wheat, and similar things, they cease, the adequate end for which those laws are ordered failing; he contends, nevertheless, that when a law commands an

act good in itself, it does not cease, the extrinsic end which the legislator intends failing; because (he says) the intrinsic goodness by which it is endowed is the proximate and intrinsic end of the law. The opposite opinion, however, seems more probable, because indeed law does not oblige, except according to the will of the legislator by whom it is enacted, nor does it continue to oblige, except while the same will morally perseveres: but when the whole and entire reason on account of which he enacted the law ceases, the will of obliging does not morally persevere: therefore, that whole reason ceasing, the law no longer obliges. The major is clear; the minor is proved. The legislator did not have the will of obliging, except dependently on that reason, and on account of it, whether the act otherwise has intrinsic goodness, or not; but the motive reason or final cause ceasing, on account of which we will something, we cease to will it, since it is impossible for an act of the will to stand, its formal object having been removed: therefore, the whole and entire reason ceasing, on account of which the legislator enacted the law, and willed it to oblige, the will of obliging also ceases.

This is confirmed: if a law should command a fast once a week, to appease God, on account of some public necessity, the public necessity ceasing, the obligation of the fast ceases, although apart from that necessity, fasting is an act of virtue, having the intrinsic goodness and honesty of temperance: therefore although a law commands an intrinsically good act, nevertheless if the adequate cause of the law ceases, or the whole motive reason on account of which it was enacted, its obligation ceases.

I said, the adequate cause ceasing, because if a law was enacted on account of several causes, one ceasing, provided the others on account of which it was enacted do not cease, the obligation of the law does not cease. Just as the law of baptism was enacted not only to remove original sin, but also to mark a man with the Christian Religion, and to distinguish him from other sects, and to render him fit and capable for receiving the other Sacraments; even if the first cause should cease, and original sin were removed through the sanctification in the mother's womb, nevertheless the law of baptism, on account of the other causes for which it was enacted, would still oblige.

Chapter IX

On the old divine law

§ I

Certain things concerning the old law are premised which are certain among all

That the old law was truly divine, and not of men, but enacted by God's own authority immediately, is certain by faith, and defined at Trent, session 4, decree on the Canonical scriptures, where it is said thus: "All the books both of the old and of the new testament, since one God is the author of both, the Catholic Church receives and venerates with equal piety and reverence." This is also clearly gathered from Scripture, for Christ, Matthew 15, speaking of the Mosaic law, calls it the Commandment of God, when He says: "You have made void the commandment of God for the sake of your traditions." And the Apostle, to the Romans 1, and to the Hebrews 1, affirms the Father of Christ to have been the author of the old testament. Reason also supports this, for as St. Thomas discusses here, q. 98, art. 2: it belongs to the same one to propose the end, and to dispose the means to the end: but the Evangelical law is the end of the Mosaic law, according to that of the Apostle, to the Romans 10: "The end of the law is Christ": therefore the same God who is the author of the Evangelical law, is also the author of the Mosaic law.

It is also established from Scripture that the old law was delivered by God to Moses through Angels, on Mount Sinai, and promulgated by the same. For St. Stephen, Acts 7, says thus of Moses: "This is he who was in the Church in the wilderness, with the Angel who spoke to him on Mount Sinai, and with our Fathers, who received the words of life to give to us." Nor is there lacking a reason or congruence to persuade this, for as St. Thomas says, the question cited, art. 3: the old law was imperfect, and as it were a certain disposition to the new law: therefore it was fitting that the new be given by Christ the Lord, but the old by ministers. For thus it happens in ordered arts, that the supreme artificer, through his ministers, disposes those things which are necessary for the work, but he himself applies the ultimate perfection.

Third, it is certain that the old law was good and holy, since it was delivered by God, from whom nothing evil or unjust can proceed. Whence the Apostle, to the Romans 7: "The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good." Where the commandment of the Mosaic law is called holy, on account of the ceremonial precepts; just, on account of the judicial; good, on account of the moral, as St. Thomas observes here, q. 97, art. 4.

You will say: the precepts of the Mosaic law, Ezekiel 20, are said not to be good. And the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 3, says that the letter kills, but the spirit gives life, where by the name of the letter, he understands the old law. And to the Hebrews 8, he says that the old testament was not free of fault. Finally, the old law permitted hatred of enemies, usury, plurality of wives, a bill of divorce, which are evil, and alien from right reason: therefore it was not good and holy.

I respond that when the precepts of the old law are said not to be good, this must be understood of the ceremonial precepts, which are called not good, that is, not perfect, because they did not confer grace, by which men would be sanctified and cleansed from sin. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 98, art. 1, ad 1. Similarly the old law is said by the Apostle to kill, because it could not confer the spirit of life, that is, grace, and by forbidding concupiscence, it would increase it, as Augustine explains, On the spirit and the letter, chapter 4. But when the same Paul says that the old testament was not free of fault, he does not take "fault" for sin, but for imperfection, defect, and infirmity, and only wishes to signify that it was imperfect, and had some defect, in that it did not confer grace, did not bring to perfection, and did not immediately raise its observers to eternal salvation.

As for what is added concerning hatred of enemies, it must be said that this was well permitted in the old law, since Leviticus 19 says: "You shall not seek revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of your citizens." Whence when it is said, Matthew 5: "You have heard that it was said to them of old, You shall love your neighbor, and hate your enemy," it is not signified (as some think) that hatred of enemies was at some time commanded or permitted in the ancient law, but only that it had been deduced by the Jews, or by certain Rabbis, that enemies were universally to be hated, from the fact that God had commanded them to love their friends, and to persecute and destroy certain Nations as enemies. Whence it is the same as if it were said: "You have heard that it was said to them of old, You shall love your neighbor (and by a consequence deduced by the Rabbis and Pharisees) and you shall hate your enemy: but I say to you, Love your enemies."

As for what is added concerning usury, St. Thomas responds, II-II, q. 78, art. 1, ad 2, that usury toward foreigners was not approved or permitted in the old law, but only tolerated with impunity for the external forum and not for the internal; just as in the commonwealth, minor evils, to avoid greater ones, are sometimes tolerated with impunity by Princes and Magistrates.

Finally, as for what is objected in the last place concerning the plurality of wives and the bill of divorce, it must be said that God dispensed with the Jews, that they might have

several wives, and that by a bill of divorce they might dismiss their wives, and marry others. Of which more at length in the Treatise on Marriage, chapters 1 and 4.

Fourth, it is certain that the Mosaic law, although good and holy, was imperfect, comparatively to the Evangelical law. For as St. Thomas discusses above, q. 91, art. 3: the perfection and imperfection of law is attended to according to three things which pertain to law. First, for it pertains to law, that it be ordered to the common good as to an end. This can indeed be twofold, namely a sensible and earthly good, and to such a good the old law was directly ordered, whence immediately, Exodus 3, at the beginning of the law, the people are invited to the earthly kingdom of the Canaanites. And again, an intelligible and heavenly good, and to this the new law is ordered, whence immediately Christ, at the beginning of His preaching, invited to the kingdom of heaven, saying: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," Matthew 4. And therefore Augustine says, Book 4 against Faustus, that promises of temporal things are contained in the old testament, and therefore it is called old; but the promise of eternal life pertains to the new testament. Second, it pertains to law, to direct human acts according to the order of justice, in which too the new law superabounds the old, ordering the interior acts of the mind, according to that of Matthew 5: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven"; and therefore it is said that the old law restrains the hand, the new law the mind. Third, it pertains to law to induce men to the observance of the commandments, and this indeed the old law did through fear of punishments; but the new law does this through the love which is infused in our hearts through the grace of Christ, which is conferred in the new law, but was prefigured in the old; therefore Augustine says, against Adimantus the Manichean's Disciple, that the brief difference of the Law and the Gospel is fear and love.

§ II

On the precepts of the old law

The precepts of the Mosaic law were threefold: moral, ceremonial, and judicial. For its end was to direct the Jewish people, and to order it fittingly, both in those things which pertain to the rectitude of natural human reason, and also in those which pertain to divine worship, and to just polity. For the first, moral precepts were given; for the second, ceremonial; for the third, judicial. And through these three taken together, man was fittingly ordered concerning himself, concerning God, and concerning his neighbor; and through them, if well observed, the commonwealth of the Jews was to be preserved in a happy and flourishing state, as God had promised them, Deuteronomy 28.

The moral precepts (as St. Thomas notes here, q. 100, art. 11) are of a threefold distinction: for some (he says) are most common, and so manifest, that they are as it were the ends of the precepts; whence in these no one can err according to the judgment of reason. Others are determined, whose reason even any ordinary person can readily see; and yet because in a few of these human judgment happens to be perverted, they need such promulgation; and these are the precepts of the Decalogue. Others still are those whose reason is not so manifest to everyone, but only to the wise. And these are the moral precepts additional to the Decalogue, delivered by God to the people through Moses and Aaron. But because those that are manifest, the other moral precepts additional to the Decalogue, are reduced to the precepts of the Decalogue by way of a certain addition to them: for in the first precept of the Decalogue the worship of foreign Gods is forbidden, to which are added other precepts prohibiting those things which are ordered to the worship of idols; as is had in Deuteronomy 18: "Let there not be found among you one who purifies his son or his daughter, passing them through fire, nor let there be a sorcerer, nor an enchanter, nor let him consult pythons, nor diviners, nor seek the truth from the dead." To the second precept, which forbids perjury, is added the prohibition of blasphemy, Leviticus 24, and the prohibition of false doctrine, Deuteronomy 13. To the third precept are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth precept, concerning honor of parents, is added the precept concerning the honoring of the aged, according to that of Leviticus 19: "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged"; and universally all the precepts inducing to the exhibition of reverence to elders, or of benefits to be shown either to equals or to inferiors. To the fifth precept, which is the prohibition of homicide, is added the prohibition of hatred, and of any plotting against a neighbor; as that of Leviticus 19: "You shall not stand against the blood of your neighbor"; and also the prohibition of hating a brother, according to that: "You shall not hate your brother in your heart." To the sixth precept, which is the prohibition of adultery, is added the precept forbidding harlotry, according to that of Deuteronomy 24: "There shall not be a harlot among the daughters of Israel, nor a fornicator among the sons of Israel," and again the prohibition of the vice against nature, according to that of Leviticus 18: "You shall not lie with a male, you shall not lie with any beast." To the seventh, concerning the prohibition of theft, is joined the precept concerning the prohibition of usury, according to that of Deuteronomy 23: "You shall not lend to your brother upon usury"; and the prohibition of fraud, according to that of Deuteronomy 25: "You shall not have diverse weights in your bag"; and universally all things which pertain to the prohibition of calumny and rapine. To the eighth precept, which is the prohibition of false testimony, is added the prohibition of false judgment, according to that of Exodus 23: "Neither in judgment

shalt thou yield to the opinion of the greater number, to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition of lying, as is added there: "You shall flee from a lie"; and the prohibition of detraction, according to that of Leviticus 19: "You shall not be a detractor, nor a whisperer, among the people." To the other two precepts (namely the precept of not coveting another's wife for oneself, and the precept of not coveting any thing, or any possession, whatever it be, of another, in order to possess it unlawfully against his consent and will), no others are added; because through these two, universally, all evil concupiscence is forbidden. These things Saint Thomas [teaches], by which he clearly expounds the distinction of the moral precepts of the old law.

As for the ceremonial precepts, Genebrard, toward the end of his Chronology, from Burgensis, and other Doctors, asserts that these in the ancient law ascended to the number of six hundred and thirteen; of which two hundred forty-eight were affirmative, namely as many as there are members and bones in a man, and three hundred sixty-five negative, as many as the days are usually numbered in a year. All these, however, can be reduced to four genera. Some indeed concerned sacrifices, of which there were three kinds in the ancient law, namely the holocaust, the peace offering, and the sin offering, whose difference we shall explain in the Treatise on the cardinal virtues, when we treat of religion. Others concerned the Sacraments, which existed in various forms in the ancient law, both for the Laity, and for the Priests and ministers of the Temple; such as circumcision, the Paschal Lamb, the consecration of Priests, the eating of the loaves of proposition, the washing of hands and feet, the shaving of hair, and the like, of which St. Thomas treats here, q. 102, art. 5. Likewise in the old law there were certain ceremonial precepts concerning sacred things, which were ordered to divine worship as instruments and aids, among which the chief were: the Tabernacle, the Ark of the Covenant, containing the two tablets of the law, the rod of Aaron, which had flowered, and the golden urn with manna; the propitiatory, which was like a certain table of purest gold; the table of the loaves of proposition; the altar of incense, on which frankincense and other aromatics of most sweet odor were burned; the altar of holocaust, on which all the victims were offered; and finally various kinds of vessels, namely little vinegar-cups, bowls, censers, ladles, cauldrons, water-jars, small mortars, lamps, etc., concerning which Josephus discusses accurately, Book 3 of the Antiquities, and Ribera, Book 3 On the Temple of Solomon. Finally, in the old law, there were some ceremonial precepts concerning certain legal observances, by which, by decree of God, the people of the Jews was distinguished from other nations, among which the chief were: abstinence from what was strangled, from blood, from fat, from the flesh of swine; from animals which did not have a divided hoof, but a solid and single one, and which also did not chew the cud; the eating of unleavened bread, of wild lettuces, and other things of this kind,

whose signification St. Thomas explains at length and learnedly, q. 102, art. 6. Of the same kind were these: "You shall not boil a kid in its mother's milk." "You shall not plough with an ox and an ass together." "You shall not wear a garment woven of two kinds of material." "You shall not wear a garment that is woven of wool and linen together." "He who has touched a dead body shall be unclean until evening."

Concerning the judicial precepts St. Thomas discourses abundantly, q. 104 and 105, where he reduces them to four heads. For some prescribe a certain order of justice between the Prince and the people, some among the citizens themselves, some between the people and foreigners, and finally some among the members of the same household. Examples are found everywhere in Scripture: e.g. for the Prince, precepts are given as to how he is to be created, how he ought to conduct himself toward the people, and in turn how the people toward him. Similarly for the people and citizens among themselves, precepts are given concerning buying and selling, and other contracts. For foreigners, precepts are given concerning the reception of newcomers and pilgrims, and concerning the manner of waging war against enemies. Finally for household members, there are laws concerning husband and wife, parents and children, masters and servants, kinsmen and relatives by marriage, whether marriages should be contracted between them, and other such matters.

These precepts differ, however, from the moral, in that the moral pertain proximately to the law of nature; but the judicial very remotely, since they are only determinations of those things which are generally contained in the natural law: e.g. by natural law thieves are to be punished, but by that judicial law the penalty of death is inflicted on them. From the ceremonial they differ in a threefold way. First, because the ceremonial pertained to divine worship, the judicial to the observance of justice toward one's neighbor. Second, because the ceremonial were per se, first, instituted to signify and figure Christ and the mysteries of the Christian religion, but not the judicial. From this follows a third difference, namely that all the ceremonial are dead, indeed also deadly, but some of the judicial still remain, not, however, insofar as they were prescribed by the old law, but only insofar as they have been assumed by Kings and Legislators for the public utility; but others indeed are dead, yet not deadly, since they can be observed without sin, as will appear from what is to be said in the following section.

§ III

Whether, and when, the old law was abrogated?

I say, first, the old law was in fact abrogated, and has ceased to oblige. This conclusion is certain by faith, and defined by the Apostles in the Council of Jerusalem held on this question; and Paul teaches it everywhere in his Epistles, especially to the Romans 6, verse 15, to the Galatians 3, verse 19, to the Ephesians 2, verse 14, and to the Colossians 2, verse 16.

This is confirmed from that passage to the Hebrews 7: "The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law": but the priesthood of the old law has been translated into the priesthood of the new law, as the Apostle contends throughout the whole Epistle to the Hebrews: therefore the law itself also was translated into the new, and thus at length abrogated, in fact ceased to oblige.

But if you ask, why was it abrogated? I respond, first, that it was abrogated for this reason, that the old testament was imperfect and weak. Whence the Apostle, to the Hebrews 7: "There is made" (he says) "a disannulling of the former commandment, because of its weakness and unprofitableness: for the law brought nothing to perfection." Second, because it was a heavy yoke. This reason for the abrogation St. Peter indicated, Acts 15, when he said: "Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" Third, because it contained only figures, which have been fulfilled through Christ. Whence Bernard, homily 2 On "He was sent": "When the fruit comes forth, the flower falls, because with truth appearing in the flesh, the figure passes away." Or as Jerome says, on chapter 4 to the Galatians: "Before the Gospel of Christ shone throughout the whole world, the legal precepts had their own splendor, but after the greater light of Evangelical grace has shone forth, the Sun of Justice having appeared to the whole world, the light of the stars is hidden, their rays have grown dim." Finally, Christ (as the Apostle testifies, to the Ephesians 2) "made both one," that is, of the two peoples, the Gentile and the Jewish, He made one fold, and accordingly He had to dissolve the middle wall of the Mosaic law, which separated one people from the other, and to unite both under one and the same Evangelical law.

You will say: the Mosaic law is preached in the sacred letters to last forever: Baruch 3: "This is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever." I respond, with St. Thomas here, q. 103, art. 3, ad 1, that the old law can be said eternal in two ways: first as to the moral precepts, which are contained partly in the Decalogue, partly indeed in other places of Scripture; these always are in force and will be in force, since they are of

the law of nature: second also as to the ceremonial, since although these have been abrogated, as to signification, they nevertheless still endure and will endure, as to the thing signified, namely Christ and the Christian religion. I add that the old law and its precepts are called eternal, because they were established for a very long time, and without a certain term defined in the very promulgation of the law: for statutes and precepts which are so enacted are wont to be called perpetual, in the common manner of speaking; in the same sense in which all laws are said to be perpetual.

I say, second, that the Mosaic law did not cease before the death of Christ. Thus theologians commonly teach, with few exceptions, who wish the Mosaic law to have ceased before the death of Christ, at the very institution of Baptism, through which the obligation of Circumcision ceased, and consequently of the whole Mosaic law, whose obligation was founded in it, and arose from it, as Paul signifies, to the Galatians 3.

This conclusion is proved in many ways: first, because the Mosaic law was shadowy and figurative, and consequently it did not cease, until its shadows and figures had been fulfilled. But these were not fulfilled until the death and passion of Christ, and before Christ, about to expire, said: "It is consummated": therefore the Mosaic law did not cease before the death and passion of Christ.

Second, Christ observed the law until death, and commanded it to be observed: for, Matthew 8, He commanded the cured leper to go to the priest, that he might offer according to the law the gift which Moses had commanded, and Matthew 23 He said: "The Scribes and Pharisees have sat on the chair of Moses; therefore whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do." The same, on the day before He was to suffer, immolated the Paschal lamb with His disciples: therefore before His death the Mosaic law had not ceased, but still obliged. Whence Luke 22 it is said: "The day of unleavened bread came, on which it was necessary that the Passover should be killed," etc., that is, by necessity of precept, which Christ willed to fulfill before He died.

Third, just as, the priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews 7, so, the priesthood remaining, it is necessary that the law also remain: but the priesthood of the Mosaic law was not translated until the passion and death of Christ; for the Apostle, to the Hebrews 9, affirms that the former tabernacle had its standing, until, through Christ's death, the way of the saints should be made manifest; but so long as that Mosaic tabernacle had its standing, so also the priesthood: therefore the Mosaic law was not abrogated before Christ's death and passion.

Fourth, the old testament, which is the same as the law, did not cease except through the new: but this did not begin to oblige except after Christ's death, since a testament is not valid, unless the death of the testator intervenes, as Paul says to the Hebrews, and Ulpian proves, book 1, ff. on testaments: therefore the testament did not cease until Christ's death.

You will say, first: Luke 16 it is said: "The law and the prophets were until John." And Matthew 11: "All the prophets and the law prophesied until John": therefore the old law ceased, when John the Baptist began to preach.

But I deny the consequence, for the sense of these words is that the law and the Prophets, until John, predicted that Christ would come; but he showed that He had already come. Or that the law and the Prophets, until John, preached temporal promises; but from then on the kingdom of God began to be evangelized, consisting in spiritual goods: for this Christ said, responding to the Pharisees who mocked Him, because He reprehended their excessive affection toward riches, and taught contempt of them; as if in this He dissented from the law and the Prophets promising temporal goods.

Or finally the sense is that the old law only lasted until the coming of Christ and the preaching of John the Baptist: but that the law and the Prophets, up to that time, reigned and triumphed, and that the law was not only alive, but also healthy. But from the time John the Baptist came, the law indeed did not die immediately, but began to grow sick, because now the grace of the Gospel was beginning to shine forth.

You will say, second: all the Ceremonies of the ancient law regarded Christ as their ultimate goal, and signified that He was to come: therefore as soon as Christ came, they began to be false, and consequently the old law then to cease.

I respond that the Ceremonies of the old law did not regard Christ absolutely, but as Redeemer, wherefore they were not abolished as soon as Christ was present, but as soon as He fulfilled, through the death of the Redeemer, the office.

You will say, third: Baptism, which is the first sacrament of the new law, was instituted by Christ before His death: therefore the precept of Baptism began to oblige before Christ's death, and consequently the precept of circumcision ceased to oblige, before the passion of Christ.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence; for although Baptism was instituted by Christ before His death, it nevertheless was not under precept except after the passion and resurrection of Christ, as St. Thomas teaches, III, q. 66, art. 2, in these words: "The necessity of using this sacrament was enjoined on man after the passion and

resurrection, both because in Christ's passion the figurative sacraments were terminated, which Baptism, and the other sacraments of the new law, succeed, and also because through Baptism man is configured to the passion and resurrection of Christ, inasmuch as he dies to sin, and begins the life of new justice; and therefore it was fitting that Christ first suffer and rise again, before the necessity of configuring themselves to the death and resurrection of Christ was declared to men." Whence although, Baptism having been instituted, before Christ's death and resurrection, circumcision was not necessary by a necessity of means, since for taking away original sin, it was not the only means, but Baptism would have sufficed for this; it was nevertheless necessary by a necessity of precept, for it was so inserted into the ancient law, that it might be a sign of the faithful who professed that law, and its use, therefore, while that law persisted, was necessary by God's precept.

I say, third, that the Mosaic law ceased in the very death and resurrection of Christ. This is against Scotus, Suárez, and others, who think that the legal observances were not altogether and completely extinguished, except on the very day of Pentecost, on which the solemn promulgation of the Evangelical law was made. It is, however, St. Thomas's, here, q. 103, art. 3, ad 2, where he writes thus: "The mystery of the redemption of the human race was completed in the passion of Christ, whence then the Lord said, 'It is consummated,' as is had, John 19; and therefore then the legal observances entirely had to cease, as if their truth were now consummated; in sign of which, at Christ's passion, the veil of the temple is read to have been torn, Matthew 27; and therefore before Christ's passion, Christ preaching and working miracles, the law and the Gospel ran together simultaneously; because now the mystery of Christ had been begun, but not yet consummated; on this account the Lord Christ, before His passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies."

The same the holy Fathers teach: for Augustine, sermon 124 On the time, says thus: "The veil of the temple is torn, which strips the Synagogue of honor, the ancient observance is dissolved." Ambrose, Book 10 on Luke, chapter 25: "The veil of the temple too is torn, by which the profaning of the mysteries of the Synagogue is declared." Caesarius, homily 6 on the Pasch, in this vein: "The veil of the temple is torn. The veil is the ornament of the tabernacle: therefore, grace shining forth, the Church is built, the Synagogue is destroyed." Finally, Pope Leo, sermon 6 on the passion, elegantly mocking Caiaphas tearing his own garments, as if Christ had blasphemed, says that the Pontiff of the law, soon to perish, showed by this tearing of his garments, that he was soon to be stripped of the honor of his own priesthood.

This is confirmed by the common consent of Jerome and Augustine in the Letters which they wrote to each other on legal matters, in which they teach that after the death and resurrection of Christ, the legal ceremonies were dead, that is, had lost the force of obliging, although Jerome thought that after Christ's death and resurrection, they were not only dead, but even deadly, so that whoever observed them (ignorance or invincible error excluded) sinned: therefore undeservedly, and without sufficient foundation, do Scotus and Suárez dissent from them.

The conclusion can, moreover, be persuaded by four reasons. The first is: since the Mosaic law was shadowy and figurative, it had to cease when the truth which it figured had arrived: but through Christ's death and resurrection, all the figures of the ancient law were fulfilled, as Christ, now dying, signified, when He said, "It is consummated": therefore, at the death and resurrection of Christ, the Mosaic law ceased, and was thoroughly abrogated. Whence Pope Leo, sermon 7 on the passion: "That the shadows might yield to the body, the ancient observance is excluded by the new sacrament; victim passes into victim, blood is removed by blood, and the legal festivity, while it is being changed, is fulfilled."

Second: Christ, at the Last Supper, established a new testament, which He then confirmed by His death and resurrection: therefore the old, as it were consumed by age, the new preceding it, was extinguished. The consequence is clear, for the validity of a later testament revokes the force of the earlier, whenever the later is established to revoke the former, as is clear in human affairs: but the new testament was established, that the former might be revoked, as all confess; and the Apostle teaches, to the Hebrews 10, in these words: "He takes away the first, that he may establish that which follows." And chapter 8: "In saying a new, he made the former old. Now that which decays and grows old, is near its end": therefore, etc.

The third reason: to the Romans 7, from the fact that we are freed from sin, Paul infers that we are equally exempt also from the yoke of the law: but in the death and resurrection of Christ we are freed from sin: therefore also from the old law. Whence the same Apostle there says that just as a woman is free from the law of marriage by the death of her husband, so the Synagogue, at the death of Christ, was freed from the obligation of the law.

The fourth reason is taken from that of the Apostle to the Hebrews 7: "The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law": therefore, the priesthood of the old law ceasing, it is necessary that the old law itself also cease; since, according to Paul, in the reality of the matter, there was a necessary connection and

concomitance between the law and the priesthood: but the priesthood of the old law ceased in Christ's own death and resurrection; for then the Aaronic priesthood was entirely evacuated, and translated into the priesthood of Christ, as is gathered from that of the Apostle, to the Hebrews 9: "Christ being present, a high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle not made with hands, that is, not of this creation, neither by the blood of goats, or of calves, but by his own blood, entered once into the holies, having obtained eternal redemption": therefore the old law ceased in Christ's own death and resurrection, and was thoroughly abrogated, even as to the moral precepts, for although these still now retain the force of obliging, it is not, however, insofar as they are precepts of the Mosaic law, but insofar as they are precepts of the natural law, whose obligation is perpetual.

I said, however, "in Christ's own death and resurrection," both because since the old law was a figure and shadow not only of Christ's passion and death, but also of His resurrection, before Christ's resurrection, it had not yet been perfectly completed, nor consequently totally extinguished. And also because the priesthood of Aaron, which was proper to the old law, ought not to have been abolished, until the priesthood of Christ was consummated, and constituted in perfection and indefectibility, which was not until His resurrection, in which Christ Himself resumed immortal and indefectible life; whence then only was fulfilled this prophecy of David: "You are a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech." Add that the obligation of Baptism, which is the foundation of the whole Evangelical law, began only after Christ's resurrection: since on the very day of the resurrection, Christ proposed its precept, saying to the Apostles: "Going, teach all nations, baptizing them," etc. Therefore then only, and not before, did the old law cease.

Against this conclusion the Adversaries object: the Mosaic law did not cease before the Evangelical began to oblige, since the generation of the latter is the corruption of the former, according to that of the Apostle, to the Ephesians 2: "Making void the law of commandments contained in decrees," that is, excluding the Mosaic law by Evangelical decrees, as Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius there expound: but the Evangelical law could not begin to oblige before the day of Pentecost: therefore, before that day, the Mosaic law did not cease to oblige. They suppose the major as certain; the minor, however, they prove thus. A law before its promulgation does not oblige, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 90, art. 4. But the Evangelical law was not promulgated before Pentecost: therefore it did not begin to oblige before the day of Pentecost. The minor is proved, both because until the time of Pentecost the Apostles did not publicly propose the Gospel to the people, and also because just as the old law was not promulgated

except on the fiftieth day from the Jewish Passover, so the new law ought not to be promulgated, except after fifty days from the true Passover of Christ's resurrection, for the promulgation of the Mosaic law, was shown above, art. 2, at the end, to have been a figure of the promulgation of the Evangelical law.

To this argument, which is the principal foundation of the Adversaries, I respond, granting the major, denying the minor, and to its proof I say that there is a twofold promulgation of law: one essential, sufficient for the law, which occurs when the Prince, as a public person, proposes and intimates it to his subjects present at the court: the other solemn and accidental, and ordered to removing the ignorance of subjects, which occurs when the law is published by a herald throughout each province, or through all the principal cities. Although, therefore, the Evangelical law, by this second kind of promulgation, was promulgated only on the day of Pentecost by the Apostles as Christ's heralds; nevertheless on the very day of the resurrection it was proposed and intimated by Christ to the Disciples, in these words: "Going, teach all nations, baptizing them," etc. Whence from the day of the resurrection it began to have the force of a law obliging of itself, although this promulgation would not suffice to remove ignorance of it, nor consequently to render men inexcusable for its transgression. From this the response is clear to the first proof of the Minor. To the second, similarly, I say that the Mosaic law was promulgated, with a promulgation sufficient for the nature of law, from that time when God gave it to Moses on Mount Sinai; for then God spoke as Prince and Legislator, and consequently from that time the precepts of that law given by God had the force of law, and so much so that its publication, made afterward by Moses to the whole people, did not have the force of the promulgation necessary to the essence of the law, but only of a declaration, lest men, from ignorance, might be excused from its obligation. Wherefore although that publication of the old law, made by Moses, was a figure of the promulgation of the Evangelical law, to be made by the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, it does not follow from this, that that was necessary for the nature and essence of the Evangelical law, but only for removing ignorance of it.

To the solution of the other argument, which could be made against our conclusion, it must be observed that although from the passion and resurrection of Christ up to the divulgation of the Gospel, the ancient law was dead, so that it neither obliged, nor had the force of obliging, it was nevertheless not altogether useless, as it is now; but as long as its goodness remained, and it was not yet deadly, the children of the Jews receiving circumcision were justified from original sin, and those who in good faith observed that law, were saved; for it befitted the divine goodness, that as long as it sustained that law, it should not take away its utility, that it might profit those who in good faith observed it;

whence for them was valid the dispensation and permission given by the law, of repudiating a legitimate wife, and taking another, or having several at once.

§ IV

Whether the Mosaic law, as soon as it ceased to oblige, was deadly?

The affirmative part was once held by St. Jerome, as is established from his Letter to Augustine, which is counted among Augustine's own Letters as the eleventh; for he distinguished only two times, one before the passion of Christ, in which the legal observances were not dead, as not having binding or expiative force, according to their manner; nor even deadly, because those who observed them did not sin; the other after Christ's passion, in which they were not only dead (that is, not having virtue and obligation), but even deadly, that is, so that whoever observed them would sin mortally. The opposite Augustine taught, Letters 9 and 19 to Jerome, where he distinguished the times. One before Christ's passion, in which the legal observances were neither deadly, nor dead. Another after the time of the Gospel's divulgation, in which the legal observances are dead and deadly. There is, however, a third, middle time, namely from Christ's passion, until the divulgation of the Gospel, in which the legal observances were indeed dead, because they neither had any force, nor was anyone bound to observe them: they were not, however, deadly, because those who from the Jews were converted to Christ, could lawfully observe them, provided that they did not thereby place their hope in them, as reputing them necessary for salvation, as if without the legal observances the faith of Christ could not justify. Augustine's position was followed by St. Thomas here, q. 103, art. 4, ad 3, and other theologians commonly, with whom.

I say, the Mosaic law was not deadly as soon as its obligation began to cease, but for some time after its abrogation, it was lawful to observe its ceremonial precepts, although it was not necessary.

This is proved effectively, because the Apostles themselves used ceremonial observances in places where the Mosaic law had already ceased to oblige, sufficient promulgation of the Evangelical law having already been made: as is clear from Acts 16, where Paul circumcised Timothy, born of a Gentile father; and chapter 18, where he shaved his head in the manner of the Nazarites at Cenchrea; and chapter 22, where by the counsel of James the Apostle and the elders, he used a legal purification with the Jews, to reconcile them to himself, and, purified, together with them entered the temple. Finally, chapter 15 of the same book, in the Council of the Apostles it was ordained, that Christians should abstain from blood, and from what was strangled, which was one of the legal ceremonies.

St. Jerome responds, in the Letter cited, that the Apostles never, after Christ's resurrection, observed the legal observances in truth, but only from a certain pious simulation, lest they scandalize the Jews, and impede their conversion.

But if the ceremonies were then deadly, as Jerome thinks, it would not have been lawful for the Apostles to usurp them even simulatedly; because it is against the profession of faith, to use a superstitious worship, and to profess externally a false religion, such as was the religion of the Jews as to those observances, if they were now superstitious, and deadly. Likewise, if it had been lawful for the Apostles to use, simulatedly, the superstitious worship of the Jews, in order to win them over, as Jerome says, it would likewise have been lawful to use, simulatedly, the superstitious worship of the Gentiles, that they might more easily convert them; and now too it would be lawful to use Jewish ceremonies, to simulate their faith, that we might win them over, as St. Augustine, in the Letters cited, rightly argues against Jerome. St. Thomas adds, in the place cited above: "It seems unbecoming that the Apostles should hide, for fear of scandal, those things which pertain to the truth of life and doctrine, and use simulation in those things which pertain to the salvation of the faithful."

The conclusion can moreover be persuaded by an excellent congruence, which St. Augustine uses to prove that after the abrogation of the Mosaic law, for some time it was lawful to observe the legal observances, until the sufficient divulgation of the Gospel, although it was not necessary. For just as (he says) we are wont to keep dead men for some time before burial, that they may be delivered with the honor of burial: so it was fitting that the legal observances, which, as living, could not be observed after Christ's death, be observed as dead, until the perfect divulgation of the Gospel, so that with honor the dead mother, the Synagogue, might be buried; and lest men should think, if they were immediately rejected, that the old law had been abominable, in the same way as the worship of the Gentiles, which the Apostles never wished to tolerate for any delay.

You will say, if it was lawful, after the abrogation of the Mosaic law, to observe the legal observances for some time, Paul could not reasonably reprehend the Apostle Peter, to the Galatians 2, because he usurped them, and separated himself from the Antiochene Gentiles, recently converted, in order to live in Jewish fashion with the Jews, who had come from Jerusalem sent by James: but Paul rightly reprehended Peter, who, as is said, to the Galatians 2, was reprehensible: therefore, after the abrogation of the Mosaic law, it was not lawful to observe the legal observances.

I respond, denying the consequence of the Major, for Peter was rightly reprehended by Paul, not because he simply used Jewish ceremonies, after the abrogation of the Mosaic

law (which Paul himself had often done, as we showed above), but because he used them with some imprudence and scandal of the weak, so much so that Christians, from his deed, were led to think that the observance of the legal precepts was still necessary, and thus in a certain way were compelled to judaize, as those words of Paul to Peter signify, to the Galatians, chapter 2: "If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the Gentiles to judaize?" The solution is St. Thomas's here, q. 103, art. 4, ad 2, where he writes this: "Peter did not sin in this, that he observed the legal observances for a time, because this was lawful for him as one converted from the Jews; but he sinned in this, that he showed too much diligence concerning the observance of the legal precepts, lest he scandalize the Jews, so that from this followed the scandal of the Gentiles."

You will ask, at what precise time did the Mosaic law begin to be deadly? I respond that this is doubtful and uncertain, yet it is quite probable, as most theologians teach, that it only began to be deadly around the fortieth year after Christ's death, after the Gospel had already been sufficiently promulgated by the Apostles throughout the whole world to the Jews, and the temple of Jerusalem, together with the state of the Jewish commonwealth, had been overthrown by the Roman Emperors; for then it was no longer necessary to show honor to a Synagogue already extinct, or to use condescension toward the Jews, who had for so long been rebels against God's calling.

Chapter X

On the new, or Evangelical, divine law

It is certain by faith, that Christ not only freed us from the old law, but also instituted a new law containing precepts, and counsels of perfection; for many testimonies of both testaments clearly declare this, and Trent, session 6, canon 12, confirms it, condemning with anathema him who shall have said that Christ Jesus was given by God to men as a redeemer in whom to trust, but not also as a legislator whom to obey. Reason also supports this: no kingdom, no perfect civil or Ecclesiastical community, can be conveniently governed, stably preserved, and efficaciously directed to its proposed end, without laws, as is known by the natural light itself, and by experience: since, therefore, Christ instituted the Church, as a new spiritual kingdom, He had to give it laws, by which it might be governed in its institution, preserved, and promoted toward its proposed end, which is eternal salvation. Whence Isaiah 33, of the Messiah it is said: "The Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king: he will save us."

Nor is that of John 1 an obstacle: "The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ," by which it seems signified that Moses was a legislator, but not Christ, and that He gave no law, but only merited grace and justification for us. It is responded, however, that grace is not said to have come through Christ, and the law given through Moses, because Christ enacted no law, but because Moses gave the Jews a bare law without grace, that is, a commanding law, but not a helping one; but Christ gave us a law with grace, that is, a commanding and assisting law. For this reason it is called by the Apostle the law of the spirit, and by Christ a light yoke and a sweet burden.

The new law given by Christ contains precepts of a threefold genus, namely moral, sacramental, and of faith; among which this difference intervenes, that the moral, since they are of the law of nature, were not instituted by Christ, but only explained, and vindicated from the errors, by which through the malice of men they had become involved. The sacramental, however, were instituted by Christ, that they might be in place of the old ones, which were by Him abrogated. The precepts of faith, however, were not newly instituted, but were only made clearer from being implicit, so that now we are bound explicitly to believe certain mysteries, which in the old law were only implicitly believed: of this kind are the nativity, passion, and death of Christ, which were obscurely believed by the Jews, but are expressly believed by Christians.

The old law and the new law, or Evangelical, agree in many things, and differ in many things. They agree, first, in this, that just as the Mosaic law was promulgated on the fiftieth day after the Passover, that is, on the day of Pentecost, so also the Evangelical law, as is established, Acts 2. Second, just as the former was promulgated on Mount Sinai, so the latter on Mount Zion, according to that of Isaiah 2: "Out of Sion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem." Third, just as there thunders and lightnings were heard, so here suddenly there came a sound from heaven, as of a mighty wind coming. Fourth, just as there appeared fire and smoke, so here appeared parted tongues as of fire. Fifth, just as there the Jews were struck with fear, so here the Apostles. Sixth, just as there an Angel with the sound of a trumpet repeated the words of the Decalogue, so here the Evangelical trumpet resounded from the mouth of the Apostles, and its sound went forth into all the world. Finally, just as there two Cherubim turned their faces toward the propitiatory, so the two laws, Mosaic and Evangelical, turn their eyes toward Christ, as a certain great propitiatory of the world; since by the same grace of Christ the Jewish people, which preceded Christ's Advent, and the Christian, which follows, was made saved, and redeemed by the same blood of the immaculate lamb. Whence Augustine, Letter 157, to Optatus: "Since all the just, that is, the true worshippers of God, whether before the incarnation, or after the incarnation of Christ,

neither lived, nor live, except from the faith of Christ's incarnation, in whom is the fullness of grace: indeed, what is written, Acts 4: 'There is no other name under heaven whereby we must be saved,' from that time avails for the salvation of the human race, from which time it was corrupted in Adam."

The two laws differ, however, first in this, that the Mosaic was written on tablets of stone, by the ministry of Angels; the Evangelical, however, engraved by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of men, according to that of Jeremiah 31: "I will give my law in their bowels, and I will write it in their hearts." Whence Theophylact, on chapter 3 of the second Epistle to the Corinthians: "By as great an interval as the spirit differs from ink, and the heart from stone, so much does the old testament differ from the new." And Augustine, On the spirit and the letter, chapter 17: "There, on tablets of stone, the finger of God wrought; here, in human hearts: there the law was placed externally, by which the unjust are terrified; here it is given internally, that they might be justified." And again, chapter 21: "The new testament differs from the old, in that through the new the law of God is written in the heart of the faithful, which through the old was written on tablets. And not even the inscription, which is justification, could the law written on tablets effect in the Jews." A disciple worthy of so great a master, Prosper, echoes this, book against the Collator, chapter 22, in these words: "In hearts, with His finger, God, that is, by the Holy Spirit, writes the new testament, so that they may naturally follow the fullness of the law, and the works of charity, nature indeed being reformed and renewed."

Second, the old and new law differ in this, that the new law, since it has as present Christ, its author and founder, who was able, from perfect justice, to merit, and to satisfy God for men; and contains sacraments which have the power of causing grace, and are as it were vessels containing it, has of itself the power of justifying; the old law, otherwise, since it lacked both. Whence St. Thomas here, q. 107, art. 1, ad 2, and St. Augustine, in many places, affirm that those who in the old testament were acceptable to God through faith, according to this pertained to the new testament, for they were not justified, except through the faith of Christ, who is the author of the new testament, according to that of 1 Corinthians: "They drank of the spiritual rock that followed them: and the rock was Christ." Hence you will understand that the old law is rightly compared to a mirror, which indeed shows blemishes, but does not remove them; but the new law to water, which not only can show filth, but also wash it away: whence Ezekiel 36, the Lord promises to the faithful of the new law: "I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness."

The third difference consists in this, that the old testament was of fear, the new is of love; for the former was of servants, whose lot is fear; the latter of sons, whose lot is love

toward a father. Whence Augustine, book against Adimantus, chapter 17: "This is the briefest and clearest difference of the two testaments, fear and love. Just as, therefore, fear is prior to love, so the old testament was prior to the new; and just as fear prepares a place for charity, but when charity has begun to dwell there, the fear which prepared a place for it is driven out: so the old testament prepared a place for the new testament, which, at its coming, was abrogated."

From this follows a fourth difference, for in the old testament, the mysteries of faith, especially of the Trinity and Incarnation, were known obscurely and imperfectly; in the new, they are clearly and expressly revealed, because indeed servants do not know the counsels and secrets of the head of the household as perfectly as do sons. Whence Christ, John 14, said to the Disciples: "Now I will not call you servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doth." Augustine indicated this difference, when he said the old testament to be a concealment of the new, and the new to be a revelation of the old; and that on this account Moses, when he spoke to the people, veiled his face, but Christ spoke to us with unveiled face, as the Apostle says, 2 Corinthians 3.

From this you will understand, that just as a hemisphere becomes brighter the more it approaches the sun, so the state of the old law, according to a greater proximity to Christ and the Gospel, received a greater clarity and illumination of the knowledge of the divine mysteries, and, as Pope Gregory says, homily 16 on Ezekiel: "According to the increases of the times, the knowledge of the holy Fathers grew; the closer they were to the coming of the Savior, the more fully they perceived the sacraments of salvation."

A fifth difference between the new and the old testament consists in this, that the new opened the gates of heaven, which the old could not open, as the Apostle declares, to the Hebrews 9, in these words: "Into the second [tabernacle], the high priest alone entered once a year, not without blood, which he offered for his own and the people's ignorance: the Holy Ghost signifying this, that the way into the holies was not yet made manifest, whilst the former tabernacle was yet standing." That is: into the Holy of Holies, which was the innermost part of the temple, and more excellent than the rest, only the High Priest entered once a year, but the other priests were forbidden that entrance: because the shutting up of the innermost sanctuary, and of the more excellent part of the temple, the Holy Spirit thereby foreshadowed, that the way to heaven had been closed, as long as the old testament remained valid. But the author of the new testament, Christ, first of all penetrated heaven, and opened the heavenly way and the gates. For which reason John saw twelve gates of heaven standing open, Apocalypse 21: "The gates thereof shall not be shut. On the east, three gates; on the north, three gates; on the south, three gates; and on the west, three gates." Toward all quarters of heaven the gates stand open, because they

stand open to the inhabitants of the whole world, not by the favor of the old, but of the new testament.

Finally, omitting several other differences between the old and new law, this is the principal one and, as it were, capital, that the old law was the shadow and figure of the new, but the new is the perfection and complement of the old. Whence Jerome, book 1 against the Pelagians, chapter 9: "In the law it is promised, in the Gospel it is fulfilled: there are the beginnings, here the perfection; in that, the foundations of works are laid, here the summit of faith and grace is set upon them." And Bernard, homily 1 on "He was sent," teaches that just as the fruit is the end and complement both of the seed and of the flowers, so Christ was the end, perfection, and complement of the old law. Chrysostom (or as others hold, Victor of Antioch) uses another similitude, expounding that saying of Mark 4: "The earth of itself bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear." He adds this: first the blade fructifies in the law of nature, afterward the ears in the law of Moses, then the full corn in the Gospel.

Treatise VII

On Grace.

Since, according to Augustine, the law was given, that grace might be sought; but grace, that the law might be fulfilled, we append, not unfittingly, to the treatise on laws, a treatise on grace, in which we shall first treat of its necessity, then briefly explain its various divisions; afterward we shall discuss habitual grace, which is the principal and noblest species of grace, and expound its essence, properties, causes, and effects.

But before we treat of these, two things must be briefly premised here. The first is that by the name of grace are signified gifts conferred on us freely and liberally by God; whence since gifts of this kind are of a threefold genus, there is also a threefold acceptation and signification of grace: one broad and improper, which comprehends whatever benefit is freely and liberally granted to us by God, whether it pertains to nature, or is above nature; whence the Fathers of the sixth Synod, action 11, in the Letter to Sophronius, apply the name of grace to the immortality of the Angels, although connatural to them; and Augustine, in Letters 95 and 102, observes that the creation and preservation of things can be called grace, because it is freely and liberally granted by God. This grace Pelagius did not deny; indeed he deceived the Fathers of the Council of Palestine, granting the necessity of grace for salutary works, but understanding by the name of grace, deceitfully, the benefit of creation, or the free benefit of creation, or free

will, freely granted to us by God, as Augustine testifies, Sermon on the words of the Apostle, chapter 7, where he says of the Pelagians: "Disputing against grace in favor of free will, they gave offense to pious and Catholic ears; they began to be shunned, they began to be avoided as a sure ruin, it began to be said of them that they disputed against grace, and they found this contrivance for concealing that odium; 'I do not,' he says, 'dispute against the grace of God, whence do you prove it?' By this very thing, he says, 'I do not dispute against the grace of God, in that I defend free will.' See the acuteness, but it is glassy; it shines as if with vanity, but it is broken by the truth." The other acceptation of grace is more proper, and does not extend to any gift whatsoever, freely and liberally granted by God in creation, but only to certain natural gifts, altogether undue, such as in the state of integral nature was the gift of integrity, and such as, in the state of fallen nature, are certain special aids within the order of nature, which are given for the exercise of certain difficult and heroic works of the natural order, as will appear below. The third, finally, is the most proper, and signifies only gifts and benefits, above the whole debt of nature, shown to us through Christ, in order to our salvation, and this is the proper and Theological consideration of grace, of which we shall chiefly treat in this Treatise, although we shall sometimes make mention of grace taken in the second way.

Second, it must be explained, for what reason St. Thomas here, q. 109, in the title, calls grace an exterior principle of human acts; for since grace, both habitual and actual, intrinsically inheres in the soul, or in its powers, it seems that he ought not to have called it an extrinsic principle of human acts. Whence some say the title is faulty, and ought to be read otherwise, namely of the exterior principle of human acts, namely of God, insofar as He moves us through grace. But it is better answered that the holy Doctor calls grace an exterior principle of human acts, not inhesively, but egressively; because although it places something in the soul, either by way of a habit, as sanctifying grace, or by way of a motion, as helping grace, that nevertheless does not flow from the interior of nature, but proceeds from an exterior principle, namely God, as operating above the whole requirement of nature. Just as a stone is said to be moved by an extrinsic principle, because although the impulse inheres in it, it is nevertheless caused by an exterior principle.

Chapter I

On the necessity of grace for the knowledge of truth

Since some truths are natural, others supernatural, that the necessity of grace in order to the knowledge of truth may become more clearly evident, both must be treated here, and first indeed of the knowledge of natural truths, that is, those which can be deduced from first principles by evident consequence, and known from sensible things; afterward of the knowledge of supernatural truths, which have no connection with natural principles, and transcend all sensible and natural things, such are the mysteries of our faith, and truths revealed by God.

§ I

Man, without a special aid of God, and with only the general concurrence, can know many, indeed also each individually, natural truths, but not all collectively

The first part is against Vásquez, whom, of our own, Father Vincent Contenson most recently followed, tome 3, dissertation 2, chapter 1. It is, however, St. Thomas's, here q. 109, art. 1, where he says thus: "For the knowledge of any truth, man needs divine help, that the intellect be moved by God to its act, but he does not need, for knowing the truth in all things, a new illumination superadded to natural illumination, but only in some things which exceed natural cognition."

The Adversaries respond that St. Thomas, by these words, only excludes the necessity of a new illumination superadded to the light of the human intellect, but not the necessity of God's special aid, distinct from His general concurrence.

But against this: although St. Thomas, in the place cited, asserts that man needs God's help for the knowledge of any truth, by the name of divine help he does not understand a special gift of actual grace, but only the general concurrence of the first cause with all second causes; for he speaks of the help of God common to the intellect and to other created agents, as is manifestly established from the fact that, immediately before the words cited, he compares the human intellect with those created agents, as to the need of divine help, which he calls a motion to act: but the help of God, common to the intellect and other second causes, is not special, but general, as is established: therefore the holy Doctor asserts that man's intellect, with only God's general concurrence, without a special gift of grace, even of an equal and natural order, can know some natural truths.

This is confirmed: St. Thomas says that for the knowledge of any truth man needs divine help: but man does not need the help of special grace, even actual, and of the natural

order, for the knowledge of any truth of the natural order, e.g. for the knowledge of the first principles, which he has innate from nature, as is clear of itself: therefore St. Thomas is not speaking of a special help of God, but only of general concurrence and help.

This is further confirmed by another testimony of the same holy Doctor, taken from In II Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, art. 5, in the argument sed contra, where he concludes thus: "Therefore the intellect can have knowledge of the true without any superadded grace." Where by those words, "without any grace," he excludes the necessity of any grace, whether habitual or actual, whether of the natural or the supernatural order, for knowing natural truths. Whence, I, q. 93, art. 3, he says thus: "All those things which exist virtually in the first principles known per se, men can naturally know."

The same part can moreover be proved by this reason which the same holy Doctor insinuates in the place cited: any creature whatsoever can, with only God's general concurrence, elicit acts connatural and proportioned to itself, as the sun to illuminate, fire to heat, sight to perceive colors, and hearing sounds: therefore likewise the intellect, with the same concurrence, and without God's special help, can know natural truths, which can be deduced from first principles by evident consequence, and known from sensible things; since it naturally has (says the holy Doctor) an intelligible light which is of itself sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, namely those to whose knowledge we can come through sensible things. Otherwise (as the same Angelic Doctor says, In II Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, art. 5), human nature would be more imperfect than others, which would not suffice for itself in natural operations, and the intellect would be of a worse condition than other natural forms and powers, since it is nevertheless more perfect and active than they, as being more immaterial.

The aforesaid Contenson responds that a twofold difference is found between the intellect and the other natural forms and powers. The first is that the other natural forms and powers are not wounded by any wound, as the intellect, through original sin, remains wounded with the wound of ignorance. The second, that the other forms and powers are not indifferent, but determined to their objects; but the intellect is indifferent to the true and the false; whence that it be determined to the true rather than to the false, it needs God's help, special within the natural order.

But against this, first: although through original sin the natural light of our intellect was wounded, or attenuated, it was nevertheless not totally extinguished, as is certain by faith: therefore with only God's general concurrence it can know several natural truths, at least of the easier ones and known per se, or which can be deduced from first principles by evident consequence. The consequence is clear, for an attenuated light,

even if not intensely, can nevertheless shine; and a sick man can elicit some steps, even if not as a healthy man; likewise the visual power, however wounded and weakened, provided it is not totally extinguished, can, without God's special help, see many objects, especially those which are most visible.

This is confirmed: the will of man is more wounded through original sin, than his intellect; and more indifferent to good and evil, than that to the true and false; and yet, notwithstanding this wound and indifference, the human will in the state of fallen nature can, without grace, or God's special help, elicit many honest and morally good acts, such as to honor parents, to succor the needy, etc., as we shall show in the following chapter against the aforesaid Author: therefore a fortiori the intellect, notwithstanding the wound of ignorance, inflicted by original sin, and the indifference which it has to the true and the false, can, with only God's general concurrence, know several natural truths.

I add that, just as the will, from its natural inclination, is propense to the honest good, so the intellect is naturally inclined to the true proportioned to it; whence falsity is against its nature, just as sin is said to be against the natural inclination of man: therefore just as the will, by reason of the natural propensity which it has to the honest good, can naturally, and apart from God's special help, elicit many honest and morally good acts; so also the intellect can know many natural truths.

That it can, however, know each one, is persuaded by this reason: the greatest and most difficult knowledge of natural truths is that which is had of God from natural effects, as being that concerning a most immaterial object, and remote from the senses: but in the state of fallen nature, the divinity can naturally be known by man from creatures, as is established from that of Romans 1: "The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," and from that of Wisdom 13: "By the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby": therefore a fortiori any other natural truth, inferior to that, will be able to be known naturally, or without God's special help.

That man in the state of fallen nature, however, does not have strength to attain the whole collection of natural truths without grace, or special help, is shown against Cajetan. A weak and wounded power cannot furnish all that which a healthy and integral power can do: but to attain every speculable truth, not only divisively but also collectively, is an act of a healthy and integral intellectual power: therefore the intellect of fallen man, affected with the wound of ignorance, cannot, unless healed by grace, or strengthened by special help, attain the whole collection of natural truths.

This is confirmed: the will, on account of the wound of malice, cannot fulfill all the precepts of the law of nature taken collectively, as will appear below: therefore likewise the intellect, on account of the wound of ignorance, will not be able to know every truth collectively.

Cajetan responds that the wound of ignorance arising from original sin is only in the practical intellect, but not in the speculative, and consequently does not impede man in the state of fallen nature from attaining, collectively, every speculative truth, but only every practical truth, or one ordered to operation.

But against this: St. Thomas, 4 Contra Gentes, chapter 52, says that among the spiritual punishments of original guilt, the greatest is the weakness of reason, from which it happens that man arrives at the knowledge of truth with difficulty, and readily slips into error, and cannot altogether overcome bestial appetites, but is often clouded by them. By these words he first establishes the wound of ignorance in the speculative intellect, and then in the practical, inasmuch as it cannot overcome bestial appetites. And in this part above, q. 85, art. 3, toward the end of the body of the article, he says: "Through sin, reason is blunted chiefly in matters to be done," where the word "chiefly" also denotes that reason is blunted even in speculable matters, though less principally. Whence here, art. 2, ad 3, he asserts that human nature is more corrupted by sin, as to the appetite for good, than as to the knowledge of the true. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the wound of ignorance arising from original sin is not only in the practical intellect, but also in the speculative.

The same third part of the assertion is proved, second, by this discourse: for acting, not only physical power is required, but also moral, and expedite power, that is, free from all impediments: but in fallen man, although there is physical power for the whole collection of truths of the natural order, since these are contained within the line of the sensible, which is the proportioned object of our intellect, for the state of conjunction with the body, there is nevertheless not moral and expedite power, since in the state of fallen nature there are many impediments, by which it is as it were bound and impeded, so that it cannot attain that whole collection, namely the brevity of life, the indisposition of the body, the bluntness of the senses, the rebellion and disturbance of the passions, frequent solicitude concerning temporal things, and the like, which those words of Wisdom 9 seem to indicate: "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things": therefore man in the state of fallen nature cannot, without God's special help, attain the whole collection of natural truths.

§ II

The objections are resolved

You will object first against the first part of the assertion: the holy Fathers sometimes assert that all our knowledge descends from the Father of lights, and that every truth, by whomever spoken, is from the Holy Spirit: therefore they judge that no one, without God's special grace, can know any truth. Whence they used to pray to God for its obtaining, as is established of St. Thomas, who was accustomed to preface his studies with this form of prayer: "O Creator ineffable, who art called the true source of light and wisdom, deign to pour upon the darkness of my intellect the ray of Thy brightness, removing from me a twofold privation, both darkness and ignorance," etc.

I respond either that the holy Fathers speak of a knowledge in some way supernatural and conducing to salvation, which we confess is not had without grace; or they only indicate that the science and knowledge of natural truths flows from God as the author of nature, and through the general concurrence, moving the intellect to understand the true, as St. Thomas expounds, q. 24 De Veritate, art. 14, in his response to the argument sed contra, and here, art. 1, ad 1, in these words: "To the first it must be said that every truth, by whomsoever it be said, is from the Holy Spirit, as infusing the natural light, and moving to understand and speak the truth, not as indwelling through grace."

As for what is added concerning prayer, it must be said that St. Thomas, and other saints, either asked from God in prayer knowledge of supernatural truths, or the removal of impediments, in order that they might know natural truths more fully, more clearly, and more easily. I add that we can pray for the attainment of a truth, when it has something of fallibility and contingency, just as for the same reason we pray for rain and fair weather to be obtained. Of which more at length in the following chapter.

You will object, second, against the second part: the will, by reason of the wound contracted from original sin, remained morally powerless for some morally good works of the natural order, for example, for loving God as the author of nature, or for overcoming a grave temptation against the natural precepts, whence it cannot exercise such works without grace, or special help of the natural order, as will appear below: therefore similarly the intellect, on account of the wound of ignorance, unless strengthened by a similar help, will not be able to know each natural truth.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that although each power remained wounded through sin, yet diversely; for the intellect was not wounded as regards the first principles, from which it proceeds to knowing conclusions, but only in extrinsic things which serve the act of

understanding, for instance because the external senses were weakened, life shortened, and we contracted many needs for properly preserving it. The will, however, was wounded as to the end, which is the principle in matters of operation, inasmuch as through original guilt it remained turned away from the ultimate end; whence it is no wonder that, weakened intrinsically in the principle of acting rightly, from which all its motion begins, it cannot exercise some morally good works of the natural order, on account of their difficulty, without special help, whereas the intellect can indeed know each natural truth.

You will object, third, with Cajetan, against the third part of the assertion: the wound of ignorance arising from original sin does not affect the speculative intellect, but only the practical: therefore man in the state of fallen nature can, without special help, know all speculative truths taken collectively. The consequence is clear from what has been said above. The antecedent, however, Cajetan proves from St. Thomas above, q. 81, art. 3, where, in assigning the powers which remained wounded by sin, he asserts one of these to be reason, in which is prudence: that is (as the same Author interprets it) reason as it underlies prudence: but reason, as it underlies prudence, is practical and not speculative: therefore, according to St. Thomas, only the practical intellect was wounded by original sin.

I respond, denying the antecedent, and to its proof I say that that gloss of Cajetan is not good, nor consonant with the text, for the holy Doctor there says that the will was wounded, in which is justice, and yet from this it is not permitted to infer that the will only received the wound of malice, insofar as it underlies justice; for those words do not make a reduplicative sense, but a specificative one. When, therefore, he says that reason, in which is prudence, was wounded, he only means that practical reason, in which prudence resides, was chiefly wounded, as he expressly hands down at the end of the body of the same article, in those words which we cited above: "Through sin, reason is blunted chiefly in matters to be done."

You will object, fourth: any creature whatsoever can, with only general concurrence, go forth into an act proportioned to its form, or natural power, as St. Thomas teaches here, art. 1. But to know all natural truths collectively is an act proportioned to the natural light of our intellect, even in the state of fallen nature, since it has for its proportioned object sensible being, or that which can be known through species furnished by the senses, under which all natural truths are contained, since through them (as we declared above) we understand only those which can be known from the senses: therefore man in the state of fallen nature can know all natural truths collectively.

I respond by distinguishing the major: any creature whatsoever can, with only general concurrence, go forth into an act proportioned to its form or power, by moral proportion as well as physical, I concede the major. By physical proposition only, I deny the major. In the state of fallen nature, however, although the collection of all natural truths is proportioned to the human intellect by physical proportion, it is not so by moral proportion, on account of the extrinsic impediments, adduced above, by which, in such a state, the cognitive power is bound, and impeded from going forth into an act proportioned to its power.

You will say, notwithstanding those impediments, man can know each individual natural truth: therefore also all collectively, since the consequence holds by ascending from each individual enumerated to all together; as if it were said, this man is capable of laughter, and that one, and this one, and so proceeding through individuals: therefore every man is capable of laughter, or all men collectively taken are capable of laughter.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence, and to its proof I say that the mode of arguing from individuals to all together by ascending is good, when the consequent is taken in the same way as the antecedent, but not so if it is taken in another way: e.g. if I should say, this horse, separated from another, cannot draw a cart, nor that one, nor this one; therefore neither can all horses together and collectively — the argument would not hold, because one would proceed from a divisive sense to a collective one. Thus likewise, although this argumentation is good: the intellect can know this, and that, and that other truth, enumerating them all divisively; therefore also all of them similarly divisively. It does not, however, hold thus: the intellect can know this, and that, and that other truth divisively; therefore also all collectively, because the same defect is committed, and one argues from a divisive to a collective sense.

You will say again, the intellect, since it is a spiritual power, the more truths it knows, the more powerful it becomes for knowing others: therefore it will eventually be able to attain the whole collection of natural truths.

I respond that although the intellect, the more it knows, becomes the more powerful in itself for knowing others, it is nevertheless weakened and fatigued in the things annexed to it and subservient to it, namely the bodily senses, and consequently, on account of that impediment, and other similar ones recounted above, it cannot attain the whole collection of natural truths.

You will ask, whether man in the state of fallen nature can, without special help, know not only each speculative natural truth, but also each practical one?

I respond that although the human intellect can, without special help, know each individual practical natural truth, which pertains to moral Philosophy, and which are principles or conclusions of it, since the same reasoning applies to these as to the speculative ones, nevertheless not every practical truth pertaining to prudence, since, when man in the state of fallen nature is, through original sin, turned away from God as natural and supernatural end, he cannot, without grace, or special help, form this practical and prudential judgment: "Here and now God, as author of nature, is to be loved above all things"; both because such a judgment depends on the rectitude of the appetite, and also because it is always joined with execution, and has the nature of a practical command: but in the state of fallen nature man cannot, without special help, love God, even as author of nature, above all things, as we shall show, chapter 3.

§ III

For knowing supernatural truths, and assenting to the mysteries of our faith, external revelation does not suffice, but internal grace is necessarily required, not only in the intellect, but also in the will

The first part is certain by faith, against the Pelagians, who taught that, external revelation or doctrine being supposed, man could, without special intrinsic grace, believe the mysteries of faith. In this error Augustine, Book On the predestination of the Saints, chapter 3, confesses that he himself was before his Pontificate, and refutes it there with various testimonies of Scripture, especially those words of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4: "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?" By which he says he was convicted and moved to retract what he had taught before his Pontificate. Likewise he urges the Pelagians from the words of the same Apostle immediately preceding: "For who distinguisheth thee?" For (he says) if faith were in us from ourselves, any believer could say: my faith, which I have not from grace, but from myself, distinguishes me. He also urges them from that of 2 Corinthians 3: "Not that we are sufficient to think any thing of ourselves, as of ourselves." For to think is less than to believe, since to believe is to think with assent: if therefore we cannot think supernatural truths of ourselves, much less can we believe them.

Reason also persuades this, for the assent of faith by which we assent to the aforesaid truths is supernatural, since it attains them under the motive, or formal reason under which they are supernatural, namely the light of divine revelation: therefore it is disproportionate to the natural powers of the intellect, and consequently needs an elevation and grace intrinsic to it, for eliciting it.

That, however, not only in the intellect, but also in the will, supernatural help is required, is certain even by faith, against the Semipelagians, who, although with the Catholic Church they confessed that we cannot believe the revealed mysteries without grace, nevertheless contended that the beginning of faith was from us, namely a pious affection for believing, or a certain affection of credulity. This error is proscribed in the Council of Orange, canon 5, in these words: "If anyone says that, as an increase, so also the beginning of faith, and the very affection of credulity, is in us not by the gift of grace, but naturally: he is proved to be an adversary of the Apostolic dogmas," etc.

Reason also supports this, for for believing from a supernatural motive, a pious motion or affection of the will is required, which efficaciously moves and determines the intellect to assent to the truths revealed to it: therefore supernatural help is also required on the part of the will. The consequence is clear, because the will, by its own powers alone, cannot efficaciously move to a supernatural act, of which sort is to believe from a supernatural motive. The antecedent, however, is usually proved in the treatise on faith, from the fact that supernatural truths differ from natural in this, that the latter have evidence either from themselves, or from the medium through which they are illuminated, by reason of which evidence they convince the intellect, and, as it were, extort assent from it, without there being necessary that it be applied to such an act by the will, at least by a free application: but the former have no evidence by which their certainty can be penetrated by the intellect, and consequently, however much they are proposed, they do not convince the intellect, nor draw it to furnishing assent, but it is necessary that it be specially applied by the will to such an assent. Whence Augustine beautifully says, Tract on John: "Whoever can enter the Church unwilling, can approach the altar unwilling, but he cannot believe unless willing." This application, however, is commonly called a pious motion or affection of the will, and that which is said, Acts 16, of a certain Lydia, a seller of purple, can be understood of it, namely that God opened her heart to attend to the things which were said by Paul, for there by the heart the will is signified, which must first be touched and changed by God through the help of grace, before the intellect furnishes assent to the revealed truths.

This is confirmed: that pious affection of the will has a supernatural object: therefore it is supernatural, and consequently demands supernatural help for its formal principle. Both consequences are clear, for from the supernaturality of the formal object, the supernaturality of the help and principle is rightly gathered. The antecedent, however, is proved: the object willed by the pious affection is the act of faith itself, formally: but that is supernatural: therefore that pious affection has a supernatural object.

You will object first against the first part of the assertion with a difficult testimony of Augustine, taken from the book On the gift of perseverance, chapter 14, where, speaking of the Tyrians and Sidonians, who, having seen Christ's miracles, would have believed, as is said Matthew 11, he adds: "From which it appears that some have, in their very natural disposition, a divine gift of intelligence, by which they are induced to faith, if they hear words, or see signs, congruent with their minds." By these words he seems to teach that some, from the mere natural gift of intelligence, without any interior gift of grace by which they might be prevented, can be moved to faith, and believe the revealed mysteries.

I respond that there is a twofold, and that most true, understanding of this passage. The first is that by the natural light of intelligence, St. Augustine does not understand something natural, but understands a naturally divine gift, that is, divine and supernatural by its own nature, for understanding: for in this way Augustine himself, as related by St. Thomas, explains that saying of the Apostle, "The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," saying: "Let it not move you that he said they did by nature the things that are of the law, for this the Spirit of grace does, that He restore in us the image of God, according to which we were naturally made."

The second, which is more literal, and seems more consonant with the text, is that St. Augustine there speaks of the motion to faith only objectively, so that he only means that some have a natural gift of intelligence of such a kind, that the same miracles, and the same external preaching of the Gospel, are more congruent with their natural disposition, than with the disposition of others, to move them only externally and objectively, because they entice them and invite them externally and objectively more than others — and yet not that that mere exterior vision of signs, in fact, draws them to faith, so that in fact through it alone they believe. That this is Augustine's mind is established from the words added, for he immediately adds: "And yet if, by God's higher judgment, they are not distinguished from the mass of perdition by the grace of predestination, neither are the divine words or deeds, by which they could believe, applied to them, even if they would indeed believe such things, if they should hear or see them."

You will object second against the second part of the assertion: if for believing supernatural help is required on the part of the will, just as it is required on the part of the intellect, it follows that just as in the intellect, besides actual help, a supernatural habit of faith is posited, by which it is permanently inclined to believing; so also there must be posited some supernatural habit in the will, by which it too is permanently inclined to commanding the act of faith: but this seems absurd: therefore also that. The

major seems true, since the same reasoning applies to the habit and the help, and to the will and the intellect. The minor, however, is persuaded thus: such a supernatural habit received in the will will be neither a Theological virtue (since the Theological virtues are only three, namely faith, hope, and charity), nor an infused moral virtue; because the infused moral virtues are lost through mortal sin, as also the grace from which they emanate; but if such a habit were given in the will, it would remain in the sinner, just as faith, since the sinner can elicit a formless act of faith: therefore such a habit in the will is not to be admitted.

I respond, first, by denying the consequence of the major, for just as in natural things, for the effecting of works of art, a habit is posited in the intellect alone, not, however, in the will, although both it and the instruments must be moved by the will; so for assenting to the revealed mysteries, a habit is not to be posited in the will, but only in the intellect; although the intellect does not elicit the assent of faith, except applied by the will, but it suffices that the will be elevated to this application by an equal help. The reason, however, of the disparity between the intellect and the will, as to the act of faith, is that the intellect is that which immediately elicits the act of faith, and therefore in it is the formal and immediate difficulty, which must be overcome through a habit; but the will only mediately and applicatively concurs to it, and therefore does not need a habit.

I respond, second, granting the consequence of the major, denying the minor. To its proof it must be said that such a habit received in the will is not properly a moral virtue, nor Theological, but reductively pertains to the Theological virtue, namely to faith, as a way and disposition to it. Both solutions are probable, although the first seems more probable, and easier. But of this more at length in the Treatise on faith, chapter 7.

Chapter II

On the necessity of grace for willing and doing good

It is certain by faith, against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, that fallen man cannot, without the help of grace, think, will, or do anything, which conduces to eternal life; for Scripture evidently teaches this, John 6: "No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him," and 15: "Without me you can do nothing." 1 Corinthians 12: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost." The same is established from the definitions of Orange, canon 7, and of Trent, session 6, canons 1, 2, 3. Reason also persuades this, for since eternal life is something supernatural, exceeding every requirement of created and creatable nature, the means proportioned to it must be supernatural, and thus exceed all the powers of nature. The only difficulty, therefore, can be whether man equally needs grace for willing and effecting a moral good of the natural order, or for eliciting honest and morally good acts, such as to honor parents, succor the needy, prudently govern the commonwealth, render to each what is his own; or whether for this the natural power of free will suffices, or the inclination instilled in it by nature toward the honest good, which through original sin is not entirely extinguished, but only diminished and weakened?

In the resolution of this most celebrated difficulty, Authors hold various opinions. Some indeed require, for any work of honesty whatsoever, the influence of habitual grace, and the command of charity, such as Michael Baius. Others, with Jansenius, necessarily require at least the influence of Christian faith. Others think a certain actual helping grace necessary. Thus Gregory of Rimini, and Vásquez, whom, of our own, Vincent Contenson follows in his Theology of the mind and heart. The Thomists, finally, and others commonly, teach that for this the powers of free will, with God's general concurrence, suffice.

§ I

The first three opinions are refuted, and the fourth is established

I say, first, for a moral work of the natural order, habitual grace, nor the command of charity, is required.

The first part seems to be of faith, for it is manifestly gathered from Trent, session 6, canon 7, where anathema is pronounced on him who shall have said that all works which are done before justification are truly sins. And canon 8, he is condemned who shall have said that the fear of hell is evil: but this fear is found in sinners before obtaining the grace of justification: therefore, according to Trent, whatever is done by sinners, before

obtaining justification, is not evil. Whence Scripture exhorts sinners to almsgiving, and other good works, which it would not do, if these could not be done by a sinner, without any admixture of sin; and it says, Daniel 4, to Nebuchadnezzar: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms": but it is established that sins cannot be redeemed by evil works. Finally, Augustine, On the spirit and the letter, chapter 24, writes this: "Just as certain venial sins, without which this life is not led, do not impede the just from eternal life; so certain good works, without which the life of the most wicked man is hardly found, avail nothing for eternal salvation." By these words he plainly declares that just as human frailty, by an utterly ineluctable force, often entangles even the most just man in some venial sins; so the light of the countenance of the Lord, naturally instilled in man, and the inextinguishable reason of the good and the equitable, assiduously soliciting the mind, frequently extorts from any wicked man some light and easy natural good works, unspoiled by any admixture of evil or wicked intention. Whence Chrysostom, homily 67 to the people: "The evil cannot be altogether evil, but it happens that he has something of good; nor can the good be altogether good, but he is wont to have some sins."

From these the second part remains proved; for since charity is inseparable from habitual grace, if without its influence some honest and morally good work could be elicited by unjustified sinners, it will likewise be manifest that that too could be effected by them without the motion and command of charity.

I add that in this the moral goodness of our acts is distinguished from their supernatural and meritorious goodness of eternal life, that the former, since it is purely natural, is constituted without habitude to the supernatural end, through the mere conformity which the act has with right reason and natural prudence; the latter, however, proceeds from the influence of grace and charity, referring our acts to the supernatural end; whence although man without charity cannot elicit acts morally good of the supernatural order, and meritorious of eternal life, he can nevertheless elicit honest and morally good acts of the natural order, e.g. to honor parents, to obey superiors, to succor the needy; for these acts have honesty or moral goodness from their proximate end, or object, whence, for them to be morally good, it is not necessary that they participate in that from an extrinsic end and the command of charity. Otherwise, if any honest and morally good work should have to be done from the motive of charity, it would follow that no virtue is given besides charity, to which alone it would belong to operate on account of such a motive, which manifestly conflicts with Scripture and the holy Fathers, who acknowledge and commend several other virtues in many places. Of which more at length in the Treatise on the Virtues in common, chapter 6.

I say, second, for eliciting an honest and morally good work, with natural honesty and goodness, faith is not required.

This is proved, first: in infidels there are some honest and morally good works: therefore for them, faith is not required in the one operating, but the natural light of reason suffices. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved from Scripture, which in various places relates that some works of infidels were rewarded by God. For Exodus 1 says that God rewarded the Egyptian midwives, on account of the benefit rendered by them to the Israelites, and built them houses. And Ezekiel 29, Nebuchadnezzar is said to have received from God the wages of his work. From which (says Jerome) we understand that even the heathen, if they have done any good work, are not passed over by God's judgment without a reward. Whence Augustine, Book 5 of the City of God, chapter 15, asserts that God gave the Romans an ample empire, that their virtues might have some remuneration in this life: but God does not reward evil and perverse works, but only good and honest ones: therefore in infidels there are some honest and morally good works. And in the book On the spirit and the letter, chapter 27, he says there are certain deeds of infidels, alien to the grace of Christ, which, according to the rule of justice, we not only cannot vituperate, but even deservedly and rightly praise, etc. Wherefore, Letter 130, he praises the continence of Polemon the Heathen, and says it was a gift of God.

Jansenius responds that by these and similar testimonies it is only proved that in infidels there are some works good from office, or from object, but not on the part of the end.

But against this, first: Scripture, Jerome, and Augustine, in the places cited, testify that some works of infidels were rewarded by God: but if these had been good only from object, and evil as to the end, or evil from the intention and affection of the one operating, they would not have been rewarded by God, since such works deserve not a reward but a punishment: therefore Scripture and the holy Fathers cited think them to have been good, not only from office, or from object, but also from the end of the one operating.

Against, second: Augustine cited says that some works of infidels are so good, that according to the rule of justice they deserve rightly to be praised: but the rule of justice attends chiefly to the end and intention of the one operating, and judges an act good in itself but from a bad intention, not worthy of praise but of reproach: therefore Augustine thinks that in infidels there are some good works, not only from the object which they regard, but also from the end and intention by which they are done. Nor is it an obstacle that the same holy Doctor there adds, of those works of infidels: "Although if it is discussed with what end they are done, they are hardly found which deserve the due

praise of justice." For the particle "hardly" does not signify that such good works are never found in infidels, but only that they are rarely and with difficulty found in them, because they for the most part operate from some depraved motive, especially from vainglory, as we shall say below.

Against, third: the same holy Doctor, Letter 99, to Evodius, asserts that in infidels there are some works so good that they are deservedly proposed for imitation: but works good only from object, and evil from the end of the one operating, since they are true sins, ought not to be proposed for imitation, but rather for detestation; otherwise one who gave alms to a needy woman, from the intention of inducing her into sin, could be proposed as one to be imitated, which is absurd: therefore, etc.

The conclusion is proved, second, from St. Thomas, who plainly favors our opinion. For on chapter 14 of the Epistle to the Romans, lecture 1, he says thus: "When an infidel does some good from a dictate of reason, not referring it to a bad end, he does not sin. His work, however, is not meritorious, because it is not informed by grace." And on chapter 1 of the Epistle to Titus, expounding these words of the Apostle, "But to them that are defiled, and to unbelievers, nothing is clean," he adds: "When a sinner does something good, according as he is a sinner and an infidel, it is entirely sin from the root; but if someone does it from the principle of some good he has, such as unformed faith, or nature, it is not unclean." Likewise, II-II, q. 10, art. 4, he asks whether every action of an infidel is a sin? And he responds negatively: "Because" (he says, in his response to the third objection) "through infidelity, natural reason is not totally corrupted in infidels, but there remains in them some knowledge of the true, through which they can do some work of a good kind." St. Augustine insinuates this reasoning, On the spirit and the letter, chapter 28, in these words: "Nevertheless, because in the human soul, the image of God has not been so worn away by the stain of earthly affections, that not even the most extreme outline remains in it, whence it may deservedly be said, that even in the impiety of its life, it does something of the law, or has some savor of it."

The conclusion is proved, third, by dismantling Jansenius's principal foundation; for he thinks all the works of infidels to be sins for this reason, that they either refer their works, good from office or object, to the depraved end of their infidelity, or at least omit to refer them to the true end, God, whom they do not know; whence they become evil either from the addition of a depraved end, or from the omission of what is due: but both are false: therefore Jansenius's principal foundation collapses. The minor, as to the first part, is clear, for an infidel can give alms to a needy person, without referring that work to his idol, or to the depraved end of his infidelity, as is established from the testimonies of St. Thomas already adduced, and from the doctrine which he hands down II-II, q. 10, art. 4,

in the body, where he says thus: "Just as one having faith can commit some sin in an act which he does not refer to the end of faith, either sinning venially, or even mortally: so also an infidel can do some good act, in that he does not refer it to the end of infidelity." And indeed (says Soto, Book 1 On nature and grace, chapter 10), if anyone can, at his pleasure, throw a coin into a river, why could he not give it to a poor man, without any evil circumstance, because it is honest?

The second part of the same minor is shown thus: for a human act to be honest and morally good, with natural honesty and goodness, it is not required that it be ordered to God as ultimate end. Both because, as we said in the preceding conclusion, in this the moral goodness of human acts is distinguished from their supernatural and meritorious goodness of eternal life, that the former is constituted through the order and relation to the honest good and consonant with reason, which of itself tends toward God as the author of the light of reason and of all honest good; the latter, however, from the order and relation to God as supernatural author, and simply ultimate end. Also, because it is repugnant that order to the supernatural end be of the essence and nature of purely natural goodness, such is the moral goodness of human acts, of which we treat in the present, namely their honesty, and conformity with reason. Also, finally, because since the order of human acts to God as supernatural author, and simply ultimate end, proceeds only from the motion and command of charity, if that were necessarily required for their honesty and moral goodness, it follows that not only the light of faith, but also the command of charity, is necessarily required for the moral goodness of human acts; and consequently that the fear of hell is evil, and that the acts done by sinners before obtaining grace and charity, are sins; which is erroneous, and condemned by Trent, as was shown in the preceding conclusion. I add that, if order to God as simply ultimate end were necessary for the honesty and moral goodness of our works, since man, whenever he acts with deliberation, is bound to act honestly and morally well, nor can there be given any deliberate human act, indifferent in the individual, as the more common opinion of theologians teaches with the Angelic Doctor, and as Jansenius himself confesses; it would follow that man, whenever he acts deliberately and in a human manner, is bound by the precept of charity, and of the love of God above all things, which is altogether foreign to the common opinion of theologians; for since such a precept is affirmative, it does not oblige always, but at determined times. Whence Rainer, in the Pantheologia, under the word "Infidelity," chapter 13: "Although the act of an infidel does not have the goodness which is sought from the ultimate end, because it is not done directly for the sake of God as for an end, it is nevertheless not sin from this very fact, that it is not ordered in this way to God as to an end, for our act need not always be ordered to the end of beatitude: whose reason is, that affirmative precepts do

not oblige to always, although they oblige always; whence it is not necessary that the act of infidels, which is not ordered to that end, always be sin, but only for that time in which he is bound to refer his act to the ultimate end." By these words he dismantles Jansenius's principal foundation.

I say, third, man in the state of fallen nature can, by the powers of nature alone, elicit some morally good works, or works pertaining to the honesty of this life; and consequently for them there is required neither grace strictly taken, nor special help of the natural order, but God's general motion and concurrence suffice.

This is proved, first, from Trent, session 6, canon 1, where it is thus had: "If anyone shall say that man, by his own works, whether they be done through the powers of human nature, or through the doctrine of the law, without the divine grace through Jesus Christ, can be justified before God, let him be anathema." By these words the Council manifestly supposes that through the powers of nature, without the grace of Jesus Christ, some morally good works can be effected: but this cannot be understood of works good only from office, or from object, and evil from the end and intention of the one operating: therefore the Council supposes that through the powers of nature, some good works can be done, not only from object, but also from the end of the one operating. The minor is proved: since works good only from object, and evil from the end and intention of the one operating, are truly sins (as is established from the example of alms given to a needy woman, from the intention of inducing her into sin), the heretics whose error the Council proscribes in that canon were not so demented and stolid as to say that man was justified through these (otherwise they would have affirmed that sins are removed by sins), but they asserted this of works morally good, both from object, and from the end and intention of the one operating: therefore the Council supposes that such works can be done through the powers of nature.

This is proved, second, from Augustine, who, as we showed in the preceding conclusion, chapters 27 and 28 of the book On the spirit and the letter, teaches that infidels had some good works, which according to the rule of justice we rightly praise, and consequently good not only from office, or from object, without the end of the one operating; since the rule of justice attends chiefly to the end and intention of the one operating, and judges an act good in itself but from a bad intention, not worthy of praise but of reproach, as we noted above: but Augustine judges that infidels did such works from the powers of free will alone, and without grace superadded to nature: therefore, according to his doctrine, man in the state of fallen nature, through the powers of nature alone, can effect some works honest and good, not only from object, but also from the end of the one operating. The major is clear from what was said in the preceding conclusion; the

minor is established from the reason which Augustine there, chapter 28, assigns; for he says that infidels did those good works, and worthy of praise according to the rule of justice, because in the human soul, the image of God has not been so worn away by the stain of earthly affections, that not even the most extreme outline remains in it, whence it may deservedly be said, that even in the impiety of its life, it does something of the law, or has some savor of it. And a little further on, speaking of the same infidels, he adds: "They themselves were men, and that power of nature was in them, by which the rational soul feels and has some savor of something lawful, even though it did not have that piety which transfers into eternal life."

This is proved, third, from St. Thomas, who also plainly favors our opinion, for in q. 24 De Veritate, art. 14, he asks whether free will can, without grace, be directed toward good. And he responds thus: "As to the good which is above nature, it is established that free will cannot without grace, because through such a good man merits eternal life; but it is established that without grace man cannot merit. But that good which is proportioned to human nature, man can accomplish through free will." That by "good proportioned to human nature," he understands the honest and moral good of the natural order, and this is the giving of alms, is clear from these words immediately preceding: "That act which is to give alms is a good proportioned to human powers, according as man is moved to this by a certain natural love or benevolence." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, man, through free will, and through the powers of nature alone, can bestow alms, from a certain natural love and benignity, and consequently elicit other similar honest and morally good acts.

Nor can it be said that the holy Doctor, by these words, "through free will," indeed excludes the necessity of sanctifying grace, or of a habitual, supernatural gift, but not the necessity of supernatural help, or at least of special help of the natural order. For St. Thomas there subjoins: "Although man can do goods of this kind without gratifying grace, he cannot, however, do them without God, since no thing can go forth into any operation, except by divine power; because a second cause does not act, except through the power of the first cause, as is said in the book On causes." By these words he requires for acts of this kind only God's general concurrence, by which all second causes are subordinated to the first in operating, not, however, God's supernatural help, or special help within the order of nature. Whence in this part, q. 109, art. 2, he expressly teaches that man in the state of corrupted nature can, by the power of his own nature, do some particular good. By these words he excludes any special help whatsoever, distinct from general concurrence; for we do not say that man can, by the power of his own nature, do that for which special help is required, as being merely gratuitous, and in no way owed to

nature.

Nor is it valid what Vásquez says, and after him Contenson, adhering to him too much in this question, that the holy Doctor there does not speak of moral but of natural good, because (they say) he adduces as example works which are for the convenience of nature, or for external governance, namely to build houses, plant vineyards, etc. Whence he indeed concedes that good architects and good vine-dressers can be given without grace, but not good and just men. It is not valid, I say. Both because in q. 24 De Veritate, already cited, he adduces the example of almsgiving, which no one doubts to be an honest and morally good work. Also because St. Thomas, here, article 2, adducing the example of works which are done for the convenience of nature, or for external governance, speaks of them as they are done from deliberation; but it is established, in St. Thomas's doctrine, that no work is given, done deliberately, which in the individual is neither morally good, nor morally evil, but indifferent to moral goodness or malice: therefore he speaks of those works as they are in the genus of morals, not as they only pertain to the order of nature, and are done for its convenience or utility.

The conclusion is proved, fourth, by this reason which the same holy Doctor there insinuates: man, in the state of integrity and innocence, could, through his natural [powers], operate every moral good proportioned to his nature: therefore in the state of fallen nature he can, from the powers of his nature, elicit at least some honest and morally good act. The consequence is clear, for the free will of man, or the natural propensity which man has toward the honest good and consonant with reason, is not totally extinguished through original sin, but only weakened and infirmed, as Trent asserts, session 6, canon 5. Therefore just as a sick man, although he cannot move perfectly with the motion of a healthy man, unless healed by the help of medicine, can nevertheless have through himself some imperfect motion; so man in the state of fallen nature will be able to effect through his own powers some moral work of the natural order, even if not every one, which is proper to a healthy man.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated from Augustine, Letter 107, to Vitalis, saying: "We lost free will for loving God, through the greatness of the first sin." For from those words this argument is deduced: original guilt being supposed, man can love God above all things, and yet because he cannot do this by the vigor of nature, Augustine asserts that we lost free will for loving God: therefore if fallen man could, by his own powers, effect no good work of the moral order of nature, even if he could do it through grace, it would be true to say that we lost free will for operating good, through the greatness of the first sin.

Nor is it valid what Vincent Contenson says, namely that in order for free will to be said, by the greatness of the first sin, not to have been extinguished for operating good, but only attenuated and infirmed, it suffices that from its own powers, and without the help of grace, it can elicit works good from office or from object, although they be evil from the end of the one operating. It is not valid, I say, for since such works are sordid with the stain of sin, if man in the state of fallen nature, from the powers of free will, could only elicit those, it follows that free will in that state avails only for sinning, and consequently that we lost, by the greatness of the first sin, free will for operating well, which conflicts with Trent.

§ II

The objections are resolved

You will object first against the first conclusion: for the moral goodness of human acts it is necessary that they be referred to God: but they are referred to Him through charity: therefore for the goodness of moral acts the command of charity is required.

I respond by denying the Major, for although for the supernatural and meritorious goodness of human acts, it is required that they be referred to God by the one operating, through the command of charity; their honesty and moral goodness, however, does not require that such relation be intended by the one operating, but it suffices that this act, by its nature or object, be ordered to God, as the author of natural light and of the honest good, and as a particular good to the universal good; and that he who elicits such an act not impede such ordination, ordering it to some depraved end, or vitiating it by some other evil circumstance: for by this very fact, that the relation which the act, by its nature, imports to God, is not impeded, it is referred to Him, at least interpretatively, and it acquires goodness from such a relation. Just as a stone, by its own nature, tends and is carried toward the center as toward the term and end of its motion, unless it is violently propelled upward by an extrinsic agent, and by such an impulse and violent detention, is impeded from union with the center, or with the place below.

You will object second against the second conclusion: no work can be given without right intention, according to that of Ambrose, Book On offices, chapter 3: "Your affection gives a name to your work": but there cannot be right intention without faith, since faith is as it were the eye of the mind which directs intention: therefore neither a good work. Whence Augustine, on Psalm 31: "Let no one count his works good before faith, for where faith was not, there was no good work: for intention makes a work good, faith directs intention."

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor, and to its proof it must be said, with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, art. 4, ad 2, that faith directs intention with respect to the supernatural ultimate end, but natural reason can direct intention with respect to some connatural good. Whence Augustine, in the place cited, speaks of good works of the supernatural order, but not of works good with only moral goodness of the natural order, of which alone we treat in the present.

You will object third: St. Augustine, Book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, teaches that faith is desired for every good work, and consequently that no work is good without faith, from which he infers that all the works of infidels are sins, and that the virtues of the Philosophers were not true virtues, but vices.

I respond that these testimonies of Augustine, on which Jansenius chiefly relies, must necessarily be softened by some benign interpretation. For Augustine, in the place cited, does not require just any faith whatsoever for a good work, but faith which operates through charity, which is found neither in an infidel, nor even in a sinning Christian. Augustine's words are these: "Learn that he who does not do good works with a good intention of faith, that is, of faith which operates through love, has his whole body, as it were with members, consisting of works, dark, that is, full of the blackness of sins." He teaches the same in several other places, especially in the book On the grace of Christ, chapter 26, in these words: "Where there is no love, no good work is credited, nor is it rightly called a good work, because everything that is not of faith is sin." Where Augustine understands those words of the Apostle, "everything that is not of faith is sin," of faith operating through charity, and yet Jansenius requires not the influence of charity, but of faith alone, for a good work, lest he strike upon the error of Michael Baius, condemned by Trent: therefore he too is bound to explain Augustine by some interpretation, just as we are.

It must therefore be said that Augustine, in the place cited, only means that no work is, without faith, simply and by antonomasia good, since indeed for man ordered to eternal glory, nothing is absolutely good, except that which leads or conduces to it; and nothing absolutely evil, except that which leads away from it. That this interpretation is legitimate is clear from the same holy Doctor there, where he says thus: "Know that we call only that good of man, that good will, that good work, which cannot be done by anyone without the grace of God, through which alone man can be led to the eternal gift and kingdom of God." Whence there, column 10, he permits Julian to say that certain good works are done through the powers of nature, provided he confesses them to be sterile for eternal life.

When, however, Augustine asserts that all the works of infidels are sins, he only means that all the works of infidels which proceed from them reduplicatively as infidels, or from an error contrary to faith, are sins, even if they are good from object and their species. For thus if an infidel, in honor of his gods, preserves virginity, or gives alms, he undoubtedly sins, because in these acts he does not operate as a man, and from the rule of right reason, but as an infidel, and from the rule of his own error, or from a depraved intention conceived on the occasion of infidelity. In the same sense must that of the Apostle be understood, which Augustine frequently cites: "Everything that is not of faith is sin," for the phrase "not of faith" must be taken not only negatively, but also contrarily, so that the sense is: that which is not of faith, but of infidelity, is sin, as St. Thomas interprets it there, lecture 3, at the end, where he says: "Everything that is not of faith is sin, must be understood thus: everything that is against faith is sin, even if it seems by its genus to be good."

Finally, when Augustine denies in infidels, or the ancient Philosophers, true virtues, by the name of true virtue he understands perfect virtue, which promotes man to eternal life, or, as he himself says in the place cited, which serves to free and beatify men. Whence there he says: "If, for the attaining of true beatitude, which faith has promised to us through Christ, the virtues avail nothing to man, they are not true virtues." I add that since virtue is not generated except through the frequentation of good acts, and the ancient Philosophers most rarely elicited good and honest acts, unless vitiated by some depraved circumstance, especially of vainglory, they most rarely acquired true moral virtues, and what was generated from their frequently repeated acts was not virtue, but vice. Whence Jerome, Letter 4, to Rusticus: "The Philosophers of the world heal a vice with a vice; we overcome vices by the love of virtues."

You will object fourth with Vásquez against the third conclusion, various testimonies of Scripture, of Councils, and of the Supreme Pontiffs, by which it seems insinuated that man, without grace, can effect no good work. For John 14, Christ says: "Without me you can do nothing." Weighing this passage, Augustine, Tract 81 on John, adds: "Whether little or much, it cannot be done without Him; without whom nothing can be done." Whence, Letter 46, to Valentine, he concludes thus: "Understand my letter according to this faith, that you neither deny the grace of God, nor so defend free will as to separate it from the grace of God, as if without it we could by any reasoning either think anything or do anything according to God — which we altogether cannot; for on this account the Lord, when speaking of the fruit of justice, said to His Disciples: 'Without me you can do nothing.'" Likewise the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 3, pronounces the very thought of good, which is the beginning of all honesty, to be a gift of God, saying: "Not that we are

sufficient to think any thing of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God." Similarly Celestine I, in the Letter to the Bishops of Gaul, manifestly declares the same necessity of helping grace for each individual good act. For, chapter 7, he says: "No one, except through Christ, uses free will well." And chapter 8: "All the pursuits and all the works and merits of the Saints must be referred to the glory and praise of God, because no one pleases Him, except from what He Himself has bestowed." Likewise, chapter 9: "So does God operate in the hearts of men, and in the very free will, that a holy thought, and every good motion of the will, is from God, because it is through Him that we are able to do any good, without whom we can do no good." Finally, in the Council of Palestine held at Diospolis, it was defined that the grace of God is necessary for each individual act. This Pelagius himself was compelled to confess, as Augustine relates, Letters 106 and 107. Likewise in the Council of Orange 2, canon 2, it is thus had: "There are many good things in man, which man does not do; but man does no good things, which God does not grant that man should do." And canon 9: "As often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work." And canon 12, he consecrates those words of Augustine, Tract 3 on John: "No one has anything of his own, except lying and sin; but if a man has anything of truth and justice, it is from that fount, which we ought to thirst for in this desert."

I respond, first, that the aforesaid testimonies of Scripture, Councils, and Supreme Pontiffs are to be understood, not of good moral work universally, but of good work conducing to the salvation of the soul, and to eternal life. That this interpretation is legitimate is established, first, from the Council of Orange 2, canon 7, where it is thus had: "If anyone shall say that man, by the vigor of nature, can think, as is fitting, or choose any good WHICH PERTAINS TO SALVATION OF ETERNAL LIFE, he is deceived by a heretical spirit, not understanding the voice of God in the Gospel, 'Without me you can do nothing,' and that of the Apostle, 'Not that we are able to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves,'" etc. By these words the Council not only manifestly declares that it is speaking of the good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, but also that the two testimonies adduced above, which the Adversaries object to us, and which are, among them, the principal and, as it were, chief ones, are to be understood of such good. It is established, second, because the Councils, and the Supreme Pontiffs, in the places adduced, intend to condemn the error of Pelagius: but Pelagius did not err in this, that he denied the necessity of grace for some morally good work of the natural order, as the Adversaries are compelled to confess, lest they incur the censure of Pius V and Gregory XIII, condemning these propositions of Michael Baius: "It is a Pelagian error to say that free will avails for avoiding any sin," and "He agrees with Pelagius who acknowledges any natural good, however small, which draws its origin

from the powers of nature alone." Therefore when the aforesaid Councils, and the Supreme Pontiffs, say that grace is necessary for each individual act, they do not speak of honest and morally good acts, of the natural order, but only of meritorious acts, and those conducing to the salvation of the soul, and eternal life. It is established, third, because if the aforesaid passages are understood with that universality which comprehends honest and morally good works, our opinion will be condemned in Scripture, and in the Councils, and in the decrees of the Popes: but it is erroneous to say that our opinion deserves any censure, as is established from the aforesaid propositions of Baius condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII: therefore it will also be erroneous to assert that the passages of Scripture, the definitions of the Councils, and the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, are to be understood so amply and universally, that they comprehend honest and morally good works of the natural order, and consequently they must be limited to works profitable for salvation, and conducing to eternal life.

I respond, second, that if the aforesaid testimonies are understood of whatever good, even of the natural order, by grace is signified the help or general concurrence of God, necessary for acting, which is comprehended under the name of grace broadly and improperly taken, as we declared at the beginning of this Treatise. St. Thomas hands down both this response and interpretation, In II Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, art. 1, ad 1 and 2; q. 24 De Veritate, art. 14, in his response to the arguments sed contra; and on John, chapter 1, lecture 1, where, expounding those words of Christ, "Without me you can do nothing," he adds: "Our works are either by the power of nature, or from divine grace; if by the power of nature, since all the motions of nature are from the Word of God Himself, no nature can be moved to do anything without Him; if by the power of grace, since He Himself is the author of grace, it is manifest that no meritorious work can be done without Him."

You will say: the Councils and holy Fathers cited speak in a sense contradicting Pelagius, since they proscribe his errors: but he did not deny that good works proceed from God as author of nature, through general concurrence, but only from God as bestower of grace, through special help: therefore this second response and interpretation is not good, nor according to the mind of the Councils and holy Fathers.

I respond that it is false that Pelagius sufficiently referred to God as author of nature all good moral works of the natural order, and that he sufficiently acknowledged our dependence on God in operating; for although he would confess that man could not act without the immediate and simultaneous concurrence of God, with which He operates with us, he nevertheless denied the concurrence or previous help, by which He acts in us without us, and by which He operates that we may operate; because he thought liberty

would be destroyed, if man could operate nothing, unless God pre-operating and premoving his will to act, as was shown in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, treatise on the Pelagian heresy, disp. 1, art. 2.

From what has been said you will understand that when the Council of Orange said, from Augustine: "No one has anything of his own except a lie and sin," either the phrase "of his own" must be understood by exclusion of general help. Or it only means that a lie and sin are so properly man's, that they are in no way God's, as author. Or he uses "lie" and "sin" improperly and broadly, for any defective act, insufficient for eternal life, according to the phrase and manner of speaking used by the ancient Fathers. Who (as Sixtus of Siena says, Book 6 of the Bibliotheca, annotation 40), all the works which men did apart from divine grace, not only did not call good, but most frequently called evil, and called them vices and sins; not that they believed them truly and simply evil and sins, but because they knew that they neither availed for acquiring Christian justice, nor conduced to procuring the good of eternal felicity, and on this account did not deign to reckon them among goods.

From these you will easily understand and explain two testimonies of St. Thomas, which seem adverse to us; for when the holy Doctor, II-II, q. 136, art. 3, ad 2, requires the help of grace for the good work of political virtue, this must not be understood of the help of special grace, but of general concurrence, which is grace commonly so called, pertaining to the gift of creation. Or it can be said that he speaks of an eminent moral work, such as to sustain many and most grave evils for the good of the fatherland; for this heroic work, special help is required, as will appear below. Similarly, when the same Angelic Doctor says, q. 24 De Veritate, art. 14: "If we should wish to call the grace of God, not some habitual gift, but the very mercy of God, by which He operates in us an inward motion of the mind, thus neither can man do any good without the grace of God." He speaks of God's general concurrence, moving and applying each creature to act, which can be called God's mercy, insofar as it removes some misery from man, namely the defect of potentiality and indetermination for acting.

Vásquez further objects an argument taken from prayer, and thanksgiving; for the Church prays God, not only for some, but also for each individual good work, and asks His grace, and, when they have been performed, gives thanks: but nothing is more founded in Augustine's doctrine, than that prayer, and thanksgiving, are the clearest signification of divine grace.

But to this it is answered, first, that the Church asks God for moral good works, insofar as they conduce to salvation; whence it concludes its collects through our Lord Jesus

Christ, from whose merits it asks that grace be given to it: but all grace of the Savior tends toward eternal life and salvation as toward its ultimate end. The same, with proportion, must be said of thanksgiving.

I respond, second, that even if it were granted that the Church absolutely asks God for honest and morally good acts, and gives thanks for them, it would not, however, from this be rightly inferred that grace strictly and properly taken is necessary for eliciting them, for often in prayer we ask for things which can be had with only general concurrence, when indeed on the part of the event they have something of fallibility and contingency; wherefore we pray God for rain, fair weather, and the fruits of the earth, and, having obtained them, give thanks to Him, because although they pertain to general providence, they nevertheless have contingency and fallibility on the part of the event.

You will say, St. Augustine, disputing with the Pelagians, from prayer, and thanksgiving, inferred the necessity of special grace; for they did not deny general grace, pertaining to the gift of creation, but special grace, and distinct from the gift of creation: therefore from the fact that the faithful ask God for help for eliciting honest and morally good acts, and for those elicited give thanks, it is rightly gathered that not only general, but also special help, is required for eliciting them.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence; for although from prayer applied to things exceeding the gift of creation, and the efficacy of natural powers, the necessity of special grace is rightly inferred; and in this way St. Augustine, from prayer, rightly proves against the Pelagians that special grace is necessary for rising from sin, and for operating well in order to eternal life, because these exceed natural powers: nevertheless, from prayer as such, grace strictly, but broadly taken, for any benefit of God whatsoever, is not inferred; for it can be applied to things of the natural order, or pertaining to God's general providence, when they have something of contingency and fallibility, as is clear in the examples adduced above.

Besides these arguments, Contenson objects two others, in which he constitutes the principal strength of his opinion. The first can be briefly proposed thus. The will of man in the state of fallen nature, so far from being indifferent to good or evil, is even more inclined to evil than to good, and more inclined to the useful or delightful good, than to the honest and consonant with reason, as St. Prosper excellently explains in the poem On the ungrateful, chapter 27, in these verses:

"The will therefore remains always loving something, and to which it may bear itself, and is deceived, entering into the windings of doubtful paths. It desires vanities, swells with vanities, and fears, and, rushing with every kind of instability, rises upon wound with a

wound."

Similarly St. Thomas, II-II, q. 136, art. 3, ad 1, says thus: "In human nature, if it were integral, the inclination of reason would prevail; but in corrupted nature, the inclination of concupiscence prevails, which dominates in man": therefore for man in the state of fallen nature to elicit honest and morally good acts, he needs God's grace, or His special help, by which he may be determined to the honest good, and practically judge it to be preferable to the delightful.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence; for although in the state of fallen nature man is more inclined to evil than to good, and concupiscence dominates in him, and frequently inclines and draws him to evil and vicious acts; nevertheless, because it does not totally remove, but only diminishes and attenuates the inclination which man has from nature instilled toward the honest good and consonant with reason, he can, from the powers of his nature, exercise some honest and morally good works, and consequently sometimes have a practical judgment, by which he judges the honest good to be preferable to the delightful, as is established from what was said above.

The other argument of the same Author is: from the precept of charity we are bound to refer our works to God as ultimate end, at least virtually: therefore for the moral goodness of a work, it does not suffice that the object and proximate end enjoy honesty, unless also the one operating intends the ultimate end, which he cannot furnish without grace.

I respond, first, that if this argument were valid, it would prove that for the honesty and moral goodness of our works, not only helping grace, but also faith and charity, are required, and consequently that all the works of infidels, and of the faithful existing in a state of mortal sin, are sins; which is erroneous, and condemned by Trent, at least as to those works which precede justification. The sequel is clear, for since man's ultimate end is supernatural, works elicited by him cannot be ordered to it, except by being directed through faith, and commanded through charity: therefore if for their honesty and moral goodness ordination to the ultimate end is required, the influence of faith, and the command of charity, will likewise be required for it. Whence that Author, willing or not, falls into the opinions of Baius, or Jansenius, which we refuted above.

I respond, second, by denying the Antecedent, for since the precept of charity is affirmative, although it always obliges, it does not oblige to always, but at certain determined times and occasions, as we related above from Rainer. I add that by this very fact that the will does not refer the work good from object, e.g. almsgiving, to some evil, but rests in the precise honesty of mercy, that act, of itself and spontaneously, tends

toward God, the source and end of all honesty, at least virtually, or interpretatively; not otherwise than a stone [tends] toward the center, unless violently propelled upward by an extrinsic agent, as we declared in the response to the first objection.

Chapter III

On the necessity of grace in order to the love of God

Celebrated and common among theologians is the division of divine love into natural and supernatural; for since God is the author of nature, or of goods of the natural order, and also of grace, or of goods of the supernatural order, and under both aspects is good and lovable, just as also knowable by the human intellect, He can terminate the affection of the human will under both aspects. Whence just as there is a twofold religion, one of the natural order, in which the light of reason shines forth, and by which God is worshiped as author of nature, through acts of the same order; the other supernatural, in which the light of faith shines forth, and by which God is worshiped as author of grace, through acts of faith, hope, charity, and the infused moral virtues: so also there is a twofold love of God, one natural, and acquired by its own genus, which is regulated by the light of reason, and terminates in God as author of nature; the other supernatural and per se infused, over which presides the light of faith, and by which God, as author of grace, and as an object beatifying with supernatural beatitude, is loved by us. That the latter cannot be elicited by man from his own powers, and without the help of grace, is certain by faith, and defined at Trent, session 6, canon 3; but concerning the other there is difficulty and controversy among theologians, whether fallen man, or one constituted in pure naturals, needs special help to love God as author of nature with an efficacious love (that is, one which by its own power is able to induce the means necessary for pleasing God, and to exclude all things repugnant to His friendship), or whether he can furnish this from the powers of nature.

§ I

The difficulty is resolved as to both parts, or of man considered in each state, of fallen and pure nature

I say, first, man in the state of fallen nature cannot, by the powers of free will, and with only general concurrence, love God as author of nature above all things with an efficacious love. Thus our Thomists more commonly teach, against Scotus, Molina, and other Recent authors.

This is proved, first, from St. Thomas here, art. 3, where he says thus: "Man in the state of integral nature did not need a gift of grace superadded to natural goods, for loving God naturally above all things, although he needed God's help to move him to this. But in the state of corrupted nature, man needs, even for this, the help of grace healing nature." He had assigned the reason a little before, taken from this, that the will of fallen man, and one existing in original or personal sin, is as it were curved, and inclined toward the private and proper good, which is the ultimate end of the sinner; whence unless it is healed by grace, it cannot refer the love of itself and of all others to God, and love Him as its own and private good, since this would be against such a crooked and deviant inclination.

This is confirmed: although weak nature can effect some work, it cannot, however, elicit the most excellent operation which healthy and integral nature can elicit: but to love God as author of nature with an efficacious love is the most excellent and most perfect act which human nature in the state of health and integrity, from the powers of free will, could elicit, since such a love virtually contains the fulfillment of the whole law of nature, according to that of Basil, Book On the institution of monks, chapter 2: "That commandment (namely of the love of God) indeed seems one, but embraces in itself the virtue of all the commandments": therefore fallen and weak man cannot, from the powers of free will, love God as author of nature with an efficacious love, but for this he needs grace.

But if you ask, what sort of grace is required for eliciting such a love? I respond, and

I say, second, for the efficacious love of God as author of nature, per se speaking, and as far as concerns the object, only a special help of the natural order is required; supposing, however, elevation to the supernatural state, per accidens and concomitantly, supernatural help is required for it.

The first part is clear, for the love of God as author of nature is an act entitatively natural, since it regards a natural object: therefore per se and from the precise nature of the object, it does not demand sanctifying grace, or supernatural help. The consequence is legitimate, for by this very fact that an act, for its elicitation, demands for its eliciting principle a supernatural form, it exceeds the faculty of nature, and consequently is supernatural.

The second is shown thus: elevation of human nature to the order of grace being supposed, and knowledge of God as supernatural author, man cannot love Him as author of nature, unless he simultaneously loves Him as end and supernatural author, just as, such elevation and knowledge being supposed, there cannot be given an aversion

from God as founder of nature, without aversion from God as supernatural author; nor can hatred of the author of nature be posited, which is not terminated in some way also to Him as author of grace: therefore since the love of God supernatural per se demands supernatural help, natural love, elevation of human nature to the order of grace being supposed, will demand it per accidens and concomitantly. I add that for such a love, not only supernatural help, but also sanctifying grace, is required, by which sin, incompatible with such love, may be removed, and the obstacle of aversion from God as ultimate end, both natural and supernatural, which likewise cannot coexist with the same love, may be removed. Whence St. Thomas here, art. 3, teaches that for the love of God as author of nature, fallen man needs healing grace: that by the name of healing grace he understands habitual grace, is established from the following article, where he says: "In the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfill all the divine commandments without healing grace." It is certain, however, that for the fulfillment of all the divine commandments, sanctifying grace is required, as will appear from what is to be said in the following chapter.

You will ask, whether the just man, endowed with sanctifying grace, needs supernatural help to love God as author of nature with an efficacious love?

I respond affirmatively, for since habitual grace, in this state of the wayfarer, does not perfectly heal man, nor restore him to the natural integrity which he lost through the first parent's sin, but leaves the rebellion of concupiscence, and the fight between the higher and lower appetite, for the merit and advance of spiritual life, he still needs strength and superadded help, in order to go forth into the act of the love of God as author of nature.

I add that, even if the just man, endowed with habitual grace, lacks the impediment of sin, and aversion from God as ultimate end, nevertheless (as we already showed) elevation of human nature to the order of grace being supposed, he cannot love God as author of nature, unless he simultaneously loves Him as end and supernatural author: therefore since in the just man the love of God supernatural per se demands supernatural help, natural love will demand it per accidens and concomitantly.

I say, third, man constituted in pure nature could not, with only general concurrence, love God as author of nature with an efficacious love, but he would not need, for eliciting such love, supernatural help, but only special help of the natural order.

The first part is clear from what was said in the first conclusion, for there we showed that fallen man cannot, from the powers of nature, and with only general concurrence, love God as author of nature with an efficacious love, because the will of fallen man is as it

were curved, inclined toward the private and proper good: but in the state of pure nature, the will of man would in the same way be propense toward the private good: therefore in the same way he would be powerless for loving God as author of nature with an efficacious love. The major is established from what was said above; the minor is shown thus. That fallen man follows a private good arises from this, that the lower appetite inclines toward the sensible good, without the bridle of reason: but in pure naturals man would have the same unbridled inclination toward the sensible good contrary to reason, since in the state of pure nature the lower part would not be perfectly subject and subordinated to the higher; but such subordination and subjection would belong to man only in the state of integrity: therefore in the state of pure nature the will of man would be in the same way propense toward the proper and private good, as in the state of fallen nature.

Furthermore, the efficacious love of God as author of nature is the most perfect and excellent act of all, since it virtually contains the fulfillment of the whole law of nature: therefore it seems proper to nature alone, integral and robust. I add that in the first part, in the Treatise on man, and the various states of human nature, we showed that the powers of human nature for operating moral good would not have been greater in the state of pure nature, than they are in the state of fallen nature: therefore if man in the state of fallen nature cannot, with only general concurrence, love God as author of nature with an efficacious love, he would likewise not have been able to do this in the state of pure nature, if he had been constituted in it.

The second part is established from what was said in the second conclusion, for as we showed there, man in the state of fallen nature needs, per accidens, supernatural help for the efficacious love of God as author of nature, on account of the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order and end: therefore since in the state of pure nature there would not have been such elevation, there would likewise not have been need of such help for eliciting that act.

Finally, the third part follows from the preceding, for man in pure nature could and would be bound to love God as author of nature above all things: but for this he would not have supernatural help, nor would general concurrence suffice, as we have already shown: therefore he would demand special help of the natural order. And indeed since that act would be most perfect and greatest within the order of nature, it would demand special help of the same order no less than the observance of the whole natural law, which would be virtually contained in it.

§ II

The objections are resolved

You will object first against the first conclusion: St. Thomas, I, q. 60, art. 6, ad 5, acknowledges in the Demons a natural love of God above all things, and In II Sent., dist. 33, q. 2, art. 2, ad 5, he likewise admits it in the souls of infants existing in limbo: therefore such a love can be compatible with sin, whether actual or original, and consequently be elicited by the proper powers of nature.

I respond that there can be posited a twofold natural love of God, one from the will as nature, prohibiting, by which God, as the principle of being, and the universal good of all nature, is loved; the other from the will as a free and elicitive power, by which God, with an elective and free love, is loved as friend and universal legislator. The first is a love of concupiscence, for since the Demons are necessitated to love themselves, and cannot but love the being of the Demons, by which their proper being is sustained and preserved, they are necessitated to love God with a love of concupiscence. The other, however, is a love of benevolence, by which God, for His own sake, and inasmuch as He is, as author of nature, supremely lovable in Himself, is loved above all things. When, therefore, St. Thomas, in the places cited, admits in the Demons, and in the souls of infants existing in limbo, a natural love of God above all things, he speaks of the first love, which we confess can be compatible with sin, and elicited by the powers of nature alone; not, however, of the second, of which alone we treat in the present.

You will object second, someone can, from the powers of nature alone, die for the fatherland, or for parents: therefore a fortiori for God as author of nature, and consequently love Him efficaciously above all things, from the powers of nature alone; for as Scripture testifies, John 15: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."

I respond, first, by denying the antecedent, for since such an act is heroic, arduous, and difficult, man in the state of fallen nature cannot elicit it by the powers of nature and free will alone, but for eliciting it he needs grace, or at least some special help of the natural order, unless perhaps such an act is done from the motive of vainglory, as often happens.

I respond, second, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence and the parity, on account of a twofold reason for the difference. The first is that God is more separated from sensible goods, which move us more and more efficaciously. The second, that the love of created goods does not require that all mortal sins be abandoned, as does the efficacious love of God, which is compatible with no mortal sin, whether actual, or habitual, or original.

You will object third: the intellect can naturally know that God, as author of nature, is to be loved above all things: therefore also the will, which is a rational appetite, following the dictate of hard reason, can, by the powers of nature alone, love Him above anything else.

I respond, granting the Antecedent, denying the consequence, for although the intellect, by speculating, can arrive at such knowledge from natural principles, it cannot, however, in the state of corruption, have a practical and prudential judgment, by which it judges that God is here and now to be loved above all things, unless assisted by special help, because man, through original sin, is more wounded in the practical intellect, than in the speculative, and more powerless for the pursuit of good, than for the knowledge of the true, according to that of the Poet: "I see the better and approve it, I follow the worse."

You will object fourth against the second conclusion: if man in the state of fallen nature needed supernatural help to love God as author of nature, such a love would not be natural, but supernatural: but this cannot be said, since it regards a natural object, it cannot but be entitatively natural: therefore not that either. The sequel of the major seems manifest, for that act, for which supernatural help is required, is supernatural.

I respond by denying the sequel of the major, and to its proof I say that the act for which supernatural help is required per se, and by way of its elicitive principle, is supernatural; but not so if such help is required only per accidens, and as removing an obstacle, as happens in the case proposed; for supernatural help is not required per se for the efficacious love of God as author of nature, but only per accidens, by reason of the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, and the conjunction of the natural end with the supernatural, and for removing the obstacle of sin, and of aversion from God as ultimate end, as we declared in the second conclusion.

You will object fifth against the third conclusion: in the state of pure nature there would be no infirmity, and consequently man in it could do whatever he could in the state of integrity and health: but man in integral nature, with only general concurrence, could love God as author of nature, as St. Thomas teaches here, art. 3, and as is established from that of Augustine, Letter 107: "We lost free will for loving God, through the greatness of the first sin": therefore he could do this also in the state of pure nature.

I respond that man in the state of pure nature would not have been infirm privatively, or positively, but negatively, because although he would then have been propense toward the private good, as in the state of fallen nature, such inclination would nevertheless not have drawn its origin from sin, but from the intrinsic constitution of man; for man consists of parts having opposite inclinations, namely the rational and the sensitive, of

which the first is naturally inclined toward the honest good and consonant with reason; the second toward the delightful and sensible good, contrary to reason. Of which more at length in the treatise on the states of human nature, last chapter, where we treat of the state of pure nature.

You will object last: man in the state of pure nature is bound by a natural precept to love God as author of nature above all things, and consequently could do this, since God does not oblige to the impossible: but not through grace, since the state of pure nature excludes all grace: therefore by the powers of nature alone.

This is confirmed: man in the state of pure nature would have a natural inclination to loving God as author of nature above all things: but if he could not do this from the powers of his nature, such inclination would be in vain, since it could in no way be reduced to act, since the state of pure nature excludes all grace, and all helps of the supernatural order: therefore man in the state of pure nature could, by the powers of nature alone, love God as author of nature above all things.

To the objection I respond that man in the state of pure nature could love God as author of nature above all things, not indeed through help of the supernatural order, nor with only general concurrence, but through special help of the natural order, which God would offer in such a state, when the obligation of the precept of love pressed; this the providence of His sweetness so requiring, which cannot command man, in any state, the impossible. Nor would the state of pure nature exclude all special grace, but only supernatural grace entitatively, or natural grace by way of a habit and permanent form, such would be a healing grace of nature, and one constituting it integral with natural integrity, as we declared in the treatise on the states of human nature, chapter 4.

From this the response to the confirmation is clear, for the major being granted, the sequel of the minor must be denied, for in order that the inclination instilled by the author of nature not be in vain, it suffices that it can be reduced to act through the powers and helps of the natural order (whether these be general, or special within that order), without recourse to the supernatural order. I said, the major being granted, because Curiel and several others not improbably think that in the state of pure nature there would not have been in man an inclination and natural appetite for loving God as author of nature, in Himself expressly, and in particular, but only for loving the universal good in common, and God, as confusedly and implicitly contained under such a universal good.

Chapter IV

On the necessity of grace for the observance of the whole law of nature

It is established from what was said, chapter 2, that man in fallen nature can fulfill some precepts of the natural law without special grace; for since it was shown there that man, in such a state, with only general concurrence, can sometimes effect some moral good, honest in every way, from this it is manifestly gathered that he can also fulfill the precept concerning such a work, e.g. concerning almsgiving to a work extremely needy, from the powers of nature alone. It is also certainly established among all that man, in every state, needs grace, for fulfilling the natural precepts, as to the manner, that is, that he fulfill them from charity, and meritoriously, and fruitfully unto eternal life: for since that manner is supernatural, and elevates the acts of natural virtues to the supernatural order and end, it is manifest that without grace and charity, which is the form of the other virtues, and confers upon them the chief power of meriting eternal felicity, they cannot be present in our acts. Only, therefore, there is difficulty, and controversy among theologians, whether man can, in the state of fallen nature, from the powers of free will alone, observe the whole law of nature, or the whole collection of natural precepts, as to substance, or whether for this he needs grace, and what kind?

§ I

The difficulty is resolved by a threefold conclusion

I say, first, man in the state of fallen nature cannot observe the whole law of nature as to substance, without special grace.

This conclusion is manifestly gathered from what was said in the preceding chapter, for in the first place the whole law of nature includes all the natural commandments, from the first up to the last: but fallen man cannot, without the help of grace, observe the first of all the commandments, namely the precept of the love of God as author of nature, as we showed there in conclusion 1: therefore neither can he fulfill the whole law of nature. Then, as we said there, although weak nature can effect some work, it cannot, however, [elicit] the most excellent operation which healthy and integral nature can elicit. The most perfect work which man in the state of integrity and health could exercise from the powers of nature, was the observance of the whole natural law, as to substance, for as to the manner conducing to salvation, even in that state he needed grace, since that manner, as we said above, is supernatural: therefore fallen man cannot, from his own powers, fulfill the whole law of nature, as to substance.

I say, second: for the observance of the whole law of nature, sanctifying, or habitual, grace is necessary in fallen man.

This is proved, first: it is impossible to be well ordered concerning means, such as are precepts, and not concerning the end, namely God, because means are chosen for the sake of the end, and with a view to it: but without sanctifying grace and charity, no one is well ordered toward God as ultimate end: therefore without it no one, in the state of fallen nature, can observe all the natural commandments.

This is proved, second: under the law of nature is comprehended the precept of loving God, the author of nature, above all things: but this cannot be fulfilled without habitual grace, as was shown in the preceding chapter: therefore neither can the whole natural law.

I say, third: in fallen man, besides habitual grace, special actual helping grace is necessarily required for the observance of the whole law of nature, which indeed, per se, and having regard to the nature of the thing, ought only to be special within the order of nature, but, human elevation to the supernatural order being supposed, ought per accidens to be entitatively supernatural.

The first part is proved: moral powerlessness for the observance of the whole law of nature, in fallen man, and existing in mortal sin, arises not only from the defect of the mind's subjection to God as ultimate end, but also from the rebellion and fight of the lower appetite against reason: but although habitual grace subjects the mind to God as ultimate end, it does not, however, take away the rebellion of the lower appetite against the higher, but leaves it in us for combat and merit, as Trent teaches, session 5, decree on original sin, and experience sufficiently shows: therefore in fallen man, for the observance of the whole law of nature, besides habitual, or justifying, grace, actual, or helping, grace is necessarily required.

That such grace, however, per se, and having regard to the nature of the thing, need not be supernatural entitatively, but it suffices that it be special within the order of nature, is established; for the observance of the whole law of nature from some honest natural motive is entitatively natural: therefore per se it cannot demand for its proximately eliciting principle a helping grace entitatively supernatural.

Finally, that, human nature's elevation to the supernatural order being supposed, it demands this per accidens, is clear from what was said in the preceding chapter, conclusion 2, treating of the natural love of God; for the same must be said, with proportion, of the observance of the whole law of nature.

§ II

The objections are resolved

You will object first against the first conclusion, that of Deuteronomy 30: "This commandment, which I command thee this day, is not above thee, nor far off, nor placed in heaven." By these words Moses seems to insinuate that the observance of the law which he intimated in God's name to the Hebrew people, is not beyond its powers.

But it is easily answered that Moses, by those words, only meant to signify that the observance of such a law is in man's power, not as one operating from the powers of nature alone, but as moved and aided by divine grace, which knocks internally on the heart, while the law sounds externally in the ears. Whence St. Thomas here, art. 6, ad 2: "Man can do nothing, unless moved by God; and therefore when man is said to do what is in him, this is said to be in man's power, according as he is moved by God."

You will object second, that of the Apostle to the Romans 2: "The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," by which it seems insinuated that the Gentiles observed the natural law by the powers of nature alone. Whence Tertullian, On the crown of the soldier, chapter 6: "The Apostle, saying to the Romans that the nations do by nature the things that are of the law, both suggests the natural law, and the natural law-giver."

I respond that those words of the Apostle can be understood of the Gentiles converted to the faith, and operating through nature reformed by grace, as St. Augustine, Book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, and St. Thomas, in the commentaries on this passage, lecture 3, interpret it. But if they are understood of Gentiles not yet converted to the faith, and operating by the powers of nature alone, as Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine himself, On the spirit and the letter, chapter 28, take them, it must be said that the Apostle, by those words, only means that the Gentiles not yet converted to the faith, naturally, that is, by the light and powers of nature alone, do well in some things, and observe some precepts of the natural law; although they cannot fulfill the whole collection of natural precepts, and the whole law of nature, without the help of grace.

You will say: Chrysostom, homily 5 on the Epistle to the Romans, expounds the Apostle's cited statement of the Gentiles who preceded the coming of Christ and the time of Evangelical grace, and of the observance of the whole natural law: for he says that they, following the custom of the law of nature, observed all those things which conduced to piety.

I respond that Chrysostom does not expound that passage of the Apostle of the Gentiles still held in infidelity, but of those who, outside the Jewish people, were imbued with faith in the one God, and also with faith in the mediator, at least implicit; from which, by the aid of divine grace, they fulfilled the law of nature. Behold St. Chrysostom's words: "He here calls Gentiles, not those who were idolaters, but those who worshipped God, who, following the law of nature, apart from the Judaic ceremonies, observed all those things which conduced to piety: such was Melchizedek with all his people, such was Job, such were the Ninevites, such was Cornelius." It is certain, however, that Melchizedek and Job did not lack faith in the mediator, and that the Ninevites could not, without implicit faith in him, either do true penance, or obtain mercy from God. Cornelius too had implicit faith, without which his prayers and alms would never have been accepted by God, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 10, art. 4, ad 3, and III, q. 69, art. 4, ad 2. Whence Augustine, book On the predestination of the Saints, chapter 7, says that Cornelius did not give alms and pray without some faith. For how did he invoke Him in whom he had not believed?

You will object third: the precepts of the law of nature taken collectively, since they are natural, do not exceed the powers of nature: therefore for fulfilling them, grace is not necessary.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: they do not exceed the powers of nature, healthy and integral, I concede the antecedent; infirm and corrupted, I deny the antecedent, and the consequence. The solution is clear from what has been said above, for as we said above, although weak and wounded nature can effect some morally good works, it cannot, however, elicit the most excellent operations which healthy and integral nature can elicit, such are the fulfillment of the whole law of nature, and the love of God as author of nature, which of itself entails the observance of all the other precepts, and has it adjoined, as long as it lasts.

You will object fourth: man in the state of fallen nature can observe each individual precept of the law of nature without special grace: but he who can fulfill each individual precept, can also [fulfill] the whole collection: therefore man in the state of fallen nature can observe the whole collection of natural precepts without special grace.

I respond, first, by denying the Major, for fallen man cannot without grace observe the first and greatest of the commandments of the law of nature, namely the precept of the love of God as author of nature.

I respond, second, granting the Major, denying the minor, whose falsity is established from what was said above, chapter 1, treating of the knowledge of natural truths, and will

appear more clearly below, when we treat of venial sins.

You will object fifth against the second conclusion: for the observance of the whole natural law, grace healing the infirmity of human nature, wounded by original sin, is required, as St. Thomas teaches here, art. 4. But habitual grace, since it is not ordered to operating, but to being, nor moves the powers of the soul to elicit their acts, but only sanctifies the soul, and cleanses it from the stain of sin, is not a healing grace, and one aiding operation, but a justifying, or sanctifying, grace: therefore it is not required for the observance of the whole law of nature, but for this actual, or helping, grace suffices.

I respond, granting the Major, denying the minor, for through original sin we contracted a twofold infirmity: one in the higher part, through the aversion of the mind from God; the other in the lower part, which remained turned away from the higher, and by reason of both we remained weak for operating well; for since the powers of the will for operating well with regard to means are drawn from the end or adhesion to it, it follows that, the higher part being turned away from God through sin, the powers of the will for operating well languish, and consequently that, in order for it to be rendered strong, the aversion of sin must be removed, which, since it cannot be removed without habitual grace, cannot, without it, be perfectly healed; whence it can rightly be called not only justifying, or sanctifying, grace, but also healing; for although it is not required as helping to operate, directly, it is nevertheless required as removing sin, which prohibits love, by which the will is rendered firm for operating.

You will object sixth: man in the state of pure nature would be equally weak for the observance of the whole law of nature, as in the state of original sin. But in the state of pure nature he would not need habitual grace for fulfilling the whole law of nature, but for this special help within the order of nature would suffice for him. Therefore neither, in the state of original sin, for fulfilling the whole law of nature, will habitual grace be necessary.

I respond by denying the Major, for although that opinion which teaches that the powers in fallen man are equal to what they would have been in pure man, or one constituted in pure naturals, pleased us elsewhere, and seemed more probable to us, and we taught it both in our Shield, and in earlier editions of our Manual; the matter, however, having now been more maturely discussed, we judge it less probable, on account of the authorities and reasons set forth in the treatise on man, last chapter, in this edition.

You will object last against the third conclusion: the observance of the whole natural law is a work entitatively natural: therefore it cannot demand entitatively supernatural helps.

I respond, granting the Antecedent, by distinguishing the Consequent: it cannot demand entitatively supernatural helps, per se, and having regard to the nature of the thing, I concede. Per accidens, and human nature's elevation to the supernatural order being supposed, I deny.

Chapter V

On the necessity of grace for the victory over temptations

From the principles established above, it is manifestly gathered, against Vásquez and Contenson, that for victory over light temptation, from a natural honest motive, special grace of God is not required in fallen man. For such a victory is an easy work, not exceeding, either physically or morally, the powers of man, even a weak one: therefore for it, man in the state of fallen nature does not need special grace. The consequence is clear from what has been said above. The antecedent, however, seems certain, for no foundation can be assigned, for so attenuating the powers of fallen man, that he should not have physical and moral proportion for victory over light temptation; especially since he has power sufficient and proportioned for some honest and morally good works, e.g. to give alms to a poor person extremely needy, and consequently for fulfilling the natural precept obliging him to it, and for resisting the temptation which could draw him away from its fulfillment, as is established from what was said, chapter 2, against the same Authors. Whence among the propositions of Baius condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII, this is numbered: "Not only are those thieves and robbers, who deny Christ the way of truth and life, but also they who say that man can resist any temptation, without the help of His grace."

It is also established, almost among all, that for overcoming grave temptation from some depraved motive, e.g. temptation to lust from the motive of avarice, or of vainglory, grace is not required; because that act, from the circumstance of the end, is evil, and grace is not desired except for an act honest in every way. Only, therefore, the difficulty is, whether for victory over grave temptation, from an honest motive, special help of grace is necessary. A temptation is called grave, however, which vehemently inclines toward evil, and draws away from good, through the proposal of some great apparent good, and great imminent evil. These things having been premised.

I say briefly, fallen man cannot overcome a grave temptation, even from some honest motive, without God's special help.

This is proved, first, from Scripture, for the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 10, says: "He will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able": from which Chrysostom,

Theophylact, Theodoret, and others, rightly infer that there are given temptations which exceed at least the moral powers of free will left to itself. Likewise Christ, Matthew 26, said to His disciples: "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation": but if the victory over any temptation whatsoever were situated in our own power, through the powers of free will, without the need of grace, as the Pelagians wished, Christ ought not to have persuaded His Disciples to vigilance and prayer, in order to overcome temptation, but only to have exhorted them to the victory which they could have obtained by their own powers. Whence Jerome, Book 2 against the Pelagians, expounding those words of the Savior, says thus: "You ought, according to your view, to have said: rise up and resist, for you have free help, and, at the same time, power granted you by the Lord, you need no other help." Similar things are had in the Council of Orange, Synodal letter, which is the ninetieth among Augustine's, where, also speaking of the Pelagians, he says: "It necessarily follows from their sacrilegious disputes, that we ought not even to pray, 'lead us not into temptation.' For if these things are placed within the possibility of nature and the choice of the will, why should he not see that these are asked in vain of the Lord, prayed for falsely, when they are sought by praying, which, by our nature already so constituted, are obtained by sufficient powers of their own"; nor ought the Lord to have said "watch and pray," but only "watch, lest ye enter into temptation." The Council of Milevis repeats almost the same thing in a Synodal letter, also among Augustine's, 92.

It is proved, second, from Innocent I, in the Letter to the Council of Carthage, in Augustine, where he says thus: "Unless, by great prayers, grace, implored for us, should descend, we by no means attempt to overcome the errors of earthly frailty and the worldly body, since it is not free will, but God's help alone, that can make us equal to resisting. He furnishes daily remedies, without which we could in no way overcome human errors; for it is necessary that by that aid by which we conquer, we again, that aid not helping, be conquered." From these words this argument can be deduced: that which we can do without special grace, that grace being set aside, is not necessary: therefore if we could be tempted, not conquered, without special grace, it would not be necessary for us, God not assisting, to be conquered — the contrary of which Innocent teaches.

It is proved, third, from the holy Fathers, who almost always warn that although it is ours to give or refuse consent to temptation, nevertheless nothing must be presumed of our own strength, but with total humility one must run to God's mercy. Thus, among others, Augustine, Book 22 of the City of God, chapter 23, where he says thus: "In this war, most full of dangers, let the victory to be achieved be neither hoped for from our own strength, nor, if achieved, attributed to our own strength, but to His grace, of

whom the Apostle says: 'Who gives us victory through Christ.'" Bernard also, sermon on the octave of Easter, has this: "As often as you resist temptation, as often as you conquer the wicked one, do not attribute it to your own powers, do not glory in yourself, but rather in the Lord." He follows this up at length, sermon 1 on the Psalm "He that dwelleth." Likewise Gregory the Great, Book 23 of the Morals, chapter 19: "Let no one esteem himself of any virtue, even when he can do something strongly, because if divine protection deserts him, there suddenly and feebly he will be overwhelmed, where he glories in standing valiantly." And Book 18, chapter 6, explaining that of Job 38, "Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest?" he adds: "While he who acts considers these things, let him attribute nothing to his own power, nor presume anything of himself, but weighing above the measures and lines incomprehensibly held, let him remain so much more in the humility of dread, as he sees all things hang more strongly in the power of the one measuring."

The conclusion can moreover be persuaded by this fundamental reason, often insinuated by us: man remained weak through sin, and his free will, although not extinguished, was nevertheless weakened and infirmed in order to moral good: therefore although he can, from his own powers, effect works which are easy, and consequently overcome light temptations, he cannot, however, perform arduous and difficult works, nor consequently overcome grave temptations, unless strengthened and aided by God's special help. The consequence is clear from the example of a man laboring under natural infirmity; for although he can, by his own powers, and without another's aid, perform some light and easy motions of a healthy man, such as to bend his knee, move his foot, and the like, he cannot, however, elicit perfect motions, such as to leap, run, take a walk, unless aided by another's help. The same, with proportion, must be said of man in the state of fallen nature, namely that he can, from his own powers, effect some easy acts, and some honest and morally good works, and also overcome some light temptations, but not arduous and difficult works, such as to love God as author of nature above all things with an efficacious love, to observe the whole natural law, to overcome grave temptations, and the like, which man in the state of healthy and integral nature could furnish from the powers of free will alone. For philosophizing must proceed in the same way, proportion being observed, concerning moral infirmity arising from sin, as concerning physical and natural infirmity.

You will say, there is a great difference between the two, for physical infirmity causes in man a diminution of members, and therefore renders man unable for the perfect motion of a healthy man; but moral infirmity diminishes nothing of the entity of the powers, since natural [faculties] remain integral after sin, and consequently cannot induce in

fallen man an inability for works of the natural order, however perfect and difficult they be.

But against this, first: if this difference held, it would follow that fallen man could, from the powers of nature, not only overcome grave temptation, but also fulfill the whole natural law, which is against the common opinion of theologians.

Against, second: although man, through original guilt, lost nothing of the entity of the powers, he was nevertheless despoiled of the gratuitous gifts, by which the mind was subjected to God, and the lower part to the higher, from which arises moral infirmity, and consequently disability and powerlessness in fallen man, for arduous and difficult works of the natural order: therefore although man, through original sin, lost nothing of the entity of the powers, he nevertheless remained morally infirm, and consequently powerless for obtaining, by his own powers, victory over grave temptation.

Finally, the conclusion can be proved by this discourse: it is connatural to any agent to operate according to the prevailing inclination: therefore since, with a grave temptation pressing, the inclination toward the delightful good contrary to reason prevails in fallen man, it will be connatural that the will follow that, and beyond nature that it then pursue the honest and consonant with reason, and consequently pursue it notwithstanding such temptation, and prefer it to the delightful good; and that it be determined to this by God, against what it naturally seeks according to the prevailing inclination then, will be a special grace and benefit of God.

Nor is it valid to say that this argument also proves that fallen man cannot, without grace, overcome light temptations, since through them too he is likewise inclined toward the sensible and delightful good, contrary to reason. It is not valid, I say, for although from light temptation there arises some inclination and propensity toward the delightful good, because that is nevertheless light and weak, it can be overcome, through the natural reason and inclination which man has toward the honest good, easily and without God's special help.

Against our conclusion this argument is usually objected, which appears difficult to some: temptation, however vehement, as long as it does not absorb the judgment of reason, does not take away liberty from fallen man to resist it: therefore fallen man can, however gravely pressed by temptation against some precept of the law of nature, overcome that temptation without special help. The consequence seems legitimate, for it seems impossible that anyone, destitute of all special help, should remain free to resist temptation, if he cannot, without special help, resist it. The antecedent, however, is proved from St. Thomas above, q. 10, art. 2 and 3, where he expressly teaches that by no

object whatsoever, nor by any passion, however vehement, the will of man, as long as he is a wayfarer, is necessitated as to the exercise of the act, but always remains free, to elicit or not elicit the act, which St. Anselm also asserts, On free choice, chapters 6, 7, 9, and 10. Reason also supports this, for if grave temptation took away liberty from the tempted man, destitute of special help to resist it, that man, consenting to it, would not sin, because no one sins in that which he cannot freely avoid.

I respond, granting the Antecedent, denying its consequence: for just as, in order for man to be called free to observe supernatural precepts, and to resist temptations inducing to their transgression, it is not necessary that he be able to furnish this without grace, and from the powers of free will alone, but it suffices that he can do it through the mediation of grace, which is offered to him by God, when their obligation presses, or grave temptation knocks; as the holy Fathers, everywhere impugning the error of Pelagius, who asserted that man is not free, if he needs God's help, teach, as St. Jerome relates in the Letter to Ctesiphon: so likewise, in order for grave temptation against natural precepts to leave fallen man free to resist, it is not required that he, pressed by such temptation, be able to resist it without special help, but it suffices that he can do it with special help, offered by God, the obligation of the natural precept pressing, and that grave temptation urging: for as St. Thomas says here, art. 4, ad 2: "That which we can do with divine help is not altogether impossible for us, according to that of the Philosopher, Ethics 3: that which we can do through friends, we can in some manner do ourselves."

For the completion of this question, you will ask first, whether, for resisting a grave temptation against the natural precepts, entitatively supernatural grace is required, or whether special help of the natural order suffices?

I respond that if man resists it from some supernatural motive, entitatively supernatural grace is required, because since an act is specified by the motive from which it is elicited, the act by which someone resists some temptation from a supernatural motive cannot but be supernatural, and consequently not demand for its principle grace entitatively supernatural. But if he resists such temptation from some honest motive of the natural order, special help of the natural order suffices; because since then the act by which he resists it is entitatively natural, it cannot demand for its principle a supernatural grace entitatively. Whence above, chapter 3, we said that the natural love of God does not require supernatural grace entitatively for the eliciting principle, but only for the expediting, by reason of the incompatibility which it has with sin, which is not found in victory over grave temptation.

You will ask, second, whether what we have said of fallen man, or one existing in the state of fallen nature, is to be understood of man already justified through grace?

I respond affirmatively, for in the justified man there remains the rebellion of appetite against reason, from which arises debility of powers in order to moral good; whence just as for this reason he needs special help for the natural love of God, for the observance of the whole natural law; so likewise he will need it for victory over grave temptation, as will more fully appear from what is to be said in the following chapter.

Chapter VI

On the necessity of grace for long avoiding all mortal sins which are against the law of nature

Since it is certain by faith that man cannot, without grace, fulfill the supernatural precepts, it is established with the same certainty that man likewise cannot, without it, avoid those precepts which consist in the transgression or omission of such precepts; whence there is only difficulty concerning mortal sins which are against the law of nature, namely, whether these can be long avoided without grace? For resolution.

I say briefly, man in the state of fallen nature cannot, by the powers of his nature, long avoid mortal sins which are against the natural law, but for this both justifying and helping grace is required.

The first part is established from what was said above, chapter 4, for there we showed that fallen man cannot, from the powers of his nature, fulfill the whole natural law: therefore neither can he, for long, from his own powers, avoid all mortal sins against such a law. The consequence is clear, for man sins for this reason, that he does not fulfill the precepts: therefore if he cannot, for long, by his own powers, observe the whole natural law, neither will he be able, from the same, to avoid, for long, all mortal sins against the law of nature.

The same truth can moreover be persuaded by the reason of St. Thomas here, art. 8. Man in the state of fallen nature has many things, both intrinsic and extrinsic, provoking him to sin, namely the rebellion of appetite, the temptation of Demons, and the fellowship of wicked men, who by their examples and counsels induce us to sin; and besides, the corruption of the earthly body, and distraction concerning worldly things, and things necessary for life, impedes continuous vigilance and attention of mind to avoiding those dangers, according to that of Wisdom 9: "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon

many things": therefore he cannot, by the powers of his nature, resist all these, and much less avoid all mortal sins against the law of nature.

That habitual, or justifying, grace is required for avoiding these, the same holy Doctor there proves by this reason. In order for man to be able to avoid all mortal sins for long, it is necessary that he have his heart so firm in God, that for the sake of obtaining no good, or avoiding evil, he would wish to be separated from Him: but he who is in mortal sin, and deprived of grace and charity, does not have his heart so firm in God, but rather turned away from Him, and turned toward a creature as toward the ultimate end: therefore he cannot long avoid all mortal sins. The minor is established; the major is proved by St. Thomas in two ways. First, by a similitude: just as in the lower appetite, not totally subjected to reason, it cannot happen but that disordered movements occur in it, and among motions of this kind, venial sins; so reason not subjected to God, and not established firm in Him as ultimate end, it cannot happen but that many disorders and sins occur even in the acts of reason itself. Whence Prosper, On the calling of the Gentiles, chapter 2: "A mutable will, which is not ruled by an immutable will, approaches iniquity the sooner, the more sharply it is bent upon action." Hence too Chrysostom, on chapter 11 of Matthew, compares the sinner to a ship, destitute of mast, sails, and rudder, which is exposed to certain shipwreck, and which is carried, not where nature directs it, but where the impulse of winds and storms drives it. Second, the same holy Doctor proves the major from this, that since in this life many evils occur which we fear, and delightful goods to which we are enticed, unless man has his heart established in God, he departs from Him, on account of obtaining goods, or avoiding evils, by contemning His precepts, or thus sins morally.

He adds that in sudden matters man operates according to a preconceived end, and according to a pre-existing habit, although, from a premeditation of reason, man can do something outside the order of a preconceived end, and outside the inclination of a habit. But because man cannot always be in such premeditation, it cannot happen that he remain long without operating according to the convenience of a disordered will, unless certainly, through grace, he is repaired to the due order. Whence Gregory, Book 22 of the Morals, chapter 12: "A sin which is not soon removed through penance, by its own weight draws to another." This is established by the example of David, who, having committed adultery, immediately added homicide: and indeed, since the ways of sinners, as the royal Prophet says, Psalm 35, are darkness and slippery, and the Angel of the Lord pursuing them, they undoubtedly fall more frequently by sinning, than those are wont to stumble who walk on slippery ground in the dark, and are pressed and driven by enemies pursuing them.

The third part, finally, of the conclusion, which asserts that man in the state of fallen nature, in order to long avoid all mortal sins against the law of nature, needs not only justifying, but also helping grace, is taught everywhere by the holy Fathers, especially by Augustine, On nature and grace, chapter 26, in these words: "Just as the eye of the body, however most soundly healthy, cannot see, unless helped by the brightness of light; so man, even most perfectly justified, cannot live rightly, unless divinely helped by the eternal light of justice." And Book On ecclesiastical dogmas, chapter 24, he says: "No one, even renewed by the grace of baptism, is fit for overcoming the snares of the Devil, and for conquering the concupiscences of the flesh, unless through the daily help of God he has received the gift of perseverance of good preservation." By the name of perseverance, however, he understands not only that which continues to the end, but also that by which someone perseveres without sin for a long time; for this too can be called perseverance, the same holy Doctor teaches, Book On the gift of perseverance, chapter 1.

St. Thomas teaches the same part of our conclusion here, art. 9, where he says that man constituted in grace needs, for operating well and avoiding sin, God's help, not only by that general reason by which no created thing can go forth into an act, except by the power of divine motion, but also by a special reason, on account of the condition of the state of human nature, which, although healed through grace as to the mind, nevertheless there remains in it corruption and infection as to the flesh, by which it serves the law of sin, as is said to the Romans 7. There also remains a certain ignorance and obscurity, according to which, as is also said to the Romans 8, "We know not what we should pray for as we ought."

The same holy Doctor insinuates another reason above, q. 68, art. 2, where he says thus: "That which imperfectly has some nature, or form, or virtue, cannot operate through itself, unless moved by another. Just as the sun, because it is perfectly luminous, can illuminate through itself; but the moon, in which the nature of light is imperfect, does not illuminate unless illuminated. A physician also, who perfectly knows the art of medicine, can operate through himself; but his disciple, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot operate through himself, unless instructed by him." But justifying grace, in this state of the way, is imperfectly participated by the just man: therefore he cannot, through such grace, operate perfectly, and long do good and avoid sin, unless moved and assisted by God's special help. The major is established; the minor is excellently proved and illustrated by our Conrad, in the commentary on article 9 of this question, where he notes that the grace of the way has a threefold imperfection, by comparison to the grace of the fatherland. The first is in the manner of operating, for the grace of the fatherland always causes actual love of God, but not the grace of the way, wherefore it is said,

Matthew 11, that any blessed one, however smallest, is greater than John the Baptist, namely as to the manner of operating; because John did not always actually love God, as do the blessed. The second is that the grace of the wayfarer, however increased, by law ordained, does not perfectly heal the appetite, as does the grace of the blessed. The third is that it does not perfect reason so as to adhere immovably to the divine rule, as does the grace of the fatherland.

The holy Doctor insinuates another reason, 3 Contra Gentes, chapter 155, where he discourses thus: "Everything that is variable, in order that it be fixed in one thing, needs the help of some immovable mover: but man is variable, both from evil to good, and from good to evil: therefore, in order that he persevere immovably in good, he needs divine help." He teaches the same, II-II, q. 137, art. 4, in these words: "Since free will is of itself vertible, and this is not taken away from it by the habitual grace of the present life, it is not subject to the power of free will, even restored, that it establish itself immovably in a good state, although it is in its power that it choose this; for very often election falls under our power, but not execution."

From these you will understand that the just must pray daily to obtain from God that special help for avoiding sins, and for persevering in good, as the Council of Orange, canon 10, admonishes, saying: "The help of God is always to be implored even by the reborn and holy, that they may be able to attain a good end, or persevere in a good work." The just must also give thanks daily to God, that they are preserved from sin, as Augustine elegantly declares, homily 23 among the 50, in these words: "Recognize the grace of Him to whom you owe both what was done, and what you did not lose. This man owes to Me what was done and forgiven — you saw; you too owe Me what you did not lose. For there is no sin which one man has done, which another man could not do, if the ruler by whom man was made is absent." And Book 3 of the Confessions, chapter 7: "I will love Thee, O Lord (he says), I will give thanks, and I will confess to Thy name, since Thou hast forgiven me such great evils and wicked deeds. To Thy grace I attribute, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted my sins as ice. To Thy grace I attribute whatever evils I have not done, and I confess that all were forgiven me, both which I did of my own will, and which, Thou being my guide, I did not do."

You will object first: therefore man, in the state of fallen nature, cannot observe the whole law, and avoid all mortal sins, because to observe the whole law, and avoid all sins, is the work of a healthy man, and consequently cannot be furnished by an infirm one, as we declared in the first proof of our conclusion: but man is healed through habitual grace, which, therefore, is called by St. Thomas here, art. 4, healing: therefore through it he becomes able to observe the whole law, and to long avoid all mortal sins, and

consequently for this he does not need further God's special help.

I respond that although man is healed through habitual grace, it is not totally and adequately so; for as the holy Doctor cited above says: "Although through grace he is healed as to the mind, there remains, however, in him corruption as to the flesh, by which he serves the law of sin." That is, concupiscence inclining toward evil, and toward the delightful good contrary to reason, from which arise various grave temptations, which draw the will toward sin; whence, in order for the justified man to overcome these, and avoid all mortal sins, beyond habitual grace, he needs God's special help, by which he may be inclined to good, and the mind's affection changed, which he contracts, enticed by cupidity.

You will say: St. Thomas, III, q. 62, art. 6, ad 3, speaking of habitual grace, says that the smallest grace can resist any concupiscence: therefore through habitual grace man is totally and perfectly healed, and becomes able to resist all the allurements and temptations of concupiscence, and consequently to avoid all mortal sins.

I respond either that St. Thomas there speaks of habitual grace, not excluding, but supposing God's special help; without which neither the smallest nor the greatest grace can long resist every temptation. Or he only means (as Cajetan interprets it here, art. 9) that the smallest grace suffices, as far as it is of itself, and from its own nature, to resist any concupiscence, but not insofar as it is in such a subject, given the fight of appetite, and the debility of reason, on account of ignorance. For just as, although the heat of boiling water overcomes its coldness, because it nevertheless is not in a subject connatural to it, it is immediately expelled by the cold: so also, because grace in us wayfarers is not in a free proportioned subject, but a much infirm and indisposed one, although it is stronger than concupiscence, it is nevertheless, by reason of the subject, if deprived of God's special help, overcome and corrupted.

You will object second: according to St. Thomas here, art. 8, man, existing in mortal sin, cannot, for a long time, avoid all mortal sins collectively, because he does not have his heart established in God, so as to be separated from Him for the sake of obtaining no good, or avoiding evil: but the just man, through habitual grace, has his heart established in God as ultimate end: therefore through it he has sufficient powers for long avoiding all mortal sins collectively. Whence the same holy Doctor there says that man, in the state of grace, can abstain from every mortal sin, which consists in reason.

I respond that the negation of the firmness of the heart in God is indeed a cause why fallen man cannot long avoid all mortal sins collectively, but not the total and adequate cause; for besides that, another cause of this powerlessness is found, namely the negation

of the subordination and subjection of the lower part to the higher, as St. Thomas teaches here, art. 9; whence since, in the state of fallen nature, this second cause perseveres in the justified man, even if the first does not subsist, he cannot avoid all mortal sins collectively, but only those which draw their origin from the first cause, namely from the disorder of reason, through aversion from God, and conversion to a creature. And this only does the holy Doctor intend, when he says that man, in the state of grace, can abstain from every mortal sin which consists in reason.

Chapter VII

On the necessity of grace for avoiding venial sins

It is certain that man, in the state of fallen nature, with the aids ordinary to this state, can avoid each individual venial sin — otherwise he would not sin in committing them, since no one sins in that which he cannot avoid. It is also established that he, with the same aids, can, for some brief span of time, be without venial sin. For as St. Thomas, III, q. 79, art. 4, ad 2, expounding that of 1 John 1, "If we shall say that we have no sin," says: "This is not to be understood as though man could not, at some hour, be without any guilt of venial sin, but because the saints do not lead this life without venial sins." Whence there is only difficulty, whether man, throughout his whole life, or for a long time, can avoid all venial sins collectively, or never, or rarely, sin venially. For resolution.

I say briefly, no one can, throughout his whole life, or for some long time, with the aids annexed to the ordinary law of grace, avoid all venial sins collectively, but for this a special privilege is required, which was granted to the Blessed Virgin alone.

The first part is certain by faith, and defined in the Council of Milevis, canon 7, and at Trent, session 6, canon 23. It is established from various testimonies of Scripture, by which it is asserted that there is no one, adorned however greatly with grace, who does not sometimes sin: 2 Chronicles 6: "There is no man that sinneth not." James 3: "In many things we all offend." Psalm 31: "Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin. For this shall every one that is holy pray to thee" — not only a sinner, but also a holy person. Finally, 1 John 1: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." From which and other testimonies this argument is formed: that which is against the common law, is a special privilege: but for the just to avoid all venial sins taken collectively, is against the common law, by which God has established that all the just be permitted some venial sins, as is established from the aforesaid testimonies of Scripture: therefore no one can abstain from every venial sin collectively, without a special privilege.

The same is established from the holy Fathers, who everywhere teach that man, as long as he lives, cannot be free from light sins, and that the feet, which are the soul's affections, while they walk in this dust, cannot be totally clean: for Augustine, Tract 1 on 1 John, says: "Man, as long as he bears flesh, cannot be without light sins." Pope Leo, sermon 4 of Lent: "While the care of this life's various actions is extended, it is necessary that even religious hearts become sordid with worldly dust." Bernard, in a sermon on the Lord's Supper, weighing those words of Christ, "He that is washed needeth not but to wash his feet," adds: "He is washed who does not have grave sins, whose head, that is intention, and hands, that is operation and conversation, are clean; but the feet, which are the soul's affections, while they walk in this dust, cannot be totally clean, without the mind sometimes yielding to vanity, sometimes to pleasure, or to curiosity, more than is fitting, at least for an hour, for in many things we all offend." He had assigned the reason for this above, saying: "In the fall of the first man we all fell; but we fell upon a heap of stones, and in mud; whence we are not only defiled, but also wounded and gravely bruised: we can indeed be washed quickly, but for healing much treatment is needed."

St. Thomas uses the same reasoning here, art. 8, where he says that man in the state of fallen nature cannot abstain from every venial sin, on account of the corruption of the flesh, that is, the sore of concupiscence, from which flows corrupted matter and pus, or the rottenness and stench of some sin, until it is perfectly healed in glory, through the charity and grace consummated in the fatherland. Whence Augustine, Book On the perfection of justice, chapter 4: "The hard necessity of having sin has followed the sinning one, until the whole infirmity is healed, and so great a liberty received, in which it is necessary that there remain the will of living blessedly, so that thus even a happy and voluntary necessity of living well is the necessity of never sinning."

This reason can be confirmed and illustrated in this manner: in order for the just man to be able to avoid all venial sins collectively up to death, or for some long time, it is necessarily required that either the tinder of sin be bound or extinguished: but by virtue of the aids which are annexed to the common law of grace, the tinder is neither bound nor extinguished: therefore by virtue of these, the just man cannot avoid all venial sins collectively up to death, or for some long time. The minor is certain, both because only in the Blessed Virgin, on account of her dignity as Mother, is the binding or extinguishing of the tinder acknowledged by theologians; and also because in all the just there remains the rebellion of appetite for combat, as Trent teaches. The major, however, is persuaded: unless the tinder of sin is extinguished, or at least bound, from the corrupted appetite, and the sore of concupiscence, there arise frequent motions not conformed to reason concerning sensible things: but amid so many struggles man cannot

keep himself immune from sin, for when he strives to resist one, another rises up, nor can reason be in continuous vigilance: therefore, unless the tinder is extinguished or bound, the just man cannot avoid venial sin for long.

From this the second part of the conclusion remains proved, for since in the Blessed Virgin, either the tinder did not exist, or it was bound, or totally extinguished, according to various opinions, in her too there was not that moral powerlessness of avoiding all venials collectively, which arises from the tinder, but she had a special privilege of never sinning venially, as Trent teaches in the place cited above, asserting that the Church has always so felt.

That such a prerogative, however, is not to be extended to other saints, however distinguished, is established from the fact that the exception establishes the rule to the contrary: but Trent, from this general rule, "No one is just who does not sin venially," excepts only the Most Blessed Virgin: therefore it comprehends the rest, however just and holy, under such a rule. Whence Augustine, On nature and grace, chapter 36: "Therefore, this Virgin excepted, if we could gather together all those holy men and women, while they lived here, and ask them whether they were without sin, what do we think they would have answered? Would they not with one voice have cried out: 'If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us'?"

Probably, however, and piously, it is believed by many, that some saints had the privilege of avoiding all venials, in some certain and determined matter, such as St. John the Baptist, venial sins committed by speech, because those especially conflict with the office of Preacher and Forerunner: whence the Church sings that he, from his years in the desert, abstained even from a light lie, lest he stain his life; the Blessed Joseph, venial sins which are against the virtue of chastity, because this befitted the spouse of the most pure Virgin. St. Gregory, Dialogue 2, chapter 2, also relates that St. Benedict never felt rebellion of the flesh, after he rolled himself among thorns. The same is likewise asserted of our Angelic Doctor, from the time he was girded by Angels with the belt of chastity. That he also never sinned venially in the matter of pride, the Church plainly declares, when, in his office, celebrating his praises, it sings:

"O most excellent doctor, light of the holy Church, blessed Thomas of Aquino, lover of divine law." "O gem of the priesthood, safe support of teachers." "A gift of God's grace, surpassing every miracle, never feels the sting of pestiferous pride."

Against the first part of the conclusion a difficult argument is usually objected, which can be briefly proposed thus. No one sins in that which he cannot avoid, as Augustine says, Book 3 On free choice, chapter 18: but if man in the state of fallen nature needed

special help, or privilege, to avoid all venials, he could not avoid them, since God is not ready to give such help or privilege to all: therefore it could not be imputed to him for guilt, that he did not avoid all venial sins. Nor is it valid what some say, that this could be imputed to him for guilt, from the fact that his powerlessness to avoid them is voluntary to himself, at least in the head, by reason of original guilt from which he was left [in that state]. It is not valid, I say, because although a voluntary in the head suffices for original guilt, it does not, however, [suffice] for actual guilt, as is established in the first-first motions of concupiscence, in negative infidelity, and invincible ignorance, which are not sins, nor imputed to guilt, even if they proceed from original sin, and consequently are voluntary in the head. This solution being set aside, therefore,

To this difficult objection I respond that, for venial sins to be imputed to man in the state of fallen nature, it is not required that God give, or be ready to give, that special help or privilege which is necessary for avoiding all venials collectively, but it suffices that He give the help for avoiding all divisively, and separately and in particular. Thus St. Thomas here, art. 8, in the body, where he says thus: "Reason can repress the individual motions of this (namely of the sensitive appetite), and from this they have the nature of sin and the voluntary, but not all." And above, q. 74, art. 3, ad 2: "Man cannot avoid all motions of this kind (namely of concupiscence), on account of the aforesaid corruption (of the tinder). But this suffices for the nature of voluntary sin, that he can avoid each individual one." Likewise, 3 Contra Gentes, chapter 160: "Although" (he says) "he who is in sin does not have this in his own power, that he entirely avoid sin, he nevertheless has the power now to avoid this or that sin; whence whatever he commits, he commits voluntarily, and so is not undeservedly imputed to guilt."

You will say: the just man is bound not only to avoid each individual venial sin, but also all collectively: therefore since no one is bound to the impossible, it is fitting that he be able to avoid all venials collectively, at least with the help of grace which God is ready to confer.

I respond that there is no precept regarding all venials collectively, for although in Scripture it is commanded in common that we not sin, this nevertheless is commanded by reason of each individual sin which we are bound to avoid; because sins always present themselves to be avoided divisively and separately, not, however, simultaneously and collectively.

You will press: man has a natural necessity of existing in some place indeterminately, with liberty of existing in this or that determinately, and yet he cannot be obliged not to exist in any place, and if in fact he were prohibited from existing anywhere, he would not

sin by existing anywhere, on account of that necessity: therefore likewise if man in the state of fallen nature has a necessity of falling into some venial sin indeterminately, even if he can avoid each one in particular, he cannot be obliged not to sin venially.

I respond, granting the Antecedent, denying the consequence and the parity, for a twofold difference is found between that example, and that of which we treat. The first is that it is necessary, from the nature of the thing, that man exist in some place, for this arises from the nature of the body, which cannot be outside all place: but the necessity of falling into some venial sin does not arise from the nature of the thing, nor on the part of the sins themselves, for these are of themselves apt to be avoided, but from the infirmity of nature, corrupted through original sin; but it would be harsh to oblige man to something in itself and from the nature of the thing impossible, or to forbid him what must necessarily and from the nature of the thing occur, but not so that which is not in itself impossible. The second difference is that in the example adduced, that common necessitating thing is always conjoined with exercise concerning some singular determinate thing, for anyone actually exercising exists in some determinate place, and thus there is a twofold necessity there, one concerning the common, and another concerning the continuous exercise of some particular. But in our case there is only one necessity to sin as such, but not to exist continually in the exercise of some sin, and thus a perfect liberty is given regarding each individual venial sin, whereas in the example adduced there is not altogether a perfect liberty concerning particulars.

Chapter VIII

On the necessity of grace for preparing oneself for it

Setting aside the error of the Pelagians and Semipelagians, by which they asserted that the first helping grace, and the first calling of God, is given in view of a good work done without grace, and from the powers of nature alone, as it were on account of merit of condignity, or at least of congruity, some Catholic Doctors stand, thinking that from the powers of nature there is given a dispositive cause, but not a meritorious one, of the first supernatural help. Thus Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel, Richard, and Javelli. Others, however, teach that although good works of the natural order are not, of themselves, dispositions to the first helping grace, nevertheless, by God's law, and by pact entered into with Christ, of grace not being denied to one doing what is in him, from the powers of nature, they have an infallible connection with it. Thus Molina, in the Concordia, disp. 10, whom several of the Recent authors follow.

§ I

Both opinions are rejected

I say, first, man cannot, from the powers of nature, dispose himself, even remotely, to the first help of grace. Thus St. Thomas here, art. 6, ad 2, where he explains this axiom, "God does not deny grace to one doing what is in him," of one doing what is in him, as he is moved by divine help. And below, q. 112, art. 3, in the body, he teaches that the preparation of man for obtaining grace, if considered as it is from free will, has no necessity for the attainment of grace, but as it is from God moving. Likewise, 3 Contra Gentes, chapter 149, speaking of divine help, moving our free will, he concludes thus: "Man, therefore, does not move himself to this, that he attain divine help, which is above him, but rather he is moved by God to attaining this. But the motion of the mover precedes the motion of the movable, in order and cause. Not, therefore, is help given to us because we are promoted to it through good works, but rather we advance through good works because we are prevented by divine help." Finally, that of q. 4, art. 7, relates this censure of the opposite opinion: "It pertains to the Pelagian error to say that man can prepare himself for grace, without the help of divine grace."

The same truth can be demonstrated by a threefold reason. The first, which the holy Doctor has here, art. 6, can be briefly proposed thus: the end and the principle of any effect ought, as to order, to be proportioned: but the end of every disposition to grace is God, not as author of nature, but as author of grace: therefore its principle ought to be God as author of grace, not as author of nature, and consequently to proceed from free will, as aided by divine grace. The major is established, for as is commonly said, the order of ends and of agents is the same. The minor, however, is shown thus: every effect whose proximate end is supernatural, has for its ultimate end God as supernatural author: but every disposition to grace has for its proximate end something supernatural, namely grace itself to which it disposes: therefore it regards as its ultimate end God as supernatural author.

The second is taken from the passage cited from the Summa contra Gentiles, where he discourses thus: "No particular agent can universally prevent the action of the first and universal agent, because every action of a particular agent has its origin from the universal agent; just as in these lower things every motion is prevented by celestial motion: but the human soul is ordered under God, as a particular agent under a universal one: it is impossible, therefore, that there be any motion in it, which is not prevented by divine action."

The third reason can be formed thus: disposition to some form perishes, and is connected, with it: but nothing natural can demand a supernatural form, such as is grace, nor be connected with it, since it is of the nature of a supernatural gift to exceed the requirement of the whole of nature, as is clear of itself: therefore acts of the natural order cannot dispose to grace.

Several absurdities and inconveniences can be added which follow from the opposite opinion. For first, if man, from works had by the powers of nature, disposed himself to the first helping grace, he would be distinguished from another not so operating, in order to spiritual salvation, a distinction not had from grace, but from nature, against that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4: "For who distinguisheth thee?"

Second, the beginning of justification would be taken not from Christ's preventing grace, but from free will, which is against Trent, session 6, chapter 5. The sequel is clear, for those acts, elicited from the powers of nature, and disposing to the first helping grace, would concur dispositively to justification, and would in some way begin it, just as a fire begins generation, which first begins to induce a disposition toward it.

Third, if man could, from the powers of nature, dispose himself to the first grace and calling, he could also merit it, at least of congruity; which is to fall into the error of the Semipelagians. The sequel is proved, since every disposition, of and by its own nature, expresses an order and habitude to the form to which it disposes, and there is great reason for it inducing it into the subject, it carries with it a certain reason of debt; whence if such a disposition is otherwise moral, and consisting in acts of free will, some reason of merit can scarcely be separated from it. Wherefore St. Prosper against the Collator, chapter 6, censures him for asserting that there are given in nature certain beginnings of faith and good will, and yet denying that grace is given according to our merits. "Even against your will," he says, "you are convicted that the grace of God is given according to our merits, since you affirm something to precede in men themselves, on account of which they obtain grace. For neither can the faith of him who asks, the piety of him who seeks, the insistence of him who knocks, have any merit of its own." St. Augustine uses a similar reason, Book 2 against two letters of the Pelagians, chapter 18, where he discourses thus: "If without God's grace desire for the good begins from us, that very beginning will be merit, to which, as if from a debt, the help of grace comes, and thus the grace of God will not be given freely, but given according to our merit."

Finally, if man, through natural works, disposed himself to the first calling, and to the first help of grace, grace would not be preventive, but prevented by nature and by free will, nor would it lead it, but be its handmaid; for every disposition precedes the form to

which it disposes, and antecedes it in priority of time, or at least of nature. St. Prosper also used this reason, in the book cited, chapter 39, in these words: "Since, according to them (namely the Semipelagians), free will is taken away, when it is prevented by grace, grace too is taken away, when it is prevented by free will."

I say, second, there is no law established, that God should infallibly confer helps of grace on man doing what is in him from the power of nature.

This is proved, first, from the Council of Orange 2, canon 6, where he is condemned who shall have said that mercy is conferred, without the grace of God, on us believing, willing, desiring, and knocking; but it would be confessed, if such a law were established: therefore it is not to be admitted.

You will say, the Council in that canon only proscribes the error of the Semipelagians, who posited some merit, and moral causality, in the works of nature, with respect to the first grace and supernatural calling; but does not condemn those who, although they join grace to one doing what is in him, from the power of nature, and from the powers of free will, nevertheless exclude all merit and moral causality, with respect to divine grace, from the works of nature.

But against this, first: the Council condemns those who assert that mercy is conferred on those believing, willing, desiring, and knocking: therefore it also condemns those who assert that the aids of grace are given out of mercy, and not out of justice, or debt, to those doing what is in them from the power of nature, and consequently those who annex grace infallibly to natural works, even without merit and moral causality.

Against, second: just as St. Prosper, cited above, from the doctrine of the Semipelagians, asserting that grace is infallibly conferred on man desiring, knocking, and doing what is in him from the power of nature, inferred it to follow that this is given according to our merits (for neither, says he, can the faith of him who asks, the piety of him who seeks, the insistence of him who knocks, have any merit of its own); so we likewise argue against Molina: although, and we assert, it follows from his doctrine that grace is given from merits, and not gratuitously, nor from mercy, but from justice, by God. For whatever is given from a law and pact to man operating, is given from justice, at least imperfect, for law and covenant found the reason of justice, as is clear from that Parable of Christ, Matthew 20, in which the laborers agreed with the Master concerning a denarius, for there the Master said to one of them: "Didst thou not agree with me for a penny? Take what is thine, and go thy way." The same is established from that of the Apostle to the Romans 4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt": therefore if the helps of preventing grace are given by God from a

law, or pact or agreement, to those doing all they can from the power of nature, they are given to them from justice, and according to debt, not truly from grace and mercy.

You will say, such debt and obligation is only in order to Christ, who entered into such a pact with the Eternal Father, not, however, in order to man using well the natural faculty of free will, and consequently to him the helps of preventing grace are given from mercy, not from justice, and according to grace, not according to debt.

But against this: if some King, at the instance of the Prince, or of his Son, should grant a law, by which he promised he would give a certain city to whoever of the soldiers of his army first entered it, certainly whoever first entered such a city would make it owed to him from justice, founded in that law established at the instance of the Prince, or the King's Son, and such a law being supposed, that work would have some proportion with the value of that city; because that law would give it such proportion, although in itself, and that law being set aside, it would not have it. So likewise, if the Eternal Father, at the instance and petition of Christ, established a law, by which He decreed to give the helps of preventing grace to those doing what is in them from the power of nature, and the powers of free will, they will be in some way owed from justice to man doing what is in him from the powers of nature; because such a law being supposed, natural works, although otherwise disproportionate, and of an inferior order, will have some right to the helps of grace.

This is proved, second, from Augustine, On the spirit and the letter, chapter 28, where he thus has it: "Just as certain venial sins, without which this life is not led, do not impede the just from eternal life; so certain good works avail nothing for eternal salvation to the impious, without which the life of the most wicked man is hardly found": but if there were given an infallible law of giving helps of grace, conducing to salvation, to anyone operating well from the power of nature, and eliciting honest works with natural honesty, such works would profit the impious for eternal salvation, as is clear of itself: therefore falsely, and against Augustine, is such a law asserted.

This is proved, third: it is repugnant that Christ, the author of grace, should have merited that some law be made by the Eternal Father, by which the whole order of grace be destroyed, or by which it be effected that grace not be grace, and that it not prevent free will, but be prevented by it: but both would follow, if by law and pact of God, on one operating well from the powers and faculty of nature, the helps of grace were infallibly conferred; for grace would then be given from merits, as was shown above, and consequently would not be grace, but wages; and it would not prevent free will, but rather be prevented by it, nor would it be its leader, but its handmaid, as we said in the

preceding conclusion: therefore that law is fictitious, and devised by Molina.

Finally, the conclusion can be persuaded by this discourse: that law, since it depends on the free will of God, cannot become known to us, except either from Scripture, or from Councils, or from the holy Fathers: but it has no foundation in Councils, or in the holy Fathers, indeed the opposite is rather gathered from them, as we showed above concerning the Council of Orange, and concerning St. Augustine; the testimonies of Scripture, however, by which Molina tries to establish or prove that law, do not insinuate it: therefore such a law is asserted absolutely without any foundation. The minor is proved as to the last part: there are two principal testimonies of Scripture which Molina adduces to prove that such a law is given, namely that of John 1: "He gave them power to be made the sons of God," and that of 1 Timothy 2: "God will have all men to be saved": but from these testimonies it is not rightly gathered that such a law is given in God: therefore it has no foundation in Scripture. I prove the minor, and first that from the former such a law is not gathered, is established from Augustine, Book 1 against two letters of the Pelagians, chapter 3, where he says thus: "Power is given, therefore, that they may be made sons of God who believe in Him, when this very thing is given, that they believe in Him, since this power, unless it be given by God, can be nothing from free will." He teaches the same thing, Book On the gift of perseverance, chapter 8, in these words: "It is therefore not in man, but in the power of God, that men have the power to be made sons of God; from Himself, indeed, they receive it, who gives to the human heart pious thoughts, through which he may have faith, which works through love." Whence Cajetan rightly observes, on chapter 1 of John, lecture 5, that the Evangelist did not say, "He gave them power to make themselves sons of God," but "He gave them power to become sons of God." For just as (he says) in natural elements there is power not that they move themselves upward or downward, but that the earth is moved downward, and fire upward: so to believers in Christ is given the power, not of making themselves sons of God (for this action exceeds every created faculty), but that they become sons of God: but this power is a gift of grace, etc. I add that St. John, expounding to whom this power is given, adds: "To them that believe in his name": therefore before the illumination of faith, power of this kind is not given, and consequently it is not rightly inferred from that testimony that one doing what is in him through the powers of free will has it in his power to become a son of God, through the infallible assistance of divine grace.

That this is also not gathered at all from the second testimony, is shown in this manner: that law, in Molina's opinion, is founded in the merits of Christ: but the antecedent will of saving all men, contained in the aforesaid testimony, precedes the merits of Christ,

and Christ foreseen, since, according to the more common opinion, from the will of saving men, the decree of sending Christ the Redeemer proceeded, as we shall show in the Treatise on the Incarnation: therefore such a law is not deduced from those words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," but these only indicate the sincere affection, by which God, of His goodness, offers the helps of His grace to all men; with which, however, it stands that He sometimes denies them, in punishment of some preceding sin, as was shown in the treatise on predestination and reprobation, last chapter.

§ II

The objections are resolved

You will object first against the first conclusion: the first supernatural helping grace requires, on the part of the subject, some disposition: but such a disposition cannot be supernatural, otherwise it would need another supernatural disposition, and thus there would be given a process to infinity: therefore it ought to be natural, and consequently man can, from the faculty of nature, dispose himself to the first help of grace. The minor is clear; the major is shown from St. Thomas, I, q. 12, art. 3, where he says thus: "Everything that is elevated to something exceeding its nature, must be disposed by some disposition." But the first helping grace exceeds man's nature: therefore, in order that he be elevated to it, some disposition must precede.

I respond by denying the major, and to its proof I say that St. Thomas's doctrine is true, when that to which the subject is elevated is related as the term of generation, and a form complete in its own order; but not so when that to which it is elevated is a way to the term. Whence, because helping grace is not related as a term, but as a way to the term, hence it is that for it a previous disposition is not required; but it is indeed required for habitual grace, because it has the nature of a nature terminating generation in the supernatural order. Just as in natural things dispositions are indispensably required for substantial forms, because they are per se, first, intended, and are the ultimate term of natural generation, but not for accidental forms, which are ordered to the substantial. This is the solution of St. Thomas here, q. 109, art. 6, ad 3, and below, q. 112, art. 2, in the body.

You will object second: purely natural acts can conduce to grace impetratorily: therefore also dispositively. The consequence is clear from the parity of reason. The antecedent, however, is proved from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 83, art. 16, in the body, where he teaches that God hears the prayer of a sinner, proceeding from a good natural desire; not indeed from justice, since the sinner does not merit this, but from pure mercy: therefore,

according to St. Thomas, natural prayer has the power to impetrate before God. Whence there, in his response to the second objection, he says thus: "Although his (namely the sinner's) prayer is not meritorious, it can nevertheless be impetrative, because merit rests on grace."

I respond by denying the Antecedent, for as the same holy Doctor teaches there, q. 82 [83], art. 15, ad 1: "Prayer which impetrates gratifying grace proceeds from some grace." And in his response to the third objection, he says: "Prayer rests principally on faith, not as to the efficacy of meriting, but as to the efficacy of impetrating": therefore, according to St. Thomas's mind, in order for prayer to be impetrative, it must proceed from grace. Whence, when he says that God hears the sinner's prayer, proceeding from a good natural desire, he speaks of a desire of nature, not bare, but elevated by helping grace, and founded in faith.

You will object third, with Molina, against the second conclusion: St. Thomas, q. 14 De Veritate, art. 11, ad 1, says thus: "If someone raised in the forests should follow the guidance of natural reason in the pursuit of good and the flight from evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him, through inspiration, those things which are necessary for believing, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, just as He sent Peter to Cornelius": therefore, according to St. Thomas's mind, the assistance of divine grace is infallible for man doing what he can from his own powers.

I respond that St. Thomas there speaks of man doing what is in him, not from the powers of bare nature; but in the power of the help of grace. This is established, both because he speaks of a man not placing an obstacle to grace, for the observance of the whole natural law, for which, in the state of fallen nature, the powers of nature do not suffice, but the help of grace is required, as the same holy Doctor expressly teaches here, art. 4. And also because he adduces the example of Cornelius: but that he did not do what was in him from the faculty of nature alone, but by special help of preventing grace, the same holy Doctor teaches, II-II, q. 10, art. 4, ad 3, whose words we shall relate below. I add that the same Angelic Doctor, whenever he explains this axiom, "God does not deny grace to one doing what is in him," says that this must be understood of one doing what is in him, not from the powers of nature, but from the help of grace, as is established both from the testimonies adduced at the beginning of this chapter, and from In II Sent. to Hannibaldus, dist. 28, art. 4, ad 3, where he thus has it: "To the third it must be said that our power can operate nothing without God, who operates in every nature and will; whence when we say something is in us, we do not exclude God's help." And on Romans 10, lecture 3: "This very thing" (he says) "that some do what is in them for converting themselves to God, is from God moving their hearts to good."

You will say: that man raised in the forests, of whom St. Thomas speaks, is supposed destitute of all help of grace, since he is supposed destitute of the illumination of faith, which is the first sufficient supernatural help: therefore he speaks of man doing what is in him from the powers of bare nature, not, however, in the power of the help of grace.

I respond by denying the Antecedent, for although such a man does not have explicit faith concerning God as supernatural author, he would nevertheless have implicit faith concerning Him, and accordingly would not be destitute of all supernatural help. The reason is that in the state of the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, it is impossible that there be, in fact, posited a conversion to God as natural author, without a conversion to God as supernatural author; whence since that man, following the guidance of natural reason in the pursuit of good and the flight from evil, would be converted to God as author of nature, he would also be, at least implicitly, converted to Him as supernatural author, and accordingly would have faith concerning Him, at least implicit; and God, in such a case, would direct some preacher of the faith to him, that he might explicitly propose to him the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and other things necessary for salvation, just as He sent Peter to Cornelius and Paul to the Macedonians. This is the solution of St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, art. 4, ad 3, where, speaking of Cornelius, he says: "That man was not an infidel, otherwise his operation would not have been accepted by God, whom no one can please without faith; but he had implicit faith in God, the truth of the Gospel not yet manifest, whence, that he might be more fully instructed in faith, Peter was sent to him."

Molina further objects another testimony of St. Thomas, taken from Book 3 Contra Gentes, chapter 159, where he says thus: "Since this is in the power of free will, to impede or not impede the reception of divine grace, it is not undeservedly imputed to guilt to him who furnishes an impediment to the reception of grace; for God, as far as is in Him, is ready to give grace to all, but only those are deprived of grace, who present an impediment to grace in themselves; just as, the sun illuminating the world, it is imputed to guilt to him who closes his eyes, if some evil follows from this; although he cannot see, unless he is prevented by the light of the sun." From these words Molina infers that if only those are deprived of divine grace, who place an impediment of guilt to the reception of grace, he who does as much as he can through the powers of nature, has infallible assistance of divine grace, since thus he avoids the impediment, namely sin.

But this testimony does not favor Molina, because St. Thomas there speaks of free will, as it was in integral man, not, however, as it is in fallen man, as Ferrariensis notes there, and as is established from the immediately following chapter, where he thus has it: "That it was said to be in the power of free will not to place an impediment to grace, applies to

those in whom the natural power was integral." Now this must not be understood of man integral with purely natural integrity (for in this he was not in fact created, nor if he were established in it, would grace be offered him, since this offering supposes the elevation of man to the supernatural order), but of man integral with the integrity of original justice, which subjected the lower part to the higher, and this to God, not only as author of nature, but also as author of grace. Thus Ferrariensis there, where he thus has it: "By natural power St. Thomas understands the power of free will, which is also called will, unspoiled by any sin, or any disorder, just as it was in the first parent before he sinned."

From these you will understand that not even by a negative disposition could anyone dispose himself to grace from his own powers. For then someone can dispose himself negatively, when he can, from his own resources, exclude every impediment to the form: but man cannot, from his own powers, avoid every mortal sin, through which a sufficient impediment to grace is posited: therefore neither can he dispose himself negatively to the first helping grace. Whence St. Thomas, on Hebrews 12, lecture 3, says: "This very thing, that someone does not place an obstacle to grace, is from the grace of God."

Chapter IX

On the necessity of grace for final perseverance

Perseverance can be taken in two ways: first, for the continuation in grace for a long time, abstracting from whether it be continued up to death. Second, for perseverance in grace, up to the end of life inclusively, or for the conjunction of grace with death, which is called final perseverance. Of perseverance taken in the first way we treated above, chapter 6, where we showed that the just man, for long abstaining from mortal sins, and persevering in good works, besides habitual grace, needs special help. Whence it remains for us here to treat of final perseverance, which alone (as Augustine says) informs merit, rewards the one running, crowns the one fighting, and conducts the sailor to port. This alone (Bernard adds) bears some semblance of eternity — it alone is that to which eternity is rendered, or which renders man to eternity. In symbol of this thing, of old were offered to God, not only first-fruits, but also tithes, because from Him is not only the inchoation of good works, signified by the first-fruits, but also perseverance in them, designated by the tithes. In type of the same thing (says Gregory the Great, Book 1 of the Morals, chapter 21), Joseph, who among his brothers is said to have persevered as just up to the end, is related to have alone had a tunic reaching to the ankles; for what is the ankle-length tunic but consummated action? As, so to speak, the ankle-length tunic covers the ankle of the body, so good action, before the eyes of God, rules us up to the end of life. Hence it is that through Moses we are commanded to offer the head and the tail of the victim, that is, that every good which we begin, we should also complete with a persevering mind. Hence Bernard concludes, and prudently admonishes us, to persevere constantly in good: "Hold" (he says) "what you hold, and join the victim's tail to its head, and take care to make ankle-length also the tunic of God's grace already put on you; since to have begun will profit nothing, if (which God forbid) it does not happen that you persevere."

§ I

Final perseverance is a special gift of God, distinct from habitual grace and the common helps, and consisting in the conjunction of grace with death, commanded from an efficacious intention of glorification

The first part of this assertion is gathered from Trent, session 6, canon 6, where it calls final perseverance a great gift of God, following Augustine, Book On the gift of perseverance, chapter 2, where he likewise says: perseverance itself is a great gift of God, by which His other gifts are preserved. By these words they declare the magnitude of this gift, and consequently plainly signify it to be distinct from habitual grace, and the common helps.

The same truth can be proved by a twofold fundamental reason. The first is: habitual grace is given to many, with the common helps annexed to it, for operating well, and persisting in good, even for a long time, who yet do not finally persevere, as experience sufficiently establishes: therefore final perseverance is a special gift, distinct from habitual grace, and the ordinary helps accompanying it.

Nor is it valid to say, with Molina, and other Recent authors, that grace and sufficient helps, by which they could persevere up to death, are given to all, but that some use them well, and some ill, and therefore those persevere, but not these, and consequently that to actually persevere is not a gift distinct, on God's part, from grace and helps. It is not valid, I say: first, because this response plainly conflicts with Augustine's doctrine, Book On correction and grace, chapter 12, where he says thus: "So much, indeed, is their will (namely of the Saints) inflamed by the Holy Spirit, that they can, because they thus will, for this reason they thus will, because God works that they will. For if, in so great an infirmity of this life, the will were left to them, in the help of God, without which they could not persevere, they would remain if they wished, but God would not operate in them that they wish; amid so many and such great temptations that will itself would succumb through its own infirmity, and therefore they could not persevere because, failing through infirmity, they would either not wish it, or would not so wish it through infirmity of the will, that they could. Aid, therefore, has been given to the infirmity of the human will, that it be moved by divine grace indeclinably and insuperably; and therefore, however infirm, it would nevertheless not fail, nor be overcome by any adversity." By these words the holy Father plainly teaches that for actually persevering in good, even sufficient help being supposed, without which no one can persevere, there is still required, in addition, an efficacious help, by which the will is infallibly bent, and perseverance itself is in fact given, and by which the Saints and elect are only those who persevere. This doctrine the men of Marseille bore so ill, that they said men were driven

by it into a kind of despair, as Hilary of Arles testifies in the letter to Augustine, in these words: "They take it ill that grace is thus divided, which was either given first to the first man, or is now given to all, that he received perseverance, not by which it would come to pass that he persevere, but without which he could not persevere through free will; but now, to the saints predestined to the kingdom through grace, such an aid of perseverance is not given, but such that perseverance itself be given to them; not only that without this gift they cannot be persevering, but even that through this gift they are none other than persevering. By these words your Holiness's [teachers] are so moved, that they say a kind of despair is exhibited to men."

Second, from the aforesaid response and doctrine of Molina, several absurdities and inconveniences follow: for if the gift of perseverance were subject to free will, and depended on it as to efficacy and use, it would follow, first, that those who persevere would be distinguished from others not persevering by something proper to themselves, namely by the good use of free will, determining and applying grace, against that of 1 Corinthians 4: "For who distinguisheth thee?" Whence they could be puffed up against others on account of their own perseverance, as if they had not received it from God, but bestowed it on themselves, against what is added there: "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?" It would also follow that God, through grace, gives us the possibility to persevere, but that to actually persevere is from free will, and consequently that which is the lesser good and less perfect is attributed to God and grace, but that which is greater and more perfect, to us and to our free will, which Augustine often reprehends in the Pelagians. Likewise it would follow that the just ought not to ask actual perseverance from God, nor give thanks to Him for it, because, as the same Augustine says, Letter 107: "We do not truly pray to God, but we merely feign that we pray, if we do not believe that He does what we pray for. We truly do not give thanks to God, but merely feign that we give thanks, if, when we thank Him for something, we do not think He does it." That this, however, is most absurd, is established from the same holy Doctor, who, in the book On the gift of perseverance, from the second chapter to the sixth, shows from St. Cyprian that in every petition of the Lord's Prayer (except that of "forgive us our debts"), the gift of perseverance is asked from God. Finally, from the same response, it would follow that predestination is uncertain and fallible, as being founded on a fallible medium, namely the gift of perseverance, which cannot be firm and stable, if its efficacy rests on a reed staff, that is, on a mobile and defectible cause, namely the human will. Whence Trent, session 6, chapter 13, refers the infallibility and efficacy of this gift, not to God's foreknowledge, exploring the future consent of our will, but to divine omnipotence, effecting that man freely and infallibly consent. For at the beginning of

that chapter, which is on the gift of perseverance, he says that such a gift cannot be had from another source, except from Him who is powerful to establish him who stands, that he may stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls. Similarly Augustine, On correction and grace, chapter 8, manifestly teaches that the gift of perseverance is independent of free will, and yet donates a free will, for he says: "If you say it pertains to man's free will, whether someone perseveres in good or not perseveres, God not giving it that he persevere, but the human will effecting it, what will you contrive against the words of Him saying, 'I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not'? Or will you dare to say that even Christ praying, Peter's faith would still have failed, if Peter had willed it to fail, as if Peter would in any way have willed anything other than what Christ had prayed that he would will? For who does not know that then Peter's faith would have perished, if that faithful will itself had failed, and would have remained permanently, if it had remained the same? But because the will is prepared by the Lord, therefore the prayer for him could not be in vain." See how the holy Doctor has recourse to God's preparation, not, however, to His foreknowledge, in order to show the infallible perseverance of Peter in faith.

The second fundamental reason, by which the first part of our assertion is proved, can be formed thus: an effect of special providence having infallible connection with glory, is a most special gift of God, distinct from habitual grace, and the common helps adjoined to it, since these as such are not an effect of special providence, but of general, pertaining to the supernatural order, as being common to the reprobate and the predestined: but final perseverance is a most special and principal effect of predestination, which is a special providence of the supernatural order, and has infallible connection with glory; for as St. Augustine excellently says, Book On the knowledge of the true life, at the end: "To the highest good the just are drawn by a certain chain, which is connected from the virtues in this manner: first, faith embraces the soul like a certain circle; faith is nourished by hope, hope is held by love, love is completed by operation, operation is drawn to the highest good by intention, intention of good is enclosed by perseverance, perseverance will be given by God, the fountain of all goods": therefore final perseverance is a special gift of God, distinct from habitual grace and the common helps.

That such a gift, however, consists formally in the conjunction of grace with death, commanded from an efficacious intention of glorification, as is said in the second part of our assertion, is shown thus: the gift of perseverance is formally situated in that by which the persevering are distinguished from the non-persevering: but they are not distinguished, antecedently to the attainment of glory, in anything else than in this, that such is the disposition of divine providence concerning them, that they must die in grace,

since others sometimes have more grace and gifts of God in this life: therefore the gift of final perseverance consists formally in a special disposition of God, by which grace is joined with death, commanded from an efficacious intention of glorification.

From this you will understand, first, that the gift of final perseverance is distinct from that which is required for long persevering in good; for the former is a proper effect of predestination, and is granted only to the predestined; but the latter is not an effect of predestination, but of general providence of the supernatural order, and is given even to the reprobate. Whence the Council of Orange, canon 10, seems to distinguish these, when it says: "The help of God must be implored by the Saints, that they may be able to attain a good end, or persevere in a good work."

You will understand, second, that the gift of final perseverance differs from the gift of confirmation in grace: the former is common to all the predestined, the latter is most special, which God granted only to the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and very few others; the former does not take away, nor bind, the power of sinning, but only causes that man not sin mortally up to the end of life, and infallibly die in grace, although he could sin absolutely; the latter, however, gives the inability to sin, whether mortally or venially, according to the manner in which it is given; for some are so confirmed in grace, that they can sin neither mortally nor venially, as the Blessed Virgin; others, indeed, although they can sin venially, cannot, however, sin mortally, as the Apostles.

You will understand, third, that the gift of perseverance is to be admitted, not only for those who persevere in grace for a long time before death, but also for those who, after having received grace, quickly die, indeed also for baptized infants, dying before the use of reason. For that an adult, after receiving grace, be immediately slain, or that a child, regenerated at the baptismal font, die before he arrives at the use of reason, is a special grace of God, because it is a special effect of God's providence, disposing their death for the time when they are in grace, and not permitting them to live longer, lest, exposed to grave temptations, and subject to the mutability of free will, they lose it before they die, according to that of Wisdom 4: "He was taken away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding": therefore, for persevering in grace up to death, even for a short time, a special gift and benefit of God is required, at least extrinsic, or a disposition of special divine providence, by which grace is joined with death. Whence Augustine, On the gift of perseverance, chapter 17: "See how far it is from the truth, to deny that perseverance up to the end of this life is a gift of God, since He gives an end to this life whenever He wills; which, if He gives before an imminent fall, He makes man persevere up to the end. But the generosity of God's goodness is more wonderful, and more evident to the faithful, in that this grace is given even to infants, to whom obedience is not the merit

that it be given." By these words he plainly teaches that the gift of final perseverance is given to baptized infants dying before the use of reason.

§ II

The objections are resolved

You will object first against the first part of the conclusion: for finishing life in grace, grace itself, with the helps ordinarily accompanying it by law, and natural causes, inducing death, suffice: therefore another special gift is feigned in vain. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved. Grace, with helps of this kind, is sufficient for avoiding all sins for some time, within which natural causes, e.g. illness, intemperance of climate, and the like, can induce death: therefore for finishing life in grace, these suffice.

I respond that all those assigned things suffice indeed for joining death with grace, as accidental causes, but not as causes per se, because a cause per se is that which, by virtue of its own causality, regards the effect of which it is said to be the cause per se; but those which are assigned in the objection are not ordered, by virtue of their own causality, to joining death with grace; whence since it must not be said that this effect is casual and fortuitous, it is necessary to posit another distinct gift, by which all causes are so disposed and prepared, that death is then inflicted by natural or violent causes, when man exists in grace.

You will object second: man having grace, has a right to glory, which, as a fruit in a seed, is virtually contained in grace, according to that of the Apostle: "The grace of God, life everlasting": therefore the continuation of grace with glory happens from debt, and not from special grace; and consequently perseverance, which makes the conjunction of grace with glory, is not a special gift, or special providence, for man having grace due to him.

But I deny the consequence, for although the just man has a right to glory, as long as he is in grace, he does not, however, have a right that he be preserved in grace up to death, or that death be conjoined with grace; since for this state, by reason of free will, he is vertible to good and to evil. Whence that someone be protected by God, so as not to lose grace when death comes, is the greatest and most special gift, and the chief effect of predestination, just as, on the contrary, that someone be permitted to die in sin, or that sin be conjoined with death, is the ultimate effect of reprobation, of which Christ said, John 8: "I go, and you shall seek me, and you shall die in your sin."

You will object third against the second part of the assertion: final perseverance is a special and undue gift and benefit: but the conjunction of grace with death is not a special gift or benefit of God: therefore the gift of final perseverance does not consist

formally in such a conjunction. The major is clear. The minor is proved. For the conjunction of grace with death, only this is required, that grace be infused or preserved, and that death then supervene: but the event of death is natural, and the infusion or preservation of grace is a general benefit of the supernatural order, pertaining to the universal providence of that order: therefore the conjunction of both is not a special gift or benefit of God of the supernatural order.

I respond, granting the Major, denying the minor, and to its proof I say that although the infusion or preservation of grace, considered in itself, is a general benefit of the supernatural order; its infusion or preservation nevertheless, from the intention that it be joined with death, is a special gift and benefit; because to this conjunction, glory is infallibly annexed, and proceeds from its efficacious intention. Similarly, although death, considered in itself, and according to the reason common to all men, is not a gift of God, but rather a punishment of sin; yet as it is a certain condition required for having an immovable state in grace, and for obtaining glory, it is given from God's special providence, and is a special benefit of His, just as also is beatitude itself to which it leads. Whence Augustine, Book 13 of the City of God: "So great has God shown the grace of faith, that death, which is established to be contrary to life, became an instrument through which one might pass to life."

For the completion of this celebrated question, you will ask, whether in the Angels and in our first parents in the state of innocence, a special gift or help of God was necessary for persevering?

I respond affirmatively: for Augustine, Book 12 of the City of God, chapter 9, expressly teaches that the good Angels, who persevered in the love of God, received from God a greater help than the evil ones, who fell; for he says: "These, falling through evil will, those, more aided, arrived at that fullness of beatitude, whence they are most certain never to fall." Nor can that greater help, granted to the good Angels, be interpreted as certain knowledge, by which the blessed Angels know they will never fall, as Jansenius contends. For as Estius rightly says, In II Sent., dist. 41, § 13: "If this help, by which the blessed Angels are said to have been more aided, were beatitude itself, the sense would be rendered inept, namely that beatitude was conferred on the Angels, by which they would arrive at beatitude."

Several reasons could also be adduced in confirmation of the same truth, but since we treated of this in the treatise on the will of God, chapter 4, § 7, that which St. Thomas insinuates, 3 Contra Gentes, chapter 155, will suffice for the present: everything that is of itself variable, in order that it be fixed in one thing, needs the help of some immovable

agent: but free will in the Angels, and in our first parents, was mobile, and vertible from good to evil, as the unhappy event sufficiently shows: therefore in order that they be firmed in good, and infallibly persevere in it, they needed God's special help. Whence Augustine, address 2 on Psalm 32, speaking of the good Angels, under the name and figure of the heavens, says thus: "Nor did they themselves furnish firmness proper to themselves; by the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the spirit of His mouth all their power." The same is taught by Gregory the Great, Book 26 of the Morals, chapter 8, where, of the Angels, he says: "Others falling, others were confirmed by God, who would similarly have fallen, unless they had been confirmed."

You will say: Augustine, On correction and grace, chapters 11 and 12, expressly teaches that Adam could, through free will, persevere, and that it was left to his free will, whether he wished to persevere, and God did this: but that is not said to be left to free will, or to be done through free will, which is only done from special grace, or for which special help is required: therefore, in Augustine's doctrine, Adam in the state of innocence did not need special help for persevering; which, proportion being preserved, must be said also of the Angels.

I respond that when St. Augustine affirms that Adam could, through free will, persevere in good, he only intends to declare the facility which he had of persevering in good, by reason of the gift of integrity, perfectly subjecting the lower part to the higher, and the higher to God, and prohibiting all rebellion, or disordered motion of concupiscence. Whence there, chapter 11, he says thus: "He did not have need of that help which the saints implore, when they say, 'I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind,' etc., because in them the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, and, laboring and imperiled in such a conflict, they seek to be given the virtue of fighting and conquering through Christ's grace. But he, tempted by no strife of himself against himself, in that place of beatitude, enjoyed his own peace with himself." And St. Thomas, objecting to himself the aforesaid testimony of Augustine, which is the principal foundation of Jansenian doctrine, II-II, q. 132, art. 4, thus responds: "To the second it must be said that Augustine says, in the book On correction and grace: 'To the first man was given, not that he should persevere, but that he could persevere through free will, because there was then no corruption which would present a difficulty for persevering.'" From which it is clear that Augustine, in the aforesaid passage, only intends to exclude, from the state of innocence, the necessity of special help healing the infirmity of nature (such as is required in us for persevering), but not the necessity of special help fixing and firming the vertibility of free will.

You will say, second: the gift of perseverance was connaturally owed to man in the state of integrity and innocence: therefore it was not a special gift or benefit of God. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved. Every form, in its own subject not impeded, is owed the concurrence for that which it demands from its nature: but habitual grace, in integral man, was a form demanding from its own nature perseverance and firmness, and suffering, as to this, no impediment, as it suffers in fallen man, on account of the rebellion of concupiscence: therefore the help for persevering was owed to him, by title of connaturality.

I respond by denying the Antecedent, and to its proof, the major being granted, I deny the minor; for although habitual grace in integral man did not suffer, as in fallen man, an impediment as to its preservation, arising on the part of the rebellion of concupiscence, it was nevertheless liable to an impediment consisting in the mobility and vertibility of free will, as is established from what was said above.

From what has been said thus far, concerning the necessity of grace for operating well, and persevering in good, you will understand that no one, however just and holy, ought to trust in his own powers of free will, but must rest solely on the hope of heavenly grace. Whence sacrilegious is this saying of the Gentile Philosopher: "Let God give strength, let Him give wealth, I will provide myself an equable mind"; as is also that of Pelagius in the letter to Demetrias: "No one but yourself can confer spiritual riches upon you. In these, therefore, you are rightly to be praised, in these you are deservedly to be preferred to others, which cannot exist without you and in you." Whence the Pelagians are not undeservedly compared to the plowmen of Egypt, for as Seneca says: "No plowman in the land of Egypt looks at the sky, because they expect the fertility of the fields not from heaven, and the influence of the stars, nor from rains, but from the inundation of the Nile alone; and all their hope, hanging as it were on their own river, as on a divinity, rests on the soil, not on heaven, on the Nile, not on God"; according to that of the Poet: "The land, content with its own goods, needy of no merchant, or of Jove, has its whole trust in the Nile alone."

Not dissimilarly also the Pelagians, Semipelagians, and whoever attributes the good of virtue, and the work of salvation, either to nature, or to Philosophy, or to their own industry, or to the powers of free will, and not to divine munificence, or to the efficacy of grace, can be said never to raise their eyes to heaven, whence our help comes; but, clinging to their own natures, in this respect like the plowmen of Egypt, to place their whole trust in the soil. Wherefore of them it is said, Isaiah 30: "Woe to you, apostate children... that have trust in the shadow of Egypt, hoping for help in the strength of Pharaoh. Egypt is man, and not God; and flesh, and not spirit; and the Lord shall put

down his hand, and the helper shall fall, and he that is helped shall fall, and they shall all be consumed together."

Chapter X

On the division of grace

Grace can first be divided into uncreated and eternal, and created and temporal. The first is the eternal love of God, by which He freely loved us in order to grace and glory, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 110, art. 1, in these words: "Sometimes the grace of God is called the eternal love of God itself, according as also the grace of predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously, and not from any merit, predestined some. For it is said, to the Ephesians 1: 'He hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children, unto the praise of the glory of his grace.'" The other comprehends those gifts which are conferred on us by God in time, for obtaining such an end. Of the first we treated in the Treatise on predestination, in which we showed the election of the predestined to be entirely free, and independent of the foreseeing of merits, wherefore it is designated in Scripture by the name of "lot"; whence it remains for us here to treat of the other, which is usually divided into internal and external. Internal is that which is interiorly united to us, and is received in the soul of man, or in its powers. External, however, is that called which does not affect it intrinsically, but only extrinsically; whence to the first genus pertain sanctifying grace, moral virtues per se infused, gifts of the Holy Spirit, and motions of helping grace, received in the intellect or the will; to the second, however, are reduced all external causes, means, and objects, through which our mind is excited to knowing or loving divine things; such are the preaching of the word of God, examples of Christ and the Saints, the reading of Sacred Scriptures, miracles, and other things of this kind, which St. Prosper describes, Book 2 On the calling of the Gentiles, chapter 26, in these words: "The grace of God indeed pre-eminently presides in all justifications, by persuading through exhortations, moving through examples, terrifying through dangers, inciting through miracles," etc.

Internal grace is divided into gratis-given and grace-making. The former does not of itself conduce to the sanctification and salvation of him to whom it is given, but through it one works for the salvation of another. The latter is referred per se to the salvation of the recipient, nor is it merely freely given, which is common to every grace, but also makes the person acceptable and friendly to God.

Again, gratis-given grace is subdivided into nine species, which the Apostle recounts, 1 Corinthians 12, in these words: "There are diversities of graces: to one indeed by the

Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, faith in the same Spirit; to another, the grace of healing in one Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to another, diverse kinds of tongues; to another, interpretation of speeches."

St. Thomas demonstrates the sufficiency of this division here, q. III, art. 4, and on 1 Corinthians 12, lecture 2, by this excellent and admirable discourse: gratis-given graces are given for this, that man may cooperate in another's salvation and conversion, not indeed by moving interiorly (for this is God's alone), but only exteriorly, by teaching, or by persuading. For this, however, three things are necessary: first, that man who ought to teach another, have plenitude of knowledge of divine things; second, that he can prove and confirm what he teaches; third, that what he ought to teach, he can suitably declare to those he is instructing. For man to have plenitude of knowledge of divine things, three things are required: first is knowledge of those things which are supposed as principles in divine science; second is knowledge of the principal conclusions; third is knowledge of divine effects, from which it is sometimes necessary that causes be manifested; and therefore three gratis-given graces are necessary for the fullness of knowledge of divine things, namely faith, through which the first principles are believed; wisdom, through which the principal conclusions are known; and science, through which the divine effects are known. But for man to be able to confirm what he teaches concerning divine things, two things are required: one is that he do those things which God alone can do, and these are miraculous works, which are twofold: for they are either ordered to the health of bodies, or to the manifestation of divine power alone, as that the sun stand still, or grow dark, and things of this kind; and therefore in order that he who teaches divine things be able to confirm them, two other gratis-given graces are posited, which are the grace of healings, and the working of miracles. The other is that he be able to manifest those things which only God knows to know, and these are two, namely future contingents, and hidden things of hearts, and on this account two other gratis-given graces are posited: for knowing future contingents also, prophecy is posited; but for knowing hidden things of hearts, discernment of spirits is posited. Finally, in order that he who ought to teach divine things be able to propose them suitably to their authors, a faculty of proclaiming is necessary, which is attended to either as to idiom, or as to the sense of what is to be proclaimed; whence for this two other gratis-given graces are posited; for on account of the first is posited the grace of tongues, and on account of the second is posited interpretation of speeches. It is established, therefore, that only nine gratis-given graces are to be admitted, for for the fullness of science only three are given, namely faith, on account of principles; wisdom, on account of principal conclusions;

science, on account of effects; but for the teacher to be able to confirm these, only four are necessary, namely the grace of healings, on account of bodily health, the working of miracles on account of the demonstration of divine power; prophecy, on account of future contingents; discernment of spirits, on account of the knowledge of the secrets of hearts; finally, in order that he may propose what is to be taught, only two are required, namely diverse kinds of tongues, on account of idiom; and interpretation of speeches, on account of the sense of the sentences.

Of these gratis-given graces, however, some are permanently in the Saints, and by way of a habit, whence they use them at will, and when they wish; such as faith, wisdom, science; others, however, are related to them by way of an actual motion, or impression, of which they cannot use at will, but only when they are moved by God, such as prophecy, and the gift of miracles. Whence Gregory, homily on Ezekiel, nicely observes that the Holy Spirit, Wisdom 1, is called stable and at the same time mobile: "Because" (he says) "it always remains in the hearts of the saints, according to certain virtues, but according to certain others it comes about to withdraw, and comes to withdraw again: for in faith, and hope, and charity, and in other goods, without which one cannot come to the heavenly fatherland, such as humility, justice, and mercy, it does not desert the hearts of the perfect: but in the virtue of prophecy, in eloquent doctrine, in the exhibition of miracles, it is sometimes present to its elect, sometimes withdraws itself."

From this rule, however, Christ must be excepted, in whom all the gratis-given graces were permanently, and by way of a habit, as St. Thomas teaches, III, q. 7, and this for a twofold cause: first, because His humanity was an instrument really and hypostatically joined to divinity; whence it was fitting that, just as that conjunction was permanent, and never to be dissolved, so also the gratis-given graces, which followed this union, should be in Him permanently, and by way of a habit. Second, because Christ was endowed with the power which they call of excellence, by reason of which He had command over all creatures, and disposed of them at His own will; and therefore, at the pleasure of His own will, He could work miracles, and command demons, diseases, the sea and the winds, as is read in the Gospel.

Internal grace is again divided into habitual and actual: habitual grace is a permanent gift of God, by which man is justified, and sanctified, and made acceptable and friendly to God, of which more at length in the following chapter. Actual grace is a transient help, exciting man interiorly, or elevating him, to operate well, as is fitting for salvation. Furthermore, such a help does not consist formally in the undeliberated acts of the intellect or the will, as several of the Recent authors wish, but in some motion, or transient quality, impressed by God on the powers of the soul, so as to elevate them,

complete them, and constitute them in first act sufficient for eliciting such acts; for since the intellect and the will do not have of themselves sufficient force for producing supernatural acts, they cannot elicit undeliberated acts of the supernatural order, unless first, at least in nature, by some fleeting and transient motion, or quality, elevated and applied to eliciting them, as our Thomists teach in the Treatise on helps, and from this they infer the necessity of physically premoving and predetermining grace. Of which one can see what we have written in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, in the Treatise on human acts, disp. 6, art. 2, § 10.

Actual grace is subdivided into operating and cooperating, which division is gathered from that of 1 Corinthians 15: "Not I, but the grace of God with me." Where Anselm says it is the same as if he said, "In good work I labored, not I, but I: for in that in which I am prevented merely by the gift of God, not I; but in that in which I have followed the gift with my will, I." The Council of Orange insinuates both graces, canon 9, in these words: "As often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work." And Augustine, On grace and free choice, chapter 17, says: "By cooperating, God perfects in us what by operating He began; because He Himself, by operating, works in us that we will, beginning; and He, who cooperates with the willing, perfects."

Further, grace is called operating, insofar as it applies the will to holy affection, or operation; cooperating, however, insofar as, with the will applied, it produces such affection or operation. For as St. Thomas teaches here, q. III, art. 2, grace is called operating with respect to that effect in which our mind is moved and not moving, but God alone moving; cooperating, however, in order to that in which our mind both moves and is moved: but with respect to that effect which is to apply the will to acting, the will is moved and not moving, since it is related to it merely passively, receiving the divine motion, by which it is applied to acting; but with respect to the other, it is related as moving and moved simultaneously, since the operation and consent of the will is effected not by God alone, but also by the will itself: therefore actual grace is rightly called operating, insofar as it applies the will to acting; cooperating, however, insofar as, with the will thus applied, it produces the same action and effect.

Operating and cooperating grace, however, are usually distinguished by various names: for first, operating grace is called preventing, and cooperating is called subsequent. Operating is called preventing, because it prevents all our deliberation, and the good use or consent of free will, in priority of time, or of nature, according to that of Psalm 58: "His mercy shall prevent me." Whence Augustine, Book 4 against two letters of the Pelagians, chapter 6: "In all things which anyone does according to God, His mercy prevents him." And Bernard, On grace and free will: "We indeed by no means can

prevent ourselves; for He finds no one good, He saves no one whom He does not first prevent." Cooperating grace, however, is called subsequent, because production of the work follows the application to the work. Whence Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 32: "Both are read in the sacred oracles: 'His mercy shall prevent me,' and 'his mercy shall follow me.' It prevents him who is unwilling, that he may be willing; it follows him who is willing, lest he will in vain." And Fulgentius, Book 1 to Monimus, chapter 11: "God prevents, giving man a good will; He follows him willing well, working in him the faculty of good work." And again: "He prevents the wicked, that he may become just; He follows the just, lest he become wicked; He prevents the fallen, that he may rise; He follows the raised, lest he fall."

Again, operating grace is called awakening, cooperating, however, is named helping. That is called awakening, because it awakens the sinner or the just man, resting from good work, as if oppressed by a certain slumber, from the sleep of sin, or of negligence of good works, according to that of Apocalypse 3: "Behold, I stand at the gate, and knock," and that of Ephesians 5: "Rise, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall enlighten thee." This grace, or rather this effect of operating grace, Augustine elegantly describes in the book of the Confessions, where, addressing God, he says thus: "Thou hast called, Thou hast cried out, Thou hast broken my deafness: Thou hast flashed, Thou hast shone, Thou hast put my blindness to flight: Thou hast breathed forth fragrance, and I have drawn breath, and now I pant for Thee; I have tasted, and I hunger and thirst; Thou hast touched me, and I have burned for Thy peace." By these words he declares that three attributes, appropriated to the three divine Persons, especially shine forth in the justification of a sinner: for the power of the Father appears in the strength and efficacy of His calling, expressed in these words: "Thou hast called, Thou hast cried out, Thou hast broken my deafness." The wisdom of the Son, indeed, in the splendors by which He illuminates his mind, whence he adds: "Thou hast flashed, Thou hast shone, Thou hast put my blindness to flight." The goodness, however, of the Holy Spirit, in the marvelous sweetness by which He entices and draws him to Himself, which he declares in the words following: "Thou hast breathed forth fragrance, and I have drawn breath, and Spirit," etc. Cooperating grace, however, is called helping, because it does not help toward doing that to which we have been excited by God. This the Church frequently asks of God, in those words of Psalm 69: "O God, come to my assistance," etc. Whence Cassian, Collation 10, chapter 5: "Do not cease to sing this little verse in whatever work, service, or journey you are engaged in; let it steal upon you meditating even in sleep, until, formed by its incessant exercise, you become accustomed to sing it even through sleep. Let this be the first thing to occur to you when you awake, let it anticipate all the thoughts of you as you rouse yourself, let it draw you, rising from

your bed, to bow your knees, and thenceforward lead you to every work and act."

Concerning these divisions of operating grace, it must be briefly observed that they properly indeed belong to actual grace, but can nevertheless be somehow accommodated to habitual grace, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 111, art. 2. For grace, as we said above, is called operating, when our mind is moved and does not move; it is said to be cooperating, when our mind both moves and is moved: but habitual grace both sanctifies the soul in the genus of formal cause, which effect it alone effects; and is simultaneously the principle of the meritorious work, which is produced by grace and free will simultaneously: therefore habitual grace can, by a certain true reason, be called operating and cooperating. It can also be called preventing and subsequent, by reason of diverse effects, of which one follows another: e.g. insofar as it gives supernatural being, it is said to prevent itself, as moving to good will, operation, and perseverance.

Finally, celebrated is the division of actual grace into sufficient and efficacious. Sufficient is that which gives the power to operate, efficacious, however, is that which is always joined with the operation which it infallibly infers. This division is taken from Augustine, On correction and grace, chapters 11 and 12, where he distinguishes a twofold grace, one which gives the power to persevere, which he asserts was granted to Adam and to the evil Angels: "For if" (he says) "this help had been lacking to either Angel or man, when they were first made, since such was not the nature made, that it could remain without divine help, they would not indeed have fallen through their own guilt; the help would indeed have been lacking, without which they could not remain." Another, which gives the actual perseverance, which was denied to Adam and to the evil Angels, and is given to the Saints predestined to the kingdom of God through His grace. The first he calls the help "without which," the other he says is the help "by which." Cyril mentions both in the book On adoration, where he says thus: "So great a benignity does the Savior God of the universe show us, that He helps us with efficacious assistance, according to what is written: 'Thou hast taken hold of my right hand, and hast conducted me in thy will'; for since man's nature is not very noble, nor sufficiently fit that you can escape evil, God, in a certain manner, contends together with us, and seems to grant a twofold benefit, persuading with admonitions, that we may find assistance, and furnishing at the same time something stronger, than that a present and violent evil can prevail." Both are also insinuated by St. Thomas here, q. 112, art. 2, ad 2, in these words: "It sometimes happens that God moves man to some good, not, however, perfect, and such preparation precedes grace; but sometimes He immediately moves him perfectly to good, and man suddenly receives grace." By these words the holy Doctor manifestly acknowledges, in the state of fallen nature, a certain grace moving and applying to

imperfect acts, and preparing for more perfect ones, which the Thomists call sufficient, another moving and applying to perfect acts, and effecting the perfect conversion and justification of the sinner, which they call efficacious. Therefore the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is legitimate, and according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, and also of Augustine and Cyril.

Reason also supports this, for since in every nature, especially intellectual, three things are distinguished, namely to be, to be able, and to operate, fittingly, in the supernatural order, a threefold grace is to be admitted. One which gives supernatural and divine being, and which is as it were the substance of that order; and this is sanctifying grace, which elevates us to the conformity and participation of the divine nature, as we shall show in the following chapter. Another which gives the power, or which completes the power in first act, and this is sufficient grace, which is called the grace of possibility. The other, finally, which gives actual operating, or which moves the power and applies it to acting, and infallibly connects it with operation, and this grace is called efficacious.

But some Recent authors contend that that help which the Thomists admit, and call sufficient, neither is, nor ought to be called sufficient: for by the name of sufficient means or help (they say) is commonly understood, by all, that which suffices by itself alone, and beyond which nothing further is required for acting: but in the opinion of the Thomists, besides that help which they call sufficient, another is required, by which the power is applied to acting, and reduced from first act to second: therefore such a help neither is, nor can, except abusively, be called sufficient. Just as (a certain Recent author says) because a sword and shield are necessary for fighting, a ship for sailing, sustenance for preserving life, colors and brush for painting, no prudent and wise man would say that man can fight without a shield and sword, sail without a ship, preserve life without sustenance, and paint without colors and brush.

I respond, first, that this difficulty presses not only the Thomists, but also the Fathers of the Society, defenders of congruent grace, as Father Martinono, a new and celebrated writer of the same Society, shows in the Antijansenio, disp. 26, sect. 3, num. 25, where, with various arguments, dismantling the congruent grace of Suárez, Vásquez, and other theologians of the Society, he subjoins this in third place: "Third, so much motion and excitation is morally necessary for conversion; therefore those who receive a lesser [motion] do not have morally sufficient help; and thus as many as are not converted lack help morally sufficient for conversion, and it is morally impossible for them to be converted. Whence a complaint of this kind would be metaphysical, and not moral and rational, which God forbid, 'What is it that I ought to have done more to my vineyard, and have not done?' Isaiah 5. For the Jews could rightly reply: You ought to have given us

help morally sufficient, not, however, such that with which it was morally impossible to be converted, and by which, being prevented, no one would be converted. How is it that You expect vintage from those for whom it was morally impossible not to bring forth wild grapes?" And below, num. 28, he says that the opinion which teaches the necessity of congruent grace for operating, falls into a twofold inconvenience which the Fathers of the Society object to the Thomists; and that it induces a necessitating grace, and excludes a sufficient one. Of moral sufficiency (he says) this is most manifest, because with such grace alone [namely incongruent] it is morally impossible to operate well. For that is called morally impossible which is so difficult, that no one does it. Just as, therefore, Suárez, Vásquez, and other defenders of congruent grace, teach that he who lacks congruent grace has sufficient help for operating, although such grace is so necessary for acting, that for someone to be converted or operate without it never happens, and consequently this is morally impossible; so the Thomists can call the aforesaid help which they admit sufficient, although the application of the power, which is from efficacious grace, is further required for operating; and the whole difference between those two opinions is in this, that congruent grace is only morally necessary for conversion and operation; but predetermining grace is among the physically prerequisite things for acting; with which, however, it stands, that he who lacks congruent grace, lacks morally sufficient help; if it is true what the aforesaid Authors say, that he who lacks physically predetermining grace lacks physically sufficient help.

I respond, second, directly to the difficulty proposed, that it is fitting to call the grace which gives power, even if it does not infer the act, sufficient, and this under a twofold title: first because it sufficiently excites the will to acting; second because it gives it the whole complement, and the whole virtue or sufficiency which is required on the part of the first act, although it does not give the application, actuality, or complement pertaining to the second act. That this suffices for the nature and denomination of sufficient help, is plainly gathered from both holy Doctors, Augustine, and Thomas: for although Augustine, in the book On the grace of Christ, and the book On correction and grace, admits a help of action, or aid "by which," which he teaches to be so necessary for operating and persevering, that without it no one would ever act well, nor persevere; nevertheless, besides that, he acknowledges a help of possibility, or aid "without which," which he teaches there to be sufficient, although besides it another is required: therefore, from Augustine, it is not of the nature of sufficient help, that it suffice by itself alone, and that beyond it nothing else be required for acting. Likewise St. Thomas, I-II, q. 106, art. 2, ad 2, says that the new law, as far as concerns itself, gives sufficient help for not sinning. Where by "sufficient help" he understands habitual grace, as Conrad, Sylvius, and other of his interpreters teach; and this is established both from the title of the

article, where he asks whether the new law justifies; and from the aim at which he drives, for he intends to prove that the new law justifies, because to it principally belongs habitual or justifying grace: but in St. Thomas's doctrine, for not sinning, or for observing the divine precepts, and eliciting supernatural acts, besides habitual grace, there is required in the just some actual and moving grace, by which habitual grace, and the supernatural and infused habits flowing from it, may be applied to acting, and reduced from first act to second, as is established from q. 109, art. 9, where the same holy Doctor thus says: "Man existing in grace does not need the help of grace, as if some other infused habit; he needs, however, help according to another mode, namely, that he be moved by God to acting rightly": therefore, according to St. Thomas, it is not required for the denomination of sufficient help that it so suffice by itself alone, that man not need another moving and applying help, but for this it is enough that sufficient help furnish all things necessary and required on the part of the first act. From this the disparity to the examples adduced is clear, for since a sword and shield are necessary on the part of the power itself, and the first act completed, for fighting, food for preserving life, a ship for sailing, brush and colors for painting, it is no wonder that he who lacks these is not judged to have sufficient helps and means for those acts. On the contrary, however, since efficacious grace, and physically predetermining, supposes the power completed in first act by sufficient help for acting, and only reduces it to second act, he who lacks it can be said to be powerful in first act for acting, and consequently to have sufficient help.

From these you will understand that Louis de Montalte, while in those famous Letters to a Provincial he derides the Thomists, because they call sufficient the help which they admit, even though besides it another is required for acting; not only shows himself a stranger to the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, but also exposes himself in turn to being derided by the Thomists, according to that common adage: "Mockers shall be mocked." And indeed, since he everywhere in the aforesaid Letters professes himself both a Disciple of St. Augustine, and a most keen defender of grace efficacious per se, he must either reject every sufficient help, distinct from the efficacious, and consequently assert that precepts are impossible for the just man who lacks efficacious help, which Innocent X, in his new constitution, condemned as heretical; or he must confess himself that the just man who lacks efficacious grace, and is instructed only with sufficient, has a power for acting sufficiently complete, and consequently can be said to have help truly sufficient for fulfilling the precepts.

Nor is it an obstacle that among the common people and grammarians only that is called sufficient which suffices by itself alone, and beyond which nothing further is required

for acting; for the manner of speaking of theologians is very often different from the manner of speaking of grammarians, because as Augustine says, Book 1 against Cresconius the Grammarian: "When the matter is understood, less need be labored over what men have chosen to call it." Let us, therefore, grant to Montalte the grammarian, that the help which the Thomists admit, and call sufficient, is not sufficient grammatically; it is enough for us theologians, that it be sufficient theologically, and in the Augustinian and Thomistic sense, explained above.

Concerning that member of this division, namely efficacious grace, several and grave difficulties would here have to be resolved, especially that celebrated controversy, whence the efficacy of grace is to be sought — from all the power of God, and the supreme dominion which He has over our wills, as the Thomists teach; or from His foreknowledge, exploring the future consent of our will, as Suárez, Vásquez, and other defenders of congruent grace wish? Or only from the event, or from the consent and determination of free will, of a grace determining and applying, as Molina and Lessius think? But out of reverence for the Apostolic See, which more than once prohibited the resolution of this controversy — agitated very frequently in the congregation "de Auxiliis" before Clement VIII and Paul V — from being committed to print, I pass over it in silence, for obedience is better than sacrifice, and it is more useful for us to experience the unction and efficacy of grace in ourselves, than to explore whence it may proceed. Easily, however, what is here lacking concerning this celebrated controversy can be supplied or gathered from what was said above on the gift of perseverance, and from what we wrote on the efficacy of the divine decrees in the Treatise on the will of God.

Chapter XI

On the essence of habitual grace, or grace-making

The various divisions of grace having been explained, it remains that we treat of habitual grace, or grace-making, which is the noblest species of grace, and the most shining jewel of all graces, by whose rays the other gifts shine, by which faith gleams, hope is raised up, and charity itself catches fire and glows. It is that by whose light we are illumined, by whose cleanliness we are purged from the dregs of sins, by whose whiteness we are made fair, by whose adornment we are made beautiful, by whose sanctity the Priests of God are consecrated, by whose majesty we are made equal to Kings, by whose seed we are begotten sons of God, by whose entirely divine power we are deified. By it we are made sons of God, brothers of Christ, members of His body, organs of the Holy Spirit, temples of the most holy Trinity, citizens of the Saints, members of God's household, His friends and intimates, and a new creature. It is, finally (as the Roman Catechism says), a divine quality, inhering in the soul, and as it were a certain splendor and light, which erases all the stains of our souls, and renders the souls themselves more beautiful and more splendid. Four things, moreover, are here to be investigated and explained concerning it: namely its essence, perfection, cause, and effects.

§ I

Habitual grace, or grace-making, is a gift intrinsic to man, namely a certain supernatural quality, permanent in the soul, and consequently having the nature of a habit and not of a disposition

The first part is certain by faith, and defined at Trent, session 6, canon 11, against the Lutherans and Calvinists, who thought grace not to be something infused into us, or existing in us, but only an extrinsic favor and benevolence of God, by which the soul is pleasing to Him, and loved by Him. This error can be refuted by various testimonies of Scripture: for it is said, 2 Corinthians 1: "He hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts." 1 John 3: "Whosoever is born of God committeth not sin: for his seed abideth in him." John 4: "He that shall drink of the water that I will give him, shall become in him a fountain of water, springing up into life everlasting": but a pledge given, a seal impressed, a seed implanted, a fountain of water gushing forth from the heart, plainly denote something real and intrinsically inhering. Therefore, Scripture, by these figures, or Metaphors, manifestly declares that grace-making grace is a gift intrinsic to man, and inhering in him.

Reason also persuades this, as St. Thomas insinuates here, q. 110, art. 1: through grace-making grace, man becomes the object of the supernatural love of God, since, as the name itself sounds, through it he becomes pleasing and acceptable to God. But while man becomes the object of the supernatural love of God, he is necessarily changed by the reception of some supernatural gift: therefore grace-making grace is some supernatural gift, infused into man by God, and received in him. The major is established; the minor is proved from the difference found between divine and human love; for human love, since it is powerless and sterile, and is not effective, but only affective, does not posit but presupposes goodness in things; on the contrary, divine love, since it is powerful and fruitful, and not affective, but effective, causes goodness in the object which it loves, and, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 20, art. 2, is infusing and creating goodness in things. Just as, therefore, God, by loving creatures in the natural order, communicates to them natural perfections, by which they are a fitting object of such love; so, by loving the intellectual creature in order to the supernatural end, He, through such love, causes in it some perfection, or supernatural gift, by which it becomes a fitting object of such supernatural love, and pleasing and acceptable to God in order to eternal beatitude, and therefore we call it grace-making grace.

You will say, first: predestination is God's special love toward the elect, in order to the supernatural end, and yet it cannot always posit in them some supernatural gift, since it sometimes happens that the elect are in a state of sin and infidelity, and consequently lack all supernatural gifts: therefore it is false that from the supernatural love of God toward men, some supernatural gift must be caused in them.

I respond that predestination does not include an efficacious love of God for every time (for often God hates a predestined one existing in mortal sin, according to present justice), but only for some time for which He has established to confer grace on the predestined; whence predestination confers grace for the time established by God, but not for that time in which, by divine decree, it is not efficacious, but suspends its effect.

You will say, second: God's hatred posits nothing intrinsic in the man He hates: therefore neither does His love in him whom He loves. But I deny the consequence and the parity: both because man can, from his own resources, have that whereby he becomes an object of God's hatred, namely sin; but not whereby he becomes an object of His love, namely good. Also because love is an act of pursuit, wherefore, if it does not presuppose good in the object toward which it tends, it must posit it; but hatred is by way of flight and withdrawal; whence it does not pertain to it to posit something in the object, but rather to remove it from it.

You will say, third: the object is preunderstood and presupposed for the act: therefore the good which shines forth in creatures, and is the object of divine love, is presupposed for it, not, however, caused by it.

I respond, first, that the object is presupposed for the act, when it is merely speculative, but not so if it is practical, as is established in the knowledge of vision, which is eminently both speculative and practical; it does not presuppose its object, but makes it, according to that of Gregory the Great, Book 32 of the Morals, chapter 6: "He does not create by seeing things that do not exist, and he contains existing things by seeing them"; of which more in the treatise on the knowledge of God. The love of God toward creatures, however, is practical and effective, and infusing and creating goodness in things, as St. Thomas, related above, says.

I respond, second, that just as intellection can be considered in two ways, namely as the production of the word (under which concept it is called speech), and as it is the pure contemplation of the object in the word itself; so the love of God can be considered as it is the efficacious and practical volition of its object, and as it has the nature of simple love, or complacency. Whence just as intellection, as speech, is prior to the word, but posterior, as it is the pure contemplation of the object in the word: so the love of God, as efficacious and practical, is prior to the goodness which it communicates to creatures; but if it is considered precisely under the concept of pure love, or complacency, it is not prior — indeed, under this aspect it can be posterior, not indeed as to entity, but as to its termination.

The second part, which asserts that grace-making grace is some quality permanent in the soul, and consequently has the nature of a habit and not of a disposition, is proved by this discourse of St. Thomas here, q. 110, art. 2: God provides no less for men whom He loves in order to the supernatural end, than for creatures which He loves for the natural good; but He so provides for the latter, that He not only moves them to natural acts, but also bestows on them certain forms and powers, or fixed and permanent qualities, which are principles of acts, so that of themselves they are inclined toward such motions; as is clear in the stone, to which He gave gravity so that it be connaturally inclined toward the center; and in fire, to which He gave lightness, so that it be connaturally carried to the place above: therefore much more He ought to infuse some supernatural forms, or powers, and permanent and fixed qualities, into those whom He moves to the supernatural end, by which they may promptly and sweetly be moved by Him to attaining the eternal good; and consequently grace-making grace will be some form or quality, having a fixed and permanent being. For although here in the state of the way, per accidens it is variable, and easily mobile from the subject, on account of its imperfect

participation, and because it is not in its connatural state; per se, however, and from its own nature, it seeks to remain long in the subject, and to be with difficulty torn from it, because per se it has firm and stable causes: whence in the fatherland, where it will be in its connatural state, it will be altogether incorruptible and unlosable, nor will it be measured by time, or by aevum, but by participated eternity, just as also the beatific vision itself. By which the objection, which could be made against this part of our assertion, is met.

§ II

Sanctifying grace is a formal participation of the divine nature, not only as it is nature, but also as it is infinite

The first part of this assertion is gathered from various testimonies of Scripture; for 2 Peter 1, men are said, through grace, to be made partakers of the divine nature. Likewise Scripture very often asserts that they are generated, born, and reborn of God through grace, and adopted into His sons: but since generation is a communication of nature, since nativity is a reception of nature, since only that one is to be called a son, who expresses and participates in the nature of the father, it must without doubt be believed that the just enjoy a participation of the divine nature through grace.

Reason also persuades this: for by divine nature we understand that primitive and font-like perfection, which in God, according to our mode of conceiving, is in a certain eminent way the source, root, and origin of the divine attributes, and the principle of divine operations: but sanctifying grace participates in such a perfection, since it is the root of charity and the other infused virtues, which are participations of the divine attributes, and the principle of operations attaining God as He is in Himself as a connatural and proportioned object, namely of the intuitive vision of God, and of the beatific love: therefore sanctifying grace is a participation of the divine nature, insofar as it is nature.

This is confirmed and further illustrated: to participate formally in something, is to have formal agreement with it, at least analogous: as is clear in an accident, which participates formally in the notion of being, because it has, in that notion, formal agreement, at least analogous, with substance: but sanctifying grace has such agreement with the divine nature, as nature; for just as God's nature is, in a certain eminent way, the root of knowledge and love, by which God, as He is in Himself, knows and loves Himself in an infinite manner; so sanctifying grace is the root of knowing and loving God as He is in Himself, and as He transcends the whole created and creatable order: therefore it is a formal participation of the divine nature, as nature is. Whence Cyril, Book 2 of the

Treasury, chapter 2: "Having the same operation connaturally with God, they must necessarily be of the same nature."

This is further confirmed: since every inclination tends toward the proper good of the nature in which it is rooted, nothing gives an inclination toward some nature, unless it at least participatively has it: but from sanctifying grace arises charity, which is an inclination toward God, as He is in Himself: therefore sanctifying grace has in itself, participatively, the divine nature, as nature is.

That it also participates in it, insofar as it is infinite, is proved against Alphonso Curiel, and Vincent Contenson, who deny this, and simultaneously their principal foundation is dismantled. In order for sanctifying grace to be said to participate in the divine nature, as it is infinite, it is not required that it capture the whole infinity of God in itself, but it suffices that some part or some mode of divine infinity befits it: but sanctifying grace captures some part or some mode of God's infinity in itself: therefore it participates in the divine nature, as infinite. The major is clear, for to participate in some perfection is not to have it totally and completely, but partially and inadequately; since to participate is nothing other than to take a part, and leave a part, as is established from the very terms. The minor, however, is persuaded: to God, as He is an infinite being, three things belong: the first is to have His essence as a connatural object, and as an intelligible form, according to whose measure He understands other things; for this belongs to Him insofar as He exceeds the whole order of created and creatable nature, and consequently, as He is infinite, has the whole plenitude of being; the second, that He identify to Himself such an object and species, and the operation by which He tends toward it; the third, that He comprehend it, and know it as far as it is knowable: but although sanctifying grace cannot have in itself the two latter, and communicate with God in them, the first, however, namely to have the divine essence as a connatural object, and as an intelligible form, befits it, when it communicates with God, as is clear from what was said within the treatise on the beatific vision: therefore sanctifying grace captures something of God's infinity, or some part of it, in itself, and consequently participates in the nature of God as He is infinite.

This is confirmed: our charity is a formal participation of the charity of God, as He is infinite: therefore also sanctifying grace is a formal participation of the divine nature, insofar as it is infinite. The consequence is clear, for it is no more repugnant that an infinite essence be participated in, than an infinite property. The antecedent, however, is St. Thomas's, II-II, q. 24, art. 7, where he proves that the charity of the way can be increased infinitely, because it is a certain infinite participation of the charity of God: but this reason would not prove this, if the holy Doctor did not intend charity to be a

participation of the infinite charity of God, insofar as it is infinite, but only according to some determined degree; because for some quality to participate in an infinite form, according to a determined degree, does not argue that it can be extended infinitely, but rather on the contrary that it cannot be increased beyond that degree which it participates. Just as the intellect of an Angel, and the substantial being of man, cannot be increased infinitely; because although they formally participate in the intellect and being of God, which are infinite, they nevertheless do not participate in infinites, but according to some determined degree.

You will object first against the first part of the assertion: sanctifying grace is called in Scripture the seed of God, as is established from that of 1 John 3: "Whosoever is born of God, doth not commit sin: for his seed abideth in him": but seed participates only virtually and not formally in the nature of the generator, for it is only its instrument, or power derived from it, for communicating its nature to another: therefore sanctifying grace is not a formal, but only a virtual, participation of the divine nature.

I respond that sanctifying grace is not called the seed of God, by relation to the divine nature, of which it is a participation, but by respect to the beatific vision, of which it is the root, and which is contained in the power of grace, just as a tree is contained in the power of a seed, according to that of the Apostle: "The grace of God, life everlasting." Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 62, art. 3: "Grace-making is compared to beatitude by a certain mode, just as the seminal reason in nature is compared to a natural effect"; whence 1 John, grace is named the seed of God.

You will object second: it is not of the nature of adoption that the nature be communicated to the person who is adopted as a son: therefore, although through sanctifying grace man is constituted an adoptive son of God, it does not follow that through it he formally participates in the divine nature. The consequence is manifest; the antecedent is established in adoption which occurs among men, for through it the adopted one does not receive the nature from the adopter, but is only accepted to his inheritance.

I respond that although the communication of nature is not of the nature of adoption which occurs among men, it is nevertheless required for the adoption by which man is adopted into a son of God. The reason for the difference, however, is that adoption in human affairs supposes that the adopted one is of the same nature with the adopter, and has in himself sufficient principle by which he is apt for perceiving his inheritance; and therefore it is no wonder if through it nature is not communicated. Divine adoption, however, since it does not suppose in man a likeness in the divine nature, nor sufficient

capacity for perceiving God's inheritance, must effect that, and consequently must bestow a participation of the divine nature. Of which more below, when we treat of the first effect of sanctifying grace, namely the adoption of man into a son of God.

You will object third against the second part of the assertion, with Father Vincent Contenson: infinity, since it is the character of divinity itself, and its proper, so to speak, difference, and befits God, insofar as He is distinguished even from supernatural creatures, is without doubt unparticipable by a creature: therefore sanctifying grace cannot be a formal participation of the divine nature, insofar as it is infinite.

This is confirmed, first: for formal participation, or imitation and expression, formal agreement, and as it were a copy, at least analogous, by which the participant delineates the traits of the thing participated, is desired: but sanctifying grace does not enjoy likeness and formal agreement with the nature of God, insofar as it is infinite, since it is a created and finite being: therefore neither a formal participation of the divine nature, as it is formally infinite.

This is confirmed, second: that which is formally participated by something is predicated of it: e.g. because an accident participates in the notion of being analogically, being can be predicated of it: but the notion of infinite being and pure act cannot be predicated of sanctifying grace, since it is essentially a created, finite, and potential being: therefore sanctifying grace is not a formal participation of the divine nature, insofar as it is infinite, and pure act.

Before these arguments are resolved, it must be observed that this Author writes and teaches contradictory things: for in tome 1, page 83, he teaches that the divine nature, as nature is, is constituted by the notion of being through essence. And in tome 5, in the Treatise on grace, page 466, he says that God is indeed supernatural, since as a being through essence He is pure, infinite and illimitable act: but this supernaturality, since it is the distinctive character of Divinity, by which He is distinguished even from supernatural creatures, can by no reasoning be transfused into creatures, and expressed or copied by them. Likewise there, page 460, he asserts, with the Thomists, that sanctifying grace is a formal participation of the divine nature. How these things can cohere and be reconciled among themselves, I plainly do not see. For if the nature of God is constituted by the notion of being through itself and through essence, and pure act, and that notion is unparticipable by creatures; it is manifest that sanctifying grace cannot, nor can it possibly, be a formal participation of the divine nature: since that which is unparticipable in God, can by no means be participated by creatures. On the contrary, however, if grace is a formal participation of the divine nature, and that is

constituted by the notion of being through itself and through essence, or pure act, it is evident that such a notion is not altogether unparticipable, and that it can, in some way, be transfused into creatures, and expressed or copied by them. Whence,

To the objection proposed I respond by denying the Antecedent, for it is established from what was said in the proof of the second part of our assertion, that although God's infinity cannot be participated by a creature adequately, and according to all the concepts and notions which it contains, it can nevertheless be participated inadequately, and according to some notion, or concept, namely insofar as it attributes to God the having of His essence as connatural object, and intelligible form, which is participated by sanctifying grace; since that is the root of the beatific vision, and of the union of the divine essence, in the nature of intelligible species, with the intellect of the blessed, permeated with the light of glory.

I add that some infinity of grace shines forth in other things: first because it has no term for its increase. Second, because it is a principle of meriting of condignity, and, to an equal degree, an objectively infinite reward, and of satisfying in some way for moral guilt, which in the nature of an offense is intrinsically infinite, as we showed in the treatise on sins. Third, because it is the principle of charity, which, as St. Thomas, related above, says, is a certain infinite participation of the charity of God. Finally, some infinity of it shines forth in this, that just as God, because He is infinite of Himself, suffices for filling every desire of the human heart (on account of which He is called by the Hebrews Shaddai, that is, He who suffices): so also grace, since it is a participation of the divine nature, and as it were a certain bond by which God is intimately conjoined to the soul, can satiate all the desires of man, especially when it shall be consummated in the fatherland, through the light of glory, and the clear vision of God, which fills and satiates all man's desires, as was shown in the treatise on beatitude.

To the first confirmation, the major being granted, I deny the minor; for sanctifying grace has this similarity and analogous agreement with the nature of God, insofar as it is infinite, that just as God, insofar as He is infinite, and exceeds the whole created and creatable order, has His own essence as a connatural object, and intelligible form; so also sanctifying grace participates in both, as was shown above.

To the second I respond, from St. Thomas, Quodlibet 2, art. 3, that something can be participated by another in two ways: first as a common and superior notion, in the way that animal is participated by man, or the notion of being by an accident: second as existing outside its essence, just as fire is participated by red-hot iron, and the light of the sun by air. What is participated in the first way by another, can be predicated of it, just as

animal is predicated of man, and being of an accident; but not so that which is only participated in the second way; for fire is not predicated of red-hot iron, nor can the light of an illuminated body be said to be the very illuminating body. Whence since sanctifying grace is only an accidental participation of the divine nature, and that is not compared to it, as a common and superior notion to an inferior, the formal notion of infinite being, or of pure act, ought not to be predicated of it, but it suffices that some notion analogically common to the divine nature and to sanctifying grace, namely to be the root of understanding and loving God connaturally as He is in Himself, be predicated of grace.

Chapter XII

By certain Corollaries the nature and perfection of sanctifying grace is more explained

From the foundations established in the preceding chapter, certain corollaries can be deduced, by which the nature and perfection of sanctifying grace will be more elucidated, and more perfectly understood.

Corollary I

It is repugnant that there be given several species of sanctifying grace, physically and essentially different among themselves

This corollary manifestly follows from what was said in the preceding chapter, for sanctifying grace (as was shown there) is a formal participation of the divine nature, as nature is: but the nature of God, under the concept of nature, since it is most simple, cannot be participated in only one way, namely by way of being constitutive, and root of the divine attributes: therefore sanctifying grace cannot be multiplied into several species essentially different among themselves.

This is confirmed and further illustrated: although the infinite perfection of God is participable in infinite ways specifically diverse, when the mode of participation is not determined, it is otherwise, however, when such a mode is determined: e.g. although the divine intellect, absolutely, is participable in many ways specifically diverse, and is in fact participated through the light of glory, through the beatific vision, through faith, through prophecy, and through science per se infused; nevertheless under that aspect by which it regards the divine essence clearly, and as it is in Himself, intuitively, it cannot be participated except in one way, namely by the light of glory, as it exercises the nature of a cognitive principle, and by the intuitive vision, as it exercises the nature of operation, or

actual knowledge, because then the mode of participation is determined. So likewise, although that which in God has the nature of essence, is participable in many ways by creatures; yet if it be considered precisely under the concept and function of nature, or as it is in a certain eminent way the root of the divine attributes, it cannot be participated except in one way, because then the mode of participation is determined and limited.

I said it is repugnant that there be given several species of sanctifying grace, physically and essentially different among themselves, because there can be given diverse graces, distinct in moral and accidental species: e.g. the grace of Christ differs in moral species from ours, because it is a principle of infinite merit and satisfaction. Similarly the sacramental graces differ among themselves in accidental species, because they have diverse virtues, and connote diverse helps, against diverse wounds of sins. Of which in the treatise on the sacraments.

You will say: those forms are distinguished in physical and essential species, from which flow properties specifically diverse: but from the grace of Christ and of Adam flow properties specifically diverse from those which flow from our grace; for in Christ grace is the root of commutative justice, and in Adam of original justice, and of the gift of integrity, but not in us; likewise grace in us wayfarers produces faith and hope, but in the comprehensors the light of glory, and the clear vision of God: therefore those graces differ among themselves in physical and essential species.

I respond that although substantial forms, from which flow properties specifically diverse, are of diverse species, accidental forms, however, are not, such as is sanctifying grace. For since it is proper to an accidental form to perfect the subject in which it is received, according to the mode and requirement of that, on account of the diversity of subjects, it produces diverse effects, sometimes specifically diverse: e.g. heat, as it is in fire, produces fire; as it is in an animal, and insofar as it is the instrument of the nutritive power, produces blood and flesh; as it is in a female, produces milk, etc. Likewise the influences of celestial bodies, according to the diversity of subjects, in which they are received, work various effects; for in gardens they produce flowers, in vineyards grapes, in olive groves olives; and water, although it is of one species, works in various ways, whitening in a lily, reddening in a rose, purpling in a violet, as Chrysostom nicely says. So likewise grace, although one and simple quality, nevertheless works multiple, and sometimes specifically diverse, effects, according to the diverse capacity and requirement of the subjects, in which it is received: for in us it causes adoptive sonship, but not in Christ; because since Christ is the natural Son of God, He is incapable of adoption; in us it causes penance, but in Christ commutative justice: in Adam before the fall it was the root of original justice, and of the gift of integrity, but after the fall it caused in him the

virtue of penance: in us it produces the virtues moderating the passions, but not in the Angels, because since they lack passions, they are not capable of them: finally, in the state of the way it produces faith and hope, but in the fatherland the light of glory, and the clear vision of God, and also beatific fruition.

Corollary II

Sanctifying grace is simply more perfect than charity, the light of glory, the beatific vision, and any other supernatural being: although the beatific vision exceeds it in mode of being, and is more perfect in a qualified sense

The first part of this corollary is clear from what has been said above: for since supernatural beings are participations of God, insofar as He exceeds the whole created and creatable order, something must be esteemed more perfect, the more it expresses and participates in a greater perfection of God: but sanctifying grace participates in that which expresses a greater perfection of God: therefore it is simply more perfect than other beings of the supernatural order. The major is clear; the minor is proved. Sanctifying grace, as we showed, participates in the divine nature, under the concept and function of nature; but the light of glory participates in the eminence of God, insofar as it exercises precisely the function of intellective power; the beatific vision insofar as it exercises the function of actual intellection; charity, however, and the other infused habits, are participations of the divine properties and attributes: although, however, all things which are in God, are absolutely equal in perfection, because each one is the whole plenitude of being; nevertheless not all things, by virtue of their own line, or by their own function, express equal perfection: but that which, by virtue of its own line, and under its own function, expresses a greater perfection in God, is nature, or the constitutive, insofar as it is such; being that from which the rest, as from a most eminent root, are virtually derived: therefore sanctifying grace participates in that which expresses a greater perfection in God.

The second part, which asserts that the blessed vision, in mode of being, is more perfect in a qualified sense than sanctifying grace, is also manifest; for second act, or operation, in mode of being, is nobler than a habit, because it does not contain the potentiality which a habit includes: but the beatific vision is second act, and sanctifying grace is a habit, as we showed in § 1: therefore the beatific vision, in mode of being, is more perfect than sanctifying grace. Similarly the light of glory, in a certain qualified and accidental respect, is more perfect than it, inasmuch as it is necessarily joined to actual operation, from which habitual grace can be separated.

You will say: since the state of the fatherland is simply nobler than the state of the way, the gifts which pertain to the state of the fatherland are simply nobler than the gifts pertaining to the state of the way: but the light of glory and the beatific vision pertain to the state of the fatherland, but sanctifying grace to the state of the way: therefore the light of glory and the beatific vision are simply more perfect than sanctifying grace.

I respond that certain supernatural gifts pertain to the state of the fatherland only, such as the light of glory, and the beatific vision; certain others pertain to the state of the way only, such as faith and hope; and others pertain to the state of the way and of the fatherland simultaneously, such as grace and charity: although, however, the gifts which are of the fatherland alone, are more powerful than the gifts of the way alone, it is nevertheless otherwise with the gifts of the way and of the fatherland simultaneously; indeed these excel all the others, at least as to that which is the first root and foundation of all the others, namely sanctifying grace. Whence St. Thomas within, q. 113, art. 9, says: "The gift of justifying grace to the impious is greater than the gift of glory beatifying."

From these you will understand that a single degree of grace is of greater price and value, and more to be esteemed, than all the natural goods of the whole universe. Whence Augustine, Book 2 to Boniface, chapter 6: "Grace surpasses not only all the stars, and all the heavens, but also all the Angels." And St. Thomas within, q. 113, art. 9, ad 2: "The good of grace of one is greater than the good of nature of the whole universe" — which golden words Cajetan, weighing them, in the commentary on that article, writes this: "Keep always before your eyes, day and night, that the good of grace of one is better than the good of nature of the whole universe, so that you may continually see that damnation is imminent to one who does not esteem such a great good offered."

Corollary III

Sanctifying grace so per se expels sin, that it is repugnant for both to be associated in the same subject

The first part is manifestly gathered from various testimonies of Scripture and the holy Fathers, which plainly declare the incompatibility of grace with sin, at least by ordinary law. For it is said, 1 John 3: "Whosoever is born of God, committeth not sin: for his seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." By these words he signifies that as long as that divine seed, which is grace, by which he is spiritually reborn, remains in him, man can neither sin in act, nor be infected by any sin. Likewise grace in Scripture is called light, but sin darkness, as is established from that of 1 Peter 2: "Who hath called you out of darkness into his marvellous light," that is, from sins to grace: therefore just as light and darkness cannot be simultaneously in the same subject and at the same time, so neither can grace and sin. Whence the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 4: "What participation hath justice with injustice? Or what fellowship hath light with darkness?" Likewise the holy Fathers teach that sin is the death of the soul, and the destruction of spiritual life, as is to be seen in Nazianzen, oration 19, and in Augustine on Psalm 9, and sermon 5 on the words of the Lord, where he says thus: "Just as the soul is the life of the body, so the life of the soul is God, united to it through grace and charity. Just as the body expires, when it emits the soul, so the soul expires, when it loses God. God lost, death of the soul; the soul emitted, death of the body." Therefore, just as death and life cannot be simultaneously in the same subject, and at the same time, so neither can grace and sin, at least by the ordinary law and power of God.

That this is also repugnant, even by the absolute power of God, is proved, first, from the principles established in the treatise on sins: for there we showed from St. Thomas that habitual sin consists in the privation of habitual grace, with respect to the preceding act of sin from which it is caused: whence since those things which are privatively opposed, cannot be simultaneously in the same subject, even by the absolute power of God (otherwise a form and its lack could stand simultaneously in the same subject, and consequently the same thing simultaneously be and not be), it is repugnant that habitual sin and sanctifying grace be associated simultaneously in the same subject. The same, with proportion, must be said of actual sin, since it causes habitual sin.

It is proved, second, by this reason: it implies a contradiction that someone should simultaneously have several total ultimate ends, not subordinated to each other, otherwise each would be ultimate and not ultimate, as was shown in the treatise on beatitude, chapter 1, § 3: but he who is endowed with grace and charity has God as his total ultimate end; but he who sins mortally, constitutes the ultimate end in a creature, as

was proved in the treatise on sins, chapter 10, § 2: therefore it implies a contradiction that someone exist simultaneously in grace and sin.

It is proved, third, by this discourse: since, according to the Adversaries, grace by its nature wipes away the stain of sin, if God, using His absolute power, should impede sanctifying grace from wiping it away, such an effect would be attributed to God as special author or conserver, and consequently God would be a special author, or conserver of sin, which is repugnant to His infinite sanctity. Just as, because fire by its nature expels cold from water, if God should miraculously, and by using His absolute power, impede such an expulsion, the preservation of the cold would be reduced to Him as a special author or conserver.

Finally, the same truth can be persuaded by this fundamental reason: the formal effects of sanctifying grace, and of mortal sin, are incompatible, even by the absolute power of God: therefore also the very forms from which they proceed. The consequence is clear, for since formal effects are nothing other than the very forms communicated to the subject, and signified in the concrete, by the same reason that formal effects conflict among themselves, do the forms from which they proceed conflict among themselves. The antecedent, however, is shown thus: the formal effects of sanctifying grace are, to render man a consort of the divine nature, and consequently to constitute him an adoptive son of God, to make him a fitting object of divine love and friendship, and to grant him a right to eternal felicity: on the contrary, the formal effects of mortal sin, both actual and habitual, are to destroy in man the participation of the divine nature, to render him hateful and inimical to God, to deprive him of divine sonship, and consequently of the right to eternal beatitude: but effects of this kind cannot, by any power, befit the same subject simultaneously, as is established: therefore neither can the effects of sanctifying grace, and of mortal sin, whether actual or habitual.

Nor is it valid to say, with Suárez, that those effects of habitual grace are not primary, but secondary, and consequently that they can be separated from it by God's absolute power; just as capacity for laughter is separable from rationality, local extension from quantity, and beatific joy from the clear vision of God: it is not valid, I say, both because some of those effects are primary, such as to render man a consort of the divine nature, and an adoptive son of God; and also because although some are secondary, all are nevertheless intimately rooted in the nature of sanctifying grace, just as properties are rooted in the essence from which they flow: whence just as, for one having rationality, there can indeed be lacking, by absolute power, actual nobility, but not the capacity for laughter; so for man having habitual grace, some of the effects recounted can perhaps, by extraordinary power, be lacking, but it is repugnant that in him there be effects of sin,

privatively, or contrarily, opposed to them.

You will object first: actual mortal sin does not expel grace physically, but only morally and by way of merit; namely because it causes the sinner to merit from God to be punished by the loss of grace, and to be deprived and stripped of it in punishment of that: but God is not bound to inflict the punishment on the one meriting it, but by His indulgence He can pardon it. Therefore, even if sin merits the withdrawal of grace, it will divinely be able to be associated with sanctifying grace in the same subject.

I respond by denying the Major, for actual mortal sin, effectively and simultaneously, and by way of merit, and consequently physically and simultaneously and morally, expels sanctifying grace from the soul. For in it three things can be considered, namely the nature of offense or injury inflicted on God, and under this aspect it expels grace only by way of merit and morally: aversion from God and conversion to a creature, and this expels grace physically, not indeed proximately and immediately, but by means of the habitual conversion to a creature which such sin leaves; for this expels charity, and consequently grace in which it is rooted. Third, in actual sin one can consider what it causes and leaves in the soul, namely the stain, and this proximately and immediately expels grace, just as privation [expels] a form. Nor is it inconvenient that one and the same thing, under diverse aspects, physically and morally, and effectively and by way of merit, expel some form.

You will say: granted that actual sin efficiently destroys grace, God can nevertheless impede its causality, and consequently the expulsion of grace from the soul: therefore He can effect that in the same subject grace and sin simultaneously exist.

I respond by denying the Antecedent, for God can impede only that causality which depends on and proceeds from Himself; but the causality by which actual sin is said to be the cause of habitual sin, neither depends on God, nor proceeds from Him; because God can be the cause neither of actual nor of habitual sin, and consequently neither of their causality.

You will object second: one act does not necessarily expel the opposed habit, but can exist simultaneously with it in the same subject, as is clear in an act of intemperance, which can simultaneously be with the virtue of temperance, or on the contrary, one act of temperance with the vice of intemperance: therefore one act of sin need not necessarily expel grace, but can simultaneously exist and be associated with it in the same subject.

I respond, first, that if this argument were valid, it would prove, not only by absolute power, but also by ordinary power, that grace can be with one or another mortal sin, since without a miracle a habit can be with a contrary act.

I respond, second, that a habit can be with a contrary act, when contradictory predicates do not follow from their simultaneity; but not so if from their coexistence contradictory predicates follow, as was shown above to happen from the simultaneous existence of sin and grace.

Third, it can be said that natural and acquired habits are not necessarily expelled by a single act, but supernatural and infused habits are indeed, such as is sanctifying grace. For acquired habits depend on the power of their subject in coming to be and being preserved; but infused habits, as to their production and preservation, depend on the action of God infusing and preserving them, just as light in its coming to be and being preserved depends on the illumination of the sun. Whence just as light would immediately cease in the air, if some obstacle were placed to the sun's illumination; so, one mortal sin only being posited in the soul, the habit of grace and charity immediately fails, because by any mortal sin whatsoever an obstacle is placed to its infusion and preservation.

Corollary IV

Habitual grace is really distinct from charity

This is proved, first: sanctifying grace is related in the supernatural order, as substantial form in the natural order: therefore just as this, according to the more common sense of the Philosophers, is really distinguished from the properties and active powers, whose root it is; so also it from the supernatural virtues, which flow from it, as properties from essence, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 110, art. 4, ad 1, in these words: "Just as from the essence of the soul flow its powers, which are the principles of operations, so also from grace itself flow virtues into the powers of the soul." The consequence is clear, for concerning supernatural things, proportion being preserved, and their supernaturality being set aside, one must philosophize as concerning natural ones; because grace, as far as can be, is tempered and accommodated to nature, as theologians everywhere teach; whence just as in the natural order substance is not immediately operative, but acts by the mediation of its powers, which are the immediate principle of operating, and consequently are distinguished from it; so also habitual grace, which in the supernatural order takes the place of substance and of nature.

It is proved, second, by the reason of St. Thomas here, q. 110, art. 3, which can be proposed thus: charity presupposes in the soul habitual grace: therefore it is really distinguished from it. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved. Charity, since it is a virtue, disposes man fittingly according to a preexisting nature, for this is of the nature of virtue, as Aristotle teaches, Physics 7, chapter 17. But it does not dispose him fittingly for human nature, insofar as it is precisely human and rational; this is proper to the moral and acquired virtues: therefore it disposes fittingly for human nature, as elevated to divine and supernatural being, through habitual grace, and consequently it supposes it in the soul.

The same holy Doctor insinuates another reason, q. 27 De Veritate, art. 2, in these words: "Just as in natural things, nature itself is one thing, and the inclination of nature, and its motion or operation, another; so also in gratuitous things, grace is one thing from charity, and from the other virtues." This reason he illustrates there, by observing that in any order of things four things are found, namely the substance or nature of the thing, its end, the inclination to such end, and the motion or tendency toward it: e.g. in a stone there is its own nature, consisting in this, that it is a mixed body of such a species; its end, which is nothing other than rest at the center; gravity, which is the propensity or inclination toward it; and descent, which is the motion or tendency toward it. Similarly in the supernatural order these four things must be found, whence in such order grace holds the place of substance or nature, the beatific vision has the nature of end, charity is the inclination toward it, and its motions are the operations elicited by charity, or commanded by it, by which such an end is acquired.

You will object first: in Scripture the same effects are attributed to grace and charity, for through both we are said to be justified, to live a divine and supernatural life, to become adoptive sons of God, etc.: therefore they are not really distinguished, but are one and the same habit, which, according as it fulfills diverse functions, is designated by diverse names.

I respond that the same effects are attributed to grace and charity, not because they are one and the same habit, but because they are inseparably connected between themselves. Just as the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13, attributes the effects of kindness, and patience, and several other virtues, to charity, not because they are one and the same habit, but because they inseparably accompany charity itself.

You will object second: if grace and charity were really distinguished, they could be separated from one another, at least by God's absolute power: but this cannot be said: therefore neither that. The minor is proved: if someone had grace without charity, he

would be pleasing and acceptable to God, indeed also His adoptive son, and yet would not be His friend, which seems absurd. Likewise if charity were infused into someone without sanctifying grace, he would neither be damned, since he would have no sin, which with charity is impossible; nor would he be saved, because since he would not be God's adoptive son, he would be incapable of His inheritance.

I respond, the major being granted, by denying the Minor, and to its first proof I say that he, to whom grace would be infused without charity, would be God's friend radically and remotely, because he would have grace, to which, as to a root, the principle of loving God would be owed. To the second I say that that case is impossible, because although God, by absolute power, can separate essence from its properties, by impeding their resultance, He nevertheless cannot make some property exist in some subject without the essence from which it flows, especially if such a property is vital: e.g. although God can create a rational soul without intellect and will, He cannot, however, produce or preserve the intellect and will without the rational soul; because since those powers are vital, they cannot subsist without the vital principle in which they are rooted: whence since charity is a vital power of the supernatural order, it cannot exist without sanctifying grace, which is the first root of supernatural life, and which in the supernatural order takes the place of nature or substance.

Corollary V

Habitual grace is subjected immediately in the soul, not, however, in its powers

This follows manifestly from what has been said above: for in the first place, that which perfects a power per se, first, for an ordered operation, is immediately operative: but sanctifying grace is not immediately operative, as we showed in the preceding corollary: therefore it does not reside in the powers of the soul, but in its essence.

Second, spiritual gifts, which are participations of the intellect and will of God, are received immediately in the created intellect and will: therefore that which is a participation of the divine nature, as nature is, must be received immediately in the very essence of the soul.

Third, since the formal effect of a form is nothing other than the very form, as communicated to the subject, the form to which its formal effect is attributed, resides immediately in that subject: but the formal effect of sanctifying grace, namely to give supernatural being and life, or to be the radical principle of supernatural life, belongs per se, first, to the soul, and not to its powers. Likewise, to be pleasing regards per se, first, not operations, or powers, but the subject; for because that is pleasing, operations are

pleasing and acceptable, according to that of Genesis 4: "The Lord had respect to Abel, and to his offerings": therefore grace itself also inheres immediately in the soul itself, not in its powers.

Finally, as St. Thomas discusses here, q. 110, art. 4: through grace we are regenerated into sons of God: but generation, first, terminates at essence, before it does at powers: therefore grace is, first, in the essence of the soul, before it is in its powers.

You will say: contraries must have the same subject from which they expel each other: but the subject of sin, which is contrary to grace, is not the essence of the soul, but its powers: therefore grace does not reside in the essence of the soul, but in its powers.

I respond by denying the Minor, for although the subject of actual sin is the power, the subject of habitual sin, however, and of the stain, to which grace is opposed, is the essence of the soul, as we showed in the treatise on sins.

Chapter XIII

On the cause of habitual grace, and the action by which it is produced

I say, first, that no creature, however perfect, not even Christ, insofar as man, can be the principal cause of sanctifying grace.

This is proved, first: through the infusion of sanctifying grace the Holy Spirit is given, according to that of the Apostle to the Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us": but no creature, nor even Christ Himself, insofar as man, has the physical and principal power of giving the Holy Spirit: therefore neither of infusing sanctifying grace. The major is clear; the minor is proved. A gift ought to be in some way the giver's own, either by identity, or by origin, or by possession, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 37, art. 1, ad 1. But by none of these ways can the Holy Spirit be Christ's, insofar as man, much less of any pure creature: therefore neither Christ as man, nor any creature, can give the Holy Spirit principally. Whence Augustine, 15 On the Trinity, chapter 20: "How is He not God who gives the Holy Spirit?" And St. Thomas, III, q. 8, art. 1, ad 1: "To give grace, or the Holy Spirit, befits Christ according as He is God, authoritatively, but it befits Him also instrumentally according as He is man, inasmuch, namely, as His humanity was the instrument of His divinity."

It is proved, second: through habitual grace we are adopted into sons of God, as we shall show in the following chapter: but no creature, nor even Christ, insofar as man, can principally adopt us into sons of God: therefore neither can He give us sanctifying grace. The minor is proved: only he can adopt into a son, who connaturally has a right to the

inheritance: but neither Christ as man, nor any pure creature, has connaturally a right to the beatific vision, which is the inheritance, since the beatific vision cannot be connatural to any created or creatable thing, as was proved in the treatise on the beatific vision: therefore no creature, nor even Christ, insofar as man, can principally adopt into sons of God. Whence St. Thomas, 4 Contra Gentes, chapter 17: "To adopt into sons of God cannot be the work of any other than God."

It is proved, third: to produce habitual grace in the soul, is to deify it, communicating to it a physical consortium of the divine nature: but to deify is God's alone, by way of principal cause, just as to enkindle by way of principal cause is fire's alone, or another's containing eminently the nature of fire, for instance the sun's: therefore it is God's alone to produce sanctifying grace by way of principal cause.

Finally, the same truth can be persuaded by this reason of St. Thomas here, q. 112, art. 1: the principal cause ought to be of greater, or at least equal, perfection, with its effect: but no creature can surpass or equal in perfection sanctifying grace; for since it is a formal participation of the divine nature, insofar as it is infinite, as was shown in chapter [11], it surpasses in essential perfection every created and creatable nature: therefore no creature can be given, which is the principal cause of sanctifying grace.

I say, second, sanctifying grace is neither created, nor co-created, but is educed from the obediential power of the soul.

The first part of this conclusion is proved, first, from St. Thomas here, q. 113, art. 9, where he asks, whether the creation of the world is a greater work of God, than the justification of the impious? And under a distinction he responds that, on the part of the mode of operating, creation is a greater work than justification, since the former is from nothing, but not the latter; but from the magnitude of the thing which is done, the justification of the impious is a greater work, than the creation of heaven and earth: but this difference would be nothing, if grace were produced through creation: therefore, according to St. Thomas, sanctifying grace is not created.

The same part is proved, second, by Cajetan's reason: grace, when it ceases to be, is not annihilated: therefore neither, when it is produced, is it created. The antecedent is certain, both because annihilation does not in fact intervene in the works of grace, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 104, art. 4; also because grace is destroyed precisely by virtue of its separation from the subject: but separation from the subject is not annihilation, since the subject remains. The consequence, however, is proved: from the common opinion of the Philosophers, the inception and the ceasing of some thing correspond to each other, so that what begins through generation, ceases through corruption; and what ceases

through corruption, begins through generation, and vice versa: therefore if grace does not cease through annihilation, it is a manifest sign that it is not produced through creation.

That it is also not co-created, can easily be shown: that is said to be co-created, which comes about through the same action, by which the subject is created; whence the intellect and the will are said to come about through co-creation, because since they are properties of the rational soul, they come about through the same action by which it itself is produced; but sanctifying grace, since it is not a property of the soul, but an accident due to it, does not come about through the same action, by which the soul is produced, but through a diverse one: therefore it cannot be said to be co-created by God with the creation of the subject.

From these the third part of the conclusion remains proved: for if sanctifying grace is neither created, nor co-created, it must be educed from some power of the subject in which it is received, since between creation and eduction there is no middle; for to create is to come to be from nothing, or from a not presupposed subject; to be educed, however, on the contrary, is not to come to be from nothing, but from a presupposed subject: but sanctifying grace cannot be educed from the natural or violent power of its subject, namely the soul, since it is neither connatural nor repugnant to it: therefore it is educed from the obediential power of the soul.

You will object first against the first conclusion: he who principally causes the ultimate disposition to some form, also principally produces that form itself: e.g. he who principally produces heat throughout, principally induces thereby the form of fire: but man principally causes the acts of contrition, or of charity, which are the ultimate dispositions to sanctifying grace: therefore he is the principal cause of it.

I respond that the agent which principally produces the ultimate disposition to some form, also principally causes that form itself, when it is educed from the natural power of the subject: but not so, if it is educed from its obediential power; because obediential power is subject only to God, so that it cannot be subjected to the dominion of any creature; but sanctifying grace is educed from the obediential power of the soul, as was shown in the second conclusion. This can be explained by the example of the generation of man, for man producing physical dispositions for introducing the rational soul, is not therefore the chief cause of the rational soul, because it is not educed from the bosom of matter, but is created by God.

You will object second: the intellect of the blessed concurs principally, and not only instrumentally, to the beatific vision, although it is entitatively supernatural, and a

formal participation of divine intellection, as we taught in the treatise on the vision of God: therefore likewise man can be the principal cause of sanctifying grace, although it is entitatively supernatural, and a formal participation of the divine nature.

But I deny the consequence and the parity: the reason for the difference, however, is that although the beatific vision is a supernatural operation, and transcends all the powers of created and creatable nature, it nevertheless supposes in the intellect of the blessed eliciting it, the light of glory, which is of the same species and perfection with it: but sanctifying grace cannot suppose in its subject some supernatural principle, equal to it in perfection, by which it is produced, since it is the most perfect form of the supernatural order, which is related as the root of the others.

You will object third against the second conclusion: Scripture in various passages seems to teach that habitual grace is created: for David, Psalm 50, asking that grace be granted to him by God, says: "Create a clean heart in me, O God." And to the Galatians 6, the just man is called a new creature. Likewise, to the Ephesians 1, the faithful are said to be created in Christ Jesus. These passages do not seem to be able to be explained, unless we say that habitual grace is created.

I respond, with St. Thomas here, q. 110, art. 2, ad 3, that grace in the sacred Scriptures is said to be created, not because it is produced from nothing according to its natural and physical being, which true creation implies; but because it is infused by God, many of our merits preceding it not, which has a certain likeness to creation, and can be called moral creation.

You will object fourth: the action by which sanctifying grace is produced ought to be the most excellent of all things, since such a quality, in nobility and perfection, exceeds any created and creatable thing, as is established from what was said in the preceding chapter: but creation is much nobler than eduction: therefore sanctifying grace is not educed, but created.

I respond that the action by which God produces sanctifying grace ought indeed to be most excellent, but accommodated to its condition: but creation is not a production which is accommodated to the condition and nature of sanctifying grace, but only eduction; for since it is an accident, and accordingly is not naturally per se subsisting, it depends in its being and coming to be on its subject, and consequently is educed from its power, not indeed natural, but obediential, if it is produced connaturally. Whence the excellence of its production above the productions of other forms, even the lower ones, is sufficiently preserved through this, that no creature is given, in whose active power principally concurring, or in whose natural passive power, it might be precontained.

You will object last: the sanctifying grace which was conferred on the Angels and our first parents, in the very moment of creation, could not come about through eduction: therefore it at least was created, or co-created. The consequence is clear, for, as we said above, between creation and eduction there is no middle. The antecedent, however, is shown thus: for some form to be educed from a subject, it is required that it come about through a transmutative action of that subject: but sanctifying grace, which was conferred on the Angels and our first parents, at the moment of creation, could not come about through a transmutative action of the subject: therefore neither be educed from it. The major is commonly taught by our Thomists in Philosophy; the minor, however, seems manifest: for the transmutation of the subject requires that it precede the form in priority of time, or at least of instant, and exist, in such a prior, under its privation: but the subject of the grace of the Angels and of the first parents, did not precede in any instant deprived of this kind of form, since they received it in the first moment of creation, according to that of Augustine: "God was in the Angels, founding nature, and bestowing grace": therefore such grace was not made through a transmutative action of the subject.

I respond by denying the antecedent, and to its proof, granting the major, I deny the minor, to whose proof I say that although for the actual transmutation of the subject it is required that it preceded in some instant, or prior, in which, deprived of the form which it receives; nevertheless in order for the productive action of the form to be transmutative of the subject as far as it is of itself, it suffices that it be distinct from that by which the subject is produced, and not have an inviolable connection with it, as our Thomists teach in physics, when they treat of the eduction of forms: but the action by which grace was conferred on the Angels and the first parents, had those two conditions, for it was distinct from that by which the Angels and the first parents were produced by God, and did not have an inviolable connection with it, since sanctifying grace did not flow from the substance of the Angels and the first parents, by way of a property; whence it was produced through a transmutative action of the subject, although per accidens it did not actually and in fact transmute it, because per accidens, in the same moment in which it was established, grace was produced, and thus it did not precede in any instant under privation of it.

Chapter XIV

On the first effect of habitual grace, namely the adoption of man into a son of God

There are three principal effects of habitual grace, of which we must treat in this chapter, and the two following: namely the adoption of man into a son of God, the justification of the sinner, and the merit of the just.

Concerning the first, it must be supposed as certain and undoubtedly held, that God adopts men into sons: for it is said, 1 John 3: "Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God." To the Romans 8: "The Spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God." Whence Chrysologus, sermon 10: "We have heard, brothers, to what place divine condescension has raised us, to what heights heavenly fatherhood has lifted us: let us believe we are sons of God, let us answer to our lineage, let us live for heaven, let us reflect the Father in likeness, lest we lose by our vices what we have obtained through grace." And sermon 70: "What wonder if Christ has consecrated men into sons of God, when He gave and adapted Himself to become a son of man? Then He transferred the nature of flesh into the divine, when He brought down Divinity to human nature; then He offered man as co-heir with Himself in heavenly things, when He rendered Himself a participant of earthly things." Similar things Chrysostom has, homily 2 on Matthew, where he says: "When you have heard that the Son of God is the son of David and Abraham, cease to doubt that you too, who are a son of Adam, are to become a son of God. For He would not have so humbled Himself, unless He were to exalt us. For He was born according to the flesh, that you might be born of the spirit; He was born of a woman, that you might cease to be a son of woman."

For reason too supports this: adoption is the gratuitous assumption of an extraneous person to another's inheritance: but God gratuitously and liberally assumes, or elevates, the rational creature to beatitude, in which God's inheritance consists, and to which by its own nature it has no right, and consequently is compared to it as an extraneous person: therefore God adopts men into sons.

There is only difficulty, therefore, and controversy among theologians, as to what is the form which constitutes man an adoptive son of God, or which founds adoptive sonship of God? For some think the divinity of the Holy Spirit, extrinsically united to us or assisting, to be the form which formally gives the being of adoptive son of God, sanctifying grace concurring only as a bond. Thus Lessius, Book On the highest good, chapter 1. Others, with Areoli, teach habitual charity to be the form, which furnishes such an effect. Others, finally, with Scotus and Durandus, say that habitual grace indeed

constitutes man an adoptive son of God; this, however, it does not have by reason of its own entity and perfection, but from the law and pact of God, by which He deputed and destined that supernatural quality, of itself insufficient and disproportionate to such an effect, to furnishing it, and through such deputation, conferred sufficient value on it; just as a coin, sealed with the royal seal, has a certain value and appraisal, which it did not obtain of itself.

§ I

The form constituting man an adoptive son of God, is neither the divinity of the Holy Spirit, extrinsically united to us or assisting, nor the habit of charity, but habitual grace adequately, and with no extrinsic favor to be expected

The first part of this assertion is persuaded by a twofold reason. The first is: that form constitutes man an adoptive son of God, which terminates the spiritual generation of man: but the divinity of the Holy Spirit, extrinsically united to us and assisting, is not the form terminating the spiritual generation of man, or by which man is regenerated into a son of God: therefore it is not the form, by which man is constituted a son of God. The major is clear, because concerning adoptive filiation one must philosophize, as concerning natural, proportion being preserved; but in natural things that which terminates generation formally, causes or founds natural filiation. The minor, however, is shown thus: the form terminating spiritual generation is that by which the generated term lives spiritually, just as the form giving life formally terminates: but the divinity of the Holy Spirit, extrinsically united to us, or assisting, is not the principle by which of living spiritually: therefore neither the formal term of spiritual generation. The major is evident; the minor is shown from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 23, art. 2, ad 2, where he says thus: "God is the life effectively both of the soul through charity, and of the body through the soul; but formally charity is the life of the soul, just as also the soul is of the body." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the divinity of the Holy Spirit, extrinsically united to us, or assisting, is not the formal principle by which of living spiritually. Reason also persuades this, for the form, which is the formal principle by which of living, must be united to the one receiving life, through identity, or through physical information: but the divinity of the Holy Spirit cannot be united to us by neither of these ways, since either mode of union imports imperfection: therefore it cannot be the formal principle by which of living spiritually.

The second reason can be proposed thus: that is the same form, by which man is justified, and by which he is constituted an adoptive son of God, since, according to Trent, session 6, chapter 4, our justification is a translation from that state, in which man

is born a son of the first Adam, into the state of grace and adoption of the sons of God. But the form, by which man is justified, is not purely extrinsic, or assisting, but intrinsic and inhering, as we shall show in the following chapter, and the same Council expressly defines it, in the same session, canon 11, in these words: "If anyone shall say that men are justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, excluding grace and charity, which is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, and remains in them, or also that the grace by which we are justified is only the favor of God: let him be anathema": therefore the form, by which man is constituted an adoptive son of God, is not purely extrinsic, nor consequently the divinity of the Holy Spirit, extrinsically united to us, or assisting, but a form intrinsically inhering, namely grace itself, habitual, which resides in the soul, and is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit. Whence Lessius's opinion seems less consonant with the mind and doctrine of Trent.

The second part of the assertion, which says that the habit of charity is not the form which constitutes an adoptive son of God, but habitual grace, is proved by the same reason as the preceding: that form gives, formally, the being of adoptive son of God, which formally terminates the spiritual generation of man: but the form terminating formally the spiritual generation of man, is not the habit of charity, but sanctifying grace itself: therefore neither does it constitute the adoptive son of God. The major is clear from the similitude or analogy which is found between spiritual and natural generation. The minor, however, is shown thus: although man, begotten by natural generation, receives simultaneously with nature the properties, he nevertheless does not terminate natural generation formally through the properties, but through human nature, which is their root: therefore likewise, although the just man, begotten by God through spiritual generation, receives the supernatural nature, and its properties, he does not terminate such spiritual generation formally by reason of the properties, but by reason of the nature of the supernatural order: but habitual grace is in the supernatural order nature, but charity is its property, as was shown above: therefore man does not terminate spiritual generation, by reason of the habit of charity, but by reason of habitual grace, which is its root.

This is confirmed, first: the formal term of spiritual generation is that by which the generated one lives spiritually radically, or which is the root of spiritual life: just as the formal term of natural generation is that by which the generated one lives naturally radically, or which is the root of natural life: but habitual grace gives life radically in the spiritual or supernatural order, but not the habit of charity, as is clear: therefore sanctifying grace, not the habit of charity, is the formal term of spiritual generation.

This is confirmed, second: the formal term of spiritual generation is that by reason of which man becomes a participant of the divine nature, and is assimilated to God, not in some attribute, but in the divine nature: but man does not become formally a participant of the divine nature, nor is he assimilated to God in nature, through the habit of charity, but through habitual grace, since sanctifying grace alone is the participation of the divine nature, under the concept of nature, but the habit of charity is a participation of the divine will, which is His attribute: therefore the same as before.

From what has been said, the third part of the assertion remains proved. For just as a man receiving the nature of the generator according to univocal agreement, by virtue of this reception, without anything else superadded, is constituted a natural son; so by virtue of the reception of the divine nature according to analogous agreement, without need of anything superadded, one is constituted an adoptive son of God: but habitual grace, by reason of its intrinsic entity, is a participation of the divine nature, according to analogous agreement, and consequently one receiving it is similar to God analogically in nature under the concept of nature: therefore by virtue of the reception of it, without any extrinsic favor, man is constituted spiritually begotten, and an adoptive son of God.

§ II

The objections are resolved

You will object first against the first part of the assertion: the form by which the just man lives in the supernatural and divine order, is what furnishes formally the being of adoptive son of God: but the divinity of the Holy Spirit, united to the just man through grace, is the form by which he lives in the supernatural and divine order: therefore also that which furnishes formally the being of adoptive son of God. The major is established from what was said above, the minor, however, is persuaded, both by various testimonies of Scripture, by which the Holy Spirit is said to justly vivify: John 6: "It is the spirit that quickeneth." To the Galatians 5: "If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit." Also because the divinity of the Holy Spirit is a certain life through essence, and consequently of itself sufficient for vivifying all things. Whence St. Thomas, 4 Contra Gentes, chapter 20, observes that the Spirit of the Lord, at the beginning of the world, is said to be borne over the waters, not as if He Himself were moved, but because He is the first principle of motion and life. And the Church, in the symbol of the Council of Nicaea, professes to believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, and the giver of life. Hence also Cornelius Mussus, Book 3 of divine history, excellently observes, that all things are vivified by spirit: "The physicians have," he says, "in animals their own spirits: breath first of all, and then those small bodies formed in the heart, in the liver, in the brain; namely the natural, vital, and animal spirits. The Grammarians also have their Spirits, which indeed we call accents, because they harmonize with the syllables, as it were their tenors and tones. Certainly, just as vowel letters give voice to words, so the accents of the letters themselves seem to be as it were their soul, because by their sharp or grave sound the words themselves are formed, as if they lived, flourished, breathed, spoke." Hence, moreover, the derivation to music of spirits, intensities and inflections, inclinations and elevations in tones and songs, are spirits, by which animated music has such power, that it can excite love, infuse joy, and drive away fears.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor. The just man indeed lives by the Spirit of God, and by His divinity, as efficient cause, and moving to vital acts of the supernatural order; not, however, as form and radical principle of supernatural life; because, as we said above, the form which is the principle by which radically of living, must be united to the one who receives life, through identity, or through physical information, neither of which can belong to the Holy Spirit, since either mode of union imports imperfection. And in this sense are the aforesaid testimonies of Scripture to be understood, by which it is asserted that the Holy Spirit vivifies the just, or that the just live by the Holy Spirit; for these must be taken in a causal, not a formal sense, as St.

Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 23, art. 2, ad 2, explaining those words of Deuteronomy 30: "He is thy life": for he says that God is life effectively, but formally charity is the life of the soul, just as also the soul of the body.

You will object second: the son is constituted through the communication of the same nature which is in the father: but the just cannot be constituted sons of God adoptive through the communication of the same nature specifically which is in God, since the divine nature is unmultipliable numerically: therefore they are constituted sons of God adoptive, through the communication of the same nature numerically, and consequently through the divinity itself, united to them through grace.

I respond that for natural filiation there is required communication of nature according to specific agreement, but for adoptive filiation it suffices that there be communication of nature according to analogous agreement: and that this befits sanctifying grace; for since it is a formal participation of the divine nature, it must agree with it at least analogically, as is established from what has been said above.

You will object third against the second part of the assertion, that of 1 John 3: "Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be, the sons of God," by which he seems to signify that charity is the form by which we are constituted sons of God. But it is easily answered that some things which are effects of sanctifying grace, are attributed also to charity, by reason of the mutual connection which they have between themselves, and thus adoptive sonship of God is attributed to charity concomitantly and secondarily, because it is a property, which flows from grace, and is inseparably joined to it.

You will object fourth against the third part of the assertion: for habitual grace to have a right to eternal life, as a wage or crown, a pact or promise of God, or His extrinsic ordination, is required, as theologians teach in the Treatise on merit: therefore likewise for it to have a right to eternal life, as an inheritance, a pact and ordination superadded to habitual grace is required, and consequently it, all extrinsic favor being set aside, cannot cause adoptive filiation, since for that a right to the inheritance of God, which is eternal life, is required.

I respond, first, that the Antecedent is denied by several theologians, who think that an extrinsic ordination of God, consisting in a pact or promise, is not necessary for the complete nature of merit, but an intrinsic ordination of God suffices, which is included in the will of giving grace as a principle of meriting.

I respond, second, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference, however, is that the meritorious right which is found in the works of the just, informed by grace and charity, is either of fidelity, or of justice, or of gratitude: the first cannot stand without a promise; the second and third, however, cannot subsist in a pure creature, without a pact of God, superadded to the dignity of the works; because since the works of the just are owed to God on various titles, they cannot, by their own force and intrinsic value, oblige God from strict justice to remunerate them: but the right founded in sanctifying grace with respect to glory as inheritance, since it is not meritorious, but only of connaturality, belongs to it without the intervention of any promise or divine ordination; just as God, by right of connaturality, is bound to infuse species into the Angel, his creation being supposed; to concur with the motion of heaven, his existence being supposed; and not to impede the outflow or resultance of the passions, supposed that He produces natures.

§ III

Three Corollaries worthy of note

It is gathered from what has been said, first, that to adopt a rational creature into a son, is not proper to any one of the divine persons, but common to the whole Trinity, as St. Thomas teaches, III, q. 23, art. 2. For God adopts a rational creature into a son, insofar as He infuses grace spiritually generative: but the infusive action of grace, since it is a free operation, and toward the outside, is common to the whole Trinity: therefore also the adoption of the rational creature.

The same holy Doctor observes there, however, in his response to the third objection, that because adoptive filiation is a certain likeness of natural filiation, it is attributed to the Son by appropriation, as to exemplar; and because in human affairs adopting is proper to the father alone, divine adoption is appropriated to the Eternal Father, as author; likewise because the same adoption is done through grace, which is a work of divine love, it is attributed appropriatively to the Holy Spirit, as infusing grace, through which we are adopted, and assimilated to God. Whence to the Romans 8 it is said: "You have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father."

It is gathered, second, that the Fathers of the old testament, existing in grace and charity, were truly adoptive sons of God, although they were not in the state of sons.

The first part is clear, for the ancient Fathers, existing in charity, were truly justified, by a justification of the same nature as ours: but justification, from Trent cited above, is a translation from that state in which man is born a son of the first Adam, into the state of

grace and adoption of sons: therefore the ancient Fathers, justified through grace, were truly sons of God, adoptive.

The second is established from this, that the Fathers of the old testament were led by the spirit of fear, whence in the sacred letters they are called servants, and are said to have the spirit of servitude, as is clear to the Galatians 4, and to the Romans 8, and elsewhere often; likewise access to the heavenly inheritance was not open to them, as it was to the just of the new law. Wherefore three degrees of adoptive filiation can be distinguished: the first and most imperfect is that of the just pertaining to the old law; the second is of the just pertaining to the new law; the third and most perfect of all, is that of the blessed seeing God, who not only have a right to God's inheritance, but also actually possess it, and are perfectly assimilated to God through the beatific vision. Of this adoption speaks the Apostle to the Romans 8, when he says: "We ourselves also, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption of the sons of God," that is, the filiation of glory, which exceeds the state of the adoption of the way; just as the state of the adoption of the just of the new law is more excellent than the state of the adoption of the Fathers of the old testament. Whence just as, on account of this excess, the Apostle, to the Galatians 4, compares the state of the ancient law to a small child, placed under tutors and guardians; so, 1 Corinthians 13, speaking of the state of the present life, comparatively to the state of glory, he uses the same similitude, saying: "When I was a child," etc. For just as the state of the old law, on account of imperfect knowledge, is like a child in comparison to the state of grace and truth, which was made through Christ: so the state of the present life, in which we see through a glass, and in a dark manner, is like a child, comparatively to the state of future life, in which there is perfect knowledge of God.

It is gathered, third, from the principles established above, that it implies a contradiction that someone be an adoptive son of God, without habitual grace. For for the adoptive filiation of God, agreement at least analogous with God in nature, under the concept of nature, is essentially required, as is established from what has been said above: but it implies a contradiction that a creature agree analogically with God in nature, under the concept of nature, without habitual grace, since the essence of habitual grace consists in this, that it be a formal participation of the nature of God, under the concept of nature, as was shown, chapter 11, § 2: therefore it implies a contradiction that someone be an adoptive son, without habitual grace.

This is confirmed: it implies that man be an adoptive son of God, unless he be spiritually begotten by God, since adoptive filiation is founded in spiritual generation, just as natural in natural: but it is repugnant that he be spiritually begotten by God, without

habitual grace: therefore it implies that, without it, he be an adoptive son of God. The major is clear; the minor is proved: to be begotten spiritually is to proceed, living with spiritual life, as it were, from God living, in likeness of nature, for which it is necessary to live radically with spiritual life: but it is repugnant to live with spiritual and divine life radically, without habitual grace, since it is the root of vital operations of the supernatural order, namely the act of charity, and of the intuitive vision of God, and other supernatural acts: therefore it is repugnant for man to be spiritually begotten by God, without habitual grace.

You will say: God can, by His absolute power, will efficaciously glory for man, without an efficacious will of conferring habitual grace, since glory does not have essential dependence on it: but man in such a case would be God's adoptive son: therefore possible, by absolute power, is God's adoptive filiation, without habitual grace. The major is established; the minor is proved. Adoption is defined by theologians and jurists as the gratuitous and liberal assumption of an extraneous person to an inheritance: but in the case posited, that will of God would be gratuitous and liberal, as is established, and man ordered to glory, would be an extraneous person with respect to the inheritance of God to which he would be ordered: therefore he would have whatever is required for the nature of an adoptive son.

This is confirmed: God could not only order such a man, to whom He should deny habitual grace, to glory, but also actually beatify him in fact, since the beatific vision does not depend essentially on habitual grace: therefore He could adopt him into a son without habitual grace. The consequence seems manifest, for if the form furnishing the right to the divine inheritance, constitutes a son of God, a fortiori the very possession of the divine inheritance itself, which is the beatific vision, will be able to constitute an adoptive son of God.

To the objection I respond, the Major being granted, by denying the minor, and to its proof I say that when adoption is defined as the gratuitous and liberal assumption of an extraneous person to an inheritance, this must be understood of an assumption effectively communicating nature, not, however, of a simple assumption ordering to an inheritance, as is established in human and civil affairs; for one can promise another an inheritance, without adopting him into a son: since therefore, in the case posited, God's will ordering man to glory, would not communicate, effectively nor affectively, the divine nature participatively, that is, habitual grace, but on the contrary would have an efficacious will of not communicating it, to such a volition the definition of adoption would not apply, nor to the man so ordained, the true nature of adoptive son. Whence to the confirmation, the antecedent being granted, I deny the consequence; for just as in

civil affairs the possession of the inheritance itself does not furnish adoptive filiation, otherwise all heirs would be adoptive sons, but the form which furnishes the right to the inheritance, namely the affective communication of nature: so also in supernatural matters, the possession of the divine inheritance, which is had through the beatific vision, does not constitute the adoptive filiation of God, but sanctifying grace itself, which alone, since it is a participation of the divine nature, can be the formal term of spiritual generation, which is the foundation of adoptive filiation, as we declared above.

You will press: for human and civil adoption, an inefficacious and conditional will of communicating nature to the adoptee suffices: therefore for divine and supernatural adoption. Whence although God, in the case posited, would not have an absolute and efficacious will of conferring sanctifying grace on such a man, he could nevertheless be His adoptive son.

I respond, granting the Antecedent, denying the consequence and the parity: the reason for the difference, however, is that in human adoption there is supposed, in the person to be adopted, a nature of the same species, and proportioned, with the inheritance of the adopter, and consequently a faculty for such inheritance in the person to be adopted, before divine adoption is applied. Whence St. Thomas, III, q. 23, art. 1, says thus: "Divine adoption has more than human, because God makes the man whom He adopts fit, through grace, for perceiving the heavenly inheritance; but man does not make fit the one whom he adopts, but rather chooses him already fit for adopting."

I shall conclude this celebrated question, and this chapter, with this pious consideration or reflection from the Roman Catechism's treatise on prayer: "Think," he says, "into what a place the highest goodness of God has raised you, who has commanded you to approach not as a servant to a Lord, unwilling and timid, but as a voluntary and secure son to a father. With this in mind and thought, consider with what zeal and piety you in turn ought to pray. For you must take care to show yourself such as it befits a son of God to be, that is, that your prayer and actions be not unworthy of the divine race to which the most beneficent God has willed you to be worthy."

I add these words of Chrysostom, sermon 71: "If you already believe yourself a son of God, according to the Prophet, wait for the Lord, act manfully, and let your heart be strengthened, that you may obtain God's inheritance through the faith and virtue of patient expectation. But if the delay of glory afflicts you, let not weariness affect you, let you not succumb through the fatigue of long waiting; believe your creditor, who has entrusted you as debtor. You have the pledge of eternal glory; do not throw it away, and the thing pledged to you will follow. The laborer sowing does not see the seed in what is

sown (as the same golden-mouthed one says, sermon 40), he will see it in the harvest, and what he grieved over in the furrow, he will rejoice over in the fruit."

Chapter XV

On the justification of the sinner, which is the second effect of habitual grace

Before we propose and resolve the scholastic difficulties, two principal errors of the Lutherans and Calvinists concerning the justification of the sinner must be briefly refuted. The first asserts that in justification sins are not truly and properly remitted, or blotted out, but only concealed, or covered by the justice of Christ, imputed to us, almost in the way in which the wounds and ulcers of someone can be covered or hidden under the garment of another. This error is proscribed by Trent, session 5, canon 5, and its falsity is established from various testimonies of Scripture, by which sins are said to be taken away, blotted out, remitted, and sinners themselves cleansed, washed, laved, and made white: John 1: "Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who taketh away the sin of the world." Psalm 50: "Blot out my iniquity." Psalm 31: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven." 1 Corinthians 6: "You are washed, you are sanctified, you are justified." Isaiah 1: "If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made as white as snow," etc. But those terms or manners of speaking of Scripture import not only the concealment of sins, but their true removal, as is clear of itself; for it would be aptly said that one washed and cleansed, who was stained with filth which he covered with a cloak or garment; it would also be incongruous for us to say an Ethiopian is made white as snow or wool, if he only concealed his blackness under a white garment. It would also be inept for sins to be said to be entirely taken away and blotted out, if they were only shaved off, like the hairs of the head, and again sprouted up and returned. Whence Augustine, Book 1 against two letters of the Pelagians, chapter 13: "We say that baptism gives indulgence of all sins, and takes away crimes, does not shave them, nor are the roots of sins kept in bad flesh, as it were of the shaved hairs on the head, whence again the sins would grow to be cut again." By these words he seems to have foreseen and refuted the aforesaid error of the heretics. Likewise, address 2 on Psalm 31, he resolves their principal foundation, taken from some passages of Scripture, in which sins are said to be covered by God. For there, explaining those words of the Psalmist: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered," he says thus: "Do not understand sins to be covered as if they were there and lived, and God covers, not you; for if you wanted to cover, blushing, the physician will not cure. The physician covers and cures; under the bandage, the wound heals, the wound is hidden." By these words he teaches that God so covers the sins of men, that He really takes them away and blots them out, and heals their wounds with the medicine of His grace. Reason also persuades this: the justification of a sinner, as we shall show below, occurs through the infusion of habitual grace: but that is incompatible with sin, at least by ordinary law, as all confess: therefore it is impossible that after

justification sins remain in man, and only be covered or hidden, by the justice of Christ imputed to us.

The second error of the heretics of our time affirms that justification does not come about through the introduction of some form inhering in the soul, but only through the justice of Christ intrinsically imputed to us. This error is likewise excluded by Trent, session 6, canon 11, and can be refuted by a threefold reason.

The first is: the Apostle, to the Romans 5, compares the justice and obedience of Christ with the sin and disobedience of Adam: but the sin of Adam is really contracted by us, for we are not called sinners, merely because the sin of the first Parent, committed in the earthly Paradise, is imputed to us; but because in the soul of each one, when it is conceived, real stain and iniquity are found, as we showed in the treatise on sins, treating of original sin: therefore the justice which is opposed to such sin, and expels it from man, ought not to be something extrinsic and imputative, but internal and real in the soul, since from the Philosopher the same reason holds of contraries.

This is confirmed: Christ restores to us what we lost in Adam: but in Adam we lost intrinsic justice, namely original justice, which was some form or perfection inhering in the soul of Adam, which he would have transfused into all his posterity, if he had not sinned: therefore Christ, through justification, communicates to us some form or intrinsic quality, from which we are denominated just.

The second reason: the justification of the sinner proceeds as from a cause, from the supernatural love of God, by which He loves man in order to eternal life: but from such love, some intrinsic and supernatural form is derived in man, as we showed, chapter 11, § 1: therefore the justification of the sinner comes about through some form, or inhering quality, and not through the justice of Christ alone, imputed to us.

The third reason: in justification man is adopted into a son of God: but the adoptive filiation of God comes about through some intrinsic form, as we demonstrated in the preceding chapter: therefore also justification. Whence Augustine, Letter 85: "What else is justice, when it is in us, than the beauty of the interior mind?" And Book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 8: "Nature, when it is justified by its Creator God, is transferred from a deformed form into a beautiful form."

The arguments of the Calvinists, drawn from certain twisted passages of Scripture, are of no moment. For it does not conflict with the Catholic truth sanctioned at Trent, that Christ, 1 Corinthians 1, is said to be made unto us justice and sanctification, for this must be understood in a causal, formal sense, just as when it is said there that Christ is unto us

wisdom, and when John 11, Christ says: "I am the resurrection and the life."

But that they say it does injury to the justice of Christ, if we say that we are justified through some justice intrinsic to us, is altogether absurd; for so far from this derogating from the justice of Christ, indeed rather it makes the dignity and excellence of His merits shine forth the more, if by virtue of them justice inhering, by which we are formally just, be communicated to us.

Finally, what they assert, that the remission of sins is nothing other than their condonation; but that does not mean anything other than an act of the divine will, by which He wills to remit sins, and to apply Christ's sanctification for our sins, is altogether foreign to the truth. For condonation of an offense in God does not import a sterile and infertile act of divine will, but a fertile and efficacious one, and one producing an intrinsic form expelling sin. Whence there is this difference between God and men condoning an offense, that man condones an offense with a sterile and inefficacious act, but God, however, with an inefficacious and fertile act. First because God, in condoning an offense, must render him to whom He remits the offense, a fitting object of His love, or condonation, which man cannot do, since human love does not posit but presupposes goodness in its object; but the divine does well, since it is creating and infusing goodness in things. Second, because an offense is not remitted to anyone, unless he retracts it: man, however, has of himself sufficient powers for retracting an offense committed against another man, but not so for retracting an offense inflicted on God; and thus the act of God condoning an offense to man, must confer on him whence he can retract it, and in some way satisfy for it; which the act of man, condoning an offense to another man, need not do.

From these it is inferred, against Calvin, that the justification of the impious does not only import the remission of sins, but also the sanctification and interior renewal of man, as Trent teaches, session 6, chapter 7; for through the acquisition of sanctifying grace, which is the formal cause of justification, as we shall show in the following section, man passes from the oldness of sin to the newness of life, according to that of the Ephesians 4: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind"; and is similarly sanctified and cleansed, as is established from that of 1 Corinthians 6: "You are washed, you are sanctified, you are justified": therefore justification imports not only the remission of sins, but also sanctification, and the interior renewal of man.

§ I

Sanctifying grace is the formal cause of justification, not, however, the act of contrition, or of charity

Thus theologians commonly teach, against Vásquez and Meratius, and it is proved, first, from Trent, whose mind and doctrine the opinion of those Authors seems less consonant with. For the Council, session 6, chapter 7, says that there is one formal cause of our justification, namely the justice of God, not that by which He Himself is just, but by which He makes us just. That truly this justice, in his mind, is only habitual grace, not, however, some act, is clear from the beginning of the same chapter, where it says that this justification comes about through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts. Likewise, session 14, chapter 4, he says: "The motion of contrition prepares for the remission of sins, if it is joined with confidence in divine mercy": but that which disposes for the remission of sins, is not the justifying form itself, since between disposition and form, some causality and dependence, and consequently real distinction, is found: therefore, according to Trent, the act of contrition is not the formal cause of justification.

This is confirmed: the formal cause of justification does not impetrate pardon and remission of sins, but formally causes it: but the act of contrition does not formally cause pardon and remission of sins, but only impetrates it, as is established from the same Trent there saying: "This motion of contrition was necessary at every time, to impetrate pardon of sins": therefore the same as before.

The same truth can moreover be persuaded by a twofold reason. The first is: in justification man is adopted into a son of God, as is clear from Trent, session 6, chapter 4: whence that very thing which is the formal term of spiritual generation, through which we are constituted adoptive sons of God, is the formal cause of the justification of the sinner: but sanctifying grace alone, and not the act of charity, or of contrition, is the formal term of that spiritual generation, since it alone is the formal participation of the divine nature, as such it is, and takes the place of substance or nature in the supernatural order, as was shown chapter 11, § 2: therefore only sanctifying grace is the formal cause of justification.

The second reason can be proposed thus: the justifying form expels sin in the genus of formal cause, just as universally every form, attributing its formal effect to the subject, expels the form or opposed privation, in the genus of formal cause: e.g. heat, which is the formal cause of heating, formally expels cold from water; light, which is the formal cause of illumination, formally expels darkness from the air: but the act of contrition, or of

charity, does not expel from the soul habitual sin in the genus of formal cause; because since such sin consists in the privation of habitual grace, as we showed in the treatise on sins, such an act is not opposed to it formally, but only in the genus of dispositive cause, which is reduced to the genus of material cause: therefore such an act is not the formal cause of justification, but only sanctifying grace, which formally removes such a stain, or habitual sin.

Vásquez objects against this assertion some testimonies of Scripture, the holy Fathers, and Councils, by which it seems insinuated that the love of God, or perfect contrition, founded in love, is the formal cause of our justification: for Christ, Luke 7, said of Magdalene: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much." And Augustine, Book 2 against Cresconius, chapter 12, says that we are cleansed from sins by the sacrifice of a contrite heart. Similarly Trent, session 6, chapter 7, attributes justification to the charity which is poured out in our hearts, etc. And session 14, chapter 4, attributes it to the act of contrition.

But it is answered to these easily, that those testimonies only prove that we are justified and sanctified by love and contrition, as ultimate disposition, not, however, as the formal cause of justification and sanctification; for the effect, which completely proceeds from the form, is attributed also to the disposition, because it proceeds from it inchoatively.

From what has been said it is gathered that habitual grace has, from within, and from its own nature, the property that it be the formal cause of justification, and not from an extrinsic favor of God; both because from itself and from its own nature it has the property that it expel habitual sin, just as any positive form, from its own nature, expels the privation opposed to it. Also because from its own nature it has the property that it be a formal participation of the divine nature and sanctity, whence it is called sanctifying: therefore just as the nature and sanctity of God, from within, constitute Him just and holy through essence, so grace has, from its own nature, to constitute one just and holy through participation, and consequently to expel sin from the soul: just as we said in the preceding chapter, that it, from its own nature, and by virtue of its own intrinsic power, and not from an extrinsic favor of God, has to constitute man an adoptive son of God.

You will say: that which is of finite goodness, cannot by its own power expel or destroy sin, containing a malice simply infinite: but the goodness of sanctifying grace is finite, and the malice of mortal sin, in the genus of morals, is simply infinite, as we showed in the treatise on sins: therefore habitual grace, by virtue of its own power, and of its own intrinsic efficacy and value, cannot destroy habitual sin, or expel it from the soul, but for

this, besides the infusion of habitual grace, a special and new favor of God, condoning the injury done to Him by sin, is required.

I respond by distinguishing the Major. That which is of finite goodness cannot expel or destroy sin containing infinite malice, by way of satisfaction, I concede the Major. By way of a form incompatible with such sin (such is habitual grace), I deny the Major.

§ II

In the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order and end, there cannot be given another form of justification than sanctifying grace, but indeed there can in the state of pure nature

The first part of this assertion is proved, first, from St. Thomas here, q. 113, art. 2, where he says thus: "The remission of guilt could not be understood, if the infusion of grace were not present." By these words the holy Doctor uses to say, when he means something implies a contradiction, because whatever does not imply a contradiction, is intelligible. By the name of grace, however, he does not understand whatever gratuitous gift, but only habitual grace, as is clear from those words immediately preceding: "The effect of divine love which is taken away by sin, is grace, by which man is worthy of eternal life."

This is confirmed: the same holy Doctor, there, in his response to the first objection, says thus: "Although man, before he sins, could have been without grace and without guilt; nevertheless after sin, he cannot be without guilt, unless he have grace." By these words he plainly teaches that although man, constituted in pure naturals, can remain without sin and without grace; nevertheless, after he has once fallen into sin, it is impossible, in the state of elevation to the supernatural order, that he be repaired, and rise from sin, without the infusion of grace.

Reason also persuades this, for as we showed in the treatise on sins, from the same Angelic Doctor: habitual sin denotes a certain stain, which consists in the privation of habitual grace: but the privation of some form cannot be removed, even by absolute power, except through the form by which it deprives, as is established in death, blindness, darkness, which cannot be removed except through life, sight, and light: therefore habitual sin cannot be removed except through the infusion of habitual grace, nor consequently can the sinner be justified. This reason St. Thomas insinuates here, q. 109, art. 7, in these words: "Since the beauty of grace comes from the illumination of divine light, the beauty of the soul cannot be repaired, unless God illuminate it anew; whence a habitual gift is required, which is the grace of light."

This is confirmed: while man is justified, he becomes a fitting object of the supernatural love of God, and consequently pleasing and acceptable to God, and His friend, indeed also His adoptive son: but it is repugnant that those effects be furnished except by sanctifying grace, since it is the term of the supernatural love of God, and the form by which man is constituted an adoptive son of God, as is established from what has been said above, and a formal effect cannot be had without a form, since it is the form itself communicated: therefore it implies that man be justified without habitual grace.

You will say that although according to the ordinary way, only habitual grace is one form of justification; yet by God's absolute power, the acts of contrition and charity can be the formal cause of justification.

But against this, first: in formal causes the distinction of ordinary and extraordinary power has no place, as our Thomists commonly teach; because since they furnish their effects only through their own communication, they cannot supernaturally effect what they cannot naturally operate; for if by something adventitious the entity of the form is changed, it will not be the same form, but if it is not changed, the formal effect will also be unchanged; since that is nothing other than the very form as communicated to the subject, and nothing else: therefore the act of contrition, or of charity, does not become naturally a fit form of justification, nor does it follow this by any supernatural miracle.

This is confirmed: that which is essentially the disposition for the formal effect of some form, cannot, even by absolute power, be the form for whose effect it disposes: just as, because heat is essentially the disposition for the introduction of the form of fire, and its formal effect, it cannot, even by extraordinary power and law, be the form of fire, or furnish the effect of the form of fire: but the act of contrition, or of charity, is essentially the disposition for justification, as was shown in the preceding section, against Vásquez and Meratius: therefore it cannot, even by absolute power, be the formal cause of justification, in the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order and end, but this can belong to sanctifying grace alone.

That in the state of pure nature justification would come about without the infusion of habitual grace, seems manifest, supposed that such a state is possible by God's ordinary law, as we showed in the Treatise on various states of human nature, last chapter, against Jansenius, and Vincent Contenson, and other Recent authors, thinking the opposite. This second part of our assertion is clear indeed: both because the habitual sin of man constituted in the state of pure nature, and not elevated to the supernatural end, would not be a privation of grace, or of supernatural rectitude, but only of conversion to God as natural end: therefore it could be removed through such a conversion, since privation

is removed through the form opposed to it. Also because if for the remission and expulsion of such sin, the infusion of habitual grace, or of another supernatural gift, were necessary, it would follow that the remission of sins would be impossible, man remaining in that state; since through the infusion of habitual grace, or of another supernatural gift, man would be led out of the state of pure nature, and constituted in the state of grace: the consequent is not to be admitted: therefore neither the antecedent. The minor is established, because otherwise man remaining in that state, would necessarily be miserable, since, having once fallen into sin, he would have no remedy by which he could be repaired, and rise from that unhappy state, and consequently could not attain the natural beatitude to which he was ordered. Whence one must either say that the state of pure nature is impossible, and repugnant to divine providence; since it is repugnant to the sweetness of divine providence, to establish or place man in some state, in which he would necessarily be miserable, and would not be able to attain his ultimate end and natural beatitude. Or, if the possibility of this state is admitted, as we showed in fact must be admitted, in the place cited, it must be asserted that justification in that state would come about without the infusion of habitual grace, namely through an act of natural contrition for sins, including the love of God above all things, as He is the author of nature. For since habitual sin in that state would only import the privation of conformity to the natural law, and aversion from God as natural end, for its destruction the act of contrition, efficacious of God, as author of nature, would suffice, joined with an extrinsic favor of God, condoning the nature of the offense.

§ III

The objections are resolved

You will object first against the first part of the assertion: grace and sin do not oppose each other immediately: therefore sin can be removed without the infusion of grace. The consequence is clear, for when two things are so related to each other, that they do not oppose each other immediately, one can be expelled from its subject, without another being introduced, as is clear in heat and cold, in whiteness and blackness, for the same subject can become, from hot, neither hot nor cold, and from white, neither white nor black. The antecedent is proved: if grace and sin opposed each other immediately, it would follow that just as, according to us, sin cannot be removed without the infusion of grace, so neither could grace be taken away from man, unless some sin of his preexisted: but this cannot be said: therefore neither that. The sequel of the major is clear, and moreover seems certain; for since habitual grace depends on God in coming to be and in being preserved, God can take it away from a man sleeping without any preceding guilt of his, and, by mere suspension of the preserving concurrence, destroy it.

I respond, from St. Thomas, q. 28 De Veritate, art. 2, ad 4, that although grace and sin, absolutely speaking, are not opposed immediately, with respect, however, to fallen man, in the state of elevation of human nature to the supernatural end, they are opposed immediately. Whence St. Thomas, related above, says that although man before he sins could have been without grace and without guilt (namely in the state of pure nature), nevertheless after sin (in the state of elevation of human nature to the supernatural order) he cannot be without guilt, unless he have grace. Whence to the argument proposed, I deny the Antecedent, to whose proof I deny the minor, and to the proof of that I say that although God, absolutely, and no supposition made, can take away grace from a sleeping man, even with no preceding guilt of his; this is, nevertheless, impossible, supposing the decree of God ordering and elevating human nature to the supernatural order and end. For for God, through extrinsic ordination, to elevate man to the supernatural order, is for God to will, as far as is of Himself, and unless it stands through man himself, to give him habitual grace, without which he cannot merit condignly eternal life: whence if God should take away habitual grace from someone, without any guilt of his, he would no longer remain ordered to eternal life, and the supernatural end.

You will object second against the second part of the assertion: St. Thomas, q. 28 De Veritate, art. 5, ad 5, thus has it: "If man had fallen from the state of nature alone, nevertheless a gift of divine grace would be required for the expiation of the infinite offense." Therefore he thinks that if man, constituted in pure naturals, sinned mortally, mortal sin could not be remitted to him, without the infusion of grace.

I respond that St. Thomas, by "gift of divine grace," does not understand habitual grace, or another gift entitatively supernatural, for since the state of pure nature excludes such gifts, it implies that man sinning in the state of pure nature, remaining in the same state, in order to expiate the offense committed against God, need grace or a gift entitatively supernatural, for the need of these gifts would extinguish the state of pure nature, since pure nature excludes the requirement of all supernatural gifts. Whence necessarily these words of St. Thomas must be understood and explained of a special help within the order of nature, without which man constituted in pure naturals could not have loved God as author of nature, as was shown chapter 3, nor consequently elicit acts of the love of God as author of nature, or of natural contrition, for expiating the offense committed against God as author of nature. For since such help would not be owed to the state of pure nature, but granted from the sweetness of divine providence, it can deservedly be called a gratuitous gift, or a gift of divine grace, as is established from what has been said at the beginning of this Treatise, where we exposed the threefold acceptation and signification of grace.

Against the same part of our assertion, Father Contenson argues in many ways, tome 5, page 490. First, he says: an act of merely natural love and contrition, in the state of pure nature, is not more efficacious than an act of supernatural love and contrition in the state of fallen nature: therefore if the latter, in the state of fallen nature, cannot be the form of justification, neither in the state of pure nature. Second, that which is essentially a disposition for the formal effect of some form, cannot be the form for whose effect it disposes, just as heat disposing to fire, can never be the form of fire: but the act of contrition, or of charity, by its essential nature, has only to be a disposition for the form of justification: therefore it is impossible for such an act to be, in any state, the form of justification. Third, the justification of the sinner proceeds from a special love of God, wishing to condone sin and remit the injury: but that singular love of God must imprint something on the sinner, to which it terminates, since divine love does not presuppose, but posits goodness in things, as the Angelic Doctor frequently urges; but that can be nothing else than habitual grace: therefore it is, in every state, the one form of justification, nor can it be another. Finally, the form of justification must be something ratified and permanent in the subject: but the act of contrition or charity is essentially flowing and transient: therefore it is impossible that it, in any state, be the form of justification: otherwise in a similar manner Vásquez and Meratius could say that such acts, in the state of elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, are the very form of justification, and all the arguments by which we impugned those Authors would collapse.

But these are light, and only prove that an act of supernatural contrition, or charity, cannot, nor could, be the justifying form in the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order. Whence to the first I respond, that although an act of contrition, or of natural love, per se and from its own nature, cannot be more efficacious and powerful for justifying, than an act of supernatural contrition and love; it can indeed be so per accidens, and by reason of the state in which it is elicited; for if nature in that state is not elevated to the supernatural order, and consequently sin does not induce the privation of sanctifying grace, but only of conversion to God as author of nature (as would have happened in the state of pure nature), the act of natural contrition and love, is sufficient for justifying, because it could expel such a privation of conversion to God as author of nature, since every privation is removed through the form opposed to it. Whence it is false that such an act, in the state of pure nature, would be essentially a disposition for the form of justification. From which the response to the second is clear. To the third I say that that singular love, by which God would wish to justify a sinner in the state of pure nature, would imprint something on him which would be its term, but not habitual grace, or another gratuitous gift of the supernatural order (for the state of pure

nature would exclude such gifts, and would be incompatible with them), but special help within the order of nature, by which the sinner would elicit an act of natural conversion and love; for such help (as we showed above) would not be repugnant to the state of pure nature, but could stand with it. Nor is it an obstacle that it would be transient, just as also the act of the love and contrition of God as author of nature; for since in the state of pure nature the stain of sin would not consist in the privation of habitual grace or another permanent quality or form, but only in the privation of conversion to God as author of nature, by a flowing help, and an act of love, or contrition transient, elicited by its mediation, it would be removed. From which the solution of the last argument is clear, and the notable difference which intervenes between the opinion of Vásquez and Meratius, and ours. For those authors speak of the justification of man in the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order, which can be made neither by flowing help, nor by a transient act, but only by habitual and permanent grace, since in that state habitual sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace.

§ IV

Corollary worthy of note

From what has been said you will understand that although among men condonation and remission of an offense can occur, without intrinsic change of the one offending, God nevertheless can remit and condone an offense to a sinner, without intrinsic change of him. This is proved by assigning a threefold reason for the difference. The first is, because one man can remit and condone an offense to another man, through his own change, and by eliciting anew an act, by which he wills not to be offended by him any longer: but God, since He is intrinsically immutable, cannot remit an offense through His own change, but only through a change of the sinner himself. The second, because a man's offense against a man takes nothing away from the offender, whose privation remaining, the offense is not remitted, and thus, in order for it to be remitted, it is not necessary that something inhering be produced in the offender, but extrinsic condonation of the offense suffices: but an offense against God takes away from the offender habitual grace, conversion to God, and conformity to reason and law, whose privation, while it remains, God's offense is not remitted, and thus it is necessary that something real and inhering be produced in man, that such a privation be removed, and the offense remitted. The third is assigned by St. Thomas, III, q. 36, art. 2, in the body, where he discourses thus: "Offense is directly opposed to grace, for from this it is said that someone is offended at another, that he repels him from his grace. This, however, is the difference between the grace of God and of man, that the grace of man does not cause, but presupposes, true or apparent goodness in the man favored: but the grace of God causes goodness in the man favored, since the good will of God, which is understood by the name of grace, is the cause of every created good. Whence it can happen that a man remits an offense, by which he is offended at someone, without any change of his will, but it cannot happen that God remit an offense to someone, without change of his will."

You will say, first: God's special love, by which He wills to remit guilt and condone an offense, is not necessitated by anything, but concurs altogether freely to the production of habitual grace, and other supernatural gifts: therefore God can have that without infusing grace, or another supernatural gift, by which the sinner is intrinsically changed.

But I deny the consequence, for the liberty of divine love cannot take away from it what is of its nature or essence: but it is of the nature of God's special love, to render man a fitting object for Himself, through the infusion of supernatural gifts, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 110, art. 1.

You will say, second: in the dispensation of a vow God relaxes its bond, without any intrinsic change of the one making the vow: equally, therefore, He will be able, without intrinsic change of the sinner, to free him from the debt of guilt, and remit the offense to him.

But I equally deny the consequence and the parity, for God can relax the bond of a vow, through only the moral change of the one making the vow; because the obligation of a vow depends on two things, namely on the promise of the one making the vow, and on the acceptance of God, which acceptance, in vows which are removed by dispensation, was not made by God, except up to that time at which the dispensation would be sought, and would be granted by the ministry of the Vicar of Christ, or of others having in the Church the faculty of dispensing; whence, that time arriving, the others being posited, that obligation ceases, through the mere moral change of the one making the vow. But indeed, to be averse from God, is not an effect depending on some disposition of God, but from the very nature of mortal sin; whence just as to be blind, or dead, cannot be removed except through the reception of forms opposed to those privations; so also to be averse from God (in which consists the nature of the offense or injury inflicted on Him by mortal sin) cannot be removed through a mere temporal or moral change of the divine will, but only through the reception of some supernatural form, converting toward God as ultimate end.

§ V

On the dispositions required for justification

That in adults there are required dispositions for obtaining the grace of justification, is certain by faith, as is established from Trent, session 6, chapters 5 and 6, and proved by St. Thomas here, q. 112, art. 3, by this reason: God moves each thing according to its mode and nature, and accordingly when He moves an adult from sin to justice, He simultaneously also moves free will to the same justice, and the source of justice, because man, adult by his own nature and mode of operating, is free; but the free must be so moved that it moves itself, except for the first-first motions, in which it is naturally apt to be moved only. Then, as the same holy Doctor, I, q. 12, art. 5, discourses: everything that is elevated to something exceeding its own nature, ought to be disposed by some disposition, especially when the form to which it is elevated is perfect, and per se, first intended, and the ultimate term of generation: but man, through justifying grace, is elevated to the participation of the divine nature, which participation is above man's nature, and the ultimate term of spiritual generation: therefore it is fitting that man be disposed for receiving it. Just as in natural things dispositions are indispensably required for substantial forms; because they are per se, first, intended, and are the ultimate term of natural generation. It remains, therefore, to be explained here, which dispositions are required for justification, or which acts, both on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will, are necessary for the justification of an adult? We treat here, however, of justification in common, for of that which occurs in the reception of baptism, or through the Sacrament of penance, we shall discuss in the treatise on the Sacraments. These things premised.

I say, first, that faith is required for the justification of an adult, but that it alone is not sufficient for it.

The first part is clear from Scripture: to the Hebrews 10: "Without faith it is impossible to please God." Mark, last chapter: "He that believeth shall be saved," etc. It is also established from Trent, session 6, chapter 6, where among the dispositions required for justification, the act of faith is first numbered, in these words: "They (adults) are disposed toward that very justice, while, aroused and aided by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing those things to be true which have been divinely revealed and promised." And chapter 8: "Faith is the human beginning of salvation, the foundation and root of all justification." Whence Augustine, sermon 22: "By faith the Lord God is founded, hope is raised, charity is perfected."

Reason also supports this: as St. Thomas discusses here, art. 4: for the justification of an adult, some motion of free will is required, by which the mind of man is turned away from sin, and turned toward God: but the first approach to God comes about through the knowledge of faith, according to that of Hebrews 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe": therefore the act of faith is required for the justification of an adult.

This is confirmed: since the will is a blind power, and needs the light and direction of the intellect, it is impossible for it to be turned toward God as supernatural end, without a preceding act of the intellect, by which it knows God as supernatural end: but this act is the act of faith: therefore for the conversion and justification of the sinner, the act of faith is required.

The second part, however, which asserts that faith alone does not suffice for justification, is defined at Trent, session 6, canon 9, against the heretics of our time, and is gathered from Scripture, 1 Corinthians 13: "If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." James 2: "Faith without works is dead." Whence Augustine, sermon 237: "Attend to the very name of faith; for it is called faith, because it does what is said. Two syllables sound when 'faith' is said: the first syllable is from 'deed,' the second is from 'saying.' I ask you whether you believe? You say, I believe: do what you say, and it is faith." Bernard, on the Song of Songs, expounding these words, "The upright love thee," echoes him, for he says thus: "Why do you divide your faith from action? You destroy your faith, for faith without works is dead. You offer a dead gift. What kind of peace offering is this, where there is such discord? You do not please God, but offend Him, being discordant with yourself. Nor is it strange, if Cain rose up against his brother, who had first slain his own faith: a faith-killer, before he was a brother-killer. Let, therefore, love animate your faith, let action prove it."

The same truth can be persuaded by this congruent reason: man, through his own will, was turned away from God, when he sinned: therefore, in order for sin to be remitted to him, he must be converted to Him through an act of the will, and consequently the act of faith does not suffice.

This is confirmed: the will was especially wounded through sin: therefore it is fitting, that it be moved to justification by some acts of its own, which is its healing.

Nor do certain testimonies of Scripture, by which justification is attributed to faith, no mention being made of works, stand against these. For it is attributed to it, not as the justifying form, or the sole sufficient ultimate disposition, but as the first foundation and root of the whole justification, as Trent cited above teaches. But when the Apostle, to the Romans 3, says: "For we account a man to be justified by faith, without the works

of the law," he only excludes the works of the law, or of nature, done without the spirit of faith. Whence Jerome, expounding this passage, and, as it were, foreseeing and choking off the error of the Calvinists, attributing justification to faith alone, says thus: "Some abuse this passage, to destroy works, asserting that faith alone is able to suffice; and yet the Apostle says elsewhere, if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."

I say, second, that an act of hope is required for justification.

This is established from Trent, session 14, chapter 4, where he says that contrition, which was at every time necessary for impetrating pardon of sins committed after baptism, prepares for justification, if it is joined with confidence in divine mercy. And afterward, when he speaks of attrition, he says that if it excludes the will of sinning, with hope of pardon, it disposes toward the grace to be impetrated in the sacrament. Scripture also favors this, for it is said, Mark 10: "Be of good heart, daughter, thy sins are forgiven thee." And to the Romans 8: "By hope we are saved." Reason too supports this, for since the remission of sins is not a human good, but divine, and is to be hoped for from God alone, man cannot strive to obtain it, unless he hopes that he will obtain it, according to that of Ambrose, Book 1 On penance, chapter 1: "No one can do penance, unless he has hoped for indulgence."

I say, third: for the justification of adults which occurs outside the sacrament, besides the act of faith and hope, there is also required an act of contrition and charity. For as St. Thomas discusses here, art. 5: for justification it is required that man withdraw from sin, and approach or be converted to God; just as for local motion it is necessary that the mobile withdraw from the term from which, and approach the term to which. But the withdrawal from sin occurs through contrition, by which we detest and hate it; but the approach or conversion to God, occurs through the act of charity, by which we approach Him, and are joined to Him, according to that of Augustine: "We approach God, not with steps of the body, but with the affections of the mind": therefore for the justification of an adult outside the sacrament, an act of contrition and charity is required. I said "outside the sacrament," because when an adult is justified by virtue of the sacrament, supernatural attrition suffices, as we shall show in the Treatise on penance.

§ VI

The acts of contrition and charity proceed effectively from habitual grace, to which they dispose

Thus our Thomists commonly teach, with few Recent authors excepted: This is proved, first, from St. Thomas, who here, art. 7 and 8, plainly favors our opinion. For art. 7, in the body, he says thus: "The justification of the impious originally consists in the infusion of grace, for through it both free will is moved, and guilt is remitted." By these words he manifestly declares that for the justification of the impious there is not required a moving help, distinct from habitual grace, but that grace itself simultaneously moves free will, and remits guilt, and consequently simultaneously furnishes the function of moving help for the acts of contrition and charity, and forms the soul, sanctifying it, and cleansing it from the filth of sins. Whence in the following article he says that that very motion of God moving is the infusion of grace. That by the name of grace he understands habitual, not, however, actual help, distinct from it, is manifest: first, because he speaks of the grace, through which the remission of guilt occurs, or which is the formal cause of justification: but that is not actual grace, but habitual: therefore he speaks of this, not of that. Second, because he speaks of the grace which requires dispositions in the subject, as is clear from these words immediately following: "That some form is not suddenly imprinted on a subject, happens from this, that the subject is not disposed, and the agent needs time to dispose this subject," etc. But the grace which needs dispositions, that it be received in the soul, is not actual, but habitual, as is established from the same holy Doctor here, q. 112, art. 2, where he teaches that no disposition is required on man's part for actual grace, but only for habitual: therefore he speaks of habitual grace, when he says that through it free will is moved, and guilt is remitted. Nor is it an obstacle that there he says that the whole justification of the impious originally consists in the infusion of grace. For the word "originally," does not exclude from the grace of which he speaks the nature of formal cause of justification, but only signifies that such grace is so the cause of the remission of sins, that it is the root, source, and origin of the whole sanctity, and of all the gifts and charisms, which are found in the sinner justified.

The assertion can moreover be proved by a threefold reason. The first can be proposed thus: it is of the nature of a vital act that it proceed from a proximate principle of life, as conjoined with a radical principle, as is clear in all vital acts, both corporeal and spiritual, which proceed from a power conjoined to the soul; but the acts of contrition and charity are vital by supernatural life, for the just man, from faith operating through love, lives: therefore they proceed from the habits of charity and penitence, as conjoined to

sanctifying grace, which is the radical principle of supernatural life.

Nor is Father Contenson's response valid, saying that the influence of supernatural habits can be supplied by the influence of actual supernatural help; just as Paul elicited the vision of God, not through the habit of the light of glory, but by the impression of light transiently communicated. Nor is this solution valid, I say: for although preternaturally, and by absolute power, man could elicit vital acts of the supernatural order without supernatural habits, by reason of a supernatural help supplying their place, as happened in the vision of St. Paul; it is nevertheless certain (as the aforesaid author confesses) that supernatural habits are required for operating better and more connaturally, and by God's ordinary law and power: but the acts of charity and contrition, which dispose for sanctifying grace, are not only vital by supernatural life, but are also connaturally elicited by the soul, and not preternaturally, and by God's absolute power; otherwise the justification of the sinner would be miraculous, like the vision of St. Paul: therefore such acts are not elicited by man, by means of a transient help, but by means of the habits of charity and penitence, as conjoined with sanctifying grace, as the radical principle of supernatural life.

The second reason is briefly proposed thus: an actual and perfect inclination toward some end, must suppose (at least connaturally and by God's ordinary way) a nature proportioned to such end: but the act of charity is an actual and perfect inclination toward God as ultimate end: therefore, in order for it to be elicited connaturally, as happens in the justification of the sinner, it must suppose sanctifying grace, which is related as a nature proportioned to such end.

The third reason is philosophical, and can be formed thus: it is not repugnant, indeed it is connatural, that something dispose a subject for the reception of some form, and nevertheless proceed from it. The consequence is clear; the antecedent, however, is declared and persuaded by various examples taken from Philosophy. For in the first place, our Thomists commonly teach, in the books On generation and corruption, that dispositions accompanying the form of the generated thing, dispose for its reception, and nevertheless proceed from it: e.g. heat as intense as fire's, which is the ultimate disposition for the form of fire, flows from it; and this St. Thomas plainly asserts, III, q. 7, art. 13, ad 2, in these words: "The heat which was the disposition for the form of fire, is the effect flowing from the form of fire, and heat now preexisting." And q. 9, art. 3, ad 2, he says: "Through heat matter is disposed to receiving the form of fire, which, however, arriving, heat does not cease, but remains, as it were a certain effect of such a form": therefore it is not repugnant for something to dispose for the reception of some form, and nevertheless be caused by it; and consequently for the acts of contrition and charity

to proceed effectively from justifying grace, to which they dispose. And indeed if this happens in natural generation, why could it not likewise happen in spiritual generation, which occurs in the justification of the sinner? Especially since, concerning supernatural things, proportion being preserved, and their supernaturality being set aside, one must philosophize as concerning natural ones; for grace, as far as can be, is tempered and accommodated to nature, as theologians everywhere teach.

A second example taken from Philosophy is: the organization of the body is the disposition for the reception of the soul, and yet the body does not have organic being, except from the soul, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 76, art. 4, ad 1, and commonly the Philosophers, when they explain this definition of the soul handed down by Aristotle: "The soul is the act of an organic body," etc.

A third example: diaphaneity or transparency is the ultimate disposition in a diaphanous body for the reception of light, which is therefore defined by Aristotle, "the act of what is transparent," and yet such diaphaneity proceeds from light, since it is impossible for any body to be diaphanous, except from participation in light.

Finally, the wind entering through the window into a hall, is the efficient cause of the opening of the window, and yet the opening of the window, as being the removal of an impediment, concurs in the genus of dispositive cause for the aforesaid entry of the wind: therefore it is not repugnant, but rather can connaturally happen, that something depend on another in the genus of efficient cause, and nevertheless be prior to it in the genus of disposing cause, and consequently neither is it repugnant that the acts of contrition and charity ultimately dispose for habitual grace, and nevertheless proceed from it effectively: because indeed causes are causes of each other, as the Philosopher says, Metaphysics 5 and Physics 2; whence what in one genus is the cause of another, can in another genus depend on it and be caused by it, and consequently in a diverse genus of cause be simultaneously prior and posterior. Thus matter is prior to form in the genus of sustaining cause, and posterior in the genus of actuating and informing cause. Thus walking is the efficient cause of healing, and healing the final cause of walking. Thus on the part of the sun it is prior to illuminate than to remove darkness: but on the part of the air, it is prior to be purged from darkness, than to obtain light, in the order of nature, although both are simultaneous, as St. Thomas says here, art. 8, ad 1. Thus of the moment, corruption according to the order of the material cause dispositively, is prior to generation, or the introduction of the form; and yet the introduction of the form is prior to its corruption and expulsion, in the genus of efficient, formal, and final cause, as the same holy Doctor asserts, In IV Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 4.

That these things may be better perceived, and the principal arguments of the Adversaries resolved: with Cajetan, Conrad, Ferrariensis, Alvarez, and other more celebrated Thomists, it must be briefly observed that habitual grace, which is infused in justification, can be considered in two ways, according to which it exercises two diverse functions: first as it is in coming to be, or being infused, and as it is held on the part of God communicating it: second as it is infused, and in accomplished being, and insofar as it is held on the part of man receiving it. In the first way it takes the place of moving help, in the second it has the nature of a habit and permanent form, and of a soul sanctifying it, and giving it divine being participatively, being pleasing to God, and a fitting object of His love; because the first function is for the sake of the second, it exercises the first before the second, in order of execution; wherefore prior in priority by which it is communicated to the soul, in the nature of moving help, than in the nature of habit and sanctifying form; so that, communicated first in the nature of help, it disposes, through the acts of contrition and charity, for its connatural reception in the nature of habit. Whence St. Thomas, related above, says that through it, both free will is moved, and guilt is remitted. By these words he manifestly declares that habitual grace furnishes both the function of moving help, and of sanctifying form.

From these the principal arguments of the Adversaries spontaneously liquefy, and are resolved into smoke and vapor. Suárez objects, first: if the acts of charity and contrition, at the instant of justification, are from grace, they presuppose it existing (since the efficient cause causes as existing), and accordingly united to the soul; since grace is an accident, and the existence of an accident is existence in, or inherence: therefore they cannot dispose the soul for its reception in the subject.

But it is easily answered from what has been said, by distinguishing the Antecedent: they presuppose it as existing and united to the soul, in the nature of moving help, I concede the Antecedent. In the nature of habit and sanctifying form, I deny the Antecedent, and the consequence. For habitual grace can, prior by nature, be united to the soul by way of moving help, so that it might ultimately prepare and dispose it, through the acts of contrition and charity, for receiving the formal effects which it attributes, as it has the nature of habit and sanctifying form.

He objects, second: habitual grace is infused into man, because he is contrite: but if contrition were elicited from the habit of grace, this causal statement would not be true, but rather this: "therefore man is contrite, because the habit of grace is infused into him": therefore contrition, by which man is ultimately disposed toward justification, does not proceed from the habit of grace, but from actual help, conferred by way of a transient.

I respond, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor; for since habitual grace exercises the function of moving help, and of sanctifying form, both causal statements are true: the first indeed understood of grace, as it has the nature of habit and sanctifying form; the second, however, understood of the same grace, as it takes the place of help. Just as in the natural order these causal statements are true, in diverse genus of cause: the window is opened, because the wind enters the hall: the wind enters the hall, because the window is opened. The soul is united to the body because it is organic: the body is organic, because the soul is united to it, and informs it. The body receives light, because it is diaphanous, and it is diaphanous, because it receives light. The air is illuminated, because it is purged of darkness, and it is purged of darkness, because it is illuminated. For causes, as we said above, are causes of each other, whence what causes something in one genus of cause, can be caused by it and depend on it in another genus.

A certain Recent author objects, third: man cannot, through sight and walking, dispose himself for having eyes, or feet, because such actions proceed effectively from the visual and progressive power. Heat also, although it can be the ultimate disposition for the form of fire, is not, however, heating, because it is effectively produced by such a form: therefore likewise, if the acts of contrition and charity proceed effectively from habitual grace, they could not have disposed for it, or if they dispose for it, they could not proceed from it.

I respond, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence and the parity: the reason for the disparity, however, is that vision and walking, since they are successive actions, cannot come about in an instant; whence they presuppose in man a progressive power not only by priority of nature, and of the instant from which, but also by priority of time and existence, or the instant in which: wherefore since the ultimate disposition for some form accompanies it, and is in the subject in the same instant in which the form is received in it, it implies that man, through vision and walking, dispose himself for having eyes and feet, and the same is of heating with respect to fire, since that too is a successive action, and not instantaneous. On the contrary, however, since the acts of contrition and charity are instantaneous, and not successive, actions, they are elicited by man in the same instant of justification, in which grace is infused, and precede it only by priority of nature; and therefore, although they proceed from it effectively, they can nevertheless dispose for it, not in the manner of antecedent disposition, but concomitant; just as heat as intense as fire's disposes for the form of fire, from which it flows, as St. Thomas, related above, says.

The Adversaries further object some testimonies of St. Thomas, which seem to be adverse to our opinion. For the holy Doctor, I, q. 62, art. 2, ad 3, says that for the

conversion by which someone prepares himself for having grace, no habitual grace is required, but the operation of God converting the soul to Himself. And in this part, q. 109, art. 6, he says that in order for man to prepare himself for the reception of the gift of habitual grace, it is not necessary to presuppose some habitual gift in the soul, since thus there would be produced a process to infinity, but there must be presupposed some gratuitous help of God moving the soul interiorly.

But to these it is easily answered, that St. Thomas, in these and similar passages, only intends that for the conversion by which someone prepares himself for having grace, no other habitual grace is required, or habitual gift distinct from sanctifying grace which is infused in the instant of justification, otherwise there would be given a process to infinity; but that grace itself suffices, which, as infused, takes the place of moving help, and consequently can be called God's motion, or the help of God moving. Whence in the passages related above he says that through it free will is moved, and guilt is remitted. And that that very motion of God moving is the infusion of grace. Than which nothing clearer and more express can be said in favor of our opinion. And these things suffice concerning the justification of the sinner, which St. Chrysologus, sermon 72, calls the Sacrament of the poverty of the Saints. Whence, sermon 68, marveling, he exclaims: "The Angels stand amazed, heaven wonders, earth trembles, the tongue cannot bear it, the ear cannot grasp it, the mind cannot attain it, the whole creature cannot sustain it, the sea does not suffice, one fears entirely to believe it."

Chapter XVI

On the merit of the just, which is the third effect of habitual grace

That man, working from grace or through grace, can truly and properly, or of condignity, merit something from God, is established from various passages of Scripture, by which it is asserted that a wage corresponds to the works of the just before God, and that glory is given by God as a just Judge, and as it were a crown of justice. And in this God has provided not a little for our honor, for as Cassiodorus elegantly says: "A crown of the virtues has little praise, which does not come down from labor; it can indeed have the palm, but does not have glory. This is the account of great virtues, that the more a man labors, the more reward he acquires." Nor is the merit of Christ derogated by the merits of the just, as the Novators chatter, but rather it is more extolled and amplified; since it is the greatest glory, that Christ could not only merit for Himself, but also, by His merits, obtain for us the power to merit: just as that natural causes can effect something, does not derogate from the infinite power and efficiency of God, but rather shows His power the more, inasmuch as He not only has the power of effecting, but can also make other effecting agents effective, the special excellence of the first and most universal cause nevertheless always being reserved to Him. This premised, two things must chiefly be discussed and explained here, namely what conditions are required for merit, and what man can merit for himself, or for others, of condignity or of congruity.

§ I

On the conditions required for meriting

Six conditions are required for merit, three hold on the part of the meritorious act, two on the part of the man meriting, and the last on the part of God rewarding, of which we must here briefly treat.

Three conditions required on the part of the meritorious act.

For an act to be meritorious, first, it ought to be free, not only with freedom from coercion, but also from necessity, as Innocent V defines in his constitution, and as St. Thomas expressly teaches, q. 6 De Malo, art. unicus, where he says that the opinion of some who posited that the will of man is moved by necessity to choosing something, although not compelled to it, is heretical, for it removes the nature of merit and demerit from human acts; for that does not seem to be meritorious, which someone does by such necessity, that he cannot avoid it. Reason also persuades this, for to be meritorious or demeritorious is a certain property of the human act: but purely spontaneous acts, and immune from coercion only, not, however, from necessity, are not properly human:

therefore neither meritorious or demeritorious. The major is clear; the minor is proved. Those actions are properly called human, which proceed from a deliberated will, as the holy Doctor says in this part, above, q. 1, art. 1. But purely spontaneous acts do not proceed from a deliberated will, that is, from deliberation of reason, and election of the will, as is clear in beatific love, and volition of good in common: therefore they cannot properly be called human acts. The arguments which are usually made to the contrary, are proposed and resolved in the treatise on the voluntary and involuntary, chapter 4, § 2.

Second, for an act to be meritorious before God, it must be morally good, because an evil work is worthy not of a reward, but of punishment; an indifferent work, however, either is nothing in the individual, according to the more common and more probable opinion; or if an indifferent work in the individual is admitted, there is no reason why it should be worthy of reward rather than punishment; for if it does not merit punishment, because it lacks malice, it also does not merit reward, because it lacks moral goodness.

Third, for a work to be meritorious, it must be done in service of another, namely of him, who is to render the wage or reward: for since merit regards retribution, it is fitting that retribution be expected and owed by a determined person; for what is owed by no one, is by no right exacted from anyone: but a wage is not owed by some person, nor can it be exacted from him, unless the action be directed to him himself, and redound to his service: therefore for a work to be meritorious, it must be done in service of another, and redound to the good, utility, or honor of him who is to render the wage or reward.

Two conditions necessary on the part of the meriting person.

The first is the state of grace, for this Trent supposes, session 6, chapter 16, and canon 32, and is gathered from Scripture, John 15: "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine; so neither can you, unless you abide in me," namely through faith and charity, as the holy Fathers, and interpreters of Scripture, everywhere expound. The reason, however, is that for condign merit of eternal life, not only the work, but also the person, must be proportioned to that end, and consequently elevated to the divine order, and to the state of divine friendship and filiation, through sanctifying grace.

The other is the state of the way, as is clearly gathered from various testimonies of Scripture: for it is said, Ecclesiastes 9: "The dead have no more a reward." And chapter 11: "In what place the tree falleth, there shall it be." Where by the falling of the tree, the death of man is designated, and by its immobility and permanence, it is declared that the merit or demerit of man in the other life is not increased or diminished. Whence the Apostle to the Galatians 6: "While we have time, let us work good to all men." And Ecclesiastes 9: "Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly." Because (as Jerome

says on chapter 6 of 1 Corinthians): "The time of sowing is the present life, when it has passed, the time of working is taken away." Finally, Christ Himself, John 9, said of Himself: "I must work the works of him that sent me, whilst it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work." Where by day, the time of the present life is understood; by night, however, death, or the state after death, in which no one can meritoriously work. Whence Origen, homily 3 on Psalm 36: "The Lord the Savior says: The night cometh, when no man can work, and this he says of that time in which each one will receive punishments for his evils. Then, therefore, you may say, will that night come, when now no one can work, but each one is then fed from his own works, which, placed here, he worked. When, therefore, it is night, no one works. In that evil time, when the punishments of sinners are afflicted, there will without doubt be a famine for those who have gathered no fruits of good work. But in that time of famine the just will be satiated, from the fruits, namely, of their own righteousness. For just as in the desert, for six days they gathered manna, but on the sixth day not one day's measure, but as much as would suffice for the morrow they gathered, and each one ate on the day of the Sabbath what he had gathered on the sixth day: so also now, as it were a certain sixth day is to be reckoned the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ; and this time of His dispensation, which through His passion He procured in this world. And therefore, while we are in the sixth day, let us gather manna doubly, that it may be able to suffice us, until the true observance of the Sabbath comes for the people of God. For if we do not gather double food, which can suffice for us in the present age and in the future, in the days of famine we shall not be satisfied."

Of this condition I think no other reason can be assigned than the divine will, which disposed and ordained to give reward to the works of the way, but not to those which are done after death. Very consonant, however, to the nature of man, is a term fixed for the way, at the point of death, and dissolution of the soul from the body; for it is connatural to the human soul, that through the mediation of the body it acquire its own perfection, and in it have more occasions for meriting, and for fighting for procuring the prize of beatitude. It is also fitting that intellectual creatures come, through faith, to vision, and first submit their intellect to God, before they are elevated to seeing Him.

But what must be said of Enoch and Elijah, dwelling in the earthly Paradise, and awaiting the Antichrist whom they are to defeat and destroy, whether they merit or not, is a problem probable on either side, some affirming, others denying. I think one of these two things necessarily must be said, namely either that those holy men, from the time when they were translated into the earthly paradise, do not merit; because although they are mortal, they are not, however, subject to the conditions of mortality, as other men,

who by common law and mode live in a mortal body; and consequently they are properly neither wayfarers, nor comprehensors, but as it were "white eternities," as Tertullian speaks, book On the resurrection of the flesh. Or if from that time they merit, and their merit endures up to their death, which they will suffer for Christ at the end of the world, they equal, in grace and charity, the Apostles, and John the Baptist himself, and consequently will be equal to them in glory and beatitude. Nor is it strange, since they will be the precursors of Christ's second coming, of the Apostles, and also His glorious Martyrs, who (as the same Tertullian says) will extinguish Antichrist with their blood. Which of these is more probable and more likely, the prudent Reader will judge.

The condition required for merit on the part of God, namely the ordination of the work to the reward.

This is required, first, because God is not capable of any obligation toward a creature, except from His own ordination, as St. Augustine teaches, on Psalm 83, in these words: "He has made Himself a debtor, not by receiving but by promising." And St. Thomas here, q. 114, art. 1, ad 3, where he says: "God is not made simply our debtor, but His own, insofar as it is owed that His own ordination be fulfilled": therefore in order for the action of man toward God to induce some right of retributing a reward, it needs God's ordination. Whence the same holy Doctor, in the body of the same article, says thus: "The merit of man before God cannot be, except according to the presupposition of divine ordination."

Second, since our works are owed to God on many titles, if God should not order them to a reward, no man could have a right to it, nor consequently infallibly attain it; for God could accept our works for the other titles owed to Him, for instance the title of creation, or of supreme dominion which He has over all creatures: therefore for man to be able to merit some reward before God, and infallibly attain it, it is necessary that God order his works to it. Of which it is also a sign, that the works of the just existing in purgatory, and the free acts of the blessed, although proceeding from charity, nevertheless merit nothing before God; because although they do not lack intrinsic value, God has not ordered them to a reward.

§ II

The retribution of the reward for merits is in God not an act of gratitude, or of fidelity, but of strict justice, not commutative, but distributive

The first part of this assertion is proved, first, from that of the Apostle, 2 Timothy 4: "As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord will render to me. The Lord the just judge." From which words this argument can be deduced: what is given as a crown of justice, and is bestowed by God as a just Judge, is bestowed from justice, not from gratitude alone or fidelity: but from the Apostle, eternal life is given by God as a crown of justice, and is conferred by Him as a just Judge: therefore it is given from justice, not from gratitude alone, or fidelity. Whence St. Thomas there, lecture [2], weighing those words of the Apostle, says thus: "It is called a crown of justice, because God renders it from His justice." And Augustine, Tract 4 on John: "Now it demands a debt (he says), now it exacts a debt: as before it received grace, it had a merciful Father; the reward requires a just Judge."

This is confirmed from the same Apostle, to the Hebrews 6, saying: "God is not unjust, that he should forget your work": but if from fidelity alone He should confer the wage owed to meritorious works, if He should deny it, He ought not to be said unjust, but unfaithful: therefore not from fidelity, but from justice, does God render the reward for our merits. Whence Augustine, On nature and grace, chapter 2: "God is not unjust, that He should defraud the just of the wage of justice." And Book 3 against Julian, chapter 4: "God Himself (which is far from being) will not be just, if the true just is not admitted to His kingdom."

The same part is proved, second, by this reason: although that which is owed to merit, can be rendered from fidelity, if it is promised; or from gratitude, if it is given in recognition of a benefit received; insofar, however, as it is owed to merit as such, as a reward namely, crown, and wage formally, it is not rendered from fidelity, or gratitude; both because neither of those virtues regards this reason formally; also because if what is rendered from fidelity were a reward and crown, it would follow that the Incarnation, which from the fidelity of the divine promises was given to the ancient Fathers, and the remission of sins, which is given to a sinner converting himself, from the fidelity of the divine promise, expressed in these words, Zachariah 1: "Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you," would be a reward, wage, and crown of justice; which, however, cannot be said, since each is purely gratuitous, and cannot fall under merit, at least of condignity, as will appear below of the infusion of the first grace. Similarly if what is given from gratitude were a reward, gifts which we offer to God in an act of thanksgiving, would have the nature of reward and crown, which is also absurd: therefore what is owed from merit, as

such, is rendered only from justice.

This is confirmed: from a promise accepted under the condition of an equal work, there arises an obligation from true justice, as is clear in the obligation of returning a denarius, a covenant made with laborers, under the condition of working in the vineyard. Whence since God promised the just eternal life, under the condition of good works, which, by reason of grace and charity from which they proceed, have equality or proportion with eternal life, as will appear in the following section; such a pact or promise being supposed, there arises in God an obligation of strict justice, to remunerate the good works of the just, proceeding from grace and charity.

That such justice, however, is not commutative, but distributive, is established from what was said in the treatise on the will of God, chapter 5, § 3, where we showed that in God there is not given commutative justice toward men, but only distributive, and we exposed there the various differences which are found between the two. Whence, studying brevity, we refer the Reader to this place, lest we uselessly repeat the same things here.

You will object first against the first part of the assertion: Trent, session 6, chapter 16, thus has it: "To justified men, and to those doing well, eternal life is to be proposed, as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God": but that which is given from true and strict justice, cannot be called by the name of grace: therefore eternal life is not attributed to good and meritorious works by God from true and strict justice, but only from fidelity, or gratitude.

I respond that eternal life is called grace, either because it has its origin from the highest grace, namely God's gratuitous predestination; or it is called grace in the root, because the first sanctifying grace, which is the principle and root of the merit of eternal life, is given gratuitously and mercifully. The Council does not, however, intend to deny that eternal life is given from justice, insofar as it is the wage of good works, but expressly asserts this there, adding: "and, as a wage, from His own promise, to be faithfully rendered to their own works and merits: for this is that crown of justice, which after his own contest and course, the Apostle said was laid up for him, to be rendered to him by the just Judge." The same is gathered from Orange 2, chapter 18, saying: "A wage is owed to good works, if they be done, but the grace which is not owed, precedes, that they be done." St. Prosper also elegantly expressed this, Book 2 On the calling of the Gentiles, chapter 2, in these words: "Grace without merit is given to each, whence he may tend to merit; and it is given before any labor, whence each may receive a wage according to his labor."

You will object second: merit is not a reward owed from justice: therefore the rendering of the reward is not, in God, an act of justice. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. If the reward of eternal life were owed to men's merits from justice, it would follow that if God did not remunerate our merits, He would do us injury: but this must not be said, for since He is the absolute Lord of all things, He takes nothing that is not His own, and consequently does injury to no one: whence Augustine, on Psalm 70: "If God should condemn the just, who could say to Him, what hast Thou done? How great, therefore, is the mercy, that He should justify the unjust?" Therefore merit is not a reward owed from justice.

I respond by denying the Antecedent, understood of merit of condignity, as it must be understood, and to its proof I say that if the reward of eternal life were owed to the just from commutative justice, God would do us injury, if He did not remunerate our merits; but not so if it is owed only from distributive justice, because the debt of distributive justice does not arise from a right of another toward the distributor, as does the debt of commutative justice, but from natural rectitude, and the very law of equity, by which the distributor is bound to commensurate the reward with merits, and distribute it according to the proportion of dignity or labor of each one. Whence an evil distributor does not properly do injury to him to whom he does not give a reward equal to his merit, but to the commonwealth of which he is a minister, or to the law and natural equity which he violates, as we more fully declared in the place cited, the treatise on the will of God, where we also resolved the objections which are usually made against the second part of our assertion. Whence there remains only to be explained here, what man can merit of condignity or of congruity.

§ III

The just, by works proceeding from grace and charity, merit of condignity eternal life

This is established from Trent, session 6, chapter 16, where it says that to those working well unto the end, and hoping in God, eternal life is to be proposed, and as a grace mercifully promised through Christ Jesus to the sons of God, and as a wage from God's own promise, to be faithfully rendered to their own works and merits. And canon 32, he condemns him who shall have said that the justified man, by good works which he does through God's grace, and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member, does not truly merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and, if he depart in grace, the attainment of eternal life itself.

Reason also supports this: in this is distinguished the merit of condignity from the merit of congruity, that the former has a certain adaptation and equality, at least of

proportion, with the reward, and consequently rightly exacts it; the latter, however, has no equality with the reward, nor debt of strict justice, but only imports a right and debt of friendship: but the works of the just, as they proceed from grace and charity, have with the beatific vision a proportional equality: therefore they merit it of condignity. The major is established; the minor is proved. Grace is the seed of glory and of the beatific vision, as is established from that of 1 John 3: "The seed of God abideth in him": but the seed, although according to entity it is more imperfect than the fruit, is nevertheless equal to it according to virtue and proportion; because in the seed not only the fruit, but also the whole tree is virtually contained: therefore habitual grace, and the works which proceed from it, have equality of proportion with glory. Whence St. Thomas here, art. 3, ad 3: "The grace of the Holy Spirit which we have in the present, although it is not equal to glory in act, is nevertheless equal in power, just as the seed of trees, in which is the power for the whole tree." For the same reason grace is called, John 4, a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting, because indeed a fountain has proportion to the river, since it virtually contains the whole river. Likewise, to the Ephesians 1, it is called the pledge of our inheritance; because just as in this a pledge differs from an earnest, that an earnest is of lesser price and value, than the thing which is bought, but a pledge is worth just as much as that for which it is offered; so likewise sanctifying grace is worth just as much as the beatific vision, indeed it exceeds it in perfection, as was shown, chapter 11, § 3, corollary 2.

This reason the holy Doctor excellently weighs here, art. 3, where he says that the meritorious work of the just man can be considered in two ways, in one way according as it proceeds from free will, in another way according as it is from sanctifying grace. If it is considered according to the substance of the work, and as it is from free will, it cannot be meritorious of condignity of eternal life, on account of its greatest inequality and disproportion with it. But if we speak of the meritorious work, according as it proceeds from sanctifying grace, thus it is meritorious of eternal life, even of condignity, because under this aspect it has equal value with supernatural beatitude. Whence just as we see that a son born of a King and an ignoble woman, although on the mother's part he does not have hereditary right to the kingdom, has it nevertheless by reason of the father, from whom he is ennobled: so likewise, although the good works of the just, as they proceed from the human will, do not have condignity and sufficient proportion with the reward of eternal life; insofar, however, as they are from the Holy Spirit moving and applying them, and joined to it through grace and charity, they are meritorious of condignity of eternal beatitude.

You will object first that of the Apostle to the Romans 8: "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." By which it seems signified that the actions elicited by us, and the sufferings endured, have no proportion and condignity with the glory which we expect; especially since the sufferings and operations of this life quickly pass, and glory shall endure perpetually. Whence the same Apostle, 2 Corinthians 4, says that that which is momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh in us an eternal weight of glory. And St. Bernard, sermon 4 on various matters: "The hour passes, and the pain passes too; not so the remuneration, not so the wage of the labor itself; it knows no end, it remains whole simultaneously, and remains forever: the punishment is drunk drop by drop, it passes by little sips; but in remuneration there is a torrent of delight, and an impetus of a river, a torrent flooding with gladness, a river of glory, a river of peace."

I respond, with St. Thomas here, art. 3, ad 1, that the Apostle speaks of the sufferings of the saints according to their substance, not, however, as they proceed from grace and charity, for thus they have condignity and proportion with glory, as was shown. Nor is it an obstacle that they quickly pass, and the beatific vision is measured by eternity; for that, with its immutable and indeterminable duration, is contained in grace, just as fruit in seed. Whence Bernard, sermon 17 on Psalm "Who dwelleth": "Glory lies hidden, my brothers, it is hidden in tribulation; in this momentary thing lies hidden eternity, in this light burden, beyond measure."

You will object second: God, from the common opinion of theologians, rewards the works of the just beyond condignity: therefore there is not true condignity in the works of the just to the reward of eternal life.

But I deny the consequence, for that God remunerates the good works of the just beyond condignity, is not to be taken as if they were not worthy of the reward of eternal life, but that beyond the reward which is owed to good works of condignity, God, from mere liberality and magnificence, adds some degree of glory, so that He renders not only a full measure, by which the equality of the reward to the merit is designated, but also one pressed down and overflowing, by which some excess above equality is denoted.

§ IV

In order for the works of a just man to be meritorious of condignity of eternal life, it does not suffice that through the habit of charity they be habitually ordered toward God, but actual, or at least virtual, relation to charity is required

This is proved, first, from the holy Fathers, who everywhere teach that charity is the root of the merit of eternal life, and consequently must actually, or at least virtually, influence meritorious works: for Augustine, On the spirit and the letter, chapter 14, says that the fruit is not good, which does not rise from the root of charity. Gregory, homily 27 on the Gospels: "You have no branch of good work of greenness, if you do not remain in the root of charity." Leo the Great, sermon 7 of Lent, weighing that of Matthew 25: "As long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you did it to me," thus has it: "What is more fruitful than this work? What is easier than this act of kindness? which indeed would not be undeserving of praise, if by mere communication of nature it were furnished to a man by a man in need. But because it does not proceed from the fountain of faith, it does not attain to eternal rewards; the condition of heavenly works is one thing, of earthly another." Where the Pontiff, for a work to be heavenly, that is, meritorious of a heavenly reward, requires that it proceed from the fountain of faith; of faith, I say, not unformed and dead, but living, and operating through love. Finally, St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 40, q. [1], art. 5, ad 6, discourses thus: "For merit, mere habitual ordination of the act to God does not entirely suffice, because from this that it is in habit, no one merits, but from this that he actually operates; nor is it, however, necessary that the intention actually ordering to the ultimate end be always joined to any action, which is directed to some proximate end, but it suffices that sometimes actually all those ends be referred to the proximate end." And dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4, he says: "This appears from the example which Avicenna posits about the artisan, who, if while exercising his work, he always thought of the rule of art, he would be greatly hindered in the work; but just as he previously thought through the rules of art, so afterward he operates, and thus in his work the rectitude of art is preserved." Than which nothing clearer and more express can be said in favor of our assertion.

The same truth can be persuaded by a threefold reason. The first is: infidelity, or the state of mortal sin, accompanying good moral works of the natural order, does not vitiate them, nor make them demeritorious, unless it in some way informs them, by referring them to an evil end, as was shown chapter 3: therefore likewise grace and charity accompanying the good works of a just man, do not dignify them, nor render them meritorious of eternal life, unless it informs them through an actual, or at least virtual, relation to God as ultimate end.

Second, in order for our acts to be meritorious of condignity of eternal life, it is required that they be done in service of God, since one of the conditions required for merit is that the act be done in service of him from whom the wage is exacted, as we declared in § 1: but our acts cannot be done in service of God, unless they be ordered to Him formally, or at least virtually: therefore for merit of condignity of eternal life, at least virtual relation toward God as ultimate end is required.

Third, in order for our works to be meritorious of condignity of eternal life, it is necessary that they be supernatural as to substance, or at least as to mode; because as we said in the preceding section, meritorious works of condignity must be of the same order as the reward: but from mere concomitance of the habit of charity, our works cannot be made supernatural, as to substance, or as to mode; for this, some influence of charity is required, actual or virtual, by which they are elevated to the supernatural order: therefore for our acts to be meritorious of condignity of eternal life, the actual, or at least virtual, command of charity is required. Whence when St. Thomas, q. 2 De Malo, art. 5, ad 7, says: "For those having charity every act is meritorious," he does not speak of those having charity only habitually, and without any actual or virtual influence into the acts of other virtues, but of those having charity formally or virtually influencing such acts. Similarly, when Trent, session 6, chapter 16, says that the good works of a justified man merit eternal life, it speaks of works proceeding from grace and charity, or commanded by it; for it says that the just man merits by works done in God: but just as when works are said to be done in the name of Christ, they are understood to be done from the motive of charity; so also when they are called done in God, it is signified that they are done from the command of charity, and are ordered, at least virtually, to God as ultimate end.

You will object first: for moral good works to be satisfactory of condignity for sins, relation or command of charity is not required: therefore neither for them to be meritorious of eternal life.

I respond, the Antecedent being granted (of which in the treatise on penance), by denying the consequence and the parity; because the condignity of satisfaction is sought elsewhere, and the condignity of merit elsewhere; for the condignity of satisfaction is taken from the equating of the punishment with the guilt, according to that of Apocalypse 18: "As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her": but for this, that the punishment be equal to the guilt, the command of charity is not required: but the merit of condignity of eternal life, is founded in the proportion of the act with such a reward, which our works cannot have without actual or virtual influence of charity. Whence St. Thomas, q. 2 De Malo, art. 5,

ad 7: "The mode of charity is included under the necessity of the precept, according as the precept is ordered to the attainment of beatitude, not, however, according as it is ordered to avoiding the debt of punishment."

From this you will understand that man, through morally good works of the natural order, can fulfill the natural precepts, although he cannot merit eternal life by these works, unless they be done from the motive of charity, and be at least virtually commanded by it. Whence when Augustine, On the spirit and the letter, chapter 14, says that the commandment is not observed, except from love of justice; for the fruit is not good, which does not rise from the root of charity — this must be understood of the observance of the commandments as it is meritorious of beatitude, and insofar as it conduces to the salvation of the soul and eternal life; but not of the observance of the natural precepts, as to substance; for this can be produced not only from the root of charity, but also from love of the honest good, as we declared, chapter 3.

You will object second: all the acts of Christ the Lord were of infinite value, precisely because they proceeded from a Person of infinite dignity: therefore likewise in the just man all good works will be meritorious, precisely because they proceed from a person favored.

I respond, first, by denying the Antecedent, for in Christ those actions only were of infinite value, which were reflexive upon the suppositum of the Divine Word, and which are called by theologians Theandric; but not those in which the dignity of the divine suppositum is related merely concomitantly and materially, such was, e.g., Christ's eating, or walking, as theologians teach in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

I respond, second, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence and the parity; for since grace is a habit, it is subject to our will as to use; whence in that it does not at all influence our works, and is related to them only materially and concomitantly, it in no way dignifies them: but the person of the Word is not subject to the use of a mere will, since it is substantial, and the will cannot operate without the concurrence of the person; therefore it dignifies the works elicited by Christ, according to the whole that it can, and consequently infinitely.

§ V

To charity alone is attributed the essential reward of beatitude, but to the other virtues only an accidental reward: if their acts are not commanded by charity

This is proved, first, from Scripture, which testifies in various places that the crown of glory, and the gifts or goods of heavenly glory, are promised or prepared for charity alone: James 1: "Blessed is the man that endureth temptation: for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him." 1 Corinthians 2: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him." To which agrees that prayer of the Church, of the 3rd Sunday after the octave of Trinity: "O God, who hast prepared for those who love thee invisible goods, pour into our hearts the effect of thy love, that loving thee in all things and above all things, we may obtain thy promises, which surpass every desire." Finally, Apocalypse 21, the Angel measures with a golden reed the gates and wall of the heavenly Jerusalem, so that by this he might signify that charity is the measure of essential glory, and that the degrees of the light of glory are commensurate with the degrees of charity. Whence Augustine, Book 83 Questions, question 46: "As much as the soul cleaves to charity, so much will it be illuminated by the light of glory." And St. Thomas, I, q. 12, art. 6: "The intellect participating more of the light of glory, will see God more perfectly; but he participates more of the light of glory, who has more of charity; because where there is greater charity, there is greater desire, and desire in a certain way makes the one desiring apt and prepared for the reception of the desired thing: whence he who will have more of charity, will see God more perfectly, and will be more blessed."

The same truth can be proved by a threefold reason. The first is: the perfection of Christian life essentially consists in charity: therefore the merit of the essential reward is founded in it alone, and consequently can belong to no other virtue, except from its motion and command. The consequence is clear, for the essential reward of the fatherland corresponds to the essential perfection of the way: whence someone will be the greater in beatitude, the more excellent he was in the perfection of Christian life. The antecedent, however, is expressly taught by St. Thomas, II-II, q. 184, art. 1, where he discourses thus: "Anything is said to be perfect, insofar as it attains its proper end, which is its ultimate perfection: but charity is that which unites us to God, who is the ultimate end of the human mind, since he who abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him, as is said 1 John 4; and therefore according to charity is especially attended the perfection of Christian life." Whence Augustine, On nature and grace, chapter 42: "Charity is the truest, fullest, and most perfect justice." And the last chapter: "Charity

begun, is justice begun; charity advanced, is justice advanced; charity perfected, is justice perfected." Likewise Bernard, sermon 27 on the Song of Songs, teaches that the greatness of a soul, or its essential perfection in the supernatural order, is to be measured from the greatness or perfection of charity: "The quantity of whatever soul (he says) is to be estimated by the measure of the charity which it has, so that, for example, that which has much charity is great; that which has little, small; that which has none, nothing: the Apostle saying, if I have not charity, I am nothing."

The second reason: through that alone do we merit the essential reward, which consists in the fruition of the ultimate end, by which we tend toward such an end: but only through charity do we tend toward God as ultimate end; for through the acts of acquired moral virtues, we tend only toward the honest good of the natural order; but through the acts of infused moral virtues, toward the honest good of the supernatural order: therefore through the acts elicited or commanded by charity alone, do we merit the essential reward.

The third reason: it is not equal, nor consonant with reason, that maidservants and handmaids have the same reward and the same crown as the mistress and queen, unless from her command: but charity is the mistress and queen of the other virtues, which are, as it were, her handmaids and servants: therefore to charity alone is the crown owed, namely essential glory, which therefore is not attributed to the other virtues, except from her command.

I add that, for an act to be meritorious of eternal life, it must be referred to the good of God rewarding, as is established from what has been said in § 1, explaining the conditions required for merit: but the acts of the other virtues are not referred to the divine good, except through charity, which alone regards the divine good, or God as good in Himself: therefore they are not meritorious of eternal life, unless from the command of charity; and consequently, unless they be commanded by charity, the essential reward of beatitude is not given to it, but only accidental.

You will object first: the act of faith is a disposition greatly proportioned to the reward of eternal life, as St. Thomas teaches in this part, above, q. 3, art. 3, where he says that vision in the fatherland corresponds to faith in the way, in which formally beatitude consists. The same can be said of hope, both because it is greatly akin to faith, and also because just as clear vision in the fatherland corresponds to faith, so comprehension corresponds to hope, as the same holy Doctor asserts there: therefore the acts of faith and hope are meritorious of condignity of the beatific vision, and consequently of the essential reward.

I respond that the act of faith is a disposition greatly proportioned to the reward of eternal life, when it is formed, and formally or virtually commanded by charity; but not so if it is unformed, and if it does not include or presuppose the command of charity. Whence when St. Thomas says that vision in the fatherland corresponds to faith, he speaks of formed faith, and one commanded by charity. The same, proportion being preserved, must be said of the act of hope; for although hope is a Theological virtue, and its property attains God immediately, it nevertheless does not attain God as He is good in Himself, but only insofar as He is our good, and as He is loved by us with a love of concupiscence; whence in order for it to attain Him, as He is good in Himself, and be referred to His service and good, the command of charity is required.

You will object second: the acts of infused moral virtues have proportion with the essential reward of eternal life: therefore they merit it of condignity. The consequence is clear from what has been said above. The antecedent, however, is shown thus: every act proceeding from sanctifying grace has proportion with eternal life: but acts elicited by infused moral virtues, proceed from sanctifying grace: therefore they have proportion with eternal life. The minor is established, for since all infused virtues emanate from grace, just as properties from essence, grace itself operates through their mediation, in the way that essence operates through its own properties, or powers. The major, however, is persuaded by this reason: the motion of any nature has proportion to its end, just as the motion of heavy and light things is proportioned to their ends, and leads them to the center: but the proper end of grace is eternal life, whence John 4, grace is called a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting: therefore every act proceeding from sanctifying grace, has proportion with eternal life.

I respond by denying the Antecedent, and to its proof, I distinguish the major: every act proceeding from sanctifying grace has proportion with eternal life through the mediation of the command of charity, I concede the major; the command of charity being set aside, I deny the major. To the proof of that, I also distinguish the major. The motion of any nature has proportion to its end, if it be more perfect, I concede the major. If it be more imperfect, I deny the major. But the motions of grace are imperfect, and, as it were, unformed, unless they be commanded by charity; whence without its motion and command, they cannot efficaciously tend toward the ultimate end, nor consequently merit eternal life of condignity. Nor is it an obstacle that grace, John 4, is called a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting; for by this it is not signified that sanctifying grace immediately by itself tends toward eternal life, and the clear vision of God, but only through the mediation of charity, which is its first and principal property, and formal tendency, or inclination toward the supernatural end. Just as, in

natural things, heavy and light things, through their own nature and substance, do not tend to the center, but through the mediation of gravity and levity, which are the proximate principles of upward and downward motion.

§ VI

Good moral works, proceeding from the powers of nature, merit neither of condignity, nor of congruity, the first helping grace

In the first part of this assertion, as in a dogma of faith, all theologians agree, against Pelagius, who, since he thought free will sufficient for operating well, and to be helped by grace only that it might do so more easily, consequently also asserted that the first help of divine grace is given to us in view of some good work done without grace, as it were on account of merit, not only of congruity, but even of condignity. This error was condemned in several Councils, especially at Milevis, Palestine, and Orange the second, in which Pelagius is commanded to confess that the grace of God is not given according to our merits.

This can be refuted by a twofold reason. The first is: merit of condignity must be equated to the reward in moral estimation, as is established from what has been said § 3. But such equality is repugnant for the works of nature to the supernatural reward, since a thing of the natural and inferior order cannot, in moral estimation, equal a thing of a superior order; as is manifest from the very terms: therefore it is also repugnant that natural works be condignly meritorious of a supernatural reward.

The other is: the predestination of Christ is the exemplar of ours: but the hypostatic union, which is the first and principal effect of Christ's predestination, was purely gratuitous, and without any preceding merits, as Augustine demonstrates from various testimonies of Scripture, chapter 29 On the predestination of the Saints: therefore likewise the first calling, or the first help of grace, is given purely gratuitously, and does not fall under merit, and of condignity, of natural works.

The second part of the assertion, which says that natural works cannot even of congruity merit the first helping grace, is against the Semipelagians, or men of Marseille, who, tempering somewhat the heresy of Pelagius, asserted that we indeed cannot, without the grace of God, do any good works, but that our wills must be prevented by it, so that a good work might either be begun or completed at some time. But nevertheless they said that before that grace there precede on our part, not indeed good works, but certain beginnings of faith and good will, in view of which God is moved to give the first helping grace, and consequently admitted some merit, at least of congruity, with respect

to the first grace. This error seems proscribed at Trent, session 6, chapter 4, where it is said that the beginning of our justification arises from God's calling, "by which they are called, no merits existing on their part," etc. For that negative particle seems to exclude every merit, both of condignity and of congruity.

It can also be refuted from Scripture: for the Apostle, to the Ephesians 1, says that we were called by lot, and elected to grace, and consequently with no preceding merits, or occasions, or congruities; for he who is elected by lot, excludes every such prevention, as St. Thomas there, lecture 4, observes, in these words: "Because a lot is nothing other than the investigation of things which happen by divine will, but grace itself depends on the divine will alone, hence it is that the grace of divine calling is called a lot, because God, by way of a lot, according to hidden providence, calls not from anyone's merits, through internal grace."

Finally, the same error can be refuted by this reason: merit of congruity can be taken in two ways; first strictly, and as it were of amicable right to the reward, by which it is distinguished from merit of condignity, which imports a debt of strict justice, and not only a right and debt of friendship. Second, broadly and improperly, for any requirement of a form, whether by way of right and condignity, or by way of only connatural habitude, in which manner every disposition can be said to be a merit of congruity with respect to the form to which it disposes, because it connaturally demands it: but natural works cannot merit the first helping grace in neither way. Not indeed in the first, since amicable right proceeds from sanctifying grace through the mediation of charity, and natural works preceding justifying grace, are from an enemy of God. Nor also in the second, since man, through works elicited by the powers of nature, cannot dispose himself for the first help of grace, as was shown in chapter 8: therefore natural works cannot merit, even of congruity, the first helping grace.

The principal motive of the Pelagians and Semipelagians, for asserting that the first grace, in view of a natural good work as a merit of condignity, or at least of congruity, is conferred by God, was (as is established from the Letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine), that if God, by His mere will, and no cause, occasion, or merit, or demerit, existing on man's part, should grant or deny His grace, He would be an accepter of persons, and an unjust distributor of His gifts; which conflicts with the Apostle to the Romans 2, and to the Ephesians 6, saying: "There is no acceptance of persons with God."

But this foundation can easily be dismantled, for the vice of acceptance of persons is only incurred, when something owed to many, is conferred on one alone: but divine grace is owed to no one, otherwise it would not be grace: therefore God bestowing it on one, and

not on another, no preceding difference on their part, is not an accepter of persons.

This is confirmed and further illustrated: acceptance of persons is opposed to distributive justice, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 63, art. 1: but distributive justice has no place in gratuitous and undue things, such are the gifts and helps of grace, as the same holy Doctor declares, on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, lecture 3, in these words: "Distributive justice has place in these things which are given from debt, as if someone has merited a wage, so that a greater wage be owed to those laboring more; but it does not have place in these things which someone spontaneously and mercifully gives, for instance if someone finding two poor men on the way, gives to one what he can, or disposes to give it in alms, he is not unjust but merciful. Similarly if someone, both equally offending him, forgives one the offense, and not the other: he is merciful to the one, and just toward the other, unjust to neither. Since therefore all men, on account of the sin of the first parent, are born liable to damnation, whom God, through His grace, frees, He frees by mercy alone, and thus to some He is merciful, whom He frees; but to some He is just, whom He does not free, unjust to neither."

This is further confirmed: without the vice of acceptance of persons, God, from many possible creatures, decided to produce some, others being left within the state of possibility; and yet on the part of those which He in fact produced, no reason inducing to their production preceded. And that God should join the Word to humanity, no merit on its part preceded, and yet from this that He left other humanities unitable to Himself, He does not incur such a vice: therefore likewise, although God bestows His grace on one and not on another, no preceding difference on their part, He cannot be accused as an accepter of persons, and unjust distributor of His gifts. Whence St. Prosper nicely, Book 2 On the calling of the Gentiles, chapter 32: "We do not dare to complain of the judgment of carnal parents, since some of their sons, before any examination of morals, before any duties of piety, they embrace with a more indulgent affection. Also in masters toward their servants, the disposition is free, nor is it justly to be reprehended, if one, from a household of one condition, chooses some whom he might more benignly honor, and whom he might more liberally educate. Should it be complained of the most benevolent equity of the Supreme Father and true Lord, that in His great house, in innumerable differences, all things vary?"

Another difficult argument against the second part of our assertion can be proposed in this manner: the hypostatic order is more distant from the order of grace, than the order of grace from the order of nature; since that distance is infinite, this, however, finite: but notwithstanding this greater distance, the hypostatic order can fall under the merit of congruity of acts pertaining to the order of grace; for as theologians teach in the treatise

on the incarnation, the ancient Fathers merited of congruity the substance, or at least the circumstances of the incarnation: therefore a fortiori works of the natural order can merit of congruity a reward pertaining to the order of grace, notwithstanding the distance which is found between the two orders.

I respond that the major is true of entitative distance, false of the distance of proportion and habitude; for in this way the order of grace is more distant from the order of nature, than the hypostatic order from the order of grace: since both orders are contained within the genus of the supernatural order, one can terminate the habitude of acts pertaining to the other; on the contrary, however, since the orders of grace and nature are diverse, one cannot be ordered to the other, but the supernatural form exceeds the requirement of the whole of nature.

This response and doctrine can be illustrated by this example: God is more distant from the intellect permeated with the light of glory, than a spiritual substance from the corporeal eye, and yet God can be seen by the intellect permeated with the light of glory, but not so a spiritual substance by the corporeal eye. Of which no other reason can be given, except that that greater distance is in the genus of being, not in the notion of the habitude of power and object. The same, with proportion, must be said in the present, namely that the hypostatic order can be attained by the order of grace, although the order of grace cannot be attained by the order of nature; because although the hypostatic order is more distant from the order of grace, than the order of grace from the order of nature; that greater distance, however, is in the genus of being, not in the notion of proportion and habitude, for the reason we have assigned.

§ VII

Man does not merit of condignity the first justifying grace, but indeed its increase, and the first glory, corresponding to the first habitual grace

The first part seems certain by faith, both because to the Romans 3 it is said: "Being justified freely by his grace"; also because the Council of Orange, canon 17, defines that charity is a gift of God poured out in our hearts, with no preceding merits on our part. And Trent, session 6, chapter 8, expounding the Apostle's phrase, says: "We are therefore said to be justified freely, because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the very grace of justification."

Reason also supports this, for if man merited of condignity the first justifying grace, either he would merit it by works preceding it, or by works following it? Not the first, both because works preceding the first justifying grace, are either purely natural, or

imperfectly supernatural, and consequently disproportionate to justifying grace, which is the most perfect form of the supernatural order. Also because every work of one existing in sin, is impeded, on account of the indisposition and state of the subject, from having the nature of merit before God. Nor the second, first because since merit is, as it were, a certain motion and way to the reward, there cannot be anything posterior to it, whence man cannot merit that which he already has, just as neither can he hope for a good which he already possesses. Of which more at length in the treatise on the incarnation, chapter 5. Second, because an act cannot be meritorious of that form, from which it derives its whole value, whence it is commonly said: the principle of merit cannot fall under merit: but the acts which suppose justifying grace in the soul, and are posterior to it, derive from it the whole of their dignity and meritorious value: therefore they cannot merit it.

That they merit its increase, however, is established from Trent, session 6, canon 32, where he pronounces anathema on him who shall have said that the good works of a justified man do not truly merit an increase of grace. And from Augustine, tract 5 on the Epistle of John, where he thus says: "Charity merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit to be perfected." The same is also persuaded by the reason of St. Thomas here, art. 8, where he discourses thus: "That falls under merit of condignity, to which the motion of grace extends: but the motion of some mover extends not only to the ultimate term of motion, but also to the whole progress in motion: the term of the motion of grace, however, is eternal life; the progress, however, in this motion is according to the increase of charity or grace, according to that of Proverbs 4: 'The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards and increaseth even to perfect day,' which is the day of glory: thus, therefore, the increase of grace falls under merit of condignity."

Finally, that the just merit the first glory, corresponding to the first habitual grace, is clear from what has already been said: for since the first glory is not a principle of meriting, as is the first grace, but rather the term of merit, nothing prevents man, through the acts of contrition and charity, elicited at the instant of justification, from meriting of condignity the first glory corresponding to the first justifying grace, although he cannot merit such grace of condignity by those acts. Whence St. Thomas, above, q. 112, art. 2, ad 1: "The preparation of man for having grace, which is simultaneous with the very infusion of grace, is indeed a meritorious operation, but not of the grace which is already had, but of the glory which is not yet had."

You will ask, whether man, through the acts of contrition and charity, and other acts by which he is disposed toward justifying grace, merits it of congruity?

I respond affirmatively, if merit of congruity is taken broadly and improperly; for by acts of charity, contrition, and other good works preceding justification, the sinner is disposed toward the first justifying grace, and impetrates it from God: but disposition denotes a certain congruence with respect to the form to which it disposes, since it connaturally demands it: similarly the petition and impetration of some gift can be called a certain imperfect merit, according to that of Augustine, Letter 105: "Neither is the very remission of sins without some merit, if faith impetrates this; for the merit of faith is not nothing": therefore man, by the acts of contrition and charity, and other acts by which he is disposed toward justifying grace, merits it of congruity, if merit of congruity is broadly and improperly employed. It is otherwise, however, if it is properly and strictly taken, namely insofar as it imports amicable right to the reward; for the acts which precede justifying grace by way of disposition, cannot have such a right, since amicable right proceeds from justifying grace through the mediation of charity. Nor is it an obstacle that the act of contrition by which man is ultimately disposed for justification, proceeds, in our opinion, from habitual grace; because it does not proceed from it, as it has the nature of habit and sanctifying form, and gives divine being participatively, under which aspect it founds perfect friendship of man with God; but it is produced by it, as it is in coming to be, and takes the place of help, under which formality it does not have to found amicable right to the reward, but only to move the will to operating.

§ VIII

The just man cannot merit for himself of condignity reparation after a fall; nor the gift of perseverance; nor even of congruity, if merit of congruity be taken strictly and properly; but indeed it can, if it be taken broadly and improperly

The first part is proved by the reason of St. Thomas here, art. 7. Merit of condignity depends on the motion of divine grace: but the motion of divine grace in the just cannot extend to the reparation of himself after a fall, since through the fall or subsequent sin it is interrupted: therefore the just man cannot merit for himself of condignity reparation after a fall.

This is confirmed: if the just man could merit for himself of condignity reparation after a fall, either he merits it, before he should have fallen, or after he should have fallen? Neither can be said: therefore, etc. The minor as to the second part is manifest, because after someone has fallen into sin, before the reception of grace, he is not capable of meriting anything from God of condignity, since he is His enemy. The minor is proved, however, as to the first: all the merits of a just man, which he acquired for himself while existing in grace and charity, are suspended and impeded by subsequent sin: therefore

such a sin cannot be removed, nor the fallen man repaired, by virtue of the merits which he had before he fell into sin. Sin, therefore, is related with respect to preceding merits, as fiction is to a Sacrament: whence just as fiction is not removed by virtue of a fictitiously received Sacrament, but another Sacrament is required to remove it; so sin, mortifying and suspending preceding merits, is not removed by virtue of merits of this kind; and thus no one, while he is in grace, can merit for himself of condignity reparation after a fall.

That he also cannot merit for himself of condignity the gift of perseverance, is established from Augustine, On the gift of perseverance, chapter 13, where he thus says: "Whence it is quite clearly shown, that the grace of both beginning and persevering to the end, is not given according to our merits." By these words he plainly teaches that just as the first preventing grace does not fall under merit of condignity, so neither does the gift of perseverance. Whence there, chapter 2, he calls perseverance a great gift of God, by which His other gifts are preserved. And Trent, session 6, chapter 13, says that this gift cannot be had elsewhere, except from Him who is powerful, both to establish him who stands, that he may stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls.

Some interpreters of Scripture also observe that the predestination of the elect is as it were a certain golden chain, by which God draws men to Himself, and lifts them from earth to heaven, composed as it were of rings from various benefits of God, namely predestination, calling, justification, and glorification: according to that of the Apostle, to the Romans 8: "For whom he foreknew, he also did predestinate; and whom he predestinated, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." The golden buckle, however, by which the rings are connected among themselves, is perseverance; for this joins glorification to eternal predestination without beginning. By this God draws the elect to heaven, but mercying, according to that of Jeremiah 31: "With everlasting love have I loved thee, therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity on thee," because the gift of perseverance is bestowed on us from God's mercy alone, and not from the merits of our works.

Reason also supports this, first because, as St. Thomas discusses here, art. 9, in the argument sed contra: if the just man could merit for himself of condignity the gift of perseverance, it would follow that no just man, or at least few, would be those who would not obtain it, since merit of condignity infallibly attains its reward; and thus either no one, or few, would fall from glory, which conflicts with those words of Christ: "Many are called, but few are chosen." Nor can it be said that therefore many do not obtain the gift of perseverance, because through sin they place an impediment. For as the holy Doctor rightly insists there, this very thing which is to sin, is opposed to

perseverance; whence if the just man merited of condignity the gift of perseverance, God would not permit him to fall into sin.

Second, he proves it in the body of the article, by this reason: that which holds on the part of the principle of merit, does not fall under merit: but the gift of perseverance holds on the part of the principle of merit, because it depends on the motion of grace, which is the principle of all merit: therefore it does not fall under merit. Where, as Cajetan rightly observes, the holy Doctor does not speak of just any motion of grace whatsoever, but of the motion of grace, insofar as it is preservative of grace, for thus it cannot fall under merit, because it is the continuation of the first production, and entitatively that very first production, or infusion of grace, which cannot fall under merit, since it is the principle of all merit. Just as no one can merit of condignity his own preservation, because preservation is not an action distinct from creation, which does not fall under merit, but is creation itself continued, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 104, art. 1, ad 4.

You will say: man can merit of condignity beatitude, and consequently the perpetuity of glory contained in it: therefore a fortiori perseverance in grace, which is not as noble and perfect, as perseverance in glory.

But I deny the consequence and the parity, for a great difference intervenes between the perpetuity of glory, and perseverance in grace; because the perseverance of the fatherland holds on the part of the term of merit, but the perseverance of the way on the part of the principle, as St. Thomas teaches here, art. 9, ad 2, in these words: "The perseverance which will be in glory, is compared to the meritorious motion of free will, as a term; but the perseverance of the way is not."

The third part of the assertion, which says that the just man cannot merit for himself reparation after a fall, or the gift of perseverance, by merit of congruity strictly and properly taken, can easily be proved from what was said in the preceding section; for, as we declared there, merit of congruity strictly taken, imports amicable right to the reward, and by this is distinguished from merit of condignity, which denotes a debt of strict and true justice, namely distributive: but the just man does not have amicable right to reparation after a fall, because through subsequent sin the friendship of God with him is destroyed; friendship, however, being violated and dissolved, amicable right cannot subsist; whence subsequent sin no less mortifies and suspends merit of congruity strictly taken, than merit of condignity: therefore just as, on account of that suspension and interruption, the just man cannot merit for himself of condignity reparation after a fall, so neither can he merit it of congruity, if merit of congruity be properly and strictly

taken.

The same must be said of the gift of perseverance, for the reason of St. Thomas expounded above: for that which pertains to the principle of merit, does not fall under merit, even of congruity, since the principle of merit can be merited by no one, neither of condignity nor of congruity, as is established concerning the first grace, which, since it is the principle of merit, no one can merit of condignity, nor of congruity, if merit of congruity be strictly and properly taken, as we demonstrated in § 6, against the Semipelagians: therefore if the gift of perseverance pertains to the principle of merit, as was shown above, it cannot fall under merit, even of congruity properly taken.

That reparation after a fall, and the gift of perseverance, however, can fall under merit of congruity, broadly and improperly taken, remains manifest from what has been said above; for a work impetrating some gift or benefit, and disposing toward it, can broadly and improperly be called a merit of congruity: but many just men impetrate from God, by their good works and prayers, reparation after a fall, and the gift of perseverance, and dispose themselves for such gifts to be received from God freely and mercifully: therefore they merit them of congruity, if merit of congruity be broadly and improperly taken. Whence this merit is what Augustine means, when, in the book On the gift of perseverance, chapter 6, speaking of the gift of perseverance, he says: "This gift of God can be suppliantly merited; but when it shall have been given, it cannot be lost through obstinacy." For the word "suppliantly" plainly declares that he there speaks of merit broadly and improperly taken, namely as it means the same as impetration. But when St. Thomas here, art. 9, says: "No one can merit for himself future reparation after a fall, neither by merit of condignity, nor by merit of congruity," he must be understood of merit of congruity strictly taken: for to the Hebrews 6, lecture 3, he seems to admit some merit of it of congruity, namely broadly and improperly taken, with respect to that gift.

You will ask, whether a mere man can merit for another, of condignity, or at least of congruity, the first helping, or justifying, grace, and reparation after a fall?

I respond that neither can be merited of condignity, but indeed of congruity in the true and strict signification, or as it imports amicable right to the reward.

The first part of this resolution is St. Thomas's here, art. 6, where he thus says: "By merit of condignity no one can merit for another the first grace, except Christ alone." Which he proves there by this reason: merit of condignity must be from the motion of divine grace: but God does not move nor order the works of the just, except to meriting for themselves eternal life, or an increase of grace, since such works proceed from the grace of adoption, but not from capital grace, which is found only in Christ the Lord, who alone

is the head of all other men: but the grace of adoption differs from capital grace in this, that that is only ordered to sanctifying and enriching the subject in which it is, nor does it extend to the perfection and sanctification of others; but this has a certain influence, at least moral, into others (since it is proper to a head to influence the members joined to it), and consequently moves the subject in which it is, to sanctifying others, and to meriting for them grace of condignity. But of this more at length in the Treatise on the Incarnation, when we shall treat of the capital grace of Christ. This reason Pope Leo insinuates, Letter 97, chapter 2, in these words: "Although the death of many saints was precious in the sight of the Lord, no innocent's slaying was the redemption of the world; the just received, they did not give crowns, and from the fortitude of the faithful, patiences were born, not gifts of justice."

The second part, however, which asserts that a mere man can merit for another the first grace, and reparation after a fall, by merit of congruity strictly and properly taken, is also taught by St. Thomas, in the article cited, in these words: "By merit of congruity someone can merit for another the first grace, because indeed since man constituted in grace fulfills God's will, it is fitting, according to the proportion of friendship, that God fulfill man's will for the salvation of others." By these words he declares that the works and prayers of the just, have a certain amicable right, by reason of which they can merit of congruity the salvation and justification of others. Whence James 5 it is said: "Pray one for another, that you may be saved. For the continual prayer of a just man availeth much." It is also witnessed by that of Augustine in the sermon on St. Stephen: "If Stephen had not prayed, the Church would not have Paul; but Paul was, for this reason, erected, because Stephen, prostrate on the earth, was heard."

What we have said of the first justifying grace, must also be said of reparation after a fall, both because the same reason holds for both; also because the just man cannot merit for himself reparation after a fall, by merit of condignity, or of congruity, properly taken, because for the time in which the reward is rendered, he is not in a state remunerable, since for then he is a sinner, and God's enemy, as we declared above: but when reparation of another occurs, the just man is for then in a remunerable state, since for that time he remains just, and God's friend, as we suppose: therefore although the just man cannot merit for himself reparation after a fall, by merit of congruity properly taken, he can nevertheless merit it for another.

Appendix to the Treatise on Grace

ON THE VARIOUS ERRORS OF HERETICS Concerning Grace and Free Will.

Since many things which we have said in the Treatise on Grace entirely depend on the full and perfect knowledge of those things which of old the Church condemned in the Pelagians and Semipelagians; for the perfection and completion of that, we have determined that here we must briefly treat of the Pelagian and Semipelagian heresy, and that to this treatment a few things about the errors of the Manicheans, Lutherans, and Calvinists must be subjoined.

Chapter I

On the Pelagian heresy

Concerning the Pelagian heresy two things chiefly must be briefly explained here. Namely, what was its first origin, and what were the degrees or states of it.

§ I

The origin of the Pelagian heresy

Some refer the first origin of this heresy to Lucifer, or to Adam, and therefore call those first the Patriarchs of the Pelagian heresy, as we noted in the Treatise on Angels. For Lucifer's first sin was pride, by which, spurning God's help, he presumed to obtain the highest good through himself, and by his own powers, which pertains to the error of the Pelagians. Whence Bernard, sermon 3 on the words of Isaiah: "He who presumed to sit, wished to be content with himself." And Gregory the Great, Book 34 of the Morals, chapter 18: "Having abandoned the Principle to which he ought to have adhered, he sought to be, in a certain way, his own principle." Similarly Adam sought the likeness of God, not as to the full equalling of the Deity, but as to his own power of operating, namely that by the power of his own nature he might attain beatitude; and therefore he can not undeservedly be called both the Proto-Pelagian and the First Parent. Whence Augustine, on Psalm 68, says that he wished to snatch, and as it were steal, divinity, and lost felicity. Hence some not incongruously observe that the Pelagian heresy is so plausible, and so consonant with corrupted nature, that almost all men, by almost natural instinct, unless corrected by faith, are Pelagians, because indeed the pride ingrained in us, and transfused from Adam into all his posterity, altogether flatters the Pelagian heresy.

Others refer the origin of this heresy to Simon Magus, for he, in disputations held with St. Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, at the beginning of the nascent Church, contended that from the efficacy of the divine will and grace, the overthrow of free will follows, as St. Clement relates, Book 3 of the Recognitions. Clement of Alexandria also writes, who flourished in the year 204, Book 5 of the Stromata, that Basilides, Valentinus, and Marcion, asserted that man, by the powers of nature, could believe, work well, and be saved, which is the very heresy of the Pelagians.

Finally, others think Origen to have been the first, or at least the principal, architect of the Pelagian heresy; and this Jerome insinuates, letter to Ctesiphon, where, addressing Pelagius, he says: "Do you wish still to know another founder of your error? Your doctrine is a little branch of Origen." Whence also Rufinus, a follower of Origen, and translator of his doctrine from the Greek, thought so ill of divine grace and the liberty of the will, that it is gathered from the same Jerome, Book 1 of the Commentaries on Jeremiah, where he calls Grunnius (by which name they are wont to designate Rufinus) the Forerunner of Pelagius. And indeed Caelestius, Pelagius's colleague, when in the Council of Carthage he was accused of the heresy denying original sin, protested with a free voice that he followed Rufinus, saying: "The holy Presbyter Rufinus, who stayed at Rome with St. Pammachius, said this." Thus St. Augustine relates, Book 2 On original sin, chapter 3. From the yeast of those heretics, then, as it were leavened, the Pelagian heresy arose, and, with the Devil's hand as midwife, that twisted serpent was drawn forth with poisonous force, who strove to extinguish, with venomous bite, the whole spirit of God's grace.

Pelagius, moreover, was British by nation, as Augustine asserts, letter 106, to Boniface; whence St. Prosper, in the poem On the ungrateful, thus describes him:

"The dogma which of old the gall of the ancient Dragon conceived, the pestiferous serpent vomited forth in British speech."

By profession, however, he was a Monk, as Chrysostom testifies especially, letter 4 to Olympias, where he thus says: "Concerning Pelagius the Monk I am afflicted with great grief," and Augustine, book On heresies, heresy 88, and Book 2 On the merits and remission of sins, chapter 16, and Isidore of Pelusium, Book 1, letter 314, which is concerning Pelagius the Monk. And that he was one of those who dwelt in Egypt, Cardinal Baronius relates, for the year 411.

That he was of outstanding and acute intelligence, and eloquent in speech, St. Augustine often affirms, as is clear from his letter to the Virgin Demetrias, against which St. Augustine wrote another, namely the one hundred forty-third, to Juliana, the mother of

Demetrias, in which he says: "For it cannot be said enough how much we desire that in the writings of those men — because for their acuteness and eloquence they are read by very many — an open confession of that grace be found."

Finally, that he was so upright and religious, that he was held to be a saint, and eminently advanced in Christian virtues, the same Augustine testifies, Book 3 On the merits of sins, chapter 1, in these words: "After a very few days I read certain writings of Pelagius, a man, as I hear, holy, and of no small Christian progress." And chapter 3, he calls him "eminently Christian." Likewise, Book 2 Retractions, chapter 33, he affirms that the life of Pelagius was preached by many. But this St. Doctor wrote concerning Pelagius, while, clothed in sheep's skin, he was concealing his error; but after his bestial ferocity was known, he called him a pestiferous heretic. For in the same chapter he adds: "I placed the name of Pelagius not without some praise, because his life was preached by many, and those things which he refuted in his writings he did not put forward from his own person, but set forth what was said by others, which nevertheless he afterward, now a heretic, with the most stubborn animosity defended." Isidore of Pelusium too, in the letter cited above, after more carefully examining Pelagius's morals, asserts that he was a vagabond, migrating from one monastery to another repeatedly, for the purpose of scrutinizing and examining everyone's tables: "The number of years," he says, "has brought grey hairs to you, and yet you have a stiff and unbending mind, migrating from one monastery to another repeatedly, and scrutinizing and examining everyone's tables. Wherefore if the odor of meats, and the seasoning of dainties, is your care, flatter rather those who hold magistracies, and pursue the hearths of cities; for hermit men do not have those resources, that they can receive you as pleases you." Orosius too testifies the same thing, in the Apology, where, speaking of Pelagius, he calls him "One-eyed," and asserts that he took a little more care of his own body, than befitted a Monk. And certainly the enemy of Christ's grace could not fail to be a friend of the belly, and could not, seeking abundantly the ill-flattering delights of the flesh, fail — I say — to gape after fleshly foods, he who would not care to establish his heart on God's grace; for that, flowing from Christ's cross and His wounds, inspires love of the cross, and contempt of delights and pleasures.

§ II

The principal errors of Pelagius concerning grace

The principal errors of Pelagius concerning grace can be reduced to these six. First, that man can live without sin. Second, that he can observe all the divine precepts without grace. Third, that he can prepare himself for grace, without the help of grace. Fourth, that man can merit without grace. Fifth, that the beginning of good work is from us, its completion from God. Sixth, that the grace of God is given according to our merits. Pelagius deduced these errors from another, by which he denied that original sin is contracted by us, and derived from Adam into his posterity: for from this he inferred that the free will of man is not weakened, nor wounded, in its natural powers, but sound and integral in them. From which again he deduced that it did not need any help of grace furnishing it powers, for observing the divine mandates, for having good morals, and for effecting justice; but, the knowledge of them being posited, that free will itself, by its own sound and integral powers, could accomplish all these things. Whence he denied every help of grace, whether efficacious or sufficient, which gave any powers, whether efficacious or sufficient, to free will: for he contended that man's free will has sufficient, indeed even efficacious, powers for observing the divine mandates, and asserted that they were sound and integral in it. But just as from the denial of original sin, Pelagius denied the necessity of grace, in the manner explained; so he deduced the denial of original sin from another, prior principle, namely from the liberty of free will, which he was unable to understand, unless he constituted it sound, firm, and strong, and without any wound of original sin, just as it had been in the first parent before sin. Whence he inferred that free will for good would be extinguished, if it were said to be weak and wounded by original sin, and powerless for observing the divine mandates, and effecting justice. Wherefore the pretext of preserving human liberty was the principal cause why he denied both original sin, and the necessity of grace.

§ III

The various degrees or states of the Pelagian heresy

Those who have more accurately scrutinized the volumes of the holy Fathers, think that various states or degrees of the Pelagian heresy must be distinguished. The first was, as it were, a Heathenism accepted from the Philosophers; in which the Pelagians, with no mention made of grace, said that man's nature suffices for exercising whatsoever works of virtue, for observing all God's mandates, and for living without any sin, and finally for attaining true and eternal felicity as a consequence. Whence Pelagius, in the letter to the most noble virgin Demetrias, chapter 2, thus says: "As often as I must speak concerning the instruction of morals and the observance of holy life, I am accustomed first to show the power and quality of human nature, and to display what it can effect, and thence to incite the mind of the hearer to the species of virtues," etc. "For the best incitements of the mind are, when someone is taught that he can do what he desires."

This error of Pelagius, Augustine reprehends and detests in various places: for Book 3 against Julian, chapter 3, he writes this: "This nature, fallen into such and so manifest miseries, has of necessity Christ as liberator, commander, and redeemer, not Julian, not Caelestius, not Pelagius as praiser." And Book 3 against two letters of the Pelagians, chapter 14: "We ought not so to praise the Creator, that we be forced to say, or rather be convicted of saying, that the Savior is superfluous. Let us honor the nature of man with deserved praises, and let us refer those praises to the glory of the Creator: but because He created us, let us be so grateful, that we not be thereby ungrateful."

This state of Pelagianism, however, we said pertains rather to Paganism than to heresy: because to assert that man himself, all help, whether of God, or of another, being repudiated, suffices for himself for every virtue, wisdom, and felicity, is a pure and unadulterated dream of Heathen Philosophy; as is clear from these words of Seneca, letter 53, foreshadowing Pelagius: "There is something in which the wise man surpasses God; He is wise by the benefit of nature, not by his own; behold a great thing, to have the security of God with the weakness of man; behold, by his own benefit, not by God's help, he thinks the wise man happy." Whence, letter 20: "Let your thoughts tend hither, this take care of, this desire, being ready to remit all other vows to God, that you be content with yourself, and with goods born from yourself. What felicity can be nearer to God's?" As if the vows of other goods must be remitted to God; but for procuring the resources of the mind, man would suffice for himself. Wherefore again, letter 124, he says: "There is one good, which is the cause and foundation of the blessed life, TO TRUST ONESELF." Similar things Cicero has in the book On the nature of the gods, where, in the person of Cotta, he says: "Because each one acquires virtue for himself, no

one has ever referred it to God as received: for on account of virtue we are rightly praised, and rightly glory in virtue, which would not happen, if we held that gift as from God, not from ourselves." And a little after he adds: "This alone is the judgment of mortals, that fortune is to be sought from God, wisdom is to be taken from oneself."

From these impure pools of profane and gentile Philosophy, those words of Pelagius seem to have been drawn, which Augustine so greatly detests: "No one but yourself can confer spiritual riches upon you. In these, therefore, you are rightly to be praised, in these you are deservedly to be preferred to others, WHICH CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT YOU AND IN YOU." Whence Faustus, Book 1 On grace, chapter 1, writes this: "Pelagius said that for obtaining salvation, man's nature alone suffices for him."

The second state or degree of the Pelagian heresy was, as it were, semi-Heathenism, in which the Pelagians began to acknowledge and preach nature itself as if it were grace. For since Pelagius was in ill repute among Catholics, because he denied the necessity of grace, in order to decline this odium, and to deceive Catholics, he employed a certain moderation, tinged with the appearance of his opinion, and began to understand by the name of grace, free will; because it is given to us as a grace from God, that is, with no preceding merits of ours, in the very creation; and he further affirmed grace to be necessary for operating well, and avoiding sin, inasmuch as, without free will, we can neither act well, nor abstain from evil, as Augustine testifies, sermon 22 on the words of the Apostle, chapter 7, where, of the Pelagians, he says: "Disputing against grace in favor of free will, they gave offense to pious and Catholic ears; they began to be shunned, they began to be avoided as a sure ruin, it began to be said of them that they disputed against grace, and they found this contrivance for concealing that odium: 'I do not,' he says, 'dispute against the grace of God.' By this,' he says, 'I do not dispute against the grace of God, that I defend free will.' See the acuteness, but it is glassy: it shines as if with vanity, but it is broken by the truth." And below, interpreting their contrivance, the Pelagians say: "Because God created man, and gave him free will, whatever man can do by free will, of which grace is he owed, if not of him who established him with that free will?" By the name of free will, however, they understood the natural good of liberty, with the other things necessary for acting freely, which are naturally present in us; of which kind are the faculty of deliberating and weighing reasons, and the motives for acting or not acting, and the natural propensity toward good, and aversion from evil, as Augustine there testifies, and Book On heresies, heresy 88, and also Jerome, letter 1 to Ctesiphon, and Book 1 of the Dialogue against the Pelagians.

Now this state differs only in name from the preceding: for it preaches exactly the same powers of nature, with this sole difference, that it brings forward a cause which gave it

such great powers gratis, and uses the name of grace, lest it seem to have altogether neglected grace. We said, however, that it can be called semi-Heathenism: because the Gentile Philosophers too acknowledged this grace, although they did not use that name. Whence Seneca, letter 90: "Who can doubt that it is the gift of the immortal Gods that we live; that it is the gift of Philosophy that we live well? Therefore we owe more to this than to the Gods, by as much as a good life is a greater benefit than mere life." Do you hear pride exalting itself against God, and above God? Nevertheless, lest he seem altogether forgetful of divine grace, as if he had been ashamed of his arrogance, correcting himself he subjoins: "This would certainly be owed, unless the Gods had bestowed Philosophy itself."

Pelagius did not persist long in that state, and in professing this grace alone. For when Catholics soon understood that a deception was being practiced on them, and that under the name of grace the same nature was again being foisted upon them, they mocked and condemned this confession of grace, as altogether fraudulent: wherefore Pelagius, still assailed by the objections of the faithful, and wishing to avoid these, fled to another species of grace, distinct from nature and free will, namely to the law and doctrine divinely handed down, by whose help he confessed man to need, that he decline from evil, and do good. Whence Augustine, On the spirit and the letter, chapter 2, says of the Pelagians: "When they begin to be pressed, how they presume to assert this to happen without divine help, they restrain themselves, nor do they dare to let go this statement, since they see how impious and intolerable it is: but they say that these things do not happen without divine help for this reason, that God both created man with free choice of will, and, by giving precepts, He Himself teaches how man ought to live." And below: "Nor does anyone, when he has been ashamed to say that we are made just through ourselves, etc. because he sees this cannot be believed by the faithful and pious, when it is said: let him turn himself to this, that he says that we cannot be just without the operation of God's grace for this reason, that He gave a law, that He instituted doctrine, that He commanded good precepts."

Hence the Pelagians, that they might better establish this contrivance of theirs concerning the grace of law and doctrine, extolled the law with great praises, as the same holy Doctor testifies, Book 4 to Boniface, chapter 5, where he relates these words of Pelagius in the letter to Demetrias: "By the law, nature is, as it were, polished with a file, and restored to its pristine splendor." And these: "As long as this recent power of nature still flourished, and long use of sinning had not, as it were, drawn a certain mist over human reason, nature was left without law; to which the Lord, now overwhelmed with too many vices, and infected with a certain rust of ignorance, applied the file of the law,

that by this frequent admonition it might be polished, and be able to return to its own splendor." Just as, therefore, earlier heresies denied Christ, some denying the truth of His divinity, others the truth of His flesh: so Pelagius too emptied His cross; for as the Apostle says, to the Galatians 2: "If justice be by the law, then Christ died in vain."

This is the third, or rather the second, state of the Pelagian heresy, which differs from Heathenism, and inclines toward Judaism: for at the beginning of the nascent Church, many of the Jews, among whom Cerinthus was foremost, thought ill of the grace of Christ, and taught that one is justified by the law, free will sufficing to observe it: against whom the Apostle wrote the Epistle to the Romans, in which he expounds at length the mysteries of divine grace and predestination, as Jerome seems to think, preface to the Epistle to the Galatians.

To the doctrine of the law the Pelagians added the examples of Christ, and the remission of sins. For in the earliest ages, from Adam up to Moses, they said the natural law sufficed; because on account of that integrity of the first condition still persisting, and the vigor of the natural law, and the still unwounded liberty of the will, there was no need of another grace: but afterward, license and the custom of sinning gradually growing stronger, nature, corrupted by bad education and depraved examples, needed the aid of the written law, which God gave through Moses: and when afterward, on account of the excessive corruption of the human race, which had grown by the custom of sinning, that law no longer sufficed for living piously and soundly, Christ came, as it were the physician of so great a disease, who would heal men by His medicinal grace, and furnish the remission of sins, evangelical doctrine, and examples of virtues. Whence Augustine, Book On original sin, chapter 26: "Let us not, therefore, as Pelagius and his disciples, divide the times, saying that just men first lived under nature, then under law, third under grace. Under nature, namely, from Adam, for so long an age in which the law had not yet been given: for then, they say, the Creator was known by the guide of reason, and how one ought to live was carried written in hearts, not by a law of letters, but by nature. But when morals were vitiated (they say), when nature, so discolored, began not to suffice, the law was added to it, by which, as it were by a file, with the rust worn away, it might be restored to its pristine splendor. But after the excessive custom of sinning, as they discuss, prevailed, for polishing which the law availed little, Christ came, and as a physician for a most desperate disease, not through disciples but through Himself, He Himself brought aid."

And so the Pelagians, lest they seem enemies of God's grace, devised a manifold kind of grace: for they called the very natural free choice of will, grace; they confessed the law of Moses to have been necessary, by which, as it were by a file, with the rust worn away,

nature would be restored to its pristine splendor; they received doctrine and divine revelation, which would show us what we ought to do; they preached the remission of sins, and the examples of Christ, to be necessary for rightly instructing life. Whence they were Heathens in philosophy, Jews in law, Christians in name alone, and by the mutability of Proteus, transforming themselves into various species, so as to abolish the true grace of Christ.

These things are certain and undoubted among all theologians, but certain difficulties and controversies are debated among them, which must be briefly discussed and resolved in the following little questions.

You will ask, therefore, first, whether Pelagius, besides those external graces already explained, ever at length admitted some interior grace, and consequently whether a third or fourth state of the Pelagian heresy is to be admitted?

I respond that Pelagius, after many disputations held with St. Augustine, and other holy Fathers, at length admitted interior grace, illuminating the intellect, and morally exciting the will. This is clear from Augustine, book On the grace of Christ, chapter 7, where he relates the words of Pelagius, saying: "God helps us through revelation and doctrine, while He opens the eyes of our heart, while He shows future things, while He unfolds the snares of the Devil, while He illuminates us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace." And chapter 10, he again introduces him speaking thus: "He works in us to will what is good, to will what is holy, while He kindles us, given over to earthly desires, and, like dumb animals loving only present things, with the magnitude of future glory, by the solicitation of rewards; while, by the revelation of wisdom, He arouses in the astonished will a desire of God, while He persuades us of everything that is good (which nevertheless he does not fear to deny elsewhere)." By these last words, "which nevertheless he does not fear to deny elsewhere," Augustine plainly declares that Pelagius, indeed at the beginning of his heresy, denied grace illuminating the intellect, and morally exciting the will, but afterward (that is, after the Council of Palestine, and several disputations held with Augustine himself and other holy Fathers) admitted it. The holy Doctor adds, however, there, that by this Pelagius did not withdraw from the commendation of law, since the function and office of law and doctrine is, to teach, illuminate, show what is to be done, and to that exhort, persuade, and excite, but not to give powers for doing and fulfilling the mandates, as he pursues at length throughout the whole book On the spirit and the letter. Whence, chapter 24 of the book cited, On the grace of Christ, speaking of the Pelagians, and refuting their doctrine, he thus says: "Let them read, therefore, and understand, let them look upon and confess that it is not by law and doctrine sounding externally, but by internal, hidden, marvelous, and ineffable

power, that God works in the hearts of men, not only true revelations (as the Pelagians confessed, and believed to suffice), but also good wills." Likewise St. Prosper, in the poem On the ungrateful, expressly teaches that the true grace of Christ not only illuminates the intellect, and excites the will, but also reforms and changes it within, as is established from these words:

"Not by this counsel only, and by benign exhortation, persuading and teaching, as if it held the norm of law, does grace act, but by changing the mind within, and reforming it. Vásquez, fashioning something new out of a broken power of creating."

You will ask, second, whether Pelagius admitted the help of possibility, or that which gives us the power?

I respond affirmatively, for this is established from Augustine, Book On the grace of Christ, chapter 3, where, of Pelagius, he thus says: "Since he constitutes and distinguishes three things, by which he says the divine mandates are fulfilled — possibility, will, and action: namely possibility, by which man can be just; will, by which he wills to be just; action, by which he is just — of these three, the first, that is, possibility, he confesses to be given by the Creator of nature, and to be not in our power, but that we have it even if we do not wish to; but the other two, namely will and action, he asserts to be ours, and so attributes them to us, that he contends they are from us alone. Finally, he holds that God's grace assists, not those two things which are altogether ours, that is, will and action, but that which is not in our power — namely, possibility — is helped by us from God: as if those things which are ours, that is, will and action, were so strong for declining from evil, and doing good, that they need no divine help; but that which is ours from God, namely possibility, were so weak, that it always needs the aid of grace." And in the following chapter, he thus introduces Pelagius speaking: "We distinguish these three thus, and, as it were, part them out in a certain fixed order: in the first place we place ability, in the second willing, in the third being. Ability we place in nature, willing in the will, being in the effect. The first of these, that is ability, properly pertains to God, who conferred it on His creature; the other two, that is, willing and being, are to be referred to man, since they descend from the fountain of the will. Therefore, in the good work of the will, is the praise of man; indeed also of God, who gave the possibility of the will itself and of the work, and who always assists that very possibility with the help of His grace; but that man is able to will and accomplish good, is of God alone." And a little after: "That I may embrace universally the whole matter, that we can do, say, think every good, is His, who gave this ability, who helps this ability; but that we in fact will, or act, or speak well, or think well, is ours, since we can turn all these things also into evil," etc. And chapter 5 of the same book, Augustine, speaking of Pelagius, thus says:

"He took care to distinguish possibility, will, action, with such subtlety, that whenever we read and hear him confess the help of divine grace, whether in law and doctrine, or wherever he establishes it, we may know what he means, nor be deceived by understanding him otherwise than he intends. For we ought to know that he believes neither our will, nor our action, to be helped by divine assistance, but only the possibility of will and of work, which alone he asserts we have from God, of these three: as if this were weak, which God Himself placed in nature, but the other two, which He wished to be ours, were so strong and powerful, and self-sufficient, that they need none of His help; and therefore He does not help us that we may will, He does not help that we may act, but only helps that we may be able to will and act." Finally, the same holy Doctor, chapter 47, reduces the whole controversy about the help of grace to this one point, that Pelagius confess the help not only of possibility, but also of will and action, and he adds: "If, therefore, he does not agree with us (Pelagius) that not only possibility in man, but also the will itself and the action, are divinely helped, no controversy, as far as I judge, will remain between us concerning the help of God's grace."

You will ask, third, whether Pelagius admitted the grace of cooperation and co-efficiency?

I respond affirmatively, and I prove it first from St. Jerome, Book 1 against Pelagius, at the beginning, where he relates Pelagius to have said: "Whatever good I have in myself, is completed by Him suggesting and helping." And to Jerome asking, "The good you do, is it yours, or God's?" he responds: "Mine and God's, that I may work, He may help."

I prove it, second, from St. Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 32, and Book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, where he clearly supposes Pelagius to have taught: "It is therefore said by the Apostle, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy, because it comes from both, that is, from the will of man, and the mercy of God: as if it were said, the will of man alone does not suffice, unless the mercy of God is also present." Therefore he supposes Pelagius to have admitted the grace of cooperation and co-efficiency.

You will ask, fourth: whether the Pelagians ever at length admitted the true grace of Christ, which makes one will and work?

Some respond, with Jansenius, that the Pelagians, after Pelagius had been everywhere condemned, relenting somewhat of their obstinacy, admitted the true grace of Christ which makes one will and work, but adulterated and corrupted it in two ways: first because they said such grace is given, not gratis, but from merit; second because they affirmed it to be required not for the beginning of the good work, but only for its

perfection and consummation, and consequently that they then began to deflect toward Semipelagianism. Whence Augustine, Book 2 to Boniface, chapter 8: "They (speaking of the Pelagians) wish the desire for good to begin in man from man himself, that he may obtain the merit even of the grace of completion by this beginning." And Book On heresies, heresy 88, thus has it: "Finally Pelagius, when reproved by the brothers for attributing nothing to the help of God's grace, yielded so far to their disquiet, that he did not prefer it to free will, but with infidel cunning subjected it, saying that it is given to men for this, that what they are commanded to do through free will, they may more easily be able to fulfill through grace."

But although from these and similar testimonies of Augustine which Jansenius adduces, it manifestly appears that the Pelagians, after their heresy was condemned, under Pope Zosimus, began to deflect toward Semipelagianism, and to teach that grace is given from the merits of good will, and that it is only required for operating more easily; it is, nevertheless, doubtful and uncertain, whether they then admitted the true grace of Christ, which makes us will and work? For Augustine, chapter 47 of the book On the grace of Christ, which he published against Pelagius, after his heresy was condemned by Pope Zosimus (as he himself says, Book 2 Retractions, chapter 50), reduces the whole controversy between himself and Pelagius on the help of grace to this, that Pelagius confess the help not only of possibility, but also of will and action. And he adds that if he wished to admit such help, no controversy, as far as I judge, would remain between us concerning the help of God's grace. Which certainly Augustine ought not to have said, if Pelagius at that time had admitted an efficacious grace which gives will and work, given from merits, and useful, but not necessary, for the attaining of perfection and salvation, but rather he ought to have asserted that if Pelagius wished to concede such grace, as purely gratuitous, and necessary for willing and working, there would be no contention between them concerning the grace of Christ. Add that the same holy Doctor, in the book On heresies, which he wrote at the end of his life, whence he left it imperfect, prevented by death, affirms that Pelagius, however various, changeable of color, and multiform, always persisted in this, that he constituted all grace in the law and doctrine.

But you will say, what then is that grace which the Pelagians finally admitted, and adulterated in the aforesaid ways, saying that it is given from merits, and required only for acting more easily?

I respond that the help which the Pelagians then admitted, is something beyond the law, and common knowledge of the mandates, namely a special illumination, had through the revelation of the Holy Spirit, and holding also on the part of the power, and not only on the part of the object; that is, a help elevating the intellect for better perceiving the law

and doctrine revealed by the Holy Spirit. This is gathered from Augustine, in the book often cited, On the grace of Christ, which he published against Pelagius and Caelestius, after Pelagius's heresy was condemned by Pope Zosimus: for chapter 7, where he related the words of Pelagius saying: "God furnishes the help of His grace, that what men are commanded to do through free will, they may be more easily able to fulfill through grace," he adds concerning the same Pelagius: "And as if about to explain what grace he means, he added, saying: which we confess to consist not, as you think, in the law only, but also in the help of God." Where he seems to posit some help beyond the law, or knowledge of God's mandates, which he says is given for [doing things] more easily. But what and of what kind that is, is clear from the words which Augustine subjoins: "Who would not desire that he should show what grace he wishes to be understood? For we ought chiefly to expect this of him, that he say that this which he says, he confesses not only in the law; but with us held in this suspense, behold what he added: 'For God helps us,' he says, 'through the doctrine and revelation of Himself, while He opens the eyes of our heart; while He shows us the future, that we may not be occupied with present things; while He unfolds the snares of the devil; while He illuminates us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace.'" Behold how Pelagius acknowledged the grace of internal illumination, not as simply and absolutely necessary for fulfilling the precepts of the law, but as useful for observing them better and more easily.

You will say: the grace of illumination is reduced to law and doctrine, as we showed above from Augustine: but that grace, which Pelagius admitted after his heresy was condemned by Pope Zosimus, is not reduced to law and doctrine, since Augustine calls it the "great help of divine grace," and says that God is to be blessed, that the Pelagians finally admitted some grace: therefore Pelagius admitted another grace, different from the grace of illumination.

I respond that there is a twofold grace of illumination; one which holds on the part of the object, and pertains to its sufficient proposal or application, which Pelagius admitted, even before he was condemned by Pope Zosimus; the other holding on the part of the power, or intellect, by which it is strengthened and elevated to assenting to the object thus proposed, and this Pelagius admitted only after his heresy was condemned by Pope Zosimus: but this latter grace, since it strengthens and comforts the power, does not pertain to the law, which only has the function of manifesting and proposing the object, and consequently is called by Augustine "the great help of grace."

You will ask, fifth, whether the Pelagians acknowledged habitual grace, sanctifying and cleansing from sins?

I respond affirmatively, against Suárez: both because Pelagius was never accused of denying such grace, and there was no dispute between the Pelagians and the holy Fathers about it, but only about actual grace, as Vásquez frankly confesses, disp. 196, chapter 3, no. 13, in these words: "The Scholastics who thought there was disputed with Pelagius about the necessity of habitual grace and the remission of sins, for observing the precepts, err through ignorance of the word and history, thinking that by the name of grace is understood habitual grace and the remission of sins." Also because Baptism, according to the Pelagians, added some supernatural gift: for Julian, in Augustine, Book 1 against him, chapter 6, says: "For this reason we baptize infants too, although they are not stained with sin, so that sanctity, justice, adoption, inheritance, brotherhood with Christ, may be given or added to them, so that they may be His members." And lest it be said that by that sanctity granted to little ones by Baptism, Julian understood only an external benevolence and favor of God, producing nothing within, he must again be heard, in the same Augustine, Book 1 of the unfinished work, folio 18, where, speaking of baptismal grace, he says: "We believe this grace to be enriched with spiritual gifts, and to be abundant with many benefits, and to be revered with virtues." By these words Julian plainly professes that baptismal grace is some supernatural gift, received in the soul, and adorning it with various endowments.

You will say: Augustine, Book On the grace of Christ, chapter 30, affirms that he could nowhere find, in the writings of Pelagius and Caelestius, the grace by which we are justified, and by which the charity of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit: therefore the Pelagians did not admit the gifts of habitual grace.

I respond that Augustine does not say absolutely that in the writings of Pelagius and Caelestius he could not find that grace by which we are justified, etc., but he adds, "as it must be confessed"; because habitual grace, and the infused habits which flow from it, must be admitted, not only for sanctifying, cleansing, and adorning the soul, but also for influencing, together with its powers, into supernatural acts; concerning which help the Pelagians did not admit such gifts, since they admitted no supernatural help applying free will to acting.

You will ask, sixth, whether the Pelagians erred concerning free will?

I respond that they erred concerning free will in two ways. First because they thought the will of fallen man to be in perfect equilibrium, just as it was in the state of innocence, and equally prone to good and to evil; and consequently they said that free will was not wounded and weakened by Adam's sin, nor, by reason of concupiscence, more inclined toward the delightful good, contrary to reason, than toward the honest good, and

consonant with reason, as St. Prosper relates in the letter to Augustine, prefixed to the book On the predestination of the Saints, where he says they asserted that as much facility as each one has for evil, so much likewise he has for good, and that with equal impetus the mind is moved either to vices or to virtues.

Second, because they generally defined the liberty of the will by indifference to good and to evil; so that they said no one to be free, except one who could indifferently operate well or ill; as is clear from Augustine, Book 1 of the unfinished work against Julian, page 150, where he reprehends him, among other Pelagians, for restricting liberty, generally taken, to an indifferent power regarding good and evil, or which could do well and ill; because from this it would follow that neither God, nor the Angels, nor blessed men, who cannot sin, or ill desire or choose, would be free: "If," he says, "that alone is free which can will (that is, good and evil), therefore God is not free, who cannot will evil, of whom you yourself have said: God cannot be, except just. Do you thus praise God, that you take liberty away from Him?"

Chapter II

On the Semipelagian heresy

Concerning the Semipelagian Heresy three things must be briefly set forth here, namely whence it drew its origin? What were the principal Semipelagian dogmas? And who were the chief Authors, or followers, of this heresy?

§ I

The origin of the Semipelagian heresy

On the occasion of St. Augustine's writings against the Pelagians, two errors concerning grace, opposed to each other, arose, one in Africa, and the other in Gaul. The first was of the Monks of Hadrumetum, who (as St. Augustine relates, Book 2 Retractions, penultimate chapter) upon reading his 105th letter to Sixtus, were divided into two parties, one of which, led by Florus, believed that God's grace was so preached by St. Augustine, that it removed the liberty of free will, and the necessity of correction; the other, however, fought for the defense of free will, and denied the efficacy of grace, that it might defend the liberty of free will. That the holy Doctor might remove this dissension, and settle that discord, he wrote two letters to Valentinus, prefect of the Hadrumetine monastery, and as many books, one On grace and free will, the other On correction and grace, by which he clearly showed that through the efficacy of divine grace, neither the liberty of free will, nor the necessity or utility of correction, is removed, as he himself testifies, Book 2 Retractions, chapter 66, in these words: "On account of those who, when God's grace is defended, think that free will is taken away, I wrote On free will and grace: but to those Monks of Hadrumetum, in whose monastery this contention had arisen concerning this matter, so that some of them were compelled to consult me, I again wrote another book, which I entitled On correction and grace, when it was reported to me that a certain one there had said that no one should be corrected if he does not do God's precepts, but that it should only be prayed for him that he do so."

But on the occasion of this second book, a second error arose in Gaul, at Marseille, in almost the very last age of St. Augustine. For when certain Marseille presbyters, and Bishops of Gaul, had read in it what he had disputed concerning the proposal of the divine will and predestination, by which those to be saved are distinguished from those to perish; and concerning the efficacy of divine grace, by which our will is indeclinably acted upon; they were greatly disturbed and scandalized, and whence the Africans, more fully instructed, laid down their error, thence Gaul, blinded by the new aspect of light, fell into various errors, as Prosper testifies in the letter to Augustine, at the beginning, where he thus says: "Many of the servants of Christ who dwell in the city of Marseille think that in your Holiness's writings, which you composed against the Pelagian heretics, whatever you have disputed therein concerning the calling of the elect according to God's purpose, is contrary to the opinion of the Fathers, and to Ecclesiastical sense. And when for some time they preferred to blame their own slowness, rather than reprehend what they did not understand, and some of them wished to ask a clearer and more open exposition of your Beatitude on this matter, it happened, by the disposition of God's

mercy, that, when certain persons within Africa raised similar matters, you produced the book On correction and grace, full of divine authority. When this, by an unhoped-for opportunity, was brought to our notice, we thought that all the complaints of those resisting should be lulled, because on all the questions, about which your Sanctity had to be consulted, so plainly and fully was it here answered, as if you had specifically taken care to compose what would settle what was disturbed among us. But upon this book of your Beatitude being read again, just as those who before followed the holy and Apostolic authority of your doctrine, are much more understanding and instructed to be found true, so those who were impeded by the obscurity of their own persuasion, withdrew more averse than they had been."

The beginning of the Semipelagian heresy, then, began from the Marseillians, who were therefore called Semipelagians, or remnants of the Pelagians; because, though in many things departing from Pelagius's doctrine, in some things nevertheless they clung to him: especially in this, that he said the first grace and calling is given from the merits of good will. Some, however, think that Vitalis of Carthage began Semipelagianism in Africa: for he said the beginning of faith is from free will, not from the motion of grace, nor is it a gift of God, but is in us from ourselves, as will appear below, when we discuss the chief Authors and followers of the Semipelagian heresy.

§ II

The principal Semipelagian dogmas

The principal dogmas of the Semipelagians, or Marseillians, elegantly described in the letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, can be reduced to these principal heads.

First, although they admitted that every man sinned in Adam's sinning, and that no one is saved through his own works, but through God's grace of regeneration; nevertheless they said that the propitiation which is in the sacrament of Christ's blood, was proposed to all men with equal will, nor did they assert that God pursues the elect with a more special affection, but rather that He predestined to His kingdom those whom He knew, being freely called, would be worthy of election, and would depart from this life good, without deficiency.

Second, from this they gathered that Augustine's doctrine on gratuitous predestination must be rejected, contending that no one before Augustine had given the sense to the Apostle's Epistle to the Romans, which he had given; indeed also that his doctrine was contrary to the edification of the hearers, and even if it were true, ought by no means to be preached. Hence they did not wish there to be a certain number of the predestined,

but that it could be diminished, or increased, lest the incitements of exhortations have no place among the infidel and negligent.

Third, they said that if God's constitution prevents human wills, the liberty of human free will is taken away, and a fatal necessity is introduced.

Fourth, that if God works all good works in us, all our merit is excluded.

Fifth, that from the predestination which St. Augustine admitted, it follows that God predestines to sin. Likewise that it injects a necessity of despairing, takes away from the fallen the care of rising again, brings to the saints an occasion of torpor, is contrary to the precepts and exhortations, and is contrary to the edification of the hearers.

Sixth, they asserted that the grace of God does not prevent, but follows, the human will, so that He does not therefore will because He is helped by God; but is helped by God, because He has first willed.

Seventh, that through God's grace, not the work itself is given, but only the possibility of the work.

Finally, Hilary relates, in the letter to Augustine, that they distinguished, in our will, the powers for operating well from the powers for well desiring, seeking, believing, etc., which pertain to the beginning of the good work; and they added that our will, while it was integral before the fall, could not only seek and desire, but also will and operate well, and accordingly that then grace helped man willing and operating well, or his good will: but nature having been corrupted by original sin, they wished there to remain in us no powers for operating well, and rightly willing (which are operations of a healthy man), but only for desiring salvation and seeking a remedy, and these powers they called certain seeds of virtues, naturally instilled in our soul. And because no one can desire salvation, and seek it, unless he first believe in a Savior, they therefore affirmed that the affection of believing is from our will, and that it precedes the grace of Christ: just as a sick man, although he does not have the powers for walking, and doing other works of a healthy man, can nevertheless desire health, and seek a physician, and ask for medicine. Whence they constituted these beginnings of good will, not in the affection of belief alone, but also in the petition, knocking, desire for health, and similar imperfect acts; and they said these are prerequired in men, that God bestow grace for believing, hoping, loving, and eliciting other perfect acts; and accordingly that God's grace does not favor except a man already desiring goods, so that our obedience is prior to God's grace, and that God awaits our wills, that we wish to be purged and healed, but does not, through His grace, effect that we seek and desire the health of the soul. And this they asserted, both lest God seem

unjust, and an accepter of persons, by preventing some with His grace, but leaving and spurning others; also lest the natural liberty of our free will, and inclination toward good, seem altogether extinguished by original sin, if man could not even desire his own health from himself, nor seek it, nor implore the aid of a physician. Whence Hilary, in the letter to Augustine, concerning the Marseillians, says: "They assert what is consonant with truth, or fitting for preaching, that, to those prostrate, and never to rise by their own strength, when the occasion of obtaining salvation is announced, by that merit, by which they shall have willed and believed that they can be healed from their disease, they also obtain the increase of their faith, and the effect of their whole sanctity."

But what they thought about the inception of faith, this also they thought must be said about persevering unto the end, namely that both must be equally ascribed to the human will, as St. Augustine testifies, book On the gift of perseverance, chapter 17, where he says: "These men so constitute the beginning of faith, up to the end of perseverance, in our power, that they do not think it to be God's gifts, nor that God works our thoughts and wills for having and retaining these; but they concede that He gives the other things, when they are impetrated from Him by the faith of one believing." And below: "But these things, they say, are given to us by God insofar as they are impetrated by a faith which begins from us; and this faith, both to begin to have, and to remain in it up to the end, as if we did not receive this from the Lord, they contend to be ours." Hence, according to St. Prosper, they referred faith and perseverance in faith to foreknowledge, not to predestination, saying: "But that those who are to believe, or who are to remain in that faith which must henceforth be helped by God's grace, God foreknew before the constitution of the world, and predestined them."

They also erred concerning perseverance in virtues, and their works, which although they confessed to be counted among God's gifts, they nevertheless did not wish there to be given any gift of perseverance, by which it would come about that the saints and the predestined would certainly and infallibly persevere, or by which they would be nothing other than well-operating and persevering in good works, such as Augustine teaches, chapters 11 and 12 of the book On correction and grace. Thus Hilary relates, in the letter to Augustine, where, of the Marseillians, he writes: "Then they take it ill that grace is thus divided, that either that was given to man then first, or is now given to men, that he received perseverance, not by which it would come to pass that he persevere, but without which he could not persevere through free will; but now, to the saints predestined to the kingdom through grace, not such a help of perseverance is given, but such that perseverance itself is given to them; not only that without this gift they could not be persevering, but even that through this gift they are none other than persevering. By

these words your Holiness's [teachers], book On correction and grace, chapters 11 and 12, are so moved, that they say a kind of despair is exhibited to men." From which it is clear that although those heretics were willing to admit a sufficient help, subject to the will, by which the will can operate if it wills; the help, however, which is of itself and by its own nature efficacious, which subjects the will to itself, and applies it to acting, and infallibly joins it with the act, they altogether repudiated; because they falsely thought that with such a help, the liberty and indifference of our will could not be compatible.

You will ask whether the Semipelagians admitted, for the beginning of faith and of good will, some grace, or posited that beginning in bare nature?

I respond that some of them admitted for such a beginning an interior illumination and excitation; others admitted for it no other grace than law and doctrine; and consequently placed the beginning of faith and good will in bare nature, altogether destitute of all interior help of grace.

The first part of this resolution is persuaded by this, that the Semipelagians rejected only that grace of Christ which they thought harmed liberty, and rendered corruption useless: but grace interiorly illuminating the mind, and only morally exciting, and awaiting the use and determination of the will, does not produce these inconveniences, as is clear of itself: therefore many of the Semipelagians did not reject such a grace, but admitted it for the beginning of faith and good will. This is established in Gennadius, whom we shall show in the following chapter to have adhered to the Semipelagians, and to have been of their sect. For he, in the book On Ecclesiastical dogmas, writes this: "The liberty of free choice therefore remains for seeking salvation, that is, rational will, but with God first admonishing and inviting to salvation, that he may choose, or follow, or act upon the occasion of salvation, that is, upon inspiration." And below: "The beginning, therefore, of our salvation we have from God's mercy, so that we acquiesce to the salutary inspiration; it is our power, that we attain what we desire by acquiescing to the inspiration; it is of the divine gift." Where, for the beginning of salvation, he admits salvific inspiration, and consequently a morally exciting grace. Cassian too hands down the very same thing no less plainly, Collation 13, chapter 3, where he says that God inspires the beginnings of a holy will, and grants the power and opportunity for accomplishing what we rightly desire. Vitalis himself, forerunner of the Semipelagians, and who, as we shall say below, began Semipelagianism in Africa, although he taught that faith is in us from ourselves, as is clear from Augustine, letter 107, did not exclude the moral excitation of interior grace. For in the same letter he said that man could, with a preceding suasion of God, and a following consent, believe by natural liberty.

The second part, which asserts that some of the Semipelagians did not admit for the beginning of faith any grace other than law and doctrine, is established from St. Prosper, letter to Rufinus, where, concerning certain Semipelagians, he thus says: "They kept this cleverness for themselves, that for beginning and progressing, and for persevering in good, they professed God's grace to be necessary for man; but in what manner they attempted to smuggle their poisoned vessels into this profession, God's own grace, through the mercy of the vessels, has revealed. For it has been most healthfully understood and perceived, that this alone was what they confessed concerning grace, that a certain instructress of free will exists, and shows through exhortations, through law, through doctrine, through creature, through contemplation, through miracles, and through external terrors, by her judgment, so that each one, according to the motion of his own will, if he seek, may find, if he ask, may receive, if he knock, may enter: because indeed His grace of calling first does this about us, that it admonish the free choice of our faculty, nor is grace anything other than law, than Prophet, than Teacher." He also says, in the letter to Augustine, that some of these do not so far decline from the paths of the Pelagians, as to say that man, by natural power and faculty, can attain to the grace by which we are reborn in Christ, by asking, seeking, knocking: so that he therefore receives, therefore finds, therefore enters, because, having used the good of nature well, he has, by the power of that initial good, merited to attain to that saving grace.

From these it is established that some of the Semipelagians placed the beginning of faith and merit in bare nature, altogether lacking any interior help of grace, against whom that Canon of the Council of Orange seems to be directed, where it is said: "If anyone says that mercy is conferred, without the grace of God, on us believing, willing, and knocking, etc." From which you will understand that this proposition which Innocent X condemned — namely that the Semipelagians admitted the necessity of preventing grace for each individual act, even for the beginning of faith — is false: for if some Semipelagians placed the beginning of faith and good will in mere nature, destitute of all interior grace, then certainly the indefinite proposition equivalent to a universal one, by which it is said that the Semipelagians admitted the necessity of preventing grace for each individual act, even for the beginning of faith, cannot be true.

You will ask, second, what power of meriting the Semipelagians attributed to grace, at the beginning of faith and good will, whether of condignity, or only of congruity?

I respond that they posited, in such beginnings of faith and good will, only the power of meriting of congruity. This is established from Faustus and Cassian, the chief followers of the Semipelagian heresy. For the first (as Gennadius relates in his life) was accustomed to say: "Whatever the liberty of free will has acquired for the labor of a pious reward, is

not properly merit, but a gift of grace." Whence in the letter to Lucidus, he says: "The fruit of our labor is a matter of duty, not of merit." The other, indeed, Collation 13, chapter 13, says God gives His grace "under the color of a certain desire and labor." And there, chapters 8 and 11, he teaches that the strivings of our will are not meritorious of grace, but rather occasions, and, as it were, handles which God grasps. Which words signify only a certain congruence and fittingness, not a strict and rigorous debt. Whence the Synod of Orange, proscribing this error of the Semipelagians, by which they attributed the power of meriting grace to the beginning of faith and good will, thus says: "If anyone says that mercy is conferred, without the grace of God, on us believing, willing, desiring, and knocking, etc." By these words the Council plainly declares that the Semipelagians did not teach that grace is given from justice to those believing, willing, desiring, and knocking, but only from mercy; nor consequently from any merit of condignity, but only of congruity. Whence when St. Prosper, against the Collator, chapter 16, affirms, from the opinion of the Semipelagians, that grace is given to natural works as a debt, not, however, conferred as a gift, he speaks of a debt from a certain fittingness and congruity, not, however, of a debt from strict and rigorous justice, such as would result from perfect and condign merit.

Chapter III

Who were the chief Authors or followers of the Semipelagian heresy?

For the completion of this treatise, and for a perfect understanding of the Semipelagian heresy, it remains that we declare who were the chief Authors or followers of it.

§ I

On Vitalis of Carthage

Vitalis of Carthage, to whom St. Augustine wrote letter 107, is thought to have begun Semipelagianism in Africa, and to have been, as it were, the Forerunner of the Semipelagians. For he said the beginning of faith and good will to be in us from ourselves, and to proceed from free will, not from the motion of grace, as the holy Doctor declares in the same letter, in these words: "If those things which I hear about you are true, you do not wish the beginning of faith, as also the beginning of a good, that is, pious, will, to be a gift of God, but contend that we have it from ourselves, that we begin to believe; but the other goods of religious life you judge God gives, through His grace, to those already seeking, asking, knocking from faith." Behold how Vitalis said the beginning of faith and good will was from us, but the other works from God's grace. Which error Augustine there strongly and forcefully refutes, with an argument drawn from the prayers of the faithful, who pray God to convert the minds of unbelievers to faith, and to make them, from unwilling, willing, and from resistant, consenting, and give Him thanks, when He converts them to faith. Whence he happily recalled Vitalis from that error, and utterly extinguished Semipelagianism, then arising in Africa, and, as it were, choked it off at its very source.

§ II

On Cassian

John Cassian, first Deacon of Chrysostom, then Presbyter at Marseille in Gaul, who flourished in the year 429, and dwelt at Marseille, at the time when, on the occasion of St. Augustine's book On correction and grace, that great disturbance arose among the Marseillians, of which we spoke above, was one of the chief followers of the Semipelagian heresy, as is established from Collation 13, On the protection of God, chapter 14. For there he teaches that the Centurion's faith, so praised by the Lord in the Gospel, which was accordingly such as befits salvation, was from the powers of that Centurion's nature alone, so much so that he asserts it would have been worthy of no praise or merit, if Christ had preferred in him what He Himself had praised. Likewise there he says that Abraham's faith was not inspired in him by the Lord, but held from the powers of nature alone. He also teaches, in the same Collation, chapters 7, 8, and 12, that man can, of himself, will the good, and that such a good will, as it were flickering, God fosters and strengthens with His inspiration, because, he says, it profits nothing to have desired the grace of health, unless the Lord, who gives the use of life itself, also grants the soundness of vigor. In this, however, Cassian differed from the other Semipelagians, that whereas all the others affirmed the beginnings of faith and good will to proceed from us, he thought it was not necessary that grace always precede, but sometimes he asserted the divine grace, or excitation, to be prior. Whence he constituted two orders of men, of whom some came freely to Christ, and began to will good, and were helped and received by grace; but others, totally prevented by grace, had no liberty in those acts of theirs. Whence, as St. Prosper rightly observed, against the Collator, chapter 9, he embraced simultaneously the error of the Pelagians and the Manicheans. For by saying that some begin, and are helped by God, he was Pelagian; but by asserting that in others God begins, and men come without their own liberty, he was Manichean. Whence it is strange that Vásquez, I, q. 23, disp. 89, chapter 4, section 5, dares to write these things concerning Cassian, and other Semipelagians: "All these, as being men otherwise Catholic, religious, against Pelagius and Caelestius confessed the grace of Christ, not only useful, but even necessary for justification, perseverance, and merits of eternal life, without which help our efforts would not only obtain with difficulty what we contend for, but would also be futile and useless for justification, and for meriting eternal life." It is also strange that there, chapter 5, he joins Chrysostom, an excellent Doctor, with Cassian on this matter and cause, saying: "Cassian and Chrysostom speak most excellently about grace." For what fellowship is there of light with darkness? And of a Catholic and eminent Doctor, with a heretic and Semipelagian, against whom St.

Prosper inveighs sharply, throughout almost the whole book which he composed against him.

§ III

On Faustus of Riez

Faustus, from Abbot of the Monastery of Lérins, was made Bishop of Riez, a city of Gaul, and flourished around the year 480, midway in time between Prosper and Fulgentius. He, wishing to appear to have condemned Pelagius, and to have refuted his errors, fell into the errors of Julian and Cassian, as is established from two books which he wrote On grace and free will, in which he first teaches, with Julian, that original sin is not a true guilt in infants, which would wound and weaken the powers of free will, but is only a punishment; whence whenever he names original sin, he admits it only under this aspect, as is not difficult to gather from the first book; for he consumes almost the whole first and second chapter in proving, against Pelagius, that death would not have come, if the first parent's sin had not existed. For since he impugns Pelagius so professedly in the matter of original sin, and names only death, and never makes mention of guilt, he without doubt followed the heresy of Julian, who posits not guilt, but death, in posterity.

Second, from this principle he infers that man's free will was not wounded, nor attenuated in its powers, and consequently, from its own natural faculty, has sufficient powers, for desiring, seeking, and asking for salvation, to which man thus desiring, seeking, and asking, that sought-after light presents itself. Whence he places the beginning of the good work before grace in man, to whom grace is infallibly given as if from merit, which is the very heresy of the Semipelagians. Thus he has it, Book 1, chapters 15, 16, and 18.

Third, he so far establishes free will as sound and integral in its powers, that he says it can, from its own innate liberty, if it wishes, observe the mandates. For Book 1, chapter 13, from that of Ecclesiasticus 15: "If thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee," he infers this: "We have seen, therefore, that the consent of the human mind can pass into both the good and the contrary part." And he understands this to be able for man from the powers of free will alone, since he supposes it sound and with integral powers, as we have already said. Whence in free will he acknowledges sufficient powers for loving God above all things, which is the first and greatest commandment: in which St. Augustine everywhere teaches the whole Pelagian heresy to be founded.

Fourth, these words of Psalm 26: "Unless the Lord build the house," etc., which the Fathers interpret concerning true grace, he expounds, Book 1, chapter 11, of external grace: he thus says: "Does He otherwise build and know the Church than through the labors and offices of Priests, through the ministries and examples of the Saints, through the virtues of the Apostles, and the deaths of the Martyrs?" Indeed those words of the Savior: "No man can come to me, except the Father who sent me draw him," which the unanimous sense of Catholics understands concerning true grace, he thus expounds, chapter 17: "What is to draw, but to preach, but to excite by the consolations of the Scriptures, but to deter by rebukes; to propose things to be desired, to threaten things to be feared, to threaten judgment, to promise reward?"

Finally, he establishes predestination after foreknowledge, and affirms that its certitude is derived from it: for he says, Book 1, chapter 11: "Therefore, while he destroys free will, he establishes all things in one or the other direction from predestination, and pronounces them determined, even emptying the highest remedies of penitence by the abruptness of impiety." And Book 2, chapter 2: "They ill understand God's predestination, asserting that from it are born the causes of human acts." And a little after, he adds: "The general foreknowledge, which concerning the state of the whole world remains in God, is born from power; but concerning the state of man, the qualities of foreknowing are borrowed from the inspection of human acts." And below he says: "Rather is the divine genus of foreknowledge derived from the origin of human will, than that the works and wills of men take their beginning from the nod and impulse of heavenly providence." And finally, in the following chapter, he thus concludes: "Unless foreknowledge shall have explored, predestination decrees nothing."

These books of Faustus, Pope Gelasius, in the canon "Sancta Romana Ecclesia," condemned, and numbered among the apocryphal. Whence this admonition of Cardinal Baronius is prudent and worthy of note, tome 6, year of the Lord 490: "Since, therefore, Faustus's opinion has been everywhere contradicted by the Catholic Church, let those see at what great peril certain of the Recent authors, while they rise up against the Novators to confute them, depart from Augustine's opinion on predestination, when otherwise weapons are not lacking, by which the heretics may be routed."

§ IV

On Gennadius

Gennadius, Presbyter of Marseille, who lived in the time of Pope Gelasius, until the year 495, is believed to have adhered to the Semipelagians, and to have been of their party: since in the book On illustrious men, he praises Cassian and Faustus, and prefers their opinion on grace to Prosper's doctrine; he prefers Rufinus, Presbyter of Aquileia, Pelagius's forerunner, and architect of the Pelagian heresy, from whom, as we saw above, Caelestius affirmed he had heard that original sin is not transmitted, to Jerome; and therefore Pope Gelasius rejects his works among the apocryphal books. Hence Baronius, year 433, no. 28, says that Gennadius is of the same stripe as Cassian; and year 490, no. 45, that he was one of the Gallican Presbyters, concerning whom Prosper and Hilary complained to Pope Celestine, that they opposed Augustine's doctrine; but he adds that he himself repented through Gelasius's efforts, and was assumed to the Episcopate of Marseille, and departed from the living orthodox and Catholic.

§ V

On Sulpicius Severus

Many also think that Sulpicius Severus, disciple of St. Martin, whose life he wrote, and most closely joined in friendship with St. Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, was tainted by the leaven of the Marseille error: because Gennadius, in the book On illustrious men, chapter 19, writes this: "Severus the Presbyter, surnamed Sulpicius, a man noble by birth and letters, and conspicuous for love of poverty and humility"; and at the end, after enumerating his labors, he adds this: "This man in his old age, deceived by the Pelagians, and recognizing his fault of loquacity, kept silence until death; that the sin which he had contracted by speaking, he might entirely amend by keeping silent." Baronius subscribes to this, year 431, no. 189, and interprets Gennadius thus, that he means Severus did not adhere to all of Pelagius's tenets, but only to those which the Marseillians received. But Guibert the Abbot opposes this, in his compendium of the Apology for Severus, where he says: "I have never read, except in Gennadius, that Severus was led astray by the Pelagians, and I do not know whether he himself read this somewhere, or learned it from mere rumor, which reports things done and undone alike." Be that as it may, it is established that Severus died Orthodox and Catholic: for in the Roman Martyrology, on the 29th of January, he is referred to among the canon of the Saints, and is said to be conspicuous for virtue and learning.

Some say he was Bishop of Bourges, because Guibert cited, who wrote an Apology for him, calls him Archbishop of Bourges. But others deny this, with Baronius cited, where he thus says: "I have found no ancient author who names this Severus, of whom we speak, a Bishop, but only a Presbyter, just as also Honorius, retracing the Catalogue of famous men." And indeed Gennadius of Marseille, writing the deeds of his own time, in the book cited above, calls him only a Presbyter, and says he died in that order, doing penance.

§ VI

On John Chrysostom

Vásquez, I, disp. 91, chapter 8, strains all the powers of his intellect, to show that Chrysostom, and other of the Greek Fathers, fell into the error of the Semipelagians, and asserts that Cassian, Chrysostom's disciple, learned the aforementioned error, which he has in Collation 13, from his own master. And in the following chapter he adduces several interpretations of theologians, by which they attempt to expound Chrysostom's testimonies, which seem to favor the Semipelagians, and to draw them into a Catholic sense; all of which he counts as of little value, and strives with all his might to overturn.

But our Sixtus of Siena vindicates Chrysostom from this error, or rather calumny, in Book 5 of the Bibliotheca, annotation 101, where he says that John Oecolampadius, professor of the Lutheran heresy, was the first to impose this error on him; and he adduces several testimonies of this holy Doctor, by which he plainly admits preventing grace, and teaches that the beginnings of our faith and salvation proceed from grace, not from bare nature. This which he has in tome 1, homily on Adam and Eve, is celebrated: "Let us profess God as the Author of all good affections and works, and of all pursuits, and of all virtues, by which from the beginning we tend from God to God, and let us not doubt that all the merits of men proceed from His grace, through which it also comes about that we begin both to will and to do something good." Several other testimonies of Chrysostom could be adduced, but this suffices for the defense of this holy Doctor, whom Anastasius, Hexameron 7, called "a river of Christ"; Theodoret, Dialogue 1, "the great light of the world, a Doctor most worthy of admiration"; Isidore of Pelusium, Book 2, letter 14, "the eye of all the Churches"; and finally Innocent I, letter 30, "the honeyed tongue of the Metropolitan Church."

§ VII

On Vincent of Lérins

It is also certain that a certain Vincent, an impugner of St. Augustine's doctrine, was of the number of the Semipelagians, against whom there are extant Prosper's responses to the Vincentian objections: but who this Vincent was is not so manifest. Some think that this Vincent was that Monk from the Convent of Lérins, made sufficiently known to us by that famous book, small in volume, but great in weight of sentences, and most elegant, which he composed on the antiquity and truth of the Catholic faith, against the profane novelties of all heresies. But this suspicion is unjust: first, because that book, plainly golden, just mentioned, testifies that he was the greatest impugner of novelties. Second, because in the last chapter of it he cites Celestine's Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, in which the Semipelagians are plainly found condemned, and he praises it exceedingly: but how could he have been Semipelagian, who so celebrates, with such praise, the condemnation of the Semipelagians? Third, because Gennadius, in the book On illustrious men, does not ascribe this defect to him, but records that he was a most powerful athlete against heretics. Whence Baronius, for the year 431, no. 188, truly hands down that Vincent, whose are the Vincentian objections in Prosper, was another Presbyter of Gaul of the same name, of whom the aforesaid Gennadius makes mention, book On illustrious men, chapter 80, while in chapter 49 he makes mention of Vincent of Lérins.

Chapter IV

On the Predestinatian Heresy

Jansenius, Book 8 On the Pelagian heresy, last chapter, strenuously contends that there never was any heresy of the Predestinatians, and that what Sigebert and others following him designated by this name, was nothing other than the true doctrine of Augustine, Prosper, Hilary, and other defenders of grace, concerning gratuitous predestination, which the Semipelagian heresy defamed with this label: which James Ussher, the notable Irish Calvinist, had also earlier taught, who in the year 1621 published a book at Dublin, entitled "Gotteschalk, and the history of the predestinatian controversy stirred up by him." Gilbert Mauguin thinks the same, on the confutation of the predestinatian fable; Cabassut, in his Notitia of the Councils; and, of our own, Contenson, in the Theology of the mind and heart, Book 8.

On the opposite side stand several grave Authors, such as Cardinal Baronius, and his abbreviator Spondanus, our Álvarez, Sirmond, Antuanfenius, and Father Natalis

Alexander in his Ecclesiastical History, fifth century, chapter 3, article 11, and dissertation 5, on the predestinatian heresy.

2. This latter opinion seems truer and more probable, and is proved, first, from various Historians, who make mention of this heresy. For Prosper Tiro, in his Chronicle, on the year of Honorius 23, has this: "The heresy of the Predestinatians, which is said to have taken its beginning from Augustine's books badly understood, began to creep abroad in these times." Sigebert, on the year of Christ 415, writes this: "The heresy of the Predestinatians began to creep abroad at this time, who are therefore called Predestinatians, because concerning predestination and divine grace they asserted that the labor of good works does not profit those living piously, if they had been predestined by God to death, nor does it harm the impious that they live wickedly, if they had been predestined by God to life: which assertion both called back the good from good deeds, and provoked the wicked to evil deeds. This heresy is said to have taken its beginning from Augustine's books badly understood." Hincmar too mentions this same heresy, book On predestination, chapter 1, Arnobius the Younger, in the exposition of the Psalter, Ennodius of Pavia, letter to Constantius, and Gennadius of Marseille, in the appendix to St. Augustine's book On heresies, where, to the eighty-nine heresies enumerated by Augustine himself, he added four which arose afterward, namely the Predestinatian, Nestorian, Eutychian, and Timothean, and this appendix is had in the codex of the Library of St. Victor at Paris.

It is proved, second, that the predestinatian heresy existed, from Faustus, in the preface to his books On free will, to Leontius, Bishop of Arles, in which he writes this: "That, out of pastoral solicitude, blessed Pope Leo, you presided over all the Churches of Gaul, in a Council of the highest Bishops gathered, for the condemning of the error of predestination. But that you have entrusted to weak shoulders, and committed to my care, the ordering of those things which you set forth most learnedly in the public conference, little consulted, in my judgment, either the great business itself, or your own well-founded reputation, or your charity toward me; you have burdened me with the peril of a chosen task."

It is proved, third, from Faustus's Letter to Lucidus, the chief follower of the predestinatian heresy, in which he proposes to him six dogmas to be condemned by himself, and to be related below, which, unless he himself should nail them with anathema, and subscribe to the Letter, he threatens that he will report him to the Synod. Of this Letter, he says, however, I retain a copy with me, to be produced in the assembly of the holy Bishops, if it should be necessary.... "But if you should refuse to transmit it subscribed, as I have said, you will yourself prove, by your very silence, that you plainly

persist in error, and accordingly you will lay upon me the necessity of exposing your person to public assemblies." This Letter (on Baronius's testimony, for the year of Christ 490) the Council of Arles approved, for in the ancient Codices it is read to be fortified not only by Faustus's own subscription, but by those of other distinguished Bishops of Gaul, namely Auxanius, Paulus, Eutropius, Pragmatius, Patiens, Euphronius, Megetius, Claudius, Leucadius, and Julianus.

It is proved, fourth, from the little book of correction of Lucidus, sent to the Gallican Bishops, by which he abjures those six depraved dogmas, and condemns them according to the Decree of the Council of Arles. "Your correction," he says, "is the public salvation, and your judgment is medicine: whence I too consider it the highest remedy, that by accusing my past errors I excuse myself, and wash away my profession by a salvific one. Accordingly, according to the recent statutes of the preaching Council, I condemn together with you that opinion which says: 1. That the labor of human obedience ought not to be joined with divine grace. 2. That says that after the fall of the first man, the will's free choice was altogether extinguished. 3. That says that Christ the Lord our Savior did not undergo death for the salvation of all. 4. That says that God's foreknowledge violently compels man to death; or that those who perish, perish by God's will. 5. That says that after receiving legitimate baptism, whoever should sin, dies in Adam. 6. That says that some are appointed to death, others predestined to life."

3. From this you will understand, first, in what chiefly the predestinatian heresy was situated, namely in those six dogmas. You will understand, second, that the dogmas of the Predestinatians agreed with the objections and calumnies by which the Marseillians defamed the doctrine of St. Augustine and his Disciples. For all those propositions, except the first, are read among the objections of the Gauls and the Vincentian objections in St. Prosper. For this was the sixth objection of the Gauls: "That free will is nothing in man." This was the first Vincentian objection: "That our Lord Jesus Christ did not suffer for the salvation and redemption of all." This was the first chapter of the Gauls: "That from God's predestination, as it were by fatal necessity, men are compelled to sins, and driven to death." This was the second of their chapters: "That from those who are not predestined to life, the grace received in Baptism does not remove original sin." Finally, that it was objected by the Marseillians to St. Augustine, that from his doctrine it follows that some are appointed to death, others predestined to life, Fulgentius testifies, Book 1 to Monimus, chapter 30, in these words: "You are not, however, ignorant, that also in past time, that most brilliant work of St. Augustine, which he wrote On the predestination of the Saints, was objected to by certain Gauls, because blessed Augustine, in his assertion of divine predestination, said that sinners are

predestined not only to judgment, but even to sin — the statements of which, because he himself was prevented by a swift death, Prosper, a learned and holy man, defended with right faith, and with copious speech." Not undeservedly, therefore, did the Historians related above say that the predestinatian heresy took its beginning from Augustine's books badly understood. Nor is it strange: "For Augustine could not speak better, than the Prophets, than the Apostles, and the Evangelists, whose minds, similarly badly understood, and incongruously applied, so many attempt to defend their errors by." These are the words of Facundus of Hermiane, book against Mocianus.

4. You will object first: St. Prudentius, Bishop of Troyes, in the book against John Erigena, chapter 4, has this: "But the third heresy, which you assert to be contrary to the Pelagians, by which the gift of grace is so preached, that the liberty of free will is entirely removed, we neither read, nor have heard.... I know not by what label you wished to designate your third heresy, unless the faithful and true followers of blessed Augustine's sayings, which we have already set forth, indeed of all Catholics." Florus the Master, writing in the name of the Church of Lyon against the same John Scotus Erigena, chapter 4, has similar things: "What," he says, "is this second heresy, so unknown, so new, and unheard of, which, free will being denied, is the preacher of grace alone? Unless (as it seems to us) this disputant either latently accuses blessed Augustine, as it were, of being a heretic, because he plainly shows and teaches, according to the truth of the Scriptures, that man can be saved by God's grace alone, and that human free will can do nothing toward eternal salvation itself, unless it be reformed, healed, illuminated, and strengthened by that same grace: or certainly he calls those heretics, who, according to his venerable and Catholic doctrine, now feel and teach concerning God's grace, as if understanding his sayings less well." Therefore, according to these Authors, the heresy of the Predestinatians is fictitious, and unheard of.

I respond that the followers of the predestinatian heresy were few, and of a rather obscure name, as is gathered from the second Synod of Orange, canon 25, in which it is thus had: "But that some have been predestined to evil by divine power, we not only do not believe, but also, if there are any who wish to believe so great an evil, we say anathema to them with all detestation" — where the Fathers used this manner of speaking ("if there are any who wish to believe so great an evil"), because Lucidus had few, and of a rather obscure name, either as Disciples, or as companions and consorts of his heresy: whence it is no wonder that such a heresy escaped the notice of St. Prudentius, Bishop of Troyes, and Master Florus. It did not, however, escape the notice of the Authors and Historians cited above, nor of the Synod of Mainz and of Quierzy, which condemned the revived predestinatian heresy in Gotteschalk.

5. You will object second: our opinion rests chiefly on the testimony of Faustus, in the letter to Lucidus related above: but no faith is to be given to the testimony of Faustus, as being the chief of the Semipelagians, especially in these matters which pertain to his own errors; whence we withdraw all faith from Eusebius in those matters which pertain to the Arians, and from Sozomen in those matters which pertain to the heresy of the Novatians; because the first was Arian, and the other Novatian: therefore the principal foundation of our opinion collapses.

I respond that we do not rely only on Faustus's testimony and authority, but on that of the Council of Arles, which, by approving Faustus's letter, made it its own; for in the ancient codices (as we noted above) it is read to be fortified not only by Faustus's own subscription, but by those of other distinguished Bishops of Gaul. Nor is it true, what some say, that Faustus's books, swarming with Semipelagian errors, were approved by those Bishops, which is an argument that they themselves were Semipelagian, or at least deceived by the Semipelagian Faustus. This, I say, is altogether foreign to the truth; because, as is gathered from Faustus's own letter to Leontius, related above, Faustus published his books On grace and free will, after the Synod of Arles, at Leontius's request, and accordingly they could not have been approved by the subscription of that Synod. But Faustus himself, exceeding the limits of the mandate imposed on him by Leontius, not only refuted the errors of Lucidus, as had been enjoined on him; but also, the occasion given, he impugned St. Augustine's doctrine on grace and predestination, and poured out the poison of the Semipelagians everywhere throughout that whole work.

No less repugnant to truth, indeed altogether incredible, seems what others assert, namely that the aforesaid Synod of Arles never existed, but was fabricated by Faustus (whom St. Isidore, book On illustrious men, chapter 14, calls a man of profound cunning, and whom Cardinal Baronius called a crafty little fox), in order to render odious St. Augustine's doctrine on grace and predestination. For among the heresies by which the Church has hitherto been afflicted, it is most certain and most constant that the Pelagian and Semipelagian sought out, and more avidly seized upon, defenses of lies, than any other; for since grace and truth were made through Jesus Christ, the enemies of grace are continual enemies of truth, and fabricators of lies. But, as I have said, this fabrication of the Council of Arles by Faustus seems altogether incredible: for if Faustus, writing to Leontius about the most remote affairs of Asia or Africa, were said to have fabricated something himself, I would by no means object; but that he supposed a Council to have been celebrated at Arles, writing to Leontius of Arles, and gathered by Leontius himself only three days before — no wise man, no man of sound judgment,

will be able to persuade himself of this.

Chapter V

The errors of the Manicheans, Lutherans, and Calvinists, concerning grace and free will

Since opposites shine forth more clearly next to their opposites, the errors of the Manicheans, Lutherans, and Calvinists, which are directly opposed to the errors of the Pelagians and Semipelagians, must be briefly described here.

§ I

On the errors of the Manicheans

The Manicheans posited that there are two eternal, co-eternal principles with each other; one good, the other evil: from which they inferred that there are two natures in man, one good, determined toward good from that good principle; the other evil, and determined toward evil from that other evil principle. Thus Augustine teaches in various places, especially Book 1 to Boniface, chapter 8, in these words: "The Manicheans, which you too have shown sufficiently that you know, introduce, with sacrilegious and impious error and vanity, two natures, one of good, the other of evil, from diverse and mutually opposed, and co-eternal, principles." From this too they deduced that man has no liberty at all, but does all things, whether good or evil, from the necessity of nature, either from that nature of good, and determined toward good, or from the nature of evil, likewise determined toward evil. Whence Jerome, in the proem of the dialogue against the Pelagians, says: "It is proper to the Manicheans to condemn nature, and to take away free will." There were several other errors of the Manicheans. For they admitted no original sin, whence they did not receive baptism for its cleansing, as Augustine teaches, Book 2 to Boniface, chapter 2, where he thus says: "The Manicheans say the laver of regeneration, that is, the water itself, is superfluous, and contend that it profits nothing to a profane heart." They also held that marriages were evil, because they are exercised with lust and concupiscence of the flesh, which they said was of that presumed evil nature. Likewise they rejected the old law, as impotent to justify, as if evil, and they traduced the Fathers of the old testament as notable sinners. But these things are not of the present purpose, since here we treat only of errors which concern grace and free will.

§ II

On the errors of the Lutherans and Calvinists concerning free will

St. Thomas rightly observes, Opusculum 19, chapter 2, that this is the custom of those who err, that since they cannot stand in the middle of truth, declining from one error, they slide into the contrary. This he there proves by the example of Arius and Sabellius, Nestorius and Eutyches, Pelagius and Mani. Whence Tertullian, against Praxeas, excellently says: "In various ways the Devil has rivaled truth, has sometimes striven to shake it by defending it. He vindicates the one omnipotent God, creator of the world, that he may make a heresy out of the unicity." The same is established from the example of Calvin and Luther, who, to avoid the Pelagian error, fell into the heresy of the Manicheans; for in order to defend, against the Pelagians, the necessity and efficacy of divine grace, they denied free will, with the Manicheans. Whence the Council of Sens, held against the Lutherans in the year 1528, in the preface concerning Luther, thus says: "Luther fell into the error of Mani, while too anxiously and scrupulously he avoids Pelagius: for, fearing to elevate free will with Pelagius, he attributes every good work which is in man to God, and nothing at all to free will: and thus, altogether removing free will, Luther became a Manichean, while he flees from being a Pelagian." From diverse principles, however, the Manicheans, Lutherans, and Calvinists deduced the negation, or extinction, of free will. For the Manicheans affirmed it to be derived from that twofold nature, respectively determined toward good and toward evil, of which in the preceding section. The Lutherans and Calvinists, however, refer it to original sin, and to the efficacy and causality of the divine decree, and of the motion flowing from it.

The first heresy, then, as it were the basis and foundation of the others, which, in the matter of free will, the Devil forged through Luther and Calvin, who are as it were two chief heads of the ancient dragon, is this: "Through original sin, free will was extinguished in us, and determined toward evil without any powers or liberty toward good; so that only the title, or the title without the reality, remained." Thus Luther, in the assertion of the Articles to Leo X, article 36, and in the book which is entitled "Operations on the Psalms," on Psalm 51, and in the book On the enslaved will; and Calvin, Book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 15, no. 8, and Book 2, chapter 3, § 7. Although, however, Calvin agrees with Luther on this, he nevertheless differs from him in this, that Luther so asserted free will extinguished through original sin, that he contends, against all Philosophy, that it is related merely passively, receiving a motion or act produced by God alone. Calvin, however, does not assert that free will is so extinguished, that it is related merely passively, but wishes it to influence our operations actively, but not freely, only spontaneously, in the manner of brute animals, and as a horse is moved by its rider.

Whence, Book 2 against Pighius: "If," he says, "liberty is opposed to compulsion, I both confess and constantly assert that the will is free, and I hold him a heretic, if anyone thinks otherwise; if it is called free in that sense, that it is not compelled, or violently dragged, but is spontaneously drawn by itself, I do not object."

The second heresy of the Lutherans and Calvinists on the matter of free will is: "From God's antecedent decree, and preventing efficacious grace, man's liberty is removed." Thus Luther, in the book On the enslaved will, where he thus perversely discourses: "Grace is preached: therefore free will is removed. The help of grace is commended: therefore free will is destroyed." And again: "As many places as there are in the divine Scriptures that mention help, so many are there that remove free will." Calvin echoes Luther, for in chapter 6 of John, he thus says: "Christ pronounces the grace of the Holy Spirit to be efficacious, by which men are drawn, so that they necessarily believe: by this all the power of free will, which the Baptists dream up for themselves, is entirely overturned." And against Pighius: "I posit that our will is so efficaciously formed, that it necessarily follows the guidance of the Holy Spirit." He teaches the same, Book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, § 10, and in the antidote to the Council of Trent, on Canon 4 of Session Six.

From these you will understand, first, that Luther and Calvin, on a twofold cause and title, deny man's free will. First because they assert that through original sin, liberty in man was entirely extinguished. Second, because they think that from the antecedent divine decree, and preventing and efficacious grace, man's liberty is removed. But if you ask, by what reasoning these can cohere and be reconciled among themselves? For if, through original sin, free will was altogether taken away and extinguished, how can it again be removed and destroyed by the efficacy of grace's motion? I respond, first, that it is proper to heretics to speak in many things inconsequently. Second, I say that they think that the liberty taken away by original sin, is still more taken away by the efficacious motion of God. Third, it can be said that they wish that if liberty had not been extinguished in man through original sin, such is the nature of God's efficacious motion, that it would altogether remove it; because by reason of its efficacy and infallibility, it necessarily infers the act to which it is given, so that no power remains for the opposite.

You will understand, second, that the heretics who denied free will, were moved to deny it from a fourfold cause, or reduced to four diverse principles that necessity which removes free will. For the Gentiles and Stoics reduced such necessity to fate, by which name of fate they understood an inevitable series of natural causes, and especially the influence of the heavens. Whence this was the saying of the Stoics (as St. Thomas relates,

q. 6 De Malo, art. unicus): "Such is the will in men, as the father of men and gods has induced," that is, the heaven, or the sun, as the holy Doctor there explains. The Manicheans, however (as we declared above), reduced such necessity to a twofold nature, determined respectively toward good and toward evil. The Lutherans and Calvinists, however, refer it to a twofold cause, alleged above, namely to original sin, and to the efficacy and causality of the divine decree, and of the motion flowing from it. Whence Calvin, Book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 16, section 8, writes this: "We, although we do not quarrel about words, nevertheless do not receive the word 'fate': both because it is of that genus which Paul teaches us to shun as profane novelties; and also because they try, by hatred of it, to burden the truth of God with envy. But the dogma is falsely and maliciously imputed to us; for we do not, with the Stoics, imagine a necessity from a perpetual connection of causes and a certain intricate series contained in nature; but we constitute God as the arbiter and moderator of all things, who, according to His wisdom, from utmost eternity decreed what He would do, and now by His power executes what He decreed."

You will understand, third, that Pelagius, Luther, and Calvin, deduced their heresies, although opposed to one another, from the same principle nonetheless, namely from this: "Free will cannot stand with God's preventing and efficacious motion." For Pelagius thus discoursed: "There is no free will, if it needs help," as Jerome relates in the letter to Ctesiphon. Or, what is the same: "God's preventing and efficacious grace, and the liberty of human free will, cannot stand together: but in man there is free will: therefore for operating it does not need God's preventing and efficacious help." On the contrary, Luther and Calvin, from the same principle, drew an altogether opposite conclusion, namely that there is no free will: for thus they argued, as we saw above from Luther: "God's preventing and of-itself efficacious grace, and free will, cannot stand together: but God's preventing and of-itself efficacious grace must be posited, as is established from Scripture and St. Augustine: therefore there is not given in us free will." Or if we wish to reduce both heresies and enthymemes to what is briefer and easier, this truth will appear more clearly. Thus, therefore, Pelagius argued: "There is free will in man: therefore he does not need God's help." Or: "There is free will in man: therefore preventing and efficacious help of God is not given." In which he placed the Antecedent as of faith, from which he deduced a heretical consequent. Luther, on the contrary, and Calvin thus discoursed: "Efficacious motion of preventing grace is given, as is established from Scripture and St. Augustine: therefore there is not free will in man." Where from the Catholic Antecedent, the opposite of Pelagius's heretical consequent, they inferred the opposite of the Catholic Antecedent, by which Pelagius had said there is free will in us. Whence of these heretics it can deservedly be said what Innocent III said of others,

related in the chapter "Excommunicamus," on heretics, namely that they have indeed diverse faces (since their errors are diverse, and opposed to one another), but tails bound together with each other; since they deduce their heresies from the same principle, in which they are bound, namely from this: "Free will cannot stand with God's preventing and efficacious motion."

From what has already been said, you will understand that the doctrine of the Thomists is directly and diametrically opposed to the errors of the Pelagians and Calvinists, since the Thomists deny that false and perverse principle: "The liberty of our free will cannot stand with the efficacious motion of preventing grace," from which, as we have already shown, those heretics deduced their heresies; indeed, with the Angelic Doctor, they everywhere teach that the efficacy of the divine will is the first root of all liberty and contingency of things, as we declared at length in the treatise on the will of God. Whence just as he who overturns the foundation of some house, or tears out the root of a tree, immediately brings down such house and tree: so the Thomists, denying and destroying that false principle and foundation of the Pelagian and Calvinian heresy, overturn both heresies from the bottom, and tear out and pull up both pestiferous and poisonous plants by the root. On the contrary, however, since Molina, Suárez, and other Recent authors, assertors or defenders of middle knowledge, admit the aforesaid principle of the Pelagians and Calvinists, and everywhere teach and contend, against the Thomists, that the liberty of our free will cannot stand with the preventing, and physical, and of-itself efficacious motion of divine grace, they favor, beyond their intention, the errors of Pelagius and Calvin, and forge and furnish so many weapons to those heretics, to defend their errors, as many arguments as they bring forth from Molina's workshop against the Thomists, to prove that God's preventing, and of-itself efficacious, grace destroys the liberty of our free will. Whence the Doctors of Louvain, in their censure, rightly observed that Molina's opinion is more apt to establish, than to overturn, the heresy of the Pelagians and Calvinists. Of which more at length in the Apology of the Thomists, which we appended in our Shield, at the end of the treatise on the will of God, in the new edition.

§ III

Calvin's errors on the matter of grace

Several are Calvin's errors on the matter of grace, which we shall briefly describe here. In the first place he asserts that the efficacious help of grace makes men operate with it spontaneously, not freely, in the manner in which a beast of burden spontaneously, not freely, follows the guidance of its rider. Thus, Book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, § 7, and in the Antidote to Canon 5 of Session Six of the Council of Trent, where he writes this: "What, then, does Augustine mean, when he speaks of the liberty of the will? Namely what he so often repeats, that men are not compelled unwilling by God's grace, but are ruled willing, so that they spontaneously obey and follow." Whence he wishes the help of divine grace to be so efficacious that it absorbs the indifference of the will, and, the necessity of consenting being imposed, confounds the power of dissenting; only spontaneity, or immunity from compulsion, being left in the will. Wherefore, in the response to the first article on the hidden providence of God, he writes this: "What the Scholastics trifle about absolute power, I not only repudiate, but also detest." Of which more at length in the aforesaid Apology of the Thomists.

Second, Calvin teaches that grace is so entirely to be attributed, that it is not thereafter for our choice, to obey its motion, or to resist. Thus, Book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, § 10.

Third, that, efficacious grace being posited, man cannot not will, nor dissent. Thus, Book 3 On free will against Pighius, page 285, and in the antidote to the Council of Trent, on Canon 4 of Session Six, in which this error is condemned, which is closely related to, and, as it were, a corollary of, the first.

Fourth, that the help of preventing grace, by which God makes us will and do, indeed efficaciously moves the will, but does not morally excite it. Thus, Book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 1, § 10. Of which Bellarmine, Book 1 On grace and free will, chapter 11.

Fifth, that every help, as it comes from God, is efficacious, and none merely sufficient. Thus in the places cited just above.

Sixth, that God's grace so gives that willing and operating itself, that the created will does not freely cooperate with it. Thus, Book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, nos. 11 and 12, where he also mocks Catholics, for confirming, from this passage of St. Paul, the concurrence of free will with grace: "I labored more abundantly than they all: yet not I, but the grace of God with me." He says they were led into this error by a perverse rendering, in which force was applied to the Greek particle "syn" [with], which, if

rendered [correctly], would produce this sense: "Not I, but the grace of God which was with me." Of which matter he treats more fully in his Commentaries on this passage of St. Paul.

From these it is clear that Calvin indeed admitted an efficacious grace, spontaneously moving the will, but denied a sufficient grace, morally exciting and cooperating, and consequently was entirely outside grace; for as St. Prosper says, letter to Demetrias, chapter 7: "Unless grace is received wholly, it is wholly rejected: for just as he who dissents in something from Catholic truth is alien from the number of the faithful, and from the lot of the Saints, so he who denies something of its fullness, is placed outside grace."

It is also established from what has been said, that according to the doctrine of Calvin and his followers, the commandments are altogether impossible for man in the state of fallen nature, since in that state they acknowledge no sufficient help, which would give him the power of fulfilling them. Whence Melanchthon, on chapter 13 of the Epistle to the Romans, says: "Since the law commands to love, it commands the impossible in like manner, as if it commanded us to fly over the Caucasus."

Appendix Second to the Treatise on Grace

ON THE AUTHORITY OF ST. AUGUSTINE in Questions on Grace

Since those things which we have said in the Treatise on Grace, concerning the necessity of grace, the gift of perseverance, the justification of the impious, and the merit of the just, chiefly rest on Augustine's testimonies, it remains, for its completion, that we briefly demonstrate how great is Augustine's authority, especially in questions concerning grace. From four heads, as it were from four sources, our whole discourse will flow, and the commendation of Augustinian doctrine: namely from the pronouncements of the Supreme Pontiffs, from the sayings of the Councils, from the testimonies of the holy Fathers, and from the eulogies of illustrious men.

Chapter I

Commendation of St. Augustine's doctrine, from the pronouncements of the Supreme Pontiffs

Augustine's doctrine, especially in questions on grace, was not so much approved, as consecrated, by the supreme heads of the Church.

Celestine I, in the Letter to the Bishops of Gaul, commends Augustine's writings and doctrine in these words: "Augustine, a man of holy memory, we have always held in our communion, for his life and merits, nor did the rumor of any sinister suspicion ever besmirch him, whom we recall to have once been held of such great knowledge, that he was reckoned among the best Masters even by my predecessors. Well, therefore, did all in common think of him, as one who was everywhere to all a source of love and honor."

Leo the Great so approved St. Augustine's doctrine, that he transcribed his words, and sent them, as rules of faith against the Pelagians, to the second Council of Orange, that they might be subscribed and received by the Bishops of that Council, as indeed was done.

Gelasius, in the Council held with seventy Bishops concerning the Apocryphal Scriptures, approved all the writings of the holy Father Augustine, handed down against the Pelagians on the matter of predestination and grace, by condemning the opposite opinion of Cassian and Faustus. And in the fifth Letter, which is to the Bishops of Picenum, against a certain man infected with Pelagian doctrine, who dared to reproach the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Jerome, he thus writes: "A still greater crime accrues, that under the sight and presence of Priests, that fly about to perish, as it is written, destroying the ointment of sweetness, should strive to lacerate Jerome and Augustine, of blessed memory, the lights of Ecclesiastical Masters."

Hormisdas, letter 67, to Possessor, at the end, thus says: "Concerning free choice, however, and God's grace, what the Roman, that is, the Catholic, Church follows and asserts, although it can be known from various books of blessed Augustine, and especially those to Hilary and Prosper, nevertheless there are contained, in the Ecclesiastical archives, express chapters, which, if you lack them, and think necessary, we shall send." These chapters, however, seem to be those which are contained in the Letter of Celestine, which no one is ignorant to have been drawn from St. Augustine's doctrine.

John II concerning St. Augustine has this in the decretal Letter to Avienus the Senator, Liberius, and Severinus: "St. Augustine, whose doctrine, according to the statutes of my predecessors, the Roman Church follows and preserves."

Innocent I, in the response to the Synod of Carthage and of Milevis, calls the letters of both Councils, written by Augustine, full of faith, and confirmed with the whole vigor of religion.

Boniface I (as St. Prosper relates, at the end of the book against the Collator), although he was most learned, nevertheless, against Pelagius's books, asked for the responses of

blessed Augustine.

Urban IV, in the Diploma to the University of Toulouse, thus says: "We, considering with how much knowledge (St. Thomas) God endowed, illuminated the Order of Preaching Friars, and the universal Church, and, following in the footsteps of blessed Augustine, adorned that same Church with a great many doctrines and sciences," etc. In which approbation this must be weighed, that the Pontiff commends the Aquinate on this ground, that he illuminated the Church: and he says he illuminated the Church precisely insofar as he followed Augustine's footsteps; and consequently he judges that St. Thomas attained the mastership of the Schools for this reason, that he was a faithful Disciple of great Augustine; which is the greatest praise and commendation of Augustine himself and his doctrine.

Clement VIII wished all the controversies about the helps of divine grace to be weighed and resolved by St. Augustine's doctrine, as if by a touchstone, as is established from the Oration which he prefixed to those disputations, and which is had in the Acts of those Congregations. "Although," he says, "I am not bound to render account of my actions except to God, I shall nevertheless now state the reasons for which I have determined to restrict this whole disputation to the norm of St. Augustine On Grace. The first is, that if, according to St. Prosper, near the beginning of the book against the Collator, for the space of twenty years, the Catholic army of the Church fought for grace against the Pelagians in such a way, that at length, with Augustine as leader, it conquered, it is fitting that also in a similar cause, we acknowledge and follow the same leader. The second is, that the same Saint seems to have omitted nothing of those things which pertain to the present controversies.... The third reason, finally, is, that since many Popes and our predecessors have been such assertors and vindicators of St. Augustine's doctrine, that they wished it to be left, as it were by hereditary right, in the Church, it is not fair that I should suffer it to be deprived of this inheritance."

Finally, Alexander VII, in the Brief given August 7, 1660, to the University of Louvain, calls the dogmas of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, "the most distinguished Doctors of the Church," "unshaken, and most secure."

Chapter II

Commendation of St. Augustine's doctrine from the sayings of the Councils

Not only the Supreme Pontiffs, but also the sacred Councils of the Church, commended Augustine's doctrine. For the canons of the second Synod of Orange (as we noted in the preceding section) are mostly Augustinian opinions, indeed transcribed from Augustine word for word.

The fifth general Synod, session 3, at the end, has this: "We follow in all things the holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, and Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine," etc.: "and we receive all things which they expounded concerning right faith, and the condemnation of heretics."

The general Synod VIII thus has it: "But also from Augustine's religious memory, who shone among the African Bishops, various letters were recited, signifying that heretics must be anathematized also after death."

The Council of Valence III, under the Emperor Lothair, chapter 1, writes this: "But to the Doctors treating piously and rightly the word of God's truth, and to the Scriptures themselves, most lucid Expositors, that is, Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and the others resting in Catholic piety, we submit reverent hearing and obedient understanding, and, as far as our powers allow, we embrace what they wrote for our salvation." The Council speaks of the matter of grace, predestination, and free will.

The Council of Toledo VIII, canon 2, thus speaks of Augustine: "Also that most holy man, Augustine, keen with acuteness of investigation, outstanding in the art of finding, abundant with copiousness of assertion, adorned with the flower of eloquence, fruitful in the fruit of wisdom, relates these things in his own works," etc.

The Council of Florence, session 7, thus has it: "Now let us bring forth into the midst the authorities of the holy Doctors, and in the first place of Augustine, the most illustrious Doctor of the Latins, whom the fifth Synod consecrated."

Finally, the Fathers of the Council of Trent, in adorning their definitions, transcribed not only the sense, but also the very words of Augustine.

Chapter III

Commendation of Augustine's doctrine from the holy Fathers

The holy Fathers too celebrated Augustine's doctrine with special encomiums. St. Jerome, although he had begun Dialogues against Pelagius, nevertheless, when he had read through Augustine's profound and heavenly writings on grace, imposed silence on himself, judging that this labor should be given up. Whence at the end of the third book of the Dialogues against the Pelagians, he thus says: "I judge this labor should be given up, lest that saying of Horace be said to me, 'carry not wood to the forest': for either we would teach the same things superfluously, or, if we wished to say new things, the better things have been taken up by a most illustrious mind."

St. Prosper, in the preface to the book against the Collator, speaking of Augustine, says: "For more than twenty years, the Catholic army, under this man's leadership, fights and conquers against the enemies of God's grace. It conquers, I say, because it does not let those it has conquered draw breath." And in the letter to Rufinus, last chapter: "But you, most beloved, if you truly desire to be instructed in these questions, as it befits you to desire, take care to become acquainted with blessed Augustine's own disputations, that in confessing God's grace, you may attain the most refined and most healthful understanding of Evangelical and Apostolic doctrine."

And again, in the poem against the ungrateful, chapter 3, he thus has it:

"Could that holy Council have proceeded to any other end, whose leader was Aurelius, and whose genius was Augustine? Whom, watering with a more abundant horn of Christ's grace, gave light to our age. Kindled indeed from his light: for God is his food and life and rest, and every pleasure, one love of Christ, one honor is Christ to him, and while he attributes no good to himself, God becomes all things to him, and wisdom reigns in a temple wholly consecrated. Therefore, of all who among the holy flock drove off the maddened wild beasts, his industry was greater, his work greater, and instructed the whole world more excellently. For wherever the crafty enemy turned his steps, and whatever ambiguous path he made through hidden windings, from this man's approach he was forestalled from a thousand paths, by ambushes finding no entry anywhere. And while outside, the rage of the greedy wolves, shut out, gnashed its teeth, and turned lies into every art, and yet could not corrupt the minds of any sheep, nor disturb doubtful hearts with sidelong complaints — by this man's mouth God worked, by this man's mouth the rivers of books flowed forth through the whole world, which the meek and humble drink, and, in the fields of souls, strive to send in the streams of vital doctrine."

St. Fulgentius, Book 2 On the truth of predestination and grace, chapter 18: "Blessed Augustine (he says), endowed from on high, labored more abundantly than all those (that is, the Greek and Latin Fathers), not, however, he himself, but God's grace with him.... Having indeed the sense of Christ, he distinguished both the offices and merits of God's grace, and of human free will, always subjecting the human to the divine, and truly teaching that both the gift of justification, and the beginning of good will, and the full effect of glorification, are divinely and gratuitously bestowed on man.... Nor did he alone triumph, bringing back victory from the enemy, but he even showed to posterity the order of fighting and conquering, if ever conquered depravity, by a recurring boldness, should strive to raise its unspeakable head."

St. Paulinus, letter 31, to Augustine, calls him "the salt of the earth," and "a lamp worthily set upon the candlestick of the Church," and his mouth "a pipe of living water, and a vein of the eternal fountain."

St. Prudentius, Bishop of Troyes, in the letter to Hincmar and Pardulus, writes this: "Warning and asking your Sincerity of this first and chiefly, that you not permit the doctrine of the most blessed Father Augustine, of all men, without any doubt, the most learned everywhere, most concordant in all things with the authority of the holy Scriptures (for indeed no Doctor has more painstakingly searched their obscure parts, more diligently sought them out, more truly found them, more truthfully expounded them, more clearly elucidated them, more faithfully held them, more robustly defended them, more copiously disseminated them) to be impugned by any contrivance during the time of your Pontificate: because it has been endowed with so great a gift of heavenly grace, that it can by no attempt of anyone be uprooted in any way: since both the sublimity of the Apostolic See, and the unity of the whole Catholic Church, have approved and strengthened it with most concordant authority."

The African Bishops, exiled in Sardinia, in a Synodal letter, have this: "Before all things be zealous, to press upon the aforesaid brothers the reading of St. Augustine's books, which he wrote to Prosper and Hilary."

Finally, St. Bernard, sermon 8 on the Song of Songs: "St. Augustine (he says) is the most powerful hammer of heretics." And letter 77, to Hugh: "From these two pillars (I speak of Augustine and Ambrose), believe me, it is difficult to be torn away; with them I confess I err or am wise."

Chapter IV

Commendation of St. Augustine's doctrine, from illustrious men

Not only the holy Fathers, but also other celebrated men, distinguished for erudition and piety, commend Augustine's doctrine, and celebrate it with various encomiums.

Cassiodorus, in the Chronicle, says: "Augustine is the master of all letters." And Divine Readings, chapter 22: "The eminent Doctor himself (he says), most blessed Augustine, the vanquisher of Heretics, the defender of the faithful, the palm of famous contests, is hidden in some of his books with excessive difficulty, in some he is so plain, that he is proved acceptable even to little ones, whose open parts are sweet, but whose obscure parts, packed with great utilities, grow rich."

Boethius: "Augustine the African, a man famous for erudition throughout the whole world, sound in faith, pure in life, wrote things so great that they can scarcely be found."

Eusebius: "Augustine, among all the eminent Doctors of the Church, is greater than all."

The Venerable Bede: "Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, the most eminent of all Doctors."

Julianus Pomerius, Book 3 On the contemplative life, chapter 31: "St. Augustine the Bishop, keen in intellect, sweet in eloquence, skilled in secular literature, industrious in Ecclesiastical labors, illustrious in daily disputations, composed in all his conduct, Catholic in the exposition of our faith, acute in resolving questions, circumspect in overturning heretics, and careful in explaining the Canonical Scriptures."

Victor of Vita, speaking of Augustine's death, has this: "Then that river of eloquence, which flowed abundantly through all the fields of the Church, was, by death itself, dried up, and the sweetness of that sweetest doctrine, imbibed more delightfully, was turned into the bitterness of wormwood."

St. Antoninus, second part of the History, title 8: "Just as the Sun shining forth, which is called the Lord of the Planets, and the father of light, shining above all luminaries: so Augustine illuminated the Church, the gem of Doctors, the father of theologians, sweet in eloquence, elucidating all subjects by penetrating them."

Blessed Jordan of Saxony, sermon 148, says that Augustine excels the other Doctors, as to the sufficiency of his statements, because nothing is lacking in Augustine's books, which pertains to the science of divine law. Whence Volusianus says, writing to Augustine: "However much ignorance is tolerated in other Priests, when it comes to the Bishop Augustine, whatever it may happen that Augustine did not know, is lacking to the law of God."

Sixtus of Siena, in his Bibliotheca, under the word "Augustine," says: "A man above all mortals who have been before him and after him, up to now."

Thomas Waldensis, speaking of St. Augustine: "Far be it," he says, "from a sober Reader, and a Catholic Expositor, to think perversely of the pillar of the Church, of the foundation of truth."

Cardinal Bellarmine, Book 2 On grace and free will, chapter 11, where he said that St. Augustine's opinion on the matter of predestination had been approved by the Church not merely once, thus concludes concerning it: "And so the Apostolic See, not merely once, but even a second and third time, against the remnants of the Pelagians, gave a sentence for the defenders of grace and predestination, so that now this opinion, namely Augustine's, ought to be called, not the opinion of whatsoever Doctors, but the faith of the Catholic Church."

Suárez, prologomenon 6 On grace, chapter 6: "Whatever, in the matter of grace, Augustine affirms as certain, and which pertains to the dogmas of faith, must be held by any wise and learned theologian, even if it is not certainly established that it has been defined by the Church."

Father Thomas de Lemos, who disputed felicitously in the Congregation on Helps, Treatise 4 On the Pelagian heresy, chapter 1, thus speaks: "The supreme defender of grace after the Apostles, and the most glorious vanquisher of the Pelagian heresy, was that great Father Augustine, the light of the Church, the pillar of the faith, the trumpet of the Gospel, the eye of the world, the lamp of Christ, the perpetual hammer of all heretics, who, as the Church sings of him, after the Apostles, first shone forth with the grace of dispensing the second word of God."

Álvarez, Book 1 On the helps of divine grace, disp. 5: "The Apostolic See (he says), not merely once, but also a second and third time, against the remnants of the Pelagians, gave a sentence for the defenders of grace and predestination, which Augustine drew from the sacred letters, so that now his doctrine ought to be called, not the opinion of one particular Doctor, but the faith of the Catholic Church."

Finally, to omit all others, St. Thomas briefly embraced Augustine's chief praises, in these three verses, which are had in the sequence which he composed concerning him, and which is sung on his feast:

"Hail, gem of Priests, tongue of Christ, voice of the Heavens, scribe of life, light of Doctors."

Which words in a wondrous manner commend Augustine and his doctrine. For what greater praise could there be, than to be called by so great and Angelic a Doctor, "the tongue of Christ," and "the voice of the heavens"?

Chapter V

The blind and rash assault of certain Recent authors, against Augustine's doctrine, is repelled

Although Augustine's doctrine has been consecrated by the Supreme Pontiffs, approved by the Councils, commended by the holy Fathers, praised by very many men, distinguished both for sanctity and for erudition, and, so to speak, sealed with so many sacred seals: because, nevertheless, as Seneca says, "Nothing is so sacred, that it does not find a sacrilegious hand, nothing so wonderful," it happens that some novel theologians, in order to thrust forward their new imaginations more freely and easily, with altogether unbridled license, rise up against Augustine, and so despise and belittle his doctrine on the matter of grace and predestination, that they have not hesitated to write that: "Augustine's footsteps are not to be followed, and the Church would be wretched, if it remained bound to Augustine's tenets." And lest anyone think I invent the enemies I strike, I shall here relate the names and words of these Authors.

In the first place, therefore, Vásquez, I, q. 47, and I-II, disp. 132, chapter 3, writes this: "In this matter I do not approve St. Augustine's opinion, but I judge that one must philosophize otherwise." Elsewhere he affirms that "we shall rashly assert that help is denied to some. From Augustine and others who have taught this, we can ask, whence they were more certain of this will of God. For we shall easily declare the passages of Scripture." There too he sufficiently insinuates that if this opinion of St. Augustine has not been condemned in the Council of Trent, this happened solely from the Council's modesty.

The same, but more sharply, Petavius testifies, as recorded by Vincent Baron, Book 1 of the Apologeticus, page 366 for me: "Not a few, nor negligible, dogmas of Augustine (Petavius says) are reproved by the judgment either of all, or of many, theologians, and not of the lowest bench, and the Council of Trent, with certain necessary additions, made Catholic not a few things of Augustine's, which are neither Catholic, nor did any ecumenical Synod wish them to be held so."

But Mariana, Book 3 On death, chapter 8, leapt over all the limits of modesty, while he did not blush to write this: "All the things that were said by Cassian, about grace and free will, are defended by learned men of our age as consonant with piety, nor deflected from

the holy rule of faith. It would have been well provided for the triad of Fathers, Augustine, Fulgentius, and Prosper, if Cassian, Faustus, and the other Marseillians, were likewise held Catholic." These words from Mariana are related by Vincent Contenson, tome 5, treatise On grace, dissertation 6, page 651.

Finally, Molina, in his Concordia, on q. 23, articles 4 and 3, disp. 1, member 6, says that Augustine, established under a certain fog, did not see the truth which the Recent theologians have found, and that hence it is that he expounded the Scriptures so harshly. And in the last member, hawking his own inventions as diametrically opposed to Augustine (by Augustine's own confession), he has this: "Which, if they had always been given and explained, perhaps neither would the Pelagian heresy have arisen, nor would the Lutherans have shamelessly dared to deny the liberty of our free will, alleging that it cannot cohere with divine grace, foreknowledge, and predestination: nor, from Augustine's opinion, and his contentions with the Pelagians, would so many faithful have been disturbed, and defected to the Pelagians; and easily would that remnant of the Pelagians in Gaul, of whom mention is made in the Letters of Prosper and Hilary, have been extinguished."

Father Thomas de Lemos also relates, Treatise 4 On the Pelagian heresy, chapter 1, that Molina published a book On the instruction of Priests, in the Spanish tongue, in which, Treatise 3, chapter [ ], he says that the holy Doctor Augustine, in order to condemn the Pelagian heresy, said many things which we would not now dare to put forward, nor would they seem safe.

But all these things must be judged not only false, but also plainly rash. For in the first place, it is not free of rashness, what Vásquez says, that Augustine's opinion on sufficient grace does not please him at all; for as we showed above, and as Bellarmine and Suárez, related above, frankly profess, Augustine's doctrine on grace, not merely approved, but even consecrated, by the Supreme Pontiffs; and his opinion ought to be called, not the opinion of one particular person, but the faith of the Catholic Church. Whence Pope Hormisdas, cited above, says: "Concerning free choice and God's grace, what the Roman, that is, Catholic, Church follows and asserts, can be known from Augustine's books to Hilary and Prosper."

Similarly, it cannot be excused from rashness, what Petavius says: that the Council of Trent, with certain things necessarily added, made Catholic not a few things of Augustine's, which are not Catholic, nor did any ecumenical Synod wish them to be held so. For as the Council of Florence says, session 7, the fifth Synod consecrated Augustine's doctrine. And so far is it from Trent having added anything to it, or having deviated

from it in any respect, that rather, in the adorning of its definitions, it transcribed not only the sense, but also the very words of Augustine. Which also the second Council of Orange did, by the mandate of Leo I, as we noted, § 2.

Third, Mariana's words, cited above, must be called not so much words as monstrosities, and seem to have been written by a Semipelagian man rather than by a Catholic Doctor. For since Gelasius, in the Council held with seventy Bishops, approved all the writings of Augustine, handed down against the Pelagians on the matter of predestination and grace, and condemned the opposite opinion of Cassian and Faustus, who, unless infected by the errors of the Semipelagians, can say: "All the things that were said in Cassian, about grace and free will, can be defended as consonant with piety, nor deflected from the holy rule of faith"? Who, unless a Disciple of Faustus or Cassian, would dare to assert: "That it would have been well provided for the triad of Fathers, Augustine, Fulgentius, and Prosper, if they were held Catholic in the same way as Cassian, Faustus, and the other Marseillians"? Whence Lupus, Abbot of Ferrières, in the Collection on three Questions, question 3, says: "The most reverend Pope Gelasius, with seventy Bishops, most learned men, determining who were or were not writers to be received, after the approbation of Augustine, and the most ample praises of Jerome, removed the aforementioned Faustus with these words: 'The little works of Faustus of Riez, the Gaul, apocryphal.' We, therefore, following the incorrupt understanding of the holy Scriptures, and looking up to the gravity of the Apostolic See, what else shall we say, but that Faustus be silent, and likewise those thinking similarly; let Jerome and Augustine speak with their fellows, mindful, namely, of that Proverb: 'Let the frogs be silent, while the heaven thunders.'" Let Mariana, therefore, be silent, and restrain his malicious tongue, lest he utter sacrilegious words against those distinguished saints, and Doctors of the Church, Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius. Indeed of that Author it can be said what Jerome says of another: "He was so tongue-tied, and of such putrid speech, that he is more worthy of pity than of injury."

Fourth, Molina erred, and was under a fog, when he wrote these words in his Concordia: "Meanwhile, however, while Augustine, under that fog, did not attend to this, that is, to positing predestination according to foreknowledge." According to Molina, therefore, the light of the Church was under a fog, and the Aquiline Doctor did not see what he himself perceived in the matter of predestination. Who would believe this of so great a Doctor, of whom Fortunatus, in the exposition of the Lord's Prayer, writes this: "Whoever agrees with the Apostle Paul, that is, the eye of the Church, together with blessed Augustine his follower, in him the darkness of ignorance does not reign."

So absurd and injurious to Augustine did these words of Molina seem to the Fathers of the Congregation on Helps, that when they were objected to Molina's defenders, they could respond nothing else, except that Molina had intended that Augustine had been under a certain fog of the world, not of doctrine. Which was unanimously derided and hissed by all who were present, since Molina plainly speaks of the fog in the matter of predestination, under which Augustine was said to be. Thus Father Thomas de Lemos relates, Treatise 3 On predestination, chapter 10, no. 143.

Finally, it is rash what Molina says, that if the things which he hands down in his Concordia had been given and explained, perhaps the Pelagian heresy would not have arisen, etc. And what he adds in the book On the instruction of Priests, written in the Spanish tongue, namely that Augustine, in order to condemn the Pelagian heresy more efficaciously, said many things which we would not now dare to put forward, nor would they seem safe. For these things are plainly injurious not only to Augustine, but to the whole Church, since Augustine's opinion, on the matter of grace and predestination, ought to be called the faith of the Catholic Church, as Bellarmine, related above, speaks, and as Pope Hormisdas hands down in the Letter to Possessor, which we adduced in § 1. And Pope Celestine, in the Letter to the Bishops of Gaul, related above, after he had approved Augustine's doctrine, against certain persons who detracted from it, as if it exceeded the necessary manner, adds this: "Because certain persons, who glory in the Catholic name, yet dwell in the condemned opinions of heretics, whether through depravity, or through inexperience, presume to object to most pious disputants, and while they do not hesitate to anathematize Pelagius and Caelestius, they nevertheless speak against our masters, as if they had exceeded a necessary manner." Whence the University of Louvain, in the preface to the censure which it composed against those who denied Augustine's doctrine, in the matter of grace and predestination, thus has it: "If, in explaining an argument of such moment, we should think that Augustine either fell, or did not maintain a right and necessary manner, not only does his authority in other matters totter, but also, what we confidently say, the Church too has erred greatly and shamefully, which, having followed his guidance and judgment, is believed to have weakened the enemies of Christ's grace, and triumphed over them: which indeed it would be wicked and impious even to think, so that we judge that this accusation against Augustine pertains not only to himself, but also to no small injury of the whole Church, and of the Apostolic See, since in the cause of this argument, all the faithful do not hesitate to attribute as much to him, as they attributed to Irenaeus against the Valentinians and Gnostics, to Athanasius and Hilary against the Arians, to Cyril against the Nestorians, to Pope Leo against the Eutychians, in such a way that St. Augustine was destined, by a singular providence, against the enemies of God's grace: so that, under his

leadership and auspices, the Catholic army might fight and conquer."

Chapter VI

Vindications of Augustinian doctrine

Some Recent authors, both Heterodox and Catholic, strive to cast shadow upon the sun, and to obscure Augustine's doctrine, with the clouds of certain objections. But it will not be difficult for us to disperse those clouds, and dissolve those objections, and altogether to vindicate Augustine's sacred doctrine, from the blemishes and errors which are ascribed to it by these Authors.

They object, therefore, first, that St. Augustine, up to his death, doubted about the creation of souls from nothing: namely, Book 10 On Genesis according to the letter, chapter 11, "Four opinions on the origin of the soul," in Letter 18 to Jerome, and 157 to Optatus, and finally, Book 2 of the Retractions, chapter 56.

I respond that before the Lateran Council, which defined that souls are created by God, and infused, being created, into bodies, the holy Fathers had been very doubtful and uncertain on this question of the origin of the soul, some affirming that it is created by God, others asserting that it is originally drawn from Adam together with the flesh; and that this latter opinion, which more openly declares the manner by which original sin is contracted through generation from the soul, was the more frequent one in the Western Church. Whence it is no wonder that Augustine inclined toward it, and that St. Jerome did not disapprove his doubt, since, being asked by him about this matter, he responded: "Let each abound in his own sense," as Augustine himself testifies, letter 157. Wherefore that doubt of Augustine's is wrongly called a blemish of his doctrine by some, since Isidore of Seville placed this doubt about the origin of the soul among the rules of faith, Book 2 On Ecclesiastical Offices, chapter 23, and among the other opinions which he proposes to be held by faith, inserted this: "That the origin of the soul is uncertain." And St. Gregory the Great, Book 7, Letter 53, to Secundinus, wrote this: "But concerning this matter, may your sweetest Charity know, that concerning the origin of the soul, no small inquiry has been made among the holy Fathers: but whether it descends from Adam, or is certainly given to each individually, has remained uncertain, and they confessed this to be an insoluble question in this life: for it is a grave question, nor can it be comprehended by man." Hence Hugh of St. Victor, Book 1 On the sacraments, part 7, chapter 3, indeed judges more probable that souls are not made from traduction, but created, and signifies that this opinion was, in his time, more common in the Church, adding, however, that "no reason, nor authority, could ever have so prevailed, that it

removed the doubt of the question."

They object, second, that Augustine, Book 1 On the merits of sinners, chapter 20, and book On the predestination of the Saints, chapter 13, and Book 2 of the unfinished work against Julian, chapter 28, teaches that the reception of the Eucharist is necessary for the salvation of infants.

But Augustine does not speak of the real and Sacramental reception of the Eucharist, but of the mystical and spiritual, which consists in union and incorporation with Christ, to which all the Sacraments are ordered as to an end, especially Baptism, since it is the beginning of spiritual life, which, by a certain special reason, is referred, as to an end, to its perfection and consummation. That this was St. Augustine's sense, Fulgentius declares, in the letter to Ferrandus the Deacon, chapter 11, where, after he taught that from the Savior's statement, John 6, "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man," etc., it cannot be inferred that actual communion after Baptism is necessary for salvation, since indeed the baptized received the effect of the Eucharist in that very regeneration, he adds: "Which we know also the holy Fathers to have believed and taught without doubt." Then he brings forward a sermon given by St. Augustine to the infants before the altar on this matter, and finally thus concludes the letter: "I think, holy Brother, that our discussion, confirmed by the sermon of the illustrious Doctor Augustine, leaves nothing to be doubted in any respect, that each of the faithful becomes a participant of the Lord's body and blood, when he is made a member of Christ's body in Baptism, nor is he alienated from the fellowship of that bread or cup, even if, before he eats that bread, and drinks that cup, he depart from this world, established in the unity of Christ's body. For he is not deprived of the participation and benefit of that Sacrament, when in himself is found that which that Sacrament signifies." But of this more at length in the Treatise on Baptism. Read the second book of the most learned Cardinal Bona On Liturgical matters, chapter 19, and the erudite Henry Noris, an Augustinian, Augustinian Vindications, § 4.

They object, third, that Augustine, in various places, teaches, especially sermon 14 on the words of the Apostle, that children dying before baptism, are not only to be deprived of the vision of God, but also to be tormented eternally by the fire of the underworld.

I respond, first, that Augustine, in these places, speaks metaphorically, and by the name of fire signifies the punishment of loss, for as he himself teaches, question 9 on Joshua, and as is clear from that of Psalm 65: "We passed through fire and water, and thou hast brought us out into a refreshment," under the name of fire, any punishment whatsoever is designated. That this interpretation is legitimate, however, is clear: first because it is

handed down by St. Thomas, q. 5 De Malo, art. 2, ad 1, and In II Sent., dist. 33, q. 2, art. 1, ad 1, and by St. Bonaventure there, art. 3, q. 1, ad 1, and by the Gloss on the chapter "Nulla," On consecration, dist. 4.

Second, because Augustine's intent was, against the Pelagians, to persuade that little ones dying without baptism, are not to be granted eternal felicity: but this is sufficiently proved, by understanding the name of fire as eternal punishment, namely eternal punishment of loss, with which eternal felicity cannot be conjoined: therefore it is to be so understood.

Third, because Augustine, Book 5 against Julian, chapter 8, otherwise 11, thus says: "Who would doubt that the unbaptized little ones will be in the lightest of all damnations: what and how great that will be, although I cannot define, I nevertheless do not dare to say that it would be more expedient for them not to exist at all, than to exist there." By these words, first, he teaches that they will be in the lightest of all damnations, which would not be true, if they sustained any punishment of sense; for without doubt their damnation will be milder and more tolerable, if they are immune from every punishment of sense, and suffer only the punishment of loss. Then he insinuates that that saying about the traitor Judas, "It had been better for him, if he had not been born," cannot be applied to those little ones; which would be false, if they were tormented by the punishment of fire: for although not-to-be, in itself, is not desirable, as being a pure privation of good, it is nevertheless good insofar as it is a removal of torment and punishment, as St. Thomas teaches in the Supplement, q. 97, art. 3.

I respond, second, that although Augustine had been in that opinion which asserts that children dying without baptism, are tormented by the fire of the underworld, he ought not therefore to be accused of error, since this opinion is not erroneous, but has no small foundation in the Scriptures, and is most apt for refuting the Pelagian error. Whence several of the holy Fathers, later than Augustine, taught it, namely Fulgentius, Gregory the Great, Isidore, Prudentius of Troyes, and others; although Fulgentius exceeded in this, that he asserted that opinion pertains to the faith: "Hold most firmly (he says, book On faith to Peter, chapter 27), and doubt in no way, that not only men already using reason, but also little ones, who either begin to live in the mother's womb, or, having been born of their mothers, pass from this world without the Sacrament of Baptism, are to be punished with the everlasting punishment of eternal fire, because although they had no sin of their own action, nevertheless they have contracted the damnation of original sin, by carnal conception and nativity."

Finally, Avitus of Vienne, in the poem to his sister Fuscina, has these verses, by which he signifies that children dying without baptism are to be tormented in hell:

"For all, this indeed is more grave, if envious death snatches away a tender child, deprived of the font of divine washing, hurling him headlong, engendered by chance for hard hell, who soon as he ceases to be his mother's son, will be of perdition: then sad mothers refuse to have brought forth those pledges, who bore children only for the flames."

They object, fourth, that it is an error which St. Augustine taught, Book 4 On Genesis according to the letter, and Book 11 On the City of God, chapter 9, namely that the whole world was created by God in a moment, since Scripture, Genesis 1, plainly declares it to have been established by God in intervals of six days.

But I deny that this opinion of Augustine, or subtle exposition of Scripture, is erroneous; indeed I say that it has some foundation in Scripture, since it is said, Ecclesiasticus 18: "He that liveth for ever created all things together."

Nor is it an obstacle that, Genesis 1, intervals of six days are enumerated, in which the world is said to have been created by God, for Augustine, in the places cited, responds that those six days are not natural, but mystical, and Angelic, distinguished not on the part of the knowledge, but on the part of the things known; so that the first work, as known by the Angel, is the first day, and so of the others: but the evening and morning, of which Moses speaks, he interprets of morning and evening knowledge, of which the former knows things in the Word, the latter outside the Word, through their proper species.

This subtle explanation of Augustine's is not to be rejected for this reason, that it more defends sacred Scripture from the derision of infidels. Whence Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, and other lights of Theology, commend it. And St. Thomas, although in the Theological Summa he inclines to neither part with an open judgment, and dissolves all the arguments of each opinion, as can be seen, I, q. 73, art. 1, nevertheless In II Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, he institutes a special article, for defending his Master Augustine's opinion, and in art. 2 pronounces on it thus: "This opinion pleases me more." What, therefore, pleased the Angelic Doctor, ought not to displease us, and much less to be called erroneous.

They object, fifth, that Augustine, Book 1 against the Academics, chapter 7, attributed a corporeal nature to Angels. But Augustine did not firmly adhere to this opinion, but, since the ancient Fathers had various opinions on this matter, he suspended his own on this question, as is established from Book 15 On the City of God, chapter 23, and Book 21,

chapter 10: "There are certain bodies (he says) which even Demons have, as has seemed to learned men.... But if anyone asserts that Demons have no bodies at all, this matter need not be labored over with laborious inquiry, or contested with contentious disputation."

They object, sixth, that Augustine, Book 16 On the City of God, chapter 9, denied that Antipodes are given: "It is too absurd (he says) that it should be said that any men could have sailed, having crossed from this to that part, over the immensity of the Ocean, and could have arrived, so that even there, from that first man, the human race would be established."

But this ignorance must be called not privative, but negative, or mere lack of knowledge (such as is found in the Angels), since neither in the sacred, nor in the profane letters, is anything certain had on this matter; but only by conjectures did some of the ancients construct the Antipodes; but led by the experiments and voyages of the more recent, we now assert this more certainly. Just as now no one denies that, under the equinoctial circle, and under the torrid Zone, there are habitable regions, although St. Thomas denied this, I, q. 102, art. 2, relying on Aristotle's authority; because indeed this is now ascertained by most certain experiments, and most faithful reports.

On Augustine's authority, it must be believed that Pope Zachary was induced to call it perverse and wicked doctrine, that there is another world, and other men, under the earth. Which is evident proof that the Supreme Pontiffs, in questions of fact, can err, as we shall show in the Treatise on faith, chapter 5, § 4.

Vásquez objects last, I-II, q. 83, disp. 132, chapter 1, that Augustine, Book 1 On marriage and concupiscence, chapter 23, taught two things altogether erroneous, and utterly foreign to the faith, namely that concupiscence is original sin, and that it is not entirely removed in the Baptized, but only shaved off, and not imputed. The words of this Author are these: "Add also that Augustine, Book 1 On marriage and concupiscence, chapter 23, teaches that concupiscence remains in the reborn, but is not imputed, but he had said it to be original sin. And chapter 26 he speaks thus: 'In those, therefore, who are regenerated in Christ, since they receive the remission of all sins, it is altogether necessary that the guilt also of this, although still remaining concupiscence, be remitted, so that, as I have said, it not be imputed as sin. For just as the guilt of those sins which cannot remain, since when they occur they pass away, nevertheless remains, and, unless remitted, will remain forever: so of that concupiscence, when it is remitted, the guilt is removed.' He thinks, therefore, that concupiscence is indeed a sin, yet is not imputed as sin in the reborn, although it remains: wherefore he seems to favor the error of those same men, who assert that original sin is covered, and not removed: shaved, but not

eradicated; that is, that it remains, but is not imputed or punished." These are Vásquez's words, by which, as is clear, he attributes two things to St. Augustine. One, that the holy Doctor asserts concupiscence to be original sin. The other, that since it itself remains in the reborn, he thinks original sin remains in them, but is not imputed to them, and by this favors the error of those who say original sin is shaved, but not removed, which is a heresy condemned at Trent, session 5, canon 5.

But each of these is plainly false, and contrary to Augustine's mind and doctrine. The first indeed, since the holy Doctor there says that concupiscence is called sin, because it is made from sin, since in the regenerate it is now not itself sin: "Just as speech is called that which the tongue makes, and writing is called what the hand makes. And likewise it is called sin, because, if it conquers, it makes sin: just as cold is called lazy, not because it is made by the lazy, but because it makes them lazy." By these words he plainly teaches that concupiscence is original sin materially, or consecutively, but not formally and essentially, which is most true, and is shown by St. Thomas, I-II, q. 82, art. 3, and is taught by Trent, session 5, canon 5.

The second thing too, which he attributes to Augustine, namely that he thinks original sin remains in the reborn, but is not imputed to them, is very far from the holy Doctor's mind; indeed he asserts the contrary in the aforesaid book On marriage and concupiscence. For in it he plainly teaches that everything which has the nature of original sin and guilt, is removed, and altogether dismissed, in the Baptized. For chapter 22 he says: "This concupiscence, I say, which is expiated by the sacrament of regeneration alone." And chapter 25: "Nothing, therefore, remains, that is not remitted, since, as it is written, the Lord is merciful in all our iniquities." And chapter 26: "In those, therefore, who are regenerated in Christ, since they receive the remission of altogether all sins, it is altogether necessary that the guilt too of this concupiscence, although still remaining, be remitted." And again: "When the guilt of that concupiscence is remitted, it is removed." With what brow, therefore, and with what audacity, can Vásquez assert that Augustine favors the error of those who say that in Baptism original sin is not removed, or eradicated, but only shaved, or not imputed, since the holy Doctor, in the aforesaid places, expressly says that nothing remains in the Baptized that is not remitted; that in them, with the remission of all sins, even the guilt of original guilt is remitted; and finally that, when the guilt of concupiscence is remitted, it is itself removed.

Vásquez will perhaps say that this is not inferred from those words, but from what he says, chapter 25 of the book cited: "The concupiscence of the flesh is remitted in Baptism, not that it not exist, but that sin not be imputed." But the sense of these words is clear, and it is most true, and intended by St. Augustine, namely that in Baptism

concupiscence of the flesh is remitted, not that it not exist in itself, since it undoubtedly remains in the reborn, but that it not be sin, nor have any nature of guilt, but that everything in it which has the nature of guilt, be altogether taken away and dismissed. That this is St. Augustine's mind is clear from the context, from chapter 22 up to and including 26. Wherefore another distinguished theologian of the same Society, James Granado, Treatise On the immaculate Conception, chapter 1, section 1, says that it cannot be said, without great injury and open falsity, that Augustine favors those who contend that original sin is not removed by Baptism, but only not imputed, since he there says that nothing remains that is not remitted, and that concupiscence is not sin in the regenerate, and that those who are regenerated receive the remission of altogether all sins. Whence he rightly concludes: "He only teaches (namely Augustine) that concupiscence, that is, appetite, and other powers of the soul, remain after Baptism, without that subjection to reason which they would have in the state of innocence, but they are now not imputed as sin, because, namely, they are no longer joined to guilt, or to original sin, which was blotted out through Baptism."